Bulgaria in British foreign policy 1943-1949. by Stankova, Marietta
Bulgaria in British Foreign Policy 
1943 -1949
Marietta Stankova
Thesis Submitted for the Degree o f  
Doctor o f Philosophy
London School o f Economics and Political Science 
September 1999
UMI Number: U120848
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U120848
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
^Heses ,
FT
3 5 8 S  .
British Library of Di;'tticsl 
and Econon^'c. Sc!e*':-e
W S 6 % 5
Abstract
The thesis analyses Britain’s political involvement in Bulgaria during 1943 -  1949. It 
explores Britain’s motives for seeking increased influence in the country and traces the 
most significant British attempts to shape Bulgarian politics. It examines British strategic 
decisions and diplomatic activities in Bulgaria against the background of the evolving 
domestic political situation and of Soviet objectives in the Balkans. Evidence from British 
archives is tested against recently released Bulgarian and Russian sources. The study 
clarifies problems central to the interpretation of post-war Bulgarian developments and 
addresses the question of British attitudes to the whole of Eastern Europe.
Bulgaria’s marginal place in British political and military thinking is found to be at odds 
with the country’s recognised strategic importance. Towards the end of the Second World 
War, Bulgaria attracted the attention of the British Government occasionally, mostly in 
the context of broader regional issues such as that of the Balkan Federation. Although the 
realisation of limited capabilities to influence Bulgarian developments coloured Britain’s 
wartime approach, never did British policy makers disavow interest in Bulgarian affairs.
The research establishes that in the armistice period British policy towards Bulgaria was 
overwhelmingly governed by traditional geopolitical factors. These focused around 
Bulgaria’s potential military threat of British imperial positions in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and overshadowed any proclaimed British commitment to democracy. 
Britain’s priorities were complicated by the emerging Cold War as a Soviet-dominated 
Bulgaria was perceived as a springboard for Communist penetration of Europe. 
Ironically, British unwillingness to challenge Soviet influence in the northern Balkans 
exacerbated the very dangers Britain was striving to alleviate. Wavering British support 
for the Bulgarian anti-Communist Opposition only served to expose Britain’s weaknesses 
and further antagonise the Soviet Union. This engendered continuous restraint and 
gradually led to the isolation of Britain from Bulgarian politics after British recognition of 
the Bulgarian Communist Government in 1947.
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Introduction
Modem Bulgaria’s development has continuously been influenced by the changing 
balance of power in Europe: Bulgaria’s very emergence as a separate nation-state in 1878 
was as much the outcome of Great Power negotiations as of the national struggle for 
independence. Starting with the somewhat misleadingly labelled Russophiles and 
Russopho_bes just after Bulgaria’s liberation from the Ottoman Empire, right through to 
pro- and anti-Western proclivities in post-Communist Bulgaria, foreign policy orientation 
has been a major constituting force in Bulgarian politics. The influence of a succession of 
Great Powers in the Balkans affected not only the country’s place in international affairs 
but also the configuration of the internal political forces. This reflected largely the fact 
that in the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, the Bulgarian political 
elite sought external support for Bulgaria’s territorial ambitions.
Bulgaria’s central situation in the Balkans attracted the attention of all European powers 
bidding for influence on the Peninsula. The country’s proximity to the Mediterranean 
Straits made it a suitable stepping-stone for extending control over the Eastern 
Mediterranean and for the penetration of the Middle East. However important it was, 
Bulgaria’s strategic position was often exaggerated in both Bulgarian popular perceptions 
and foreign policy doctrine. For the Great Powers, dominance over the country was rarely 
so pivotal as Bulgarian political wishful thinking would have it. The discrepancy became 
evident on a number of occasions, most notably when in the early 1900s Russia -  
universally seen as Bulgaria’s protector - embraced the cause of Serbia in preference to 
that of Bulgaria.
The question of Bulgaria’s historic significance is related to the struggle among the major 
European states for leadership in world affairs. In later modem times Russia and Great 
Britain showed consistent interest in the Balkans. The former used its cultural and historic 
links with the South Slavs in order to secure its expansion towards warm-water seas; the 
latter relied on influence in the Mediterranean countries to protect routes to its overseas 
imperial possessions. The resulting controversy crystallised in the so-called ‘Eastern 
Question’ of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when European affairs were 
dominated by rivalries over the territorial legacy of the declining Ottoman Empire. This 
in turn intensified attention to Bulgaria which could be used as an outpost for pressure on, 
or a stronghold for the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Straits.
In the inter-war years France and Germany were active in the Balkans using the region as 
a political and economic base for their conflict over the post-First World War status quo. 
However, at the end of the Second World War it was Soviet Russia and Great Britain which 
re-emerged as the main contenders for dominance over the Balkans. This was a consequence 
of their wartime military and political involvement in the region. It also reflected the 
evolution of their long-term geopolitical priorities.
Finding explicit accounts of British foreign policy objectives in the historical literature is 
difficult. To a degree this reflects the practical non-ideological approach of the Foreign 
Office and other British foreign policy making institutions. Nevertheless, there doubtless 
were overall principles and beliefs underpinning Britain’s specific diplomatic and political 
actions. In the twentieth century, Britain has taken part in every major political process and 
remained a determining factor in European affairs. Therefore, empirical investigation into 
Britain’s relations with individual powers would form an essential element of any attempt to 
uncover the logic of European developments. For this, the end of the Second World War is 
an especially opportune moment: the imminent defeat of Germany left a vacuum on the
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continent which initiated a new phase of political settlement. Against such a background, 
Britain’s involvement in Bulgaria in the final stages and immediately after the Second World 
War is a topic deserving historical research. It illuminates Britain’s perceptions of itself as a 
Great Power, which should have a say in developments across the world.
The main significance of the subject lies in the understanding that British attitudes to 
Bulgaria during 1943 -  1949 formed an important aspect of the renewed Anglo-Russian 
controversy in the Balkans. In its turn, the evolution of the British-Soviet relationship had 
an impact on Britain’s approach to Bulgaria. In order to rationalise this two-way process it is 
necessary to establish not only the main elements of British planning for Bulgaria but also 
how these were related to the acknowledged intensity of the Soviet interest in the country. 
A further step would be to analyse the British interpretation of Soviet ambitions in the 
country and the adjoining region in comparison to the actual motives and plans governing 
Soviet actions. For this, it would be vital to observe the interaction of strategic and 
ideological factors bearing on Britain’s behaviour. Not only did Britain fear that the 
Soviet Union coveted areas of traditional British dominance but it suspected that the 
spread of Communism would be used for the achievement of such a goal.
From Britain’s perspective Bulgaria’s vulnerability to Soviet pressure exposed to Soviet 
penetration the southernmost Balkans, where Britain had long-standing interests. An 
adequate explanation of British actions in Bulgaria hinges on the emphasis that these 
depended on the projection of their consequences on Britain's Mediterranean and Middle 
Eastern interests rather than on the effects they would have in Bulgaria alone. This was the 
fundament of Britain’s approach to Bulgaria and it is necessary to underline that for strategic 
purposes Bulgaria was always perceived and treated as a part of the Balkans which should 
be differentiated from the more elusive category of Eastern Europe. To this, however 
significant, Bulgaria’s shared wartime experience with Romania’s and Hungary’s and the
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similarity of its post-war pattern of communisation to that of Poland and Czechoslovakia 
were only additional dimensions.
A worthwhile line of analysis is to assess how the ongoing division of Europe into two 
hostile military and ideological blocs in 1943 -  1949 was reflected in British actions towards 
Bulgaria and how this affected Bulgarian internal affairs. The reverse side of this question is 
to find out how the small and insignificant Bulgaria added to the tension in relations among 
the Great Powers. Bulgaria’s position can be investigated as a test-case for some of the early 
inter-Allied clashes which gradually developed into the Cold War. Looking into the points of 
confrontation over the country would reveal whether it could be placed among the 
immediate causes for the conflict. This would place British policy to Bulgaria in a broader 
analytical framework and address the problem of Britain’s aims in areas of secondary 
importance.
All these issues demand tracing how Britain’s objectives were transformed into concrete 
military, diplomatic and political actions regarding Bulgaria. It is essential to explore the 
process through which Britain’s Balkan interests and the renewed British-Russian tension 
took the shape of, for example, support for the Bulgarian Opposition or opposition to the 
South Slav Confederation scheme. To that end, the three parts of the thesis cover three 
chronological periods each of which reflects distinct stages of European developments at the 
end and immediately after the Second World War. Firstly, attention is focused on dual 
developments during 1943 -  1944, namely British efforts to detach Bulgaria from Germany 
and political planning for post-war Bulgaria. The relation between the two throws light on 
Britain’s short- and long-term priorities and establishes a point of departure for the 
assessment of future British strategies.
The second part covers the years 1944 -  1947 when the Allied Control Commission for 
Bulgaria functioned. This was the time when Britain had military and political
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representatives in the country. It is interesting to follow their impressions of local events, the 
recommendations these engendered and the final actions undertaken after discussion with 
experts in London. As this is the period of Britain’s association with the Bulgarian anti- 
Communist Opposition, it allows investigation into the practical interaction of strategic and 
ideological objectives in British foreign policy. The final part tackles the period following 
the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria in 1947. This is an attempt to take the 
analysis of British policy to Bulgaria further than has so far been done in the historiography 
of the subject. It maps Britain’s diminishing interest in a country where the Communist 
Party’s position was consolidating under undisputed Soviet domination and where Britain’s 
opportunities and willingness for active policy were severely restricted.
* * *
The historiography of international relations of the latter stages of the Second World War 
and the early post-war period has often focused on Eastern Europe and assessed the 
policies of all Three Big Allies towards the area. Historians have been predominantly 
concerned with the role of political developments in Eastern Europe in the origins of the 
Cold War. This has led to investigation of British and US perceptions and reactions to 
Soviet actions in the region in addition to analysis of the long-term factors which 
informed the formulation of British and US policy. The well-known traditionalist and 
revisionist schools accept that at the end of the Second World War British and US leaders 
had little practical alternative to the spheres-of-influence solution in Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans.1 The controversy between the two emerges from the differing interpretations 
of the meaning and the reasons for the establishment of this formula. The revisionists
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argue that the Soviet Union had a legitimate right to dominate the countries lying to its 
west, especially having in mind that Britain and the USA had devised the Italian 
precedent and insisted on exclusive control over Japan.2 They also contend that the 
tensions between the two Western Allies and the USSR were exacerbated by actions such 
as those proclaimed by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. These are seen not 
only to have condemned Soviet behaviour in Eastern Europe but also to have been 
correctly perceived by the Soviet leadership as waging a campaign to force the Soviet 
Union out of Eastern Europe. In contrast, the traditionalists hold that Britain and the USA 
only reluctantly conceded Soviet domination over Eastern Europe in recognition of their 
own inability to prevent such a development. The West is credited with continuing to 
uphold the values of democracy and human rights as outlined in the Atlantic Charter and 
the Yalta Declaration, even after Western recognition had been granted to the Eastern 
European Communist Governments.3 A later trend in historiography, the so-called ‘post­
revisionism’ challenges both traditionalists and revisionists. It tries to introduce new 
sources as well as new ideas, mainly the theory of mutual misunderstanding and 
misconception of each other’s objectives. Influential works in this category are those of 
Vojtech Mastny who discusses Soviet foreign policy during 1941 - 1947 in terms of ‘the 
intricate relationship among Moscow's military strategy, diplomacy and management of 
international Communism’.4
1 Hammond, T.T. (ed.) Witnesses to the Origins o f  the Cold War. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1982; Lundestad, G. The American Non-policy towards Eastern Europe 1943 - 1947. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1978
2 Kolko, G. The Politics o f War: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945. New York: 
1968; Clemens, D.S. Yalta. New York: Oxford UP, 1970
3 Feis, H. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought. Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1967; McNeill, W.H. America, Britain and Russia. Their Cooperation and Conflict. London: 
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970
4 Mastny, V. Russia's Road to the Cold War. New York: Columbia UP, 1979; Mastny, V. The Cold War 
and Russian Insecurity. New York: Oxford UP, 1996
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Post-Communist Russian scholars attempting to analyse newly available documents have 
curiously reproduced this debate. Some come to the conclusion that senior Russian 
diplomats were guided mostly by geo-strategic considerations rather than desire for 
communisation of Europe.5 Others claim that careful examination of the interaction 
between the ideas of world Communism and Russian imperialism reveals that the two 
were not necessarily contradictory; in fact it is even possible to perceive them as 
complementing each other.6
As the bulk of historical literature on the Cold War originates from the USA it deals mainly 
with the Soviet-US controversy and treats Britain as the junior partner in the Atlantic 
relationship. Such a view has been reiterated by the British historian Elisabeth Barker who 
describes Britain's position ‘between the superpowers’ as being motivated by a growing 
concern for its own weakness and acknowledgement of its limited ability to influence world 
events and pursue independent policy.7 In contrast, Anne Deighton traces the roots of British 
post-war diplomacy back to the patterns of wartime thinking and planning. She claims that it 
is vital for the interpretation of British policy to understand that Britain regarded itself as a 
Great Power able to determine the course of events in Europe. Above all Britain justified its 
right to do so not by its military or economic strength, but by virtue of its expertise in 
international affairs.8
While the course and substance of the Cold War debate has been taken into consideration 
during the research and writing of the thesis, it should be pointed out that this forms only the
5 Pechatnov, V.O. ‘The Big Three of Soviet Foreign Policy: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about 
Post-War Relations with the United States and Great Britain.’ Working Paper no. 13. Cold War International 
History Project: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, July 1995. p. 17
6 Reynolds, D. (ed.) The Origins o f the Cold War in Europe. International Perspectives. New Haven: Yale 
UP, 1994. p.60
7 Barker, E. The British between the Superpowers 1945 - 1950. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983. p.60-62
8 Deighton, A. (ed.) Britain and the First Cold War. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989; Deighton, A. ‘The 
"Frozen Front": The Labour Government, the Division o f Germany and the Origins o f the Cold War 1945 - 
1947. ’ International Affairs, vol.63, no.3, summer 1987. p.449-464
general background against which British policy towards Bulgaria in 1943 -  1949 is 
discussed. Mainly, this is a result of the effort to place the British approach in the context of 
longer-term relations and attitudes to the country and the adjoining region. The objective has 
been to show that while exacerbating British-Soviet tensions in the immediate post-war 
period, clashes over Bulgaria had a longer history and were not engendered solely by the 
emerging Cold War.
Historians have rarely turned to British, or for that matter Great Power, policy towards 
Bulgaria. Both Martin Kitchen who looks at the British-Soviet relationship during the 
Second World War and Victor Rothwell who discusses at length Britain's foreign policy in 
the early Cold War mention Bulgaria only in passing. This is done in the context of wider 
issues such as the political connotations of the opening of a Second Front in the Balkans or 
the Balkan Confederation scheme. The treatment of Bulgaria is overshadowed by attention 
to developments in Central Europe such as the Polish question or the political evolution of 
Czechoslovakia.9 It would be right to acknowledge that such preoccupations follow the 
priorities of the British Foreign Office. However, they also help confirm the standard view 
that Bulgaria’s case deserves little attention due to the country’s traditional pro-Russian 
proclivities and the smooth installation of the Soviet political model.
The thesis has been more influenced by deliberate searches for the main factors which 
determined Britain's post-war diplomacy apart from, or in parallel to, the Cold War. John 
Kent's interpretation is particularly powerful: it is based on the premise that Britain’s desire 
to sustain its imperial positions was the main driving force of British foreign policy. What 
mattered for Britain was that its domination in the Middle East and the Eastern 
Mediterranean should not be disputed by any other Great Power - which in the
9 Kitchen, M. British Policy towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1986; Rothwell, V. Britain and the Cold War 1941 - 1947. London: Cape, 1982
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circumstances after the Second World War could only mean the Soviet Union. As Britain 
regarded Greece and Turkey as the crucial link in its imperial policy, it was prepared to 
divert Soviet pressure on these two countries to the northern part of the Balkans.10 Such an 
interpretation, which places Bulgaria, as well as Romania and Yugoslavia, on the fringes of 
the British interest, picks up themes present in the works of Elisabeth Barker. She also sees 
Bulgaria predominantly as part of Britain’s Balkan rather than Eastern European policy. 
Although quite concise, Barker’s analysis of British attitudes to Bulgaria is thorough and 
consistent and as such is a notable exception in the literature. Her most valuable contribution 
is the assertion that Bulgaria was not unimportant or marginal for British foreign policy 
makers and yet they were not prepared for a clash with the Soviet Union over it. Barker 
approaches Bulgarian developments from a wider Balkan perspective and casts light on the 
importance of the country in relation to its neighbours.11
Even so, the evolution of British policy towards Bulgaria has not been recounted and
analysed in detail. As Barker’s research rarely extends beyond 1945 a common impression
has been formed that developments after the Potsdam Conference and especially after the
Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1945 are barely worth looking into.
Some advance has been made towards overcoming this by works on the Allied Control
1 0Commission for Bulgaria, the most comprehensive of which is Michael Boll’s monograph. 
However, as these are predominantly based on US documentary or memoir material, they 
focus on the activities of the US political and military missions in Bulgaria.13
10 Kent, J. ‘The British Empire and the Origins o f the Cold War. ' Deighton. A. Britain... p. 165-183
11 Barker, E. Truce in the Balkans. London: Percival Marshall Company Ltd., 1948; Barker, E. Macedonia, 
Its Place in Balkan Politics. London: RIIA, 1950; Barker, E. British Policy in South-East Europe in the 
Second World War. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976; Barker, E. et al. (eds.) British Political and Military 
Strategy in Central-Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988
12 Boll, M.M. Cold War in the Balkans: American Policy towards Bulgaria 1943 - 1947. Lexington: UP of 
Kentucky, 1984
13 Black, C.E. 'The Start o f  the Cold War in Bulgaria: A Personal View. ' The Review of Politics, vol.41, 
no.2, April 1979. p. 163-202; Homer, J.E. 'Traicho Kostov: Stalinist Orthodoxy in Bulgaria.’ Survey.
17
Historiography also lacks meaningful exploration of the interaction between Western and 
Soviet policy towards Bulgaria. Practically no attempts have been made to juxtapose Soviet 
intentions as revealed from contemporary Soviet archives and the British perception of these 
as based on Soviet actions in Bulgaria and the rest of Eastern Europe in 1943 -  1949.14 Little
effort has gone into investigating how the British interest in Bulgaria -  limited as it was -  
was translated into specific actions in the country. Most existing accounts revolve around 
British political involvement with the Bulgarian anti-Communist Opposition. The prevailing 
deductions are ideologically coloured and claim that this followed either from Britain’s 
commitment to upholding democracy in Bulgaria or, on the contrary, from Britain’s 
imperialistic designs for Bulgaria.15 A corollary of the latter is the implicit assertion by a 
number of Bulgarian scholars that Bulgaria had a special role in the British post-war scheme 
for the Balkans.16 Such a self-centred opinion is mainly the result of the lack of a 
comparative perspective and little effort to find out the place of Bulgaria in the larger and 
more complicated European, or at least Eastern European picture.
* * *
vol.24, no.3, summer 1979. p. 135-142; Homer, J.E. ‘The Ordeal o f Nikola Petkov and the Consolidation o f  
Communist Power in Bulgaria. ’ Survey, vol.28, no.2, summer 1984. p.75-83; A few articles on the ACC in 
Bulgarian are mainly narratives containing numerous technical details, Pintev, S. 'Nachalna deinost na 
Suyuznata Kontrolna Komisia v Bulgaria, oktomvri 1944 - januari 1945.' Istoricheski Preeled. god.XXXV, 
no.4/5, 1979. p. 196-203; Pintev, S. ‘SSSR, SASht i Velikobritania i Moskovskoto primirie s Bulgaria, 
septemvri - oktomvri 1944. ’ Izvestia na Bulgarskoto Istorichesko Druzhestvo. kn.32.1978. p.241-259
14 The problem is mentioned in Dimitrov, V. ‘The Failure of Democracy in Eastern Europe and the 
Emergence of the Cold War, 1944 -  1948: A Bulgarian Case Study.’ DPhil: University o f Cambridge, 
1996.
15 Roberts, Fr. Dealing with Dictators: The Destruction and Revival o f  Europe 1930 - 1970. London: 
Weidenfield&Nicolson, 1991; The Earl of Avon. The Eden Memoirs. The Reckoning. Boston: Houghton 
Muffin, 1965; Churchill, Sir Winston. The Second World War. vols.III - VI. London: Cassell, 1948 -  1954; 
Feis, H. Churchill... Frankel, J. British Foreign Policy 1945 - 1973. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1975; Keeble, Sir 
Curtis. Britain and the Soviet Union, 1917 - 1989. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1990
16 The definitive Soviet-period work is Trukhanovski, V.G Vneshyaya politika Anglii v period Vtoroy 
mirovoy voinyi 1939 -  1945gg. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970. For the prevalent Bulgarian 
interpretation see Gunev, G. and I.Ilchev. Winston Churchill i Balkanite. Sofia: Izdatelstvo na OF, 1984; for 
comparison see Rachev, St. Anglo-Bulgarian Relations during the Second World War 1939 -  1944. Sofia: 
Sofia Press, 1981 and Rachev, St. Chirchill, Bulgaria i Balkanite. Sofia: Sotri, 1995.
The majority of published English-language sources used for the thesis pertain to the wider 
question of British-Soviet relations in the early Cold War years. Amongst them the most 
enlightening have been those in the series Documents on British Policy Overseas, published 
by the Historical Branch of the Foreign Office. The volume dealing with Eastern Europe in 
the mid-1940s contains seminal documents highlighting the turning points in British foreign 
policy regarding the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence. Another useful publication of 
earlier British Government material is The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British 
Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1 7  The secret wartime correspondence between 
Roosevelt and Churchill comprises parts of the debate between British and US leaders 
regarding the conduct of the Second World War and its political consequences for the 
Balkans and Bulgaria. It offers glimpses of the decision making process regarding such 
crucial issues as the bombing of Bulgaria in 1943, the October 1944 percentage agreement
• •  1R •and Soviet behaviour in occupied Bulgaria. The importance of personal diplomacy is 
further clarified by the messages exchanged between the British and US Heads of 
Government and Stalin.19
None of the mentioned collections matches the time span and subject scope of the sections 
on Bulgaria in the annually published by the US Department of State Foreign Relations o f 
the United States?0 These documents detail the daily contacts between the US 
representatives in Bulgaria and their colleagues and superiors in Washington. They often 
throw light on how the country was treated in inter-Allied talks and how the difference of
17 Ross, G. (ed.) The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 1944 - 
1945. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985
18 Loewenheim, Fr.L. et al. (eds.) Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence. New 
York, 1975
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Stalin’s Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and 
Truman, 1941 -1945. London: Lawrence&Wishart, 1958
20 United States Department of State. Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1943 - 1955. Washington, DC, 
1961 - 1985
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attitudes between Britain and the USA was translated into concrete actions directed to Sofia 
or Moscow. The series also reveals to what extent British views influenced and were 
influenced by those of the USA. It is another documentary volume, The American Military 
Mission in the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria 1944 -  1947, that is unique among 
English-language published sources in its dealing specifically with Bulgaria.21
When the dissertation was started, the published archival material from Bulgaria was dated, 
negligible and only consisted of officially scrutinised Communist Party and Government 
proceedings.22 Some progress has since been made by the appearance of documentary 
collections, dealing with wartime and immediate post-war issues, including the methods 
used by the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) to seize control of the country. The 
publication of the diary of the Bulgarian Communist leader Georgi Dimitrov has been 
extremely valuable, especially since the original is still not available to researchers.24
A similar picture emerges regarding Soviet and Russian publications.25 Although the 
question of Soviet Government and Communist Party archives continues to represent a 
politically-loaded issue in Russia, problems related to developments in Bulgaria are 
illuminated by an increasing number of publications. These trace the link between Party and
21 Boll, M.M. The American Military Mission in the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria 1944 - 1947. 
Boulder, Colo.: Columbia UP, 1985
22 The Trial o f Nikola D.Petkov, August 5 - 15, 1947: Records o f the Judicial Proceedings. Sofia: Ministry of 
Information and Arts, 1947; The Trial o f Traicho Kostov and His Group. Sofia: Press Department, 1949; 
Ustanovyavane i ukrepvane na narodnodemokratichnata vlast septemvri 1944 -  may 1945. Sofia: Izdatelstvo 
na BAN, 1969; Vunshna Politika na Narodna Republika Bulgaria: Sbomik ot dokumenti i materiali v dva 
toma 1944 - 1962. Sofia: Durzhavno Izdatelstvo ‘Nauka i Izkustvo’, 1970
* Its full name was Bulgarian Workers Party (Communists) but BCP will be used hereafter
23 Toshkova, V. et al. (eds.) Bulgaria, nepriznatiyat protivnik na Tretiya Raih. Sofia: Izdatelstvo na MO 
‘Sv.Georgi Pobedonosets’, 1995; Ognyanov, L. et al. (eds.) Narodna Demokratsiya ili Diktatura. Sofia: 
Literaturen Forum, 1992
24 Dimitrov, G. Dnevnik 9 mart 1933 -  6fevruari 1949. Sofia: Universitetsko Izdatelstvo ‘Sv.Kl.Ohridski’, 
1997
25 Valev, L.B. et al. (eds.) Sovetsko-Bolgarskie otnosheniya i Svyazi, 1944 - 1948gg.: Documenti i materiali. 
Moscow: Nauka, 1981
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Government in the foreign policy decision making process in the Soviet Union, as well as 
the influence of Moscow on the Eastern European Communist Parties.26
The quantity and variety of unpublished sources relevant to the thesis is overwhelming, 
especially allowing for the fact that new documents are annually released not only from the 
until recently sealed Soviet and Bulgarian archives but also in Britain. The bulk of primary 
sources consulted for the dissertation is of British origin and is kept in the Public Record 
Office at Kew. These are mostly documents generated by two Foreign Office Departments - 
the Southern, which dealt with Bulgaria and its neighbours, and the Northern, which dealt 
with Soviet Russia. In addition, there were documents emanating from the Foreign Office 
Research Department (FORD), as well as correspondence with various other British 
Government bodies such as the Special Operations Executive (SOE), the Political Warfare 
Executive (PWE), the Board of Trade (BoT), etc. FO files also contain the flow of 
communications between London and British political and military representatives in the 
country. This material gives the most complete picture of the process of decision making. 
Following in detail discussions within and between FO Departments regarding policy 
towards Bulgaria in 1943 -  1949, the sources reveal the elaboration of British wartime and 
post-war objectives and track their practical implementation. They also uncover the various 
options available to British policy makers and uniquely -  their assessment of results and 
consequences.
In comparison, evidence coming from various Bulgarian and Russian archives is patchy. 
This is to a great extent due to the fact that these archives have been partially open for a few 
years only and still lack precise operational rules and routine. Another difficulty is posed by 
the lack of a well-established methods of decision making and the lack of any Bulgarian or
26 Lebedev, N.S. et al. (eds.) Comintern i Vtoraya Mirovaya Voina. 2 vols. Moscow: Pamyatniki 
istoricheskoy myisli, 1994, 1997; Volokitina, T.V. et al. (eds.) Vostochnaya Evropa v Dokumentah 
Rossiyskih Arhivov 1944 -  1953. vol.l, 1944 -  1948. Moscow: Sibirskiy Hronograf, 1997
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Soviet equivalent of the British FO minutes, which trace in minutiae the range of opinion 
and options from which final policy emerged. Still, the examination of the available 
documents from different Bulgarian institutions -  the Ministries of Foreign and Internal 
Affairs, the Central Committee (CC) of the Bulgarian Communist Party -  as well as the 
personal archives of prominent Communist Party and state leaders, as Georgi Dimitrov, 
Vassil Kolarov and Traicho Kostov, enables partial reconstruction of the policy making 
process. These materials disclose how far Bulgarian leaders were able to exercise their own 
initiative regarding Western activities as opposed to merely acting on Soviet orders.
Soviet archives have preserved documents enabling reconstruction of policy making 
regarding Bulgaria, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. It is particularly useful to compare the 
views and intentions emanating from Soviet sources with contemporary Western 
interpretations and reactions. Examination of the released Soviet archives is crucial in 
establishing the relation between Soviet military strategy and post-war planning for Eastern 
Europe as reflected in the case of Bulgaria. The interaction between the Soviet design and 
the strategy of the Bulgarian Communist Party is another outstanding issue. Moreover, some 
clarification is possible of the Soviet position in negotiations over Bulgaria and the limits to 
which Stalin was prepared to go in the clash with the Western powers over Eastern Europe 
in general. All this throws additional light upon the relevance of the methods employed by 
the Western Allies to promote the democratic future of Bulgaria. It also helps to judge the 
extent to which Britain’s perceptions of Soviet aims were correct and whether British tactics 
were adequate to Soviet intentions.
Part One
‘What Will Be the Place of Bulgaria at the Judgement Seat?’ *
Chapter One 
Bulgaria in British Post-war Planning
Since the latter half of the nineteenth century Bulgaria’s place in British foreign policy had 
been determined by a number of inter-related political, strategic and economic factors fused 
in the so-called Eastern Question. Even after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the 
intricacies of this Great Power controversy for dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean were 
to a degree still relevant to Britain’s Balkan policy. Before and during the Second World 
War Britain retained its commitment to securing the naval routes to its imperial territories in 
the Middle East. This overriding objective shaped Britain’s relations with the individual 
countries in the region.
Bulgaria could influence developments not only in the Balkan Peninsula but also across 
Eastern Europe. At the heart of the Balkans and bordering the Black Sea, the country 
attracted Britain’s attention as it stood close to the Mediterranean Straits, an area of 
traditional British interest. In the nineteenth century, the approach towards Bulgaria was 
complicated by the British perception of the country as closely attached to Russia because of 
ethnic and cultural similarities. Such an opinion continued to hold sway after the First World 
War despite a number of open rifts between Russia and Bulgaria in the late nineteenth and
* Winston Churchill in the House of Commons, 2.08.1944
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the first half of the twentieth century. Britain considered Bulgaria a convenient stepping- 
stone for the fulfilment of Russian aims of predominance in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Centuries-long Russian engagement in conflict with the Ottoman Empire affected the 
development of the whole Balkan Peninsula and the adjoining areas. Britain had been 
jealously watching Russian military successes and the increase of Russian influence in 
proximity to the Straits.1 Bulgaria’s significance lay in its links with parts of the European 
continent vital for Britain’s security and trade. Such attention as was paid to Bulgaria should 
be placed in the context of Britain’s involvement in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 
which had to be safeguarded against the encroachment of adversaries like Russia. On its own 
account, the country had little value for British post-Second World War policy planning.
The Eastern Mediterranean was an internationally recognised zone of British interest. The 
Balkans were the natural hinterland to this sensitive area. A Great Power controlling the 
Peninsula could use it to defend or menace the Straits and with this, communications to the 
Middle East. Accordingly, strong influence over Greece and Turkey was central for Britain’s 
security in the Mediterranean. This would undoubtedly be enhanced by amicable relations 
with Bulgaria. The precariousness of Britain’s position in the region had been clearly 
demonstrated by the Bulgarian occupation of Aegean Thrace and Macedonia in 1941 -  
1942. The presence of Bulgarian troops there created serious military difficulties for Britain 
throughout the Second World War. From the British perspective, Bulgarian withdrawal from 
these territories would bring a distinct strategic advantage to the Allied military effort 
against the Axis. In the longer term, Britain’s position in the Balkans would benefit if as a
1 Barker, E. Britain in a Divided Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1971. p .ll; Kennan, G. Russia and the 
West under Lenin and Stalin. London: Hutchinson, 1961; Kennan, G. ‘The X  Article. ’ Gati. Ch. (ed.l 
Casing the Bear: Containment and the Cold War. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1974. p.9-23; 
Ragsdale, H. (ed.) Imperial Russian Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993. p.211-246; Cohen, 
A. Russian Imperialism. London: Praeger, 1996. p.48-56
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result of British influence Bulgaria could be persuaded to co-operate with its neighbours and 
thus cease to be a cause of regional instability.
The Sources of British Policy towards Bulgaria. ^  the of
1942, the British Government began investigating the question of European post-war 
settlement. The initial efforts were mostly intellectual exercises, contained within the 
Foreign and the Dominions Offices. The first ‘planners’ at the FO Reconstruction 
Department, headed by Gladwyn Jebb, were mainly engaged in constructing different 
scenarios for the post-war international re-alignment of forces.2 At that time, attitudes 
towards Bulgaria, as towards the other European small powers, were governed by tradition 
and above all by its role in the continuing armed conflict.
Military Considerations. During the war Britain looked towards Bulgaria only
occasionally, discussing it mainly as an ally of Germany. However, British officials noted 
that the country was unique among the signatories of the Tripartite Pact in that it had 
managed to abstain from active participation in any war theatre. It had only been engaged in 
Axis operations of secondary importance, such as the occupation of Greek and Yugoslav 
territories and in providing supplies for German regiments in the Balkans. The Bulgarian 
King had withstood pressure from Hitler to send troops to the Eastern front. Moreover, 
having declared war on Great Britain and the United States in December 1941, Bulgaria 
maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union throughout the war. Both the 
Bulgarian Government and Opposition greatly emphasised this limited involvement in the 
war, hoping that it would secure benevolent treatment by whichever side emerged 
victorious.3
2 Jebb, G. The Memoirs o f Lord Gladwyn. London: Weidenfield&Nicolson, 1972. p.113-119
3 Miller, M.L. Bulgaria during the Second World War. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford UP, 1975. p.53-62
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Indeed, in the earlier stages of the war those British diplomatic and military experts who had 
followed the course of Bulgaria’s association with the Axis acknowledged the peculiarities 
of the Bulgarian position. The FO Southern Department had some understanding of the 
country’s predicament between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. But the closer to the 
Balkans fighting moved the less tolerance of Bulgaria’s behaviour British observers 
displayed. They rejected the Bulgarian Government’s claims of ‘symbolic’ participation in 
the war. The British Government could not play down Bulgaria’s contribution to the 
maintenance of stable Axis control over the Balkans. It was Bulgarian troops which held 
down local resistance and thus freed German divisions to fight elsewhere.4 Above all, 
Bulgaria’s political and diplomatic difficulties could not significantly influence British long­
term policy. Factors going beyond the immediate wartime concerns prevailed in shaping the 
general attitude towards Bulgaria and ultimately determined its standing at the end of the 
war. It was Britain's broad interest in the region which dictated the elaboration of specific 
policies towards Bulgaria.
Through its leverage in the Balkans, Britain had played an important role at various points in 
Bulgaria’s modem history. However, even during the short-lived ‘Bulgarian Agitation’ in 
1876 -  1878 in defence of the Bulgarian Christian population from the atrocities of the 
Ottoman authorities, Britain had not been involved in internal Bulgarian developments.5 
Britain had predominantly been concerned with strategic issues relating to Bulgaria’s claims 
for territorial enlargement which could disturb the equilibrium in the Balkans. Mostly, 
Britain had tried to parry excessive Soviet aspirations towards the Eastern Mediterranean. In 
1943 -  1944, no British diplomat or politician claimed that Britain should aim for 
unequivocal control over Bulgaria.
4 HS5/180, SOE memorandum, 7.06.1943; F0371/37152, R6704, Howard to Barker, 28.06.1943
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What mattered to Britain was that no Great Power hostile to its interests should dominate 
Bulgaria. In the changing military circumstances this could only be attained by the 
establishment of British physical presence in the field. In early 1943, the Southern 
Department took the view that ‘the obvious and easiest solution would be that we and the 
Americans by an invasion of the Balkans should be on the spot and in a position to police 
that part of the world’.6
Such considerations had practical value only if supported by adequate military actions. In 
1943, while Southern Department officials were suggesting the deployment of British 
military and possibly civilian authorities in Bulgaria, the British Chiefs of Staff were 
rationalising Churchill’s idea for an attack on ‘the soft under-belly of the Axis’.7 Churchill’s 
initial argument at the end of 1942, just as the subsequent British military planners’ 
recommendation for a fighting front in the Balkans, was based on the necessity for
Q
maximum diversion of forces and damage to Axis communications. But neither the Prime 
Minister, nor his military commanders were able to overcome their US counterparts’ 
opposition. High-ranking US politicians and officers had a stiff ‘doctrinal objection to 
anything to do with the Balkans’.9 They considered anything but massive concentration of 
force for the cross-Channel invasion of Europe to be a wasteful diversion and engagement in 
‘pinprick warfare’.10 There was an additional US suspicion that the real British motives were 
rooted in imperial aspirations to secure a sphere of influence in the Balkans.11 In October
5 Shannon, R.T. Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876. Hassoks: Harvester Press, 1963. Saab, A.P. 
Gladstone, Bulgaria and the Working Classes, 1 856- 1878. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard UP, 1991
6 Barker, E. British Policy... p. 134
7 Churchill, W.S. The Second... vol.IV. p.433
8 McNeill, W.H. America... p.221, 304-305
9 Macmillan, H. The Blast o f War 1939 -1945. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1967. p.503
10 Stimson, H.L. and McGeorge Bundy. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York: Harper&Bros, 
1947. p.437
11 Leahy, W.D. I  Was There. London: Victor Gollanz Ltd., 1950. p. 191; Lord Ismay. The Memoirs o f General 
the Lord Ismay. London: Heinemann, 1960. p.287, 323; Macmillan, H. The Blast... p.190-191, 503-504;
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1943, mainly upon US insistence, the Three Allies decided against opening a front in the 
Balkans. This happened despite the fact that Allied forces were engaged in Italy from where 
it was possible to push towards the north-western Balkans.12 It also made futile Britain’s
1 3continuous attempts to secure Turkey’s unequivocal commitment on the Allied side.
In fact, the British Commanders in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, notably General 
Sir Hemy Maitland Wilson and General Sir Harold Alexander, who were responsible for the 
elaboration of Balkan strategy, were comparatively little concerned with its long-term 
implications. It was the Foreign Office and the War Cabinet which had to project military 
decisions into British post-war interests.14 In late 1943 and even in the first half of 1944, 
they conceded the priority of immediate wartime objectives over peacetime planning. Even 
Churchill, the person most aware of the political consequences of an Allied offensive, or the 
lack of it, in the Balkans had to bow to the military rationale. In the conflict between short- 
and long-term policy, the former prevailed.
Britain’s Support o f Bulgaria’s Neighbours. Before the Second World War,
Britain’s attitude to Bulgaria had been formulated in conjunction with longer-standing 
relationships with Bulgaria’s neighbours. Bulgaria’s siding with Germany confirmed the 
basic negative assumptions towards it in British foreign policy making circles. Bulgaria’s 
signing of the Tripartite Pact on 1 March 1941 restored the clarity of the inter-war strategic 
situation in the Balkans. This had been blurred during the period of Bulgarian neutrality 
proclaimed in September 1939. Searching for foundations of the post-war settlement, the 
British Government could not avoid looking back at the recent pattern of relations. In the
American Secretary of War Stimson was among the few who believed in Churchill’s sincerity, Stimson, 
H.L. On Active Service... p.437,447.
12 Howard, M. Grand Strategy. London: HMSO, 1966. vol.IV, part I. p.275
13 Deringil, S. Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Second World War: An 'Active’ Neutrality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1989. p. 133-165
14 Woodward, Sir E.L. British Foreign Policy in the Second World War. London: HMSO, 1971. vol. II. p.273
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First World War Bulgaria had fought and lost on the side of the Central Powers, 
subsequently displaying vigorous revisionist criticism of the Versailles system. Moreover, 
historical examples of amicable political relations between Bulgaria and Great Britain were 
few and far between.
Between the wars a relatively small number of Bulgarian politicians advocated pro-British 
orientation. The scarcity of fruitful economic contacts was glaring. Indeed, Bulgaria 
produced few commodities in demand on the British market, and most of them could be 
easily obtained from some of its neighbours. In the 1920s and 1930s, Britain was not 
prepared to make purchases for political rather than economic profit, leaving Germany 
plentiful space for manoeuvring in the field of investment and trade with Bulgaria. By 1939, 
Germany was not only Bulgaria's largest trade partner, but also received most of the 
exportable surplus of the country in exchange for credits and supply of much needed 
armaments. Germany utilised this situation and positioned itself as Bulgaria’s reliable ally in 
peace and war.15
In the late 1930s, the FO conducted an extensive internal debate on the need to 
counterbalance the Reich's economic domination of Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria. Few 
practical solutions were found as British companies could not beat the prices Germany 
offered for Bulgarian goods.16 Any proposed actions were relatively mild as it was feared 
that Berlin would view these as an economic challenge. During 1937 - 1938 the FO was 
determined to show that Britain’s purpose was not to deny Germany access to Eastern 
Europe but to re-establish economic equilibrium there. Even though the Bulgarian 
Government itself desired to contain the German economic penetration, Britain’s attempts to
15 Miller, M.L. Bulgaria... p.7
16 Dimitrov, I. Anglia i Bulgaria 1938 -  1941: v navecherieto na Vtorata svetovna voina. Sofia: Izdatelstvo na 
OF, 1983. p.15-16; Rendel, Sir George. The Sword and the Olive: Recollections o f Diplomacy and the Foreign 
Service 1913 -1954. London: Murrey, 1957. p.141-144; Deringil, S. Turkey’s... p.24
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activate economic relations with Bulgaria failed. This was predominantly the result of 
Britain’s inability to change its trade patterns, in order to achieve diplomatic and political
1 7goals.
In diplomatic terms, Britain had made half-hearted efforts to prevent Bulgaria’s attachment 
to the Tripartite Pact. It had insisted on Bulgaria’s remaining neutral but had offered no 
positive encouragement, which could have been used either by the Bulgarian King or by pro- 
Western politicians to oppose aligning with Germany. Most importantly, Britain upheld the 
Versailles Treaty, universally perceived in Bulgaria as the source of all evils. Bulgarian 
statesmen generally overlooked a detail in Britain’s position, namely that it was prepared to 
contemplate peaceful territorial alterations to the peace settlement.18
Britain had little ground for rapprochement with Bulgaria whose domestic and foreign 
policy were driven by unfulfilled territorial aspirations. In the years leading up to the Second 
World War, the only offer that could have tempted Bulgaria to stay away from the Axis was 
some territorial acquisition which Bulgarian ruling circles could present as a step in the 
direction of ‘Bulgarian national unification’. This was the very thing Britain could not 
promise or even contemplate, constrained as it was by commitment to Greece and 
Yugoslavia. However, belated British approval was declared for Rumania’s return of 
Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria in August 1940. This small piece of compromise passed 
largely unnoticed in Bulgaria as it was disproportionate to the support shown by Germany 
which had actually forced Rumania’s hand.19
17 F 0371/24873, R43, BoT to FO, 1.06.1940, R1697, MEW to FO, 6.02.1940; F0371/24882, R5681 -  
R7795, Sofia -  FO, May -  October 1940; Kaiser, D. Economic Diplomacy and the Second World War: 
Germany, Britain, France and Eastern Europe 1930 - 1939. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1980. p.170-195
18 Barker, E. British Policy... p.8,57
19 F0371/24862, R939, Rendel to FO, 12.01.1940; F0371/37151, R5372, Rose minute (hereafter minutes will 
be indicated by the name of the author only), 18.06.1943; Miller, M.L. Bulgaria... p.30; Dimitrov, I. Anglia...
p.22
The British Government had officially endorsed Balkan unity but also insisted that any 
initiative should originate from the Balkan states themselves. However, the FO understood 
that the proponents of the status quo who joined in the Balkan Entente stood to benefit from 
maintaining Bulgaria’s image as unwaveringly pro-German; without making any 
concessions they could rely on British support. Still, the value of the Balkan Entente for 
British strategy remained paramount.20 Indeed, any attempt to draw Bulgaria closer to 
Britain risked appearing to favour it at the expense of its neighbours. The strategic advantage 
of neutralising Bulgaria would then be outweighed by the danger of antagonising its 
adversaries.
In the initial stages of the war Bulgaria was relatively inconspicuous among the enemy 
states. In the course of the war the British Government became increasingly aware of the 
military difficulties Bulgaria posed for the Allies. Most British experts grew intensely hostile 
to any attempt on the part of the Bulgarian Government to present itself as merely caught in 
the vortex of Great Power politics. As a result, the significance of the tense inter-war 
Bulgarian-British relations was magnified. To an extent, the state of affairs preceding the 
war was replicated during its latter stages. Since the autumn of 1943 British military and 
political planners had agreed on the desirability of knocking Bulgaria out of the conflict. As 
very small numbers of Allied troops would be available for the Balkans, Britain had to 
devise effective measures for the application of diplomatic pressure. Any contacts with 
Bulgaria brought up before British officials the familiar question of arousing ‘at once... the 
deepest suspicion on the part of the Greek, Yugoslav and Turkish Governments’.21
20 F0371/24869, R3730, Rendel to FO, Clutton, 17.03.1939
21FRUS 1943, vol.I, p.489, British Embassy Washington aide-memoire, 6.04.1943
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In late 1943 and 1944, the FO declared that it was impossible ‘to give the Bulgarians the
99slightest sympathetic consideration’. Even when the Bulgarian Government showed 
willingness to establish unofficial contacts with the Allies, the FO believed that it was 
simply trying to get itself ‘out of scrapes’ which it had got into through its own fault.23 
British attitude was augmented by what the British Balkan experts recognised as ‘the violent 
anti-Bulgarian feeling in both Greece and Yugoslavia’.24 Their Govemments-in-exile 
constantly pressed Britain to make a commitment to harsh punishment of Bulgaria for its 
role in the war. They did not fail to protest at a single instance when through propaganda or 
otherwise Britain tried to display mildness in order to detach Bulgaria from the Axis. So 
vociferous were these protests that the Head of the Southern Department Sir Orme Sargent 
feared that they might have exactly the opposite effect. Some ‘latent Bulgarophilia in the 
British public’ could find ‘a favourable breeding place in the irritation and disillusionment 
which our Greek and Yugoslav allies are bound to cause us as time goes on’.25
Planning for Bulgaria was further complicated by the territorial demands of its neighbours 
against it. Britain had repeatedly stated that territorial changes would have to await the peace 
settlement. The Greek representative in London Romanos was eager to secure British 
commitment to an enlarged post-war Greece. In September 1943, he complained that in a 
speech the British Prime Minister had not mentioned the Greek hope for rectification of the
9 fifrontier with Bulgaria. Even Turkey, still nominally neutral and on relatively good terms 
with Bulgaria, criticised BBC broadcasts advising Bulgaria to side with the Allies. The 
Turkish Government hinted that it wondered whether the Bulgarian treachery was going to
22 F0371/37153, R11655, Soviet aide-memoire, 29.10.1943
23 F0371/37002, N1246, Kuibyshev to FO, 16.01.1943
24 F0371/37153, R2129, Eden brief, 9.03.1943
25 F0371/37153, R11655, Sargent, 24.07.1943
26 F0371/37248, R9396, Romanos to Laskey, 28.09.1943, R9740, Eden brief, October 1943
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be ‘condoned and forgotten’. This confirmed the FO’s impression that Turkey would 
manoeuvre for the acquisition of the Sakar massif from which Bulgaria presently dominated 
Adrianopol.27
Accumulating evidence made the FO sceptical as to its ability to induce Bulgaria to abandon 
the Axis. The British Government was precluded from making even the vaguest of promises 
to Bulgaria. Apparent British support for Greece and Yugoslavia and attempts at drawing 
Turkey closer convinced the Bulgarian Government that its only chance of keeping the 
country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty was to remain on Germany’s side. The FO 
fully realised that it could not offer any positive encouragement to Bulgaria and was thus 
tying the hands even of those circles in Bulgaria which could promote the anti-German 
case. The feeling of impasse made the FO reluctant to explore the possibilities of 
rapprochement with Bulgaria. It had some historic sense of failure and was anxious not to 
lay up incalculable difficulties in its plans for the future of South Eastern Europe.28
British Perceptions of the Soviet Role in the Balkans. British foreign policy
makers acknowledged that, as long as Britain was seen as the champion of the interests of 
Bulgaria’s neighbours, Sofia would look to another Great Power for protection. In early 
1943, beginning to feel uncertain about Germany’s ultimate ability to win the war, 
Bulgaria’s rulers were increasingly likely to try to reinvigorate relations with the Soviet 
Union. The FO had to consider the consequences of such a development on British interests.
In early 1943, Sir George Rendel, British Ambassador in Sofia in 1938 -  1941 and to the 
Yugoslav Govemment-in-exile during the war, reminded the FO that, first among the lesser 
powers Bulgaria had realised that ‘in modem conditions small states cannot stand alone’.29
27 F0371/37158, R5885, Clutton to Helm, 10.07.1943, FORD paper, 13.07.1943; Woodward, Sir E.L. British 
Foreign ...vol.IV.p.109,110,117
28 FRUS 1943, vol.I, p.493, State Department (hereafter State) to FO, 28.04.1943
29 F0371/37173, R974, Rendel to Sargent, 1.02.1943
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Other British Eastern European experts believed that at the current stage of the war the 
majority of the Bulgarian people were ‘as always fervently pro-Russian’. Some diplomats 
claimed that only just before the arrival of the Red Army on the banks of the Danube would 
the anti-Communists in Bulgaria see the imminent dangers of Soviet occupation.30
The FO feared that it was not only pro-Russian feelings which might bring renewed Russian
influence over Bulgaria. Balkan specialists recalled that in November 1940 the Soviet Union
had proposed to Bulgaria a pact of mutual assistance which would have given the Soviet
Union the right to establish naval and military bases within range of the Dardanelles. During
the negotiations for an Anglo-Soviet treaty in 1941 -1942, Soviet security guarantees for the
Balkan countries had featured prominently on the Soviet agenda. Stalin had confided in
Eden his design for domination of Romania, and the FO surmised that he would also 
 ^1advance to Bulgaria. It would only be necessary for the Soviet Union to champion some of 
Bulgaria's pre-war territorial claims to become the ‘virtual mistress of the country’. Then 
Britain would encounter difficulties in distinguishing between ‘purely Bulgarian and 
ultimately Russian interests’. Rendel was certain that Russia would push south until it 
obtained military, naval and air bases in the Adriatic and the Aegean. He warned that if the 
British Government did not wish to see Russian bases ‘at Split and Dubrovnik, and 
probably at Dedeagatch, Kavala or even Salonika’, it should in the first place prevent the 
appearance of these at Varna and Burgas.32
Rendel claimed that the Soviet Union would not resist the temptation to establish its 
influence in South Eastern Europe. He even foresaw the possibility of ‘a spontaneous 
movement... which would result in the creation of a number of small states or republics
30 F0371/37157, R1592, Clark Keir to FO, 20.02.1943
31 Howard, M. Grand Strategy. vol.III, part I, p.273; Swain, G. ‘Stalin’s Wartime Vision o f the Post-war 
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which would then spontaneously ask for admission into the Soviet Union’. In such a case it 
would be ‘impossible for the Soviet Union to refuse to have anything to do with it, whatever 
its undertakings before the Western powers about non-intervention in South Eastern 
Europe’. Such a development could start from Bulgaria and would have profound 
consequences on the internal situation of Greece and even more Yugoslavia, where the 
extreme left anti-monarchists were very strong.
The fact that Communists were becoming increasingly prominent in the small Bulgarian 
resistance only complicated the issue of the Soviet role in Bulgaria in particular and in the 
Balkans as a whole. Their Communist ideology could become the instrument for spreading 
Soviet influence to the south and even west of Europe. What the Southern Department began 
considering in the spring of 1943 was whether Britain could, and moreover should, aim ‘to 
save’ Bulgaria from possible bolshevisation.34
Uncertainty about Soviet Plans. In the latter stages of the war, the biggest
hindrance to the elaboration of a clear British policy towards Bulgaria was the lack of solid 
knowledge of Soviet plans and attitudes. By 1943, the only definite conclusion the FO had 
reached was that Soviet influence in the Balkans was going to expand. The more intricate 
question was, however, whether this increased influence was likely to be coupled with 
imposition of the Soviet form of government. Stalin had repeatedly proclaimed that the 
Soviet Union did not aim at ‘the seizure of foreign territory’, nor did it intend to impose its
c
‘will and regime upon the Slavonic or any other enslaved nations’. The FO saw all these as 
propaganda statements. British officials did not fail to notice that no Soviet declaration 
mentioned the aspirations of indigenous Communists across Europe. Nevertheless,
33 Ibid.
34 Rothwell, V. Britain... p.l 13; Barker, E. 'Problems o f the Alliance: Misconceptions and Misunderstandings’. 
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throughout 1943, British foreign policy makers were prepared to give the Soviet Union the 
benefit of the doubt.
From different pieces of contemporary evidence the FO ascertained that Stalin’s ideas about 
Bulgaria, and indeed other East European countries, fluctuated. In December 1941, when the 
Soviet Union desperately needed military support, Stalin had suggested to Eden that Turkey 
might be given a portion of Bulgaria south of Burgas.36 Such an opportunistic approach 
indicated to the FO that Stalin was not led by sentiment but was mostly concerned about 
concrete wartime achievements. That is why later, in 1943, the Southern Department 
discussed the possibility of asking the Soviet Union to threaten Bulgaria with war and to 
proclaim that unless Bulgaria capitulated, the Soviet Union could not guarantee its 
independence. Such a proposition, however, touched on the question of the future of South 
Eastern Europe. The Soviet Government had hitherto shown reluctance to commit itself ‘in
'xnany way’ on this subject. It was doubtful whether the British Government was ready to 
make such decisions, either.
In 1944, the FO continued to speculate about Soviet intentions towards Bulgaria. Even in the 
spring and summer of that year, when Moscow exerted open pressure on the Bulgarian 
Government to desert the Germans, Soviet short-term plans were unclear to British officials. 
As no precise information could be obtained from the Soviet Government, British observers 
could only surmise that the USSR strove to establish a ‘dominating moral position’. This 
raised further questions: would Soviet Russia demand something tangible, for example air
35 F0371/36991, N983, radio intercept, 8.02.1943; Dilks, D. ‘British Political Aims in Central, Eastern and 
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36 F0371/37158, R5885, FORD paper, 2.07.1943: Woodward, Sir E.L. British Foreign... vol.IV. p.83
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bases, or seek to ingratiate itself with the Bulgarians by offering them an outlet to the 
Aegean?38
There is substantial evidence, confirmed from newly available Soviet archives, that not even 
the Bulgarian Communist leader Georgi Dimitrov residing in Moscow had clues about the 
precise Soviet plans for Bulgaria. This, in turn, casts doubts over the existence of such
-JQ
plans. The best available indications of Soviet foreign policy thinking are the reports of 
three Soviet Foreign Ministry Commissions which functioned from the end of 1943 to mid- 
1945 and dealt with different aspects of post-war reconstruction. These were headed by 
Maxim Litvinov, Kliment Voroshilov and Ivan Maisky, all experienced Soviet diplomats 
with deep understanding of the mechanisms of Kremlin policy formulation. It is reasonable 
to assume that their analyses could not have differed much from the opinions of their
40superiors.
According to the reports the three Commissions submitted to Molotov between January and 
November 1944, the USSR’s main objective was to become so strong that no power in the 
world could contemplate aggression against it. To achieve this, the Soviet Union should aim 
to emerge from the war with strategically favourable boundaries. The countries 
neighbouring it should sign treaties of mutual aid and give it ‘the necessary number of land, 
air and naval bases’.41 In this respect, neither Britain nor the United States were expected to 
create major difficulties, apart from voicing some ideological objections. It was believed 
they would simply bow to the inevitable, with Britain most probably seeking an accord with
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Soviet Russia on the basis of spheres of security. The Commissions recommended that the 
Soviet Union should strive to maintain good relations with the Western Allies.42
The three high-ranking Soviet diplomats seemed to take for granted the existence of a 
second, equally important, Soviet aim. They insisted that the European continent should 
become Socialist as only this would preclude the possibility of new wars and thus guarantee 
Soviet security. Some post-Communist Russian scholars claim that the Commissions’ papers 
referred to revolution merely because this was the current political jargon.43 Such a 
conclusion is questionable, especially since the reports clearly pointed out that a policy of 
communisation would be the greatest challenge to the desired understanding between the 
Soviet Union and the West. Soviet promotion of a proletarian revolution across Europe was 
judged to be especially damaging to relations with Great Britain. Simultaneously, in the 
diplomats’ minds the Soviet Union was undoubtedly going to support any indigenous 
movement towards what was termed ‘real democracy’. In some cases, such as those of the 
German satellites, the establishment of ‘Popular Front Governments’ would require outside 
pressure. The reason why these documents were relatively devoid of excessive Marxist 
terminology lies in the very context in which they were conceived and produced -  there was 
no need to state the obvious. Moreover, the Commissions were not required to question the 
necessity or feasibility of revolution, but to forecast its international consequences.
From such occasional glimpses of Soviet policy formulation, it becomes evident that there 
was no contradiction between the different driving forces of Soviet foreign policy. Naturally, 
during the war the defence of Soviet territory held priority over lending support to foreign 
revolutionaries. The spread of revolution should not put the security of the Soviet Union at 
risk. As the stability of the European situation depended on preserving the alliance with the
42 Pechatnov, V. ‘The Big Three...’ p.7
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Western powers, Communism should only be established in countries which were not of 
crucial importance to the Western Allies.44
Looking into the enemy countries’ future, Soviet officials initially asserted ‘the principles of 
broad democracy in the spirit of the national front’ 45 However, they predicted that the 
implementation of these principles could require a degree of external intervention, preferably 
exercised jointly by the Three Allies. But in Soviet eyes ‘the retrograde record of the West’ 
cast a doubt over such a possibility. Therefore, Europe should be divided into zones of 
interest and each Big Power should abstain from developing close, especially military 
relations with the countries not falling within its own sphere. The proposed line of division, 
apparently drawn on the basis of maximum Soviet interest, placed Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and 
Romania in the Soviet zone of influence. The aim of undermining Turkey’s position as the 
sole guardian of the Straits was underlined by the Soviet diplomats. They considered that as 
long as Britain was confident that Bulgaria would receive no outlet to the Aegean, it would 
not object to Soviet influence over that country or Romania. Soviet foreign policy specialists 
emphasised the importance of reassuring Britain that it would not lose control over the 
Eastern Mediterranean 46
On the whole, Soviet planners assessed the situation in Europe realistically. They clearly 
outlined the maximum Soviet aims in Eastern Europe and considered the means for their 
attainment. Their most significant achievement was an adequate understanding of the 
Allies’, and especially of Britain’s preoccupations, thus outlining a firm and reliable basis 
for negotiations with the Allies.
44 Swain, G. ‘Stalin’s Wartime... 'p.73; Pechatnov, V.O. ‘The Big Three...’ p.22-23
45 Filitov, A.M. ‘V komissiyah. ..' p.57
46 Ibid] Pechatnov, V. ‘The Big Three.. . ’ p.3
39
British Judgement o f Soviet Aims. The lack of reliable information of Soviet
aims led British foreign policy makers to make assumptions on the basis of developments 
they were able to observe. Comparing British speculations on Soviet plans to the actual 
Soviet behaviour reveals the extent to which British planning and strategy rested on reality. 
It is now evident that most British analysts correctly assessed the predominance of the 
geopolitical motive in Soviet foreign policy but were also right not to overlook the role of 
Communist ideology.
In late 1943 and the first half of 1944, British policy makers professed no unanimous 
opinion regarding the USSR’s ultimate foreign policy objectives. The majority agreed that in 
Eastern Europe Stalin would strive to preserve and expand the concessions he had extracted 
from Hitler in 1939 -  1940. The FO generally accepted that, in addition to Poland and the 
Baltic republics, the Soviet Union would aim to establish a strong influence over the 
Balkans. How far such plans were going to damage British interests depended on whether 
Soviet dominance would be exerted only over the foreign policy of the region.
Within the FO, different perspectives produced varying attitudes to the Soviet Union. The 
Northern Department, which covered the USSR, expressed serious doubts that the latter had 
cut-and-dried long-term plans, and even more that the FO had adequate knowledge of them. 
The experts on the Soviet Union maintained that Soviet and British interests were not 
necessarily antagonistic. One opportunity for reconciliation would arise from cautious 
British actions in the Balkans. Christopher Warner, Head of the Northern Department, 
repeatedly warned that if the Soviet leadership detected any British preparation for 
confrontation, they would respond in kind and would ultimately ‘hold the higher cards’.47
The Southern Department, on the other hand, had been long convinced that the Soviet Union 
would invade the Balkans. This view began to be taken into greater consideration by the
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British Government in the spring of 1944 as Soviet troops were pushing the German armies 
across the western Soviet border. The beginning of fighting beyond Soviet territory 
precipitated yet another attempt on the part of the FO to evaluate possible dominant 
tendencies in post-war Soviet foreign policy. Simultaneously, Eden and Churchill voiced 
anxiety regarding the consequences of Soviet westward advances and imminent proximity to 
the Eastern Mediterranean. Neither of the two leaders was categorical that the Soviet 
conduct would be troublesome, both were increasingly worried and nervous.48 Eden was 
also disturbed lest British suspicions were leaked outside the narrow policy making circles 
thus increasing the possibility of confrontation. Eden deemed it extremely important that the 
FO should not treat the emergence of a direct clash of interest regarding the Balkans as a 
foregone conclusion.49
FO discussion papers from the first half of 1944 reveal British thinking about the potential 
Soviet threat and the required reaction to it. Acting on Eden’s instructions, various FO 
Departments ‘assemble[d] the evidence in their possession of [the] Soviet intention and the 
manner in which the Soviet Government appeared to be carrying it out’. The result was a 
broad policy paper which was circulated in the FO and became the basis for a memorandum 
for exclusive distribution to the War Cabinet.
The FO pointed out that the spread of Russian influence and communisation of the Balkans 
were separate trends, not to be confused. The fact that the Balkan resistance leaders were 
mostly Communist did not necessarily mean a ‘systematic attempt by some organisation to 
communise the whole Peninsula’. Indeed, British officials showed concern not so much for 
the expansion of Communism as for the spread of Russian influence. They confirmed earlier
47 F0371/43646, R9092, Warner, 7.06.1944
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views that ‘Russia was out’ for a predominant position in South Eastern Europe. This could 
be achieved through the establishment of friendly Governments in most Balkan countries, 
for example by the Partisans in both Yugoslavia and Greece. In many cases the Communists 
were bound to emerge as the governing force after the war and the Soviet Government was 
using them as a means to an end, but not necessarily an end in itself. British experts 
conceded that the Soviet Union could justify its building-up of Communist-led movements 
on purely military grounds, especially since Britain itself was supporting -  or had supported 
- Communist guerrillas in most countries. The FO recognised that, ironically, ‘the Russians 
have merely sat back and watched us doing their work for them’. The most important 
conclusion contained in the FO policy paper was that the Soviet threat to British interests 
should not be exaggerated as this could itself precipitate a direct conflict.50
The analysis of Soviet demands and the means to fulfil them was supplemented by an 
attempt at defining potential measures to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in the 
Balkans. Four theoretical alternatives were put forward. Dropping of support for the 
Communist-led movements and boosting the more moderate elements was one possibility, 
as was the opposite, namely full support to Communists ‘to take the wind out of the 
Russians’ sails’. Either of these options would cause extreme embarrassment to Britain as it 
would involve reneging existing agreements and military commitments, especially in Greece 
and Yugoslavia. The same held true of a suggestion for a British-Soviet undertaking not to 
interfere in the Balkans. The only feasible option seemed that Britain should focus on 
Greece and Turkey while availing itself of ‘every opportunity to spread British influence*. 
Deliberate efforts should be made to avoid direct challenges to Soviet Russia.51
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
42
In this and later papers, the FO approached the subject of Soviet influence in the Balkans 
from a clearly strategic perspective. Its main conclusions were incorporated in subsequent 
position documents such as the Post-Hostilities Planning Committee study of ‘The Effect of 
Soviet Policy on British Strategic Interests’ from June 1944. This repeated that the Soviet 
Union would most certainly occupy Romania, strengthen its favourable position in Bulgaria 
and Yugoslavia and demand military bases in the first two countries. The Committee 
accepted that Britain could only counter such developments by diplomatic means which 
would hardly be effective. Consequently, later in June 1944, the War Cabinet confirmed the 
original recommendation of the FO, namely that Britain should consolidate its position in 
Greece and Turkey and try to spread influence in the rest of the region, avoiding a conflict 
with the Soviet Union.52
Thus, the line of British post-war involvement in the Balkans was more or less clearly 
drawn. As the extension of British influence was restricted by what was perceived to be 
growing Soviet ambitions, the limited British resources had to be concentrated in crucial 
areas. Bulgaria fell outside these. The FO did not dispute what it called the ‘dominating 
moral role’ of Russia in Bulgaria and realised that to challenge this would only serve to 
exacerbate Anglo-Soviet relations. The result would then be precisely the opposite of what 
was needed for Britain to defend the Eastern Mediterranean successfully.
The Need for Co-operation with the Soviet Union. In June 1944, the Northern
Department of the FO drew attention to the possibility that the Soviet Union and Great 
Britain mutually recognised each other's interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
Straits. The experts at the FO Soviet desk thought that any British effort to build influence in 
Bulgaria and Romania against the Soviet Union was bound to fail. They recommended that
52 Barker, E. ‘Problems...’ p.45-47
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instead of conflict zones these two countries should become the testing ground for co­
operation with the Soviet Union.
Eden confirmed the necessity of continuing collaboration with Moscow and repeated the 
importance of declaring this publicly. He insisted that the British Government should appear 
to be informing, consulting and respecting the views of the Soviet Union:
We should not hesitate to make our special interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and therefore in 
Greece and Turkey, and indeed our interest elsewhere in the Balkans, clear to the Russians: but in any 
steps we take to build up our influence we must be most careful to avoid giving the impression of a 
direct challenge.54
Such views coincided with trends apparent in earlier FO thinking. In late 1943, in messages 
to Churchill, Stalin had revealed a desire, before discussing military strategy, to resolve ‘all 
the fundamental questions concerning ... mutual security and ... legitimate interests’.55 At 
the same time British Government officials too were becoming aware of the necessity to 
raise with the Soviet leaders the issue of post-war settlement.56
Lack of unity among the Allies had been variously displayed throughout the war. The 
increasingly rapid military developments after mid-1943, revealed the necessity for making 
decisions quickly, which in turn increased the possibility of divergence of policy between 
Soviet Russia and Britain. FO observers were particularly aware of the lack of mutual 
consultation and information about Eastern Europe. They predicted a number of political 
questions that would arise in the event of military operations there. In July 1943, 
E.M.Wilson at the Northern Department underlined the negative effects of the lack of 
discussions with the Soviet Union about policy in Europe in general:
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.. .unless there is some measure of agreement... on general political strategy in Europe there will be 
increasing heart-burning about tactics, and minor disagreements about tactics will become magnified 
into major disagreements about strategy and principles.57
He recalled that it was British troops which were and would be fighting on other peoples' 
territory, a fact placing on Britain the primary responsibility for starting negotiations ‘to get 
our practical strategy in respect of these territories agreed’. If the situation was not amended 
in time, ‘when the Russians begin fighting on other peoples' territory they will see very little 
need to consult us, and by that time the situation will have deteriorated almost beyond 
repair’.58 Wilson pointed to examples of Soviet compromises such as Stalin’s abstention 
from concluding a treaty with the Czechoslovak Govemment-in-exile. He warned that Stalin 
was not going ‘to behave’ so well indefinitely unless Britain made some specific approach.59
Such fears were reiterated by higher-ranking Government officials. Robert Bruce Lockhart, 
Head of the Political Warfare Executive, held that an arrangement with the Soviet Union 
should be a main desideratum of British policy. He believed ‘that Britain and the United 
States cannot guarantee frontiers or even comparative peace in Central and Eastern Europe 
without a full understanding with Russia’.60 Sir Stafford Cripps, former Ambassador to 
Moscow and War Cabinet member, expressed similar views. He was convinced that ‘easy as 
it is to prompt the Soviets into mischief, it should be easier still to harness them to 
responsible policy’. He warned that if, for example, the Soviet Union was excluded from the 
current discussions over Italy, there would be ‘hell to pay*. Stalin would interpret this as an 
invitation to exclude the Western Allies from decisions relating to Central and Eastern 
Europe: ‘This he may in any case. But why provide him with a moral right and legal
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justification.’61 Reviewing advice for rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Sargent 
complained that it constituted ‘a minor form of appeasement’. But he admitted that ‘a store 
of goodwill and confidence should be built up, so it could be drawn upon when relations 
become really difficult’.62
Already in mid-1943, Rendel had pointed to the extreme complexity of an agreement with 
the Soviet Union in relation to the Balkans. He claimed that the importance of urgent 
political discussions between the Allies could not be overestimated. These should clarify not 
only ‘the fate of the whole of South-Eastern Europe South of the Danube, and possibly 
South of the Carpathians, but also the major issue of the future relations between the Soviet 
Union and Western Europe, at a point where the interests of the two are likely to impinge on 
each other most acutely and dangerously’. Rendel called for the formulating of ‘a clear and 
consistent policy designed to ensure the real independence and prosperity of this important 
area’. Rendel insisted that the matter required urgent treatment by a special committee which 
should be guided by political rather than academic aims and should put forward constructive 
and well-defined suggestions for policy towards South Eastern Europe:
The various intricate aspects of this vitally important and urgent problem could be collated, classified 
and simplified, and... die issue could be presented in a complete yet compact and manageable form 
which would enable HMG to take a clear decision.63
Rendel’s proposal was welcomed by the Southern Department which agreed that ‘waiting on 
events was likely to be fatal’ as they ‘would not wait for [the British Government] to make 
up [its] mind’. Officials dealing with the Balkans saw clear advantages in determining 
exactly what they wanted in the region so that they ‘could seize any opportunity’. They 
accepted that suggestions were bound to be amended in the light of future developments but
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this was preferable to simply waiting on Soviet moves. Nothing came of these ideas. In 
August 1943, Sargent made some preliminary moves to choose a chairman for the proposed 
committee. His actions were, however, suspended without explanation shortly after the 
sudden death of the Bulgarian King Boris m  in August 1943.64
‘Negative’ Planning for Bulgaria. On Eden’s orders Rendel’s letter to the FO
from February 1943 was printed for circulation in the War Cabinet. The letter drew 
particular attention to the importance of Bulgaria for the formulation of long-term British 
policy towards the whole Balkan region:
... when the last act of the drama begins, ... the centre of the stage will be held ... by Bulgaria. 
Bulgaria - insignificant as she may seem when judged by standards of major world politics - holds a 
key position in South-East Europe out of all proportion to her own intrinsic importance. We have 
twice been led into misfortune by ignoring or belittling the Bulgarian issue. But its bearing on the 
problem of the future of South-East Europe as a whole is so vital.. .65
The Southern Department perceived such comments to be an elaboration of a ‘favourite 
thesis’ of Rendd's. Exaggeration and bias were attributed to the diplomat whose pro- 
Bulgarian feelings were well-known. Simultaneously, the logic of his repetitive statements 
was difficult to refute. Partly, the irritation of the FO derived from the fact that simply 
acknowledging Bulgaria’s significance was not sufficient at the current stage of the war. The 
specialists at the Bulgarian desk realised that a more active attitude was needed but was 
hampered by Britain’s having few contacts with Bulgaria and little information about the 
state of affairs within the country. Indeed, the brief on Bulgaria compiled for the Secretary of 
State for the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943 was barely
64 Ibid., Sargent to Craigie draft, August 1943
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adequate. The FO was reduced to appealing to the Soviet Foreign Ministry for up-to-date 
information; the reply was in such general terms as to be of little practical use.66
No Guarantees for Bulgarian Sovereignty. The lack of hard knowledge certainly
added to the FO’s inclination to elaborate policy towards Bulgaria in essentially negative 
terms. Although some Southern Department officials had privately expressed understanding 
for Bulgaria’s difficult position, British public pronouncements emphasised that the country 
could not expect soft treatment at the hands of the victorious Allies. The proclaimed British 
attitude was in full compliance with the principles of unconditional surrender of Germany 
and its satellites. Even when in late 1943 and 1944 unconditional surrender was no longer 
considered an effective approach and was silently dropped from Allied propaganda, no
7concessions to Bulgaria were ever seriously contemplated.
The British Government’s primary demand was the cessation of Bulgarian occupation of 
Greek and Yugoslav territory. This was repeatedly stressed as the first requirement to be
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imposed by the Allies on a defeated Bulgaria. Even more importantly, the British 
Government displayed ambiguity towards Bulgaria’s independence after the war. Some 
internal FO documents reveal beliefs that Bulgaria should retain its sovereignty, yet it was 
considered vital that no official statement or propaganda should raise any ‘false hopes on 
this score’.69 On the contrary, in order to force Bulgaria’s detachment from the Axis, it 
should be constantly repeated that unless Bulgaria changed sides in the conflict, Britain 
would not pledge itself to the survival of an independent Bulgarian state. These views were 
communicated to the US State Department and formed the basis of Eden’s brief for the
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Moscow Conference in October 1943.70 The official British position was milder than 
alternatives investigated within the FO. For example, Douglas Howard, Head of the 
Southern Department, predicted that the resolution of the Bulgarian question lay either in 
‘carving up Bulgaria between Yugoslavia and Greece with perhaps a separate Macedonian 
state or, annexation of some sort by Soviet Russia’.71 Such explicit opinions were, however, 
an exception among British diplomats and civil servants.
British lack of interest in Bulgaria’s existence as a separate state was greatly influenced by a 
negative attitude towards the ruling Bulgarian dynasty. King Boris HI was held personally 
responsible for Bulgaria’s siding with Germany and the Bulgarian Government’s decision to 
that effect was regarded as ‘deliberate and having been taken in full knowledge of the 
consequences’. The fate of the King was a matter of indifference to the British Government, 
all the more so since his actions fitted with the pattern of Saxe-Coburg treachery towards 
Britain.72 Even Rendel, who during his mandate in Sofia had been quite respectful of Boris, 
agreed that the King’s ‘continued presence in the country was only likely to compromise the 
Bulgarian case still further’.73 Boris’s death in August 1943 did not bring a change in the 
FO’s views on the Bulgarian monarchy. However, criticism of the Bulgarian Royal Family 
was silently dropped from British propaganda. The FO and the PWE agreed that they should 
not antagonise the Bulgarian public opinion which was generally sympathetic to Boris’s 
young successor and the widowed Queen Mother.74
The FO maintained these views in the face of a somewhat more lenient US attitude towards 
Bulgaria. In early 1944, aiming like the British Government to knock Bulgaria out of the war
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the State Department elaborated a ‘long-range’ plan for that country. In US diplomatic 
thinking it was vital to give some encouragement to Bulgaria. Under the influence of 
officials, who like Rendel had served in Sofia before the war and continued to monitor 
Bulgarian developments, several proposals were forwarded for discussion with the FO. 
Among these was a declaration that there existed no intention to change the Bulgarian 
borders of March 1941 or to breach the country’s independence as long as the occupied 
territories were evacuated. The State Department went so far as to recommend an enquiry 
into a possible autonomy of Macedonia within Yugoslavia, and some minor territorial 
alterations which would benefit the western Bulgarian border.75 All this was 
unceremoniously ruled out by the FO which judged its US counterpart to be too sympathetic 
to the Bulgarians as a whole and to King Boris in particular. Some Whitehall officials even 
spoke of an ‘American appeasement plan’ in direct contradiction to British policy. 
Therefore, they quickly and firmly ‘disabused’ their US colleagues ‘of any idea that support 
can be usefully given’ to Bulgaria. This was in line with the earlier British rejection of 
anything but a negative policy and negative propaganda to Bulgaria. In July 1943, Howard 
had warned that the Bulgarian Government could not be expected ‘to risk their necks and 
take matters in their own hands if they are given no encouragement to think that by doing so 
they will receive better treatment’. That is why he recommended ‘a bare announcement on 
the lines of [the] famous Albanian declaration to the effect that there will be an independent 
Bulgaria after the war’.77 But Sargent was opposed to ‘the smallest carrot’ for Bulgaria,
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ruling out even a statement about the retention of Dobrudja. Eden approved of such 
toughness.78
The firm refusal to issue any assurance of Bulgarian independence spelled difficulties for 
British policy towards Bulgaria. There was little ground on which the FO could initiate 
contacts with Bulgarian politicians and use them for the promotion of British wartime and 
post-war interests in the country. An additional problem arose from the uncertainty as to 
whether Britain should just aim to detach Bulgaria from the Axis or seek a longer-term 
influence over the country.
The Idea o f a Balkan Federation. With almost no effective tools with which to
70influence Bulgaria, the FO could only ‘wait and see how events turn out*. The only 
proactive element in its strategy was the concept of a Balkan Federation, in which Bulgaria 
would participate. Such an option was approved by most British diplomats and civil servants 
who were involved in policy making regarding Bulgaria.
In May 1942, the Greek and Yugoslav Govemments-in-exile signed a Treaty of Friendship 
and Mutual Assistance. This had been encouraged by Britain which recognised the Royal 
Greek and Yugoslav Governments as Allies. The Treaty itself centred on wartime co­
operation against German and Bulgarian occupation of the Balkans. The two signatories and 
their British mentors also viewed it as the foundation stone for a peacetime federal scheme. 
In mid-1942, Britain supported preliminary discussions on the subject between the Yugoslav 
and Greek exiled leaders and Bulgarian emigre politicians in the Middle East, represented by 
Dr.Georgi Dimitrov*. Even though the latter was not officially recognised by the Allies as 
the head of a Bulgarian Govemment-in-exile, co-operation with him featured highly in any
78 Ibid., Eden to Halifax, 27.07.1943
79 F0371/37153, R10192, draft brief, 4.10.1943
* Dr.Georgi M. Dimitrov was a Bulgarian Agrarian leader, popularly known in Bulgaria by his initials, 
G.M. in order to be distinguished from his namesake, the Communist Georgi Dimitrov.
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intentions to extend British influence in Bulgaria after the war. The FO looked particularly 
favourably upon the left wing of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), of which 
Dr.Dimitrov was President. Amongst the other advantages it could provide for Britain, the 
organisation was known for its open anti-monarchist feelings and its long-held commitment 
to the idea of a Balkan Federation.80
In early 1943, the FO Research Department was instructed to look into the feasibility of 
grouping together various Balkan states. The result was a comprehensive theoretical analysis 
of the foreseeable effects of such an action on the economy, internal and foreign policy of 
the region, as well as its wider international repercussions. As different combinations of 
states were considered, it became clear that a union of the Balkan countries could form a part 
of a whole series of new supra-national groupings. The Baltic republics could be brought 
together, as well as the Central European states. The Balkan Federation would constitute an 
important element in a new European post-war order, intended to bring security and stability 
to volatile regions of the continent.
For the FO analysts, a large Balkan state only made sense if it included Bulgaria. In Britain’s 
perceptions Bulgaria’s nationalist pretensions had caused a number of conflicts in the region 
in the course of the previous eighty years. As on historical and ethnic grounds Bulgaria 
continued to have territorial claims towards all its neighbours, it would remain a source of 
Balkan instability. This would be further aggravated by economic difficulties. A Federation 
might be a way of overcoming Bulgaria’s grievances as the country would share economic 
benefits with its neighbours and have a stake in their prosperity and stability. Most 
significantly, engagement with the defence of the whole region was likely to constrain 
Bulgaria’s revisionism.81
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Neutralisation of the Balkan “powder keg” was distinctly advantageous to the whole of 
Europe and would have positive implications for British security. Imperial economic and 
political interest clearly dictated that Britain should seek a long-term settlement for the 
endemic problems of the region. Of additional but not smaller importance was the fact that a 
Balkan Federation established under the British aegis would have broader consequences for 
Britain’s international position. It could become a vital barrier to the extension of Soviet 
influence in proximity to the Mediterranean Straits. This in fact was the critical motive for 
Britain’s support and encouragement of a Balkan Federation. The FO was predominantly 
thinking in terms of the need to consolidate British influence in the Aegean region and use it 
as the basis for penetration further inside the Balkan Peninsula.
Throughout 1943, the British plan for a Balkan Federation was elaborated with traditional 
power-political patterns in mind. It was placed in the context of perennial British strategic 
objectives and gave only marginal consideration to political development inside the 
countries which were intended to form the constituent federal parts. The establishment of 
enduring democracy in the Balkan countries was perceived as desirable and ultimately 
contributing to the stability of the proposed Federation. But this was not a primary concern 
for British policy makers.
For all the FO papers and discussions devoted to it, the plan for a Balkan Federation was in 
fact only sketchily developed. Questions such as the countries which it would encompass, 
their political outlook, the fate of their existing dynasties were left unanswered, or 
sometimes unexplored. However, the most significant error of judgement made by the FO 
on this subject was to mention it to Turkey in early 1943 in an attempt to ascertain Turkish 
possible reaction. At that time, the Turkish Government was preoccupied with the 
Communist danger it considered to be emanating from Soviet Russia. This was aggravated 
by the possibility of the establishment of a large predominantly Slav state along Turkey’s
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European border. The Turkish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu discussed the 
tentative British proposal with diplomats from various Balkan countries, including Bulgaria. 
He also attempted to involve Arab states in what became his own initiative for a 
Mediterranean Bloc. The FO was appalled at the Turkish indiscretion; the proposal was
bound to become known to Stalin and be interpreted as a bulwark against Soviet
82penetration.
Whether this happened is unclear, but the Soviet Union had the last say regarding the 
Federation scheme. The idea had surfaced during the Anglo-Soviet treaty negotiations in 
1942. Then Molotov had demonstrated a studiedly negative attitude, which became all the 
more pronounced at the time of the Yugoslav-Greek agreement.83 Nevertheless, Eden 
reverted to the Balkan Federation idea in Moscow in October 1943. The British proposal 
was formulated in such terms that it could be viewed as a positive step towards the 
banishment of spheres of influence from international politics. Although this principle was 
of central importance for the US Government, Secretary of State Cordell Hull demonstrated 
little interest, leaving the issue to be resolved between the Soviet Union and Britain.84
Although both Eden and Molotov declared officially that their Governments did not favour 
separate spheres of influence in Europe, they did not reach an agreement on the Balkan 
Federation scheme. There was almost no discussion of the British proposition. Instead 
Moscow produced a statement that the plan was not appropriate as the nations concerned 
had not been consulted. Such an important step as the creation of a Federation should be the 
result of ‘free, peaceful and well-considered expression of the will of the people*. The Soviet
82 TsDIA -  AMVnR, f.176, op.15, a.e.48, 1.149, 173, Ankara to Sofia, 6.02.1943, a.e.49, 1.24, Ankara to 
Sofia, 12.02.1943; F0371/37179, R5081, Cadogan -  Yovanovic conversation, 4.06.1943; This is not 
mentioned in Deringil, S. Turkey’s... p. 133-166, nor in Livanios, D. ‘Bulgar-Yugoslav Controversy over 
Macedonia and the British Connection, 1939-1949’. DPhil: University o f Oxford, 1995
83 F0371/36992, N4906, FO memorandum, 10.08.1943
84 Sainsbury, K. The Turning Point. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985p.88-90; Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs o f  Cordell 
Hull. New York: Macmillan, 1948. p.1298
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Union did not view the existing emigre Governments or even the future first post-war 
Governments to represent adequately ‘the aspirations of their people’. It also believed that in 
the proposed form the Federation idea resembled too closely that of a cordon sanitaire
Of
directed against the Soviet Umon.
The unfavourable Soviet reaction forced the British Government to drop the whole subject 
until a more suitable moment. To all intents and purposes, however, the Balkan Federation 
scheme was permanently deleted from British plans for a post-war settlement. There was 
considerable uncertainty as to what could take its place. An acceptable substitute was not 
found and Britain did not prepare adequately to exploit the vacuum which would result from 
German withdrawal from the Balkans.
At the same time, the British Government became extremely watchful of any Soviet 
attempts to take up the idea of a Balkan Federation and give it a suitable for the Soviet 
Union form. In May 1944, an FO paper traced some indications of Soviet intentions to foster 
the unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. For Britain such a move would have several 
negative effects. It would isolate Greece and weaken its position vis-a-vis its northern 
neighbours. It was certain to revive Bulgaria's claim for an Aegean outlet, again to Greek 
disadvantage. Most importantly, a South Slav Federation would certainly be under direct 
Soviet patronage, and would threaten both Greek and Turkish positions in the 
Mediterranean. In practice all this constituted a direct challenge to the British interest and 
influence in the region.86
* * *
British planning for post-war Bulgaria was predominantly based on strategic priorities. In it 
historic British attitudes, relations with Bulgaria’s neighbours and above all the legacy of
85 FO/37031, N6921, Moscow conference proceedings, 19 -  30.10.1943
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centuries of rivalry with Russia featured high. The latter factor was complicated by the fact 
that Russia was now a Communist state, whose power mechanisms and political logic were 
not yet fully comprehended by British foreign policy makers. At this stage, concerns for 
democracy in Bulgaria, if present at all, played a supplementary part to security 
considerations.
Suspicions about the ultimate Soviet aims in the Balkans and Bulgaria were common 
currency in the FO. Nevertheless, there emerged a consensus among British Government 
officials that no active measures for counteracting Soviet influence unfavourable to Britain 
should be formulated. This was left for the future when Soviet aims and claims would be 
clearer. Not knowing what privileges the Soviet Union might demand in Bulgaria, it was 
deemed impossible for the British Government to determine its reaction in advance.
Britain failed to devise the slightest inducement for Bulgarian withdrawal from the Axis. 
Neither could it commit itself to any specific plan about Bulgaria’s post-war development 
before it made sure that the Soviet Union would also associate itself. All this clearly 
amounted to the concession of Soviet predominance in Bulgaria. The only condition 
imposed was that Soviet interests in Bulgaria did not threaten British influence in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Most strikingly, however, the FO could not even consistently follow a policy 
of disinterest and detachment. While it consciously chose not to take any actions regarding 
Bulgaria, it continued to regard the country as a possible zone of future interest.
86 F0371/43583, FO memorandum, 30.05.1944
Chapter Two 
Getting Bulgaria Out of the W ar
When Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact on 1 March 1941, Britain broke off official 
relations but did not declare war. It was the Bulgarian Government of Professor Bogdan 
Filov that declared war on Great Britain and the United States in December 1941, following 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. From that moment British political and military 
strategists sought to force Bulgaria out of the war. They gave priority to the need to 
disengage the country from the Axis and get it either to return to neutrality or to turn against 
Germany. Any British initiatives to that end were influenced by political considerations. 
The British Government was frilly aware that in Bulgaria British geopolitical interests were 
up against strong Soviet aspirations for dominance. All British Government bodies, which 
looked into wartime and post-war issues relating to Bulgaria, had to take into account the 
possible reaction of the Soviet Ally. Policy formulation and propaganda to Bulgaria were 
also shaped by Britain’s involvement with the Govemments-in-exile of Greece and 
Yugoslavia, reflecting the importance Britain attached to these two countries.
The Frustrations and Failures of the SOE. Britain directed a great deal of its
wartime efforts regarding Bulgaria towards establishing a network of special agents and 
obtaining relevant military and political information. Such activity was hindered by the fact 
that Bulgaria was not occupied but allied to Germany, a fact not conducive to the 
development of a significant resistance movement.
The Special Operations Executive was the clandestine British organisation most active in 
Bulgaria during the Second World War. It had developed as a branch of the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS) and later merged with similar structures from other
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Government Departments. Its structure and objectives were spelled out in a founding 
document approved by the War Cabinet in June 1940. This entrusted the newly 
established organisation with ‘all operations of sabotage, secret subversive propaganda, 
the encouragement of civil resistance in occupied areas, the stirring up of insurrection, 
strikes, etc.’.1
Very early in its development the SOE clashed with a number of agencies with which it 
had to co-ordinate its actions in Bulgaria, as well as the rest of Europe. The intelligence 
agencies resented the fact that SOE’s subversive methods could endanger informers who 
worked best in an atmosphere of calm and stability. The Political Warfare Executive 
protested that its carrying out of a consistent propaganda line was impeded by the sparse 
and often contradictory information it received from the SOE. The Chiefs of Staff 
believed that SOE’s actions which were of a limited military scale and impact, no matter 
how impressive psychologically, were a waste of effort and personnel which should be 
employed in regular fighting.
The SOE was often attacked by the Foreign Office, which jealously guarded its domain of 
external relations against friend and foe alike. A prime example of this was the negative 
attitude of the British Minister in Sofia, Rendel who strongly objected to the 
commencement of secret operations in Bulgaria before the declaration of war. He was 
overruled by instructions from London but this did not mean that the diplomatic 
establishment had overcome its suspicions and reservations towards the SOE. These were 
even more pronounced in the case of Bulgaria where the FO had minimal contacts and 
restricted influence, all of which could easily be monopolised by the SOE. The
1 West, N. The Story o f SOE, Britain’s Wartime Sabotage Organisation. London: Hodder&Stoughton, 
1992. p.20-21; Foot, M.R.D. SOE 1940 -1946. London: BBC Publications, 1986; Stafford, D.A.T. Britain 
and European Resistance 1940 -  1945. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979; Sweet-Escott, B. Baker Street 
Irregular. London: Methuen, 1963. Most of these mention operations in Bulgaria only in passing.
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complicated relationship between the FO and the SOE in Bulgaria shaped some aspects of 
Britain’s approach and policy towards that country during the latter stages of the war.
SOE vs FO Contacts with Bulgaria. The preparation for work inside Bulgaria
combined various political and military elements. Few available sources outline specific 
objectives. The broad picture can only be obtained from the existing operational material, 
bearing in mind that plans were constantly being altered to accommodate the changing 
perception of the situation in the country. Even so, documents from 1942 - 1944 show 
that some considerations remained constant and obviously formed the backbone of ideas 
about Bulgaria. Emphasis was given to the need to contact the biggest possible number of 
anti-Axis organisations and bring them into the loose coalition of a National Front. This 
was to unite all forms of resistance under the broad slogan of Bulgarian independence. Its 
political aims would be the distribution of propaganda, the mobilisation of anti-Hitler 
public opinion and pressure on the Bulgarian Government to exit from the war. 
Simultaneously, the National Front would hinder Bulgaria’s war effort in every 
conceivable way, including by sabotage and subversion. Initially the SOE considered that 
its ultimate task in Bulgaria in conjunction with the united opposition forces would be the 
staging of a revolt, if and when the British military authorities judged it appropriate.
In its preliminary work in Bulgaria the SOE did not exclude collaboration with any group 
which shared anti-Govemment and anti-German feelings. Soundings and contacts in 1940 
-1941 confirmed the expectations that in practice there were few political formations 
which were worth cultivating. These were the left wing of the Agrarian Union, the 
Military League and the Protoguerovists, that is the federalist left wing of the Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO). The maintenance of links with the 
Military League led by Damian Velchev was deemed especially important as the
2 HS5/181, D/H2 to D/HI, 28.10.1940
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organisation had undisputed influence over the Bulgarian army and police force. Realism 
prompted British officials to recognise that though these officers opposed Bulgarian 
involvement with Germany, they were not necessarily pro-British. Contacts with the 
Bulgarian military were also hindered by the utterly conspiratorial nature of their 
organisation and their strong desire for independence, which prevented them from 
accepting funding from foreigners. In contrast, the Protoguerovists were eager to receive 
as many weapons and ammunitions as possible. Their terrorist methods were ideal for 
sabotage and, if necessary, for assassination, although in common with the officers they 
agreed to work ‘with’, rather than ‘for’ Britain.3
Shortly before the British Legation left Bulgaria in 1941, the SOE in London received a 
report from one of its agents visiting Bulgaria that ‘complete understanding’ had been 
reached between the above three organisations. The most categorical commitment was 
that of G.M., the left Agrarian leader. Negotiations with him had not been easy but, once 
he accepted co-operation with the British secret services, the latter had many occasions to 
confirm that he was ‘a man of exceptional judgement and mental honesty’.4 Among the 
first successful operations of the SOE in Bulgaria was organising G.M.’s escape from 
Bulgaria in the truck transporting the archives of the British Embassy to Turkey in 
February 1941. G.M. was then helped to make his way to the Middle East. With British 
help and under British supervision he set up the Free and Independent Bulgaria 
Committee, which was in charge of two radio stations broadcasting into Bulgaria from the 
Middle East. There he also served as the resident authority on all matters Bulgarian. G.M. 
actively worked for the renewal of his contacts with his followers and fellow-politicians
3 HS5/181, D/H2 to D/HI, 28.10.1940, report D/H2 to D/HI, 28.11.1940; Amery, J. Approach March. 
London: Hutchinson, 1973. p. 175. The links of the Protoguerovists with the Bulgarian Communists are 
revealed in Semerdjiev, P. BKP, Makedonskiyat vupros i VMRO. Detroit, Michigan: Macedono-Bulgarian 
Institute, c.1990. p.60, 84
4 HS5/181, D/H2 to D/HI, 28.10.1940
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inside Bulgaria. He duly prepared messages to be smuggled over the Turkish border or by 
sea. Very few of these reached the addressees and even fewer were answered.5
When Bulgaria first entered the war the SOE maintained that G.M. was the representative 
not only of his Agrarian faction but also the authorised envoy of the other two 
organisations which had shown an inclination to collaborate with the British services in 
Bulgaria. There is indirect evidence that initially the British Government was prepared to 
treat him and his associates as friendly exiled political leaders. On 21 September 1941, 
Lord Glenconner, Head of SOE in Cairo, wrote to G.M. and his aide Kosta Todorov that 
they were recognised as the heads of a Bulgarian pro-British organisation and as such 
would be helped on the principles of Lend-Lease.6 This was contrary to the intentions of 
the FO which vigorously opposed and effectively precluded any official recognition of 
G.M.’s political status. Consequently, Todorov, who had appeared in London in 1942, 
created a few unpleasant incidents for the FO. He remonstrated at being denied what he 
regarded as promised backing for his attempts to act as the representative of an emigre 
Government.7
In the summer of 1943, the relatively smooth relations between the British special 
services and G.M. suffered further. Upon intervention from the FO, G.M.’s movements 
and responsibilities for propaganda to Bulgaria were restricted. This precipitated doubts 
in the SOE whether he would continue the association with it at all; the more so since at 
the very same time he had been approached by the US secret services. There is no clear 
indication why restrictions were placed on G.M.’s duties. The recurring FO resentment of
5 Rendel, G. The Sword and the Olive: Recollections o f Diplomacy and the Foreign Service. London: 
Murrey, 1957. p. 178; Moser, Ch. Dimitrov o f Bulgaria. A Political Biography o f Dr.George M.Dimitrov. 
Ottawa, II.: Caroline House Publishers, 1979. p. 169-170
6 HS5/183, Lord Glenconner to Dr.G.M.Dimitrov, September 1941
7 HS5/183, SOE communications, SOE to FO, September 1941; Todoroff, K. Balkan Firebrand. Chicago, 
II.: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company, 1943. p.312-313
the SOE does not offer a persuasive explanation. An important factor for limiting G.M.’s 
activities could have been the apprehension that he would indeed form a Govemment-in- 
exile, which would then seek official British support. A British refusal would be 
embarrassing in view of the erstwhile involvement and recognition would be impossible 
without scandalising the vociferous Greeks and Yugoslavs.8
After the withdrawal of the British Legation, the FO tried to establish its own channels for 
communication with Bulgaria. Among the few means it had were the services of the former 
Bulgarian Minister in London Nikola Momchilov, who had resigned his post on Bulgaria’s 
adherence to the Axis. The Southern Department had a very favourable opinion of him and 
he was prepared to co-operate with the FO, even though he knew it had ruled out his idea of 
setting up a Bulgarian Govemment-in-exile in London. In the summer of 1942, Momchilov 
had suggested that he write personal letters to three senior Bulgarian officers who were 
serving with the Bulgarian occupation corps in Yugoslavia. The letters were cleared with the 
Chiefs of Staff and then dispatched through secret channels.9
In his letters Momchilov warned that Bulgaria’s future position would be determined in the 
course of the coming Balkan campaign which was going to be a joint operation of all Three 
Alllies. The central theme of the letters was to urge responsible Bulgarian circles to stop 
helping the Germans and not ‘to sit back and wait for the Soviet troops’.10
In early 1943, following the same procedure, Momchilov wrote twice to General Mihov, 
Bulgarian War Minister, and also to the Bulgarian Ministers in Switzerland, Spain and 
Sweden. There is evidence in the Bulgarian archives only of the letter to the Bulgarian
8 HS5/180, special report: April - September 1943,1.10.1943; HS5/190, D/H2, 28.09.1944; Young, K. (ed.) 
The Diaries o f Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, vol.2 ,1939-1965. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980. p.l 15; Moser, 
D. Dimitrov. .. p. 159
9 F0371/37151, R3420, Momchilov to Sargent, 10.04.1943
10 Rachev, St. Churchill... p.157; F0371/37151, R3420, Momchilov to Sargent, 10.04.1943, R3952, 
Momchilov to Sargent, 30.04.1943; F0371/37152, R10716, Momchilov to Sargent, 24.10.1943
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Ambassador in Madrid Purvan Draganov which was duly presented to King Boris El and 
the Bulgarian Government in the summer of 1943. The Soviets had learned about these 
approaches and immediately requested more information. This alarmed Eden who feared 
that the USSR might suspect Britain of dealing behind the Soviet back.11
The FO had no illusions about the minor value of these communications. At the time, 
however, their chances appeared no less likely than those of the missives G.M. was 
preparing. British officials found the effort worthwhile as it could open an alternative 
channel with Bulgaria, involving political circles different from the ones with whom the 
SOE hoped to work.
Momchilov, as well as Dimiter Matsankiev, another Bulgarian exile in London, persistently 
tried to persuade the FO of the enormous importance of securing contacts with the Bulgarian 
army which consisted of half a million well-equipped, trained and disciplined men. There 
were historical reasons to believe that the rank-and-file were anti-German. Elisabeth Barker 
at the PWE judged these arguments to be imaginative and over optimistic but was inclined to 
accept the plausibility of the existence of some anti-Govemment centre within the Bulgarian 
army; indeed ‘it would be contrary to Balkan tradition if there were not’.12
The Southern Department was well aware of the advantages that would be derived from 
stable links with Bulgarian officers. In this it was at one with the SOE which had made some 
contacts with representatives of the Military League and was hopeful of renewing them. The 
SOE estimated that the military were among the few groups in Bulgaria which were capable 
of bringing about a revolution. The FO agreed with this and was prepared to authorise 
contacts with the army, although it firmly forbade any political dealings with either
11 Moser, D. Dimitrov... p. 159; Barker, E. British Policy... p.214
12 F0371/37155, R817, Matsankiev memorandum, 12.01.1943, R4215, Barker to Southern Department, 
8.05.1943; F0371/43589, R7421, Momchilov to Southern Department, March 1944; F0371/43586, R7482, 
Momchilov to Howard, 10.05.1944
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Communists or Agrarians. The FO accepted that one British objective should be to cause the 
fall of the Bulgarian Government by revolution. But what it had in mind was, should the 
opportunity arise, ‘to engineer a military revolution which would at the worst neutralise the 
Bulgarian army as an effective fighting force, and at the best turn it into a pro-Allied 
force’.13
The increased attention -  if only on paper -  towards the Bulgarian army reflected the 
growing necessity in the course of the war to achieve practical results in Bulgaria. After the 
successful Allied landings in Sicily it was obvious that a Bulgarian volte-face could be 
decisive for the whole Balkan Peninsula. This overshadowed any political considerations. 
Action in the field became imperative, all the more so since propaganda broadcasts from 
London and Jerusalem were the only success Britain could claim. G.M.’s contacts barely 
gave signs of existence; the previous January the SOE had dropped ‘blind’ and lost 
J.S.Morgan, their best-trained officer for work in Bulgaria.14
It was at this point that the FO’s tolerance of the SOE Bulgarian section wore thin. In 
September 1943, the death of King Boris IE marked an important political crossroad for 
Bulgaria of which little became immediately known in London. Sargent recorded the 
desperate need for information by wondering ‘have we any idea what is happening in 
Bulgaria? Can nobody tell us anything... C? SOE? Middle East Intelligence?’ His 
subordinates dryly commented that the SOE’s Bulgarian contacts were ‘rotten’.15 Ironically, 
the FO was to a great degree dependent on situation briefings provided by the special 
services. These were often ambiguous and sometimes downright contradictory, and
13 F0371/37153, R5322 and HS5/180, Major Boughey - Howard, 16.06.1943, 21.06.1943; F0371/43587, 
R2808, SOE plan, 4.02.1944
14 HS5/180, memorandum on Bulgaria, 7.06.1943
15 F0371/37153, R8978, Sargent, Rose, 13.09.1943; Barker, E. British Policy... p.215
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deepened the criticism of the same diplomats who had themselves stood in the way of 
establishing a secure underground network in Bulgaria in the first instance.
British Military Missions in Bulgaria. A fresh attempt to collect information and
influence events in the country was required. For this the FO authorised the dispatch of a 
British Military Mission, led first by Mostyn Davies and after his death by Frank Thompson. 
Their actions were accompanied by controversy and bad luck, which caused tendentious 
interpretations of British policy towards Bulgaria.16 With hindsight, it is now possible to say 
that in the winter of 1943 -  1944, British policy makers evaluated Bulgaria on purely 
military grounds and emphasised the necessity to knock it out of the war despite the possible 
political cost. What is probably most striking is the fact that both the FO and the SOE 
regarded work with the Bulgarian Communists as not only advantageous but also highly 
desirable.
At the beginning of the war the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact embarrassed 
Communists across Europe. They could no longer pursue their erstwhile anti-fascist rhetoric 
and tactics as their main enemy, the fascists, were bound by a treaty with their principal 
patron, the Soviet Union. When Bulgaria joined the Axis, the Bulgarian Communist Party 
was still suffering from this confusion. Nevertheless, British observers considered it one of 
the staunchest anti-Govemment forces, which could also boast past terrorist actions and a 
history of underground survival. British special agents had not sought direct connection with 
the Communists themselves. The SOE believed that, if necessary, G.M. who was in the left 
wing of the Agrarian movement would be able to attract Communists for common action. 
The FO’s attention was drawn to the Communists when in early 1943 reports of increased 
Communist activity accumulated in London. This led to an enquiry in February 1943 from
16 The accusation was initially publicised by the Bulgarian Partisan leader General Slavcho Trunski in 
Rabotnichesko Delo, 26.11.1947. It was tirelessly repeated by Bulgarian Communist historiography and
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the FO to the SOE London Headquarters in Baker Street, as to why no direct links with the 
Bulgarian Communists had been made. The SOE’s reaction was acid:
.. .having been accused by the Foreign Office of working only with the Communists in Greece, we are 
now politely ticked off for not working with them in Bulgaria. ...in Yugoslavia they are quite 
incapable of making up their minds whether to support their accredited Ally the Yugoslav 
Government, or the so-called Communists supported by Russia... .it is too much to expect the Foreign 
Office to be consistent.17
The confusion was more apparent than real and lasted only until British policy makers 
clarified in their minds the relation between the military contribution of the various 
resistance movements in the Balkans and the future strategic position of the territories in 
which they operated. Indeed, the news of successful Communist fighting was more often 
than not accompanied by warnings from people coming out of Bulgaria that the leftist 
elements were getting too strong and clearing the ground for radical social changes to be
1 fibacked by the approaching victorious Soviet army. At the same time, officers with leftist 
and sometimes openly stated Communist inclinations worked in the SOE itself. In the case 
of Bulgaria it is not obvious whether they played as significant a role as the one attributed to 
them in relation to the resistance movements in Yugoslavia.19
One advantage that sprang from the lack of reliable contacts and sufficient information about 
the internal developments in Bulgaria was that in a way it freed British policy makers to 
undertake what they considered the most practicable course. They were not restrained by
recently re-surfaced in Thompson, E.P. Beyond the Frontier: The Politics o f a Failed Mission. Woodbridge: 
Merlin Press, 1997.
17 HS5/185, DH/V to CD, 27.02.1943
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19 Foot, M.R.D. SOE... p. 145-147; Beloff, N. Tito’s Flawed Legacy. London: Gollanz, 1985. p.89-93
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any alliances with political elements inside the country whose position they might endanger 
by uninformed action.
The short stoiy of British involvement with the Bulgarian Partisans is relatively well-known 
despite the scarcity of memoirs and secondary literature. Two Missions were dropped in 
zones controlled by the Yugoslav Partisans on the border with Bulgaria at the end of 1943. 
They managed to find Bulgarian guerrillas and established contact with representatives of 
the Central Committee of the BCP, which effectively controlled Bulgarian armed resistance. 
The Missions’ brief was to estimate the potential strength of the underground Bulgarian 
movement and gather evidence for a considered opinion as to whether Britain should support 
i t20
The little that was known about Bulgarian resistance made some British officers suspicious 
of getting involved with simple ‘never-do-wells’ who could also turn out to be anti-British. 
But the belief that even such people could be useful prevailed:
Whether these are good Bulgarians or bad Bulgarians... are questions, which do not interest SOE. 
What interests SOE is that these are Bulgarians who are prepared to fight and commit sabotage against 
the Bulgarian Government and the Germans although this means risk of torture or death for them. 
Such men can be useful to us.21
The reports of the British Liaison Officers (BLOs) -as the Missions’ heads were called - 
were favourable to the Bulgarian Partisans. The latter claimed to have divided the country 
into twelve operational zones, which were under the command of a central military 
authority. Information about the numbers and actions of detachments in each zone was 
forwarded to Cairo, together with information about the political organisation behind the 
resistance -  the Fatherland Front coalition of anti-Govemment parties. This body also
20 HS5/180, memorandum on Bulgaria, 7.06.1943; Rachev, St. Churchill... p.193
21 HS5/180, Bulgaria situation report, March 1944
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directed armed town units, which were responsible for a wave of political murders, 
especially in Sofia. In order to forestall suspicions that the Fatherland Front was simply a 
facade for the Communists, the latter claimed that not all guerrillas were Communists and 
that the Communist Party was but one of the founders of the Fatherland Front.22
It is now evident that the Bulgarian Communist leaders in charge of links with the BLOs 
misrepresented the role of the Communist Party in the armed resistance in Bulgaria. The 
British officers were told that there were about 12,000 Partisans in Bulgaria. This figure was 
not doubted initially and supplies were apportioned accordingly. Post-war Western 
historiography accepted these numbers as opposed to the hugely inflated ones put forward 
by the Bulgarian Communists after September 1944.23 New sources reveal that the 
Communists used different internal statistics. In March 1944, the CC reported to Moscow 
that ‘there were twenty-six Partisan detachments altogether with the overall number of 
Partisans at 2,320’ 24
te
Not being able verify it, the SOE in the Middle East had no reason to distrust the received 
information. The strong figures seemed to be indirectly confirmed by the constant stream of 
news about the upsurge of leftist opposition to the Bulgarian regime. The BLOs did not 
express the slightest doubt about the sincerity of their Communist contacts and could not 
even guess at the discrepancy between reality and the data they were given. They themselves 
were attached to what we now know were the biggest Partisan units operating in relatively 
favourable circumstances on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border. The BLOs also assessed
22 F 0371/43579, R724, Talbot-Rice to Howard, 14.01.1944, R3645, BLO report, 21.02.1944, R3646, BLO 
reports, 23.02.1944
23 Bell, J.D. The BCP from Blagoev to Zhivkov. Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1986. p.63
24 The first communications from the BLOs in Bulgaria claimed that the Partisans were ‘several thousands’, 
later they were reported at about 12,000, F0371/43587, R2808, SOE plan, 4.02.1944. The lower figure is 
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favourably the opportunities for the Partisan forces in Bulgaria to grow: the population was 
assumed to be of generally leftist inclinations, attracted by the Partisan slogans and 
occasional personal examples of courage. Another positive factor was the perceived 
mounting popular discontent with the Bulgarian Government’s internal and foreign policy.
Such analysis of the situation in Bulgaria led the SOE to resolve to assist the Partisans. The 
Bulgarian section highlighted the crucial element of time: at this moment comparatively 
small supplies of arms would go a long way and eventually make a big difference. An even 
more significant result would be the knowledge that aid had been sent by Britain and the 
USA. This would give the British clandestine organisations a good chance of gaining the 
Partisans’ confidence and establishing mutual co-operation on a firmer basis. It could 
convince the Bulgarian guerrillas to provide the SOE with the necessary military information 
and accept BLOs for other parts of the country.
From the start the SOE realised that the usefulness of the Bulgarian movement depended on 
the extent of British help. For the Bulgarian Partisans to play their potentially important part, 
it was vital that they receive regular drops of supplies. Sorties were planned to start in 
February. There should be twenty in that month, increasing to fifty in May. These should 
provide the Bulgarian Partisans with at least 7,500 rifles, 18 tons of explosive materials and 
demolition accessories and 2,000 pairs of boots.
The FO had approved support for the Bulgarian Partisans. The SOE Bulgarian section had 
been apportioned stores for the equipment of 15,000 men but transportation aircraft was not 
available due to other more urgent tasks. The original planning was modified to fifteen 
possible sorties in February, with the hope for compensation in the following months. In
25 F0371/43587, R2808, Force 133 appreciation, 4.02.1944
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practice, however, the combination of lack of aircraft and bad weather conditions reduced 
the number of successful sorties in February and March 1944 to three.26
These logistical difficulties were further aggravated by the re-structuring of the SOE brought 
about by the general course of the war. Following the move of the Allied Headquarters, the 
SOE operational centre was transferred from Africa to Bari in Italy at the beginning of 1944. 
For technical reasons, however, the Bulgarian and Romanian sections remained in Cairo. 
This made the lines of command and decision making extremely complicated. These crossed 
even more when the Balkan Allied Force was made responsible for the operation of special 
duty aircraft in the region but not for the special operations themselves. At roughly the same 
time a special Balkan Affairs Committee had been established to co-ordinate all Allied 
actions in the region by reconciling conflicting views. This, however, encountered US 
resistance from the very beginning.
The position of the BLOs in Bulgaria was not made easier by the suspicions of the Partisan 
leaders. In March 1944, the CC received a letter from its exiled head Georgi Dimitrov 
ordering it to treat with caution any British approaches and to make no political 
undertakings. Dimitrov warned that imperialist Britain might try to trade immediate material 
help for future political influence in Bulgaria. After the war, prominent guerrilla leaders 
asserted that as time went on and supplies did not come, the Partisans began wondering 
whether Britain had not set out to disrupt the Partisan organisation. They suspected that 
Britain aimed at destroying the Partisans’ potential for taking power in Bulgaria at the end of 
the war.28 These allegations were made in the early Cold War period and reflect the then 
attitude of the Bulgarian Communists to Britain. The assertions have little value for the
26 HS5/180, situation report, March 1944
27 F0371/43654, R4736, Lord Moyne memorandum, 8.03.1944; F0371/43655, R10986, 9th meeting of 
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appreciation of British policy as emerging from the contacts between the SOE and the 
Partisans as they fail to take into account Britain’s priorities of the moment. They are 
indicative, however, of the lack of trust of the Bulgarian Communist guerrillas for Britain 
and therefore of the shaky original basis of the relations of the SOE with the Partisans.
The plan for SOE activities listed purely military objectives. The overall aim was to secure 
German withdrawal from Bulgaria and to cause the fall of the Bulgarian Government. If 
‘revolution’ was mentioned it was in the sense of a military coup which would neutralise 
Bulgaria as an active enemy. The FO liaison at the Middle East Headquarters Kit Steel 
admitted that he looked upon the Partisans as an instrument of pressure on the present 
Government: ‘What happens after Bulgaria turns on Germany... is no concern of ours so 
long as the damage to the Germans has been done’.29 Strict instructions were dispatched to 
the BLOs in Bulgaria not to get involved in internal Bulgarian affairs at all. In propaganda 
too, the FO insisted on strict neutrality as far as Bulgarian politics was concerned. As late as 
the summer of 1944, they did not wish to appear to be promoting the image even of their 
known collaborator, the Agrarian G.M..
The same tactical considerations were put forward by high-ranking SOE officers in Cairo 
and London while assessing the SOE actions in Bulgaria after the Bulgarian army captured 
and executed Frank Thompson in June 1944. The review concluded that the Bulgarian 
Partisans’ actions had a negligible influence on the military configuration in the Balkans. 
Their inability to engage in serious warfare with the German or Bulgarian army was the 
primary cause for Britain’s decision to cease the contacts. By August 1944 Lord Moyne, the 
Minister Resident in the Middle East, had professed that the Bulgarians ‘had shown
28 Dragoicheva, Ts. Povelya na dulga. vol.3. Sofia: Partizdat, 1980. p.495-496; Rabotnichesko Delo, 
26.11.1947; Lebedev, N.S. Comintern...p.425,443
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themselves immune to our attempts to build up serious resistance movement in Bulgaria
proper such as would have appreciable influence on events there*. He concluded that ‘the
Bulgarian Partisans were incomparable with the Yugoslavs in terms of conquering free
zones’. For Lord Moyne, a high proportion of the Bulgarian guerrillas were ‘simply
traditional brigands: risking the life of spirited young officers not to speak of arms deliveries
^  1
to most undesirable elements are not worth the candle*.
Secret Operations in Bulgaria and the Allies. The Soviet and US secret services also
operated in Bulgaria during the Second World War. In terms of intensity and success, the 
wartime activities of the British secret services in Bulgaria do not stand up to comparison to 
those of their Soviet counterparts. It was characteristic of the British-Soviet wartime 
relationship that whereas Moscow was informed about British special operations, Soviet 
subversive efforts Bulgaria were not admitted to the Allies. This was partly due to the 
working habits of the Soviet services, which were burdened by bureaucratic rules and 
obsessed with security.32 More importantly, the Soviet Government withheld information 
about any actions in Bulgaria because it did not wish to give any idea about its objectives in 
the country.
Relations between the British and US special services were open and, in most cases, 
mutually beneficial. At first, the USA displayed little interest in Bulgaria. The US High 
Command had made it abundantly clear that in general it preferred not to interfere too 
prominently in the Balkans. In September 1942, an agreement was reached between the 
newly formed US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the SOE. According to this, in the 
Middle East the OSS would be subordinate to its British counterpart. The arrangement was
30 F 0371/43587, R2808, SOE plan, 4.02.1944; F0371/43585, R6050, FO to Cairo, 9.04.1944; 
F 0371/43586, R9693, Clutton, 21.06.1944
31 F 0371/43579, R12750, Lord Moyne to FO, 15.08.1944
32 Deane, J.R. The Strange Alliance. London: John Murray, 1947. p.27-33
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adhered to until in the autumn of 1943 Colonel William Donovan, the Head of the OSS, 
proposed to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff a scheme dealing with Bulgaria. This was ‘a long- 
range plan’ for Bulgaria but its immediate objective was to contact the Bulgarian 
Government and secure its withdrawal from the war. The plan looked into possibilities to 
enhance US subversive efforts, mostly understood as attempts to divert Bulgaria from 
participating in further military operations against the Allies. One part of the scheme 
envisaged ‘organisation and direction of guerrilla warfare and any other form of action 
against the Germans’. Few US servicemen stationed in the Balkans could undertake such 
operations. That was why, even though it was developed at a department responsible for 
secret warfare and ‘black’ propaganda, the plan foresaw the predominant use of diplomatic 
methods.33
The British special services were anything but pleased at the sudden outburst of US interest 
in Bulgaria, which they viewed as threatening to their whole position in the region. Churchill 
was vehemently against any notion of US actions in the Balkans being carried outside 
British command and control. His advisers at the FO and the SOE were sure of their superior 
knowledge and had nothing but scepticism for the US initiative.34
These rivalries were purely tactical and temporary. They did not carry with them any 
implications for the political future of Bulgaria. The British and US special services, which 
had both been set up to function in the extraordinary circumstances of the war, aimed at 
specific wartime results. Frictions with the Soviet services were at a different level and 
reflected the strained relationship with that Ally.
In Moscow, the SOE and the OSS had their own representatives, separate from the Military 
Missions of the Two Western Allies. Their functions turned out to be little more than
33 Boll, M.M. 'US Plan for a Post-war Pro-Western Bulgaria: A Little-Known Wartime Initiative in Eastern 
Europe. ’ Diplomatic History, vol.7, no.2,1983. p. 125-130
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representative. They were in touch with the NKVD, the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
to which they passed low-level military intelligence. They arranged for Soviet Missions to 
be transported to Yugoslavia and Italy with British help, in the hope that these efforts would 
be appreciated and reciprocated. But ‘sharing secrets with Stalin* remained a difficult and 
thankless business.35
Recognising the limited nature of its contacts with Bulgaria, the SOE approached the Soviet 
special services with requests for details on developments in the country. British officials 
expected that the Soviet services possessed more up-to-date information, as the Soviet Union 
maintained relations with Bulgaria and had retained its Embassy in Sofia. All the Allies 
received from the Soviet side, however, was general political outlines, which gave few 
insights and hardly went beyond what was known from British and US sources.36 This 
clearly illustrates Soviet reluctance to participate in joint actions and Soviet unwillingness to 
communicate specific knowledge to the Western partners.
In mid-1944, despite erstwhile frustrations, the FO agreed that the SOE should renew 
contacts with the NKVD, mainly for the purpose of consultation. By then the Bulgarian 
section in the Middle East and the SOE at Moscow had separately put forward the idea that 
Soviet assistance should be requested again. A joint impromptu plan was made to ask the 
NKVD ‘to lend’ the Bulgarian Communist political emigre Georgi Andreichin to the SOE. 
After some thought this was dropped as too risky and unrealistic. Nevertheless, the SOE
34 Boll, M.M. Cold War... p .ll ,  15-16, 28; Barker, E. British Policy... p.118-120
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continued its efforts to obtain operational information, mainly enquiring about possible 
Bulgarian contacts and dropping points for Allied planes carrying supplies.37
The SOE was right to suspect that Moscow possessed information on Bulgaria which it
simply refused to disclose to its war Allies. Indeed, apart from diplomatic relations,
throughout the war the Soviet Government maintained contacts with the Bulgarian
Communists. This was done initially through the Comintern. When the Comintern was
officially disbanded in May 1943 the Department for International Information (DII) of the
CC of the Bolshevik Party assumed its functions.38 Dimitrov, the Head of the Comintern, 
over
also presided the Foreign Bureau of the Bulgarian CC and was recognised as the leader of 
the BCP by the Communists inside Bulgaria. Dimitrov had wireless links with Bulgaria -  
one direct and another through Tito, who passed telegrams across the Bulgarian border. 
Dimitrov could also send letters to his comrades inside Bulgaria through Comintern couriers. 
Two radio stations broadcast over Bulgaria from Soviet territory.39 Recently published 
materials make it clear that all directives to the Bulgarian Communists were approved and, 
in certain cases, inspired by Stalin and his close associates.40
In Bulgaria Moscow employed a combination of political and subversive elements among 
which the Bulgarian Communists were the most important. In July 1941, in response to the 
German invasion of the USSR, the BCP decided to prepare for an armed uprising. In August 
Stalin mled against this: Dimitrov informed the internal leaders that after most careful
37 HS5/179, report on Bulgaria, 1.03.1943
38 Lebedev, N.S. Comintern... p.72-80
39 Bell, J.D. The BCP... p.58; Daskalov, D. Zhan... p.184-185; Dimitrov, G. Dnevnik... p.258-282
40 Issussov, M. Stalin and Bulgaria. Sofia: UI ‘Sv.Kl.Ohridski’, 1991; Daskalov, D. Zhan...; Lebedev, N.S. 
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examination ‘by the highest authority’, it had been concluded that it would be impossible to 
support an uprising from outside and therefore it would be doomed.41
Instead, the Soviet Government encouraged the setting up of armed town units and of 
guerrilla bands to operate in the countryside. The Soviet Government, however, made it 
clear that it had no arms to spare for the Bulgarian resistance. The first time the Soviet 
Government did send in weapons and ammunitions was on 8 September 1944, when a 
Communist seizure of power was imminent42 In addition, the Bulgarian Communists were 
directed to gather military intelligence as was done for instance by the spy ring of General 
Vladimir Zaimov who was caught by the Bulgarian police and executed in June 1942 43 The 
Soviet secret services also aimed to reinforce the Bulgarian resistance: Bulgarian emigres* 
were dropped by parachute and transported by submarine to the Bulgarian Black Sea coast 
in 1941 -  1942 44 As neither NKVD nor Red Army archives have been opened, the precise 
information sent to Moscow by its agents in Bulgaria is not known. Undeniably, this 
information was crucial for the Soviet Government’s assessment of the political and military 
situation in Bulgaria.
Neither the Bulgarian Partisans nor the NKVD related any of their operational knowledge to 
their British contacts; the latter were not even informed that at the time the BLOs were with 
the Bulgarian resistance, at least two Soviet-trained Bulgarian-born radio operators were sent 
in through Yugoslavia.45 The British special services were not aware either that the BCP -
41 Valeva, EX. ‘Kurs na vooruzhennuyu bor’bu bolgarskogo naroda. Perviyie partizanyi (yun’ 1941 -  
fevral’ 1943g.). ’ Marina. V.V. (ed.l Dvizheniva Soprotivleniya v stranah Tsentral’noy i Yugo-vostochnoy 
Evropy 1939 -  1945. Moscow: Radiks, 1995;. Moscow: Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies, 1995. 
p.211-214
42 Daskalov, D. Zhan... p.281; Rachev, St. Churchill... p.234; Lebedev, N.S. Comintern... p.12
43 Bell, J.D. The BCP... p.60
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with Soviet knowledge -  had contacts with Bulgarian Opposition politicians. Of these, 
probably most forthcoming was the future Prime Minister Ivan Bagryanov who even 
promised to soften police and army measures against the Partisans in return for a political 
compromise.46
The Soviet Government’s unwillingness to work with the British services in Bulgaria 
stretched to an extent which was detrimental to the interests of the Bulgarian Communists. 
In March 1944, when the weather finally permitted the dispatch of supplies to the Bulgarian 
resistance, the SOE could not find the necessary aircraft. The Soviet air force was asked 
whether it could organise drops of British materiel in eastern Bulgaria including captured 
German weapons. The Partisans themselves had specifically asked for these and the Soviet 
army was known to have them. Months passed before the British appeal received a reply: the 
Soviet militaiy forces would neither send the weapons nor provide safe dropping points 47
The Logic of Military Necessities. The subversive efforts of the British special
services in Axis territory were not developed per se. Their purpose was to support the 
overall military strategy of the Allies, to prepare and supplement operations by the regular 
armed forces. This logic was certainly applied to the Balkans: while SOE actions were 
being carried out on the ground, British military and political leaders were discussing a 
possible major Allied offensive on the Peninsula.
The idea of large-scale operations in the region had been first endorsed in 1942 when it 
seemed that these could be an extension to a successful campaign in North Africa. True, at 
that time British military planners put the stress on undermining the Italian position in the 
Central Mediterranean. But they were very much aware that this would have decisive
46 Dimitrov, I. Ivan Bagryanov -  tsaredvorets, politik, durzhavnik. Sofia: AI ‘Prof.Marin Drinov’, 1995. 
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consequences eastward where Turkey’s entry into the war was only one of a series of 
important strategic objectives.
Churchill, supported by the Southern Department, was the greatest proponent of the idea of a 
Second front in the Balkans.48 He put it forward whenever he found a suitable opportunity at 
either military or political discussions. Although his stubborn adherence to the Balkan front 
was undoubtedly related to various long-term considerations, his initial motives were above 
all military. Only in mid-1944 did Churchill stress that his cherished Eastern Mediterranean 
initiative was also designed to resolve ‘the brute political issues’ between Britain and the 
Soviet Union. In this Churchill himself was motivated by imperial concerns at least as much 
as by anti-Communism which had been a formidable characteristic of his political outlook 
before the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union 49 It can be speculated that if Allied military 
operations had been carried out in the Balkans they would have enhanced British influence. 
This, however, would not have necessarily meant a decrease in the role of the Balkan 
Communist parties. Neither did it signify a British preference for political over military 
objectives in the course of the war.50
An invasion of South Eastern Europe was continuously deliberated at British-US ‘top-brass’ 
conferences, and while none of them endorsed it completely, it was not categorically 
discarded until mid-1944. In mid-1943 the invasion of Sicily not only brought fighting closer 
to the Balkans but also made military action there physically possible. This had a profound 
impact on Hitler’s satellites among which Bulgaria was believed to be particularly impressed 
by developments in Italy. Roosevelt agreed that this situation should be exploited by the 
Allies. At the Casablanca Conferences in January 1943 and the Washington Conference in
48 Rothwell, V. Britain... p.201
49 Barker, E. British Policy... p. 124; Dilks, D. ‘British Political... ’ p.28; Kent, J. British Imperial... p.9; 
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May 1943, the US Chiefs of Staff had given consent to explore the option favoured by their 
British counterparts. But because for US military planners a Balkan campaign remained 
militarily undesirable, the possibility for it became distinctly remote by the time of the 
Quebec Conference in August 1943.51
At Teheran at the end of 1943 the US military commanders firmly refused to deploy troops 
in the Balkans. This did not prevent Churchill from bringing up the question in the summer 
of 1944, when General Alexander promoted the idea of taking advantage of the Ljubljana 
gap. The last attempts to convert the US Chiefs were made in August and September 1944 
when Churchill tried to substitute the landings in the south of France for operations in the 
Adriatic. He could not prevail over the joint front of Roosevelt and Stalin who -  each for his 
own reasons -  expressed preference for a cross-Channel invasion (code-named 
OVERLORD). This decision had far-reaching consequences as the subsequent absence of 
Western troops in the Balkans proved a major hindrance for British and US post-war 
strategy. But the course and above all the outcome of these discussions leaves no doubt as to 
the priority of military over political objectives.52 The possibility of landings in the Balkans 
was evaluated chiefly in terms of how it would influence the preparation for OVERLORD 
by pinning down as many enemy divisions as possible.
Military objectives were also paramount in Soviet planning. Until the end of 1942 Stalin 
repeatedly urged the Western Allies not only to advance in Europe, but suggested that the 
Second front might be opened in the Balkans. Even if he was merely probing British
50Rachev, St. Churchill... p. 184
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intentions with the aim of diverting them, as Elisabeth Barker suggests, he was also 
envisaging short-term military achievements.53
A direct attack on Hitler’s Eastern European satellites by Britain and the United States could 
have had distinct advantages for the Allied war conduct. Some contemporary British 
observers even thought that a skilful and well-timed action could bring about the surrender 
of the whole of South Eastern Europe in weeks. The collapse of one Axis satellite would 
have had an immediate effect on the others, and the collapse of more than one would be fatal 
for Germany. In late 1943 and in 1944, Germany was becoming increasingly dependent on 
the resources of its satellites. The denial of the Romanian oil fields, which were Germany’s 
only substantial source of natural oil, could have had far-reaching repercussions. Bulgaria’s 
strategic importance lay in the fact that the Balkan range could be considered the forward 
bastion guarding the Danube, which was the essential transport route for Romanian oil. The 
defence of the mountains, in turn, depended on the possession of Sofia and the railways 
north of it.54
The Balkan countries were aware of their strategic significance to Germany. They were 
becoming ever more apprehensive of future Allied strategy, especially after the Allied 
successes in North Africa and Sicily and the reversal at the Eastern front. For Bulgaria, one 
of the high points of alarm was at the beginning of 1943, when the Adana Anglo-Turkish 
conversations were alleged to have spelt out military efforts directed against it.55 Reports 
reaching Sofia from most Bulgarian diplomatic missions abroad dealt with the possibility of 
a Balkan invasion. The ones that refuted it were no less disturbing as they discounted it on 
the grounds of some kind of Western understanding with Soviet Russia from which
53 Barker, E. British Policy... p.l 12; Rothwell, V. Britain... p.109
54 FO 37173, R5514, The Observer excerpt, 20.06.1943; F0371/43587, R2808, Force 133 appreciation,
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communisation of the region would ensue. If this was in any degree true, the Bulgarian 
ruling circles were once again facing the difficulty they had experienced at the start of the 
war, namely how to balance between Germany and the USSR.56
This apprehension was exploited by British military planners who knew about it from 
intercepted enemy diplomatic messages. Even if a Balkan campaign was not forthcoming, 
fear of it could divert attention first from Sicily and then from Western Europe where the 
real landings would take place. In 1942, leaflets dispersed over Bulgaria by British planes 
and broadcasts from the Middle East asserted that the next Allied actions would focus on the 
Balkans and would involve the entry of Anglo-American forces in Bulgaria. This would 
force Bulgarian capitulation before the Western Allies. This line of propaganda was later 
extended to augment the strategic deception necessary to guard the plans for OVERLORD. 
The British secret services even suggested simulating Allied military activities along the 
Bulgarian Black Sea coast to imply imminent land invasion of the Balkans. The idea fell 
through for lack of Soviet support.58 All the false leads, however, impressed Bulgarian 
politicians. They also most probably alarmed Soviet intelligence despite the fact that it knew 
of British deception techniques in advance. One misconception the Soviet Ally might have 
shared with the Bulgarian enemy was that since Britain had long-standing imperial interests 
in South Eastern Europe, it meant to intervene to re-establish a dominant position there. 
Such thinking was rooted in late nineteenth-century rivalries but was also fed by the pre-war 
perception of Britain as the protagonist of anti-Bolshevism.
The FO Southern Department was of course aware that no substantial troops would be 
dispatched to Bulgaria but some officials still hoped that at least a token force would be
56 Ibid., a.e.59,1.35, Madrid to Sofia, 31.05.1943,1.82, 7.07.1943 Budapest to Sofia, a.e.60,1.37, Berlin to 
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available to signify British interest there. This was very different from Romania where the 
only realistic and desirable option was that of Soviet occupation.59
Even when it was perfectly clear that no major fighting would take place in the Balkans, the 
Bulgarian ruling circles continued to believe that if and when they decided to surrender to 
the victors, an Allied force would be present to protect them from the Germans.60 All these 
political conjectures seemed to be reinforced by the Allied air attacks over Bulgaria.
Bombing Bulgaria. It is not very clear how the idea of bombing Bulgaria
originated. Perhaps it had occurred to the military planners naturally, once important 
communications and transport points in the Balkans and especially the Ploesti oil fields 
came within reach of bases in southern Italy. Bulgaria itself had few strategic centres of great 
importance. In fact the first raids over its territory took place when weather or other 
obstacles did not permit attacks on Romanian targets which had higher priority. In the 
autumn of 1943, attention to bombing Bulgaria gradually increased. One reasons for this was 
that bombing German troops on Yugoslav or Greek territory -  which had also been 
discussed - carried the danger of inflicting casualties on the civil population of Allied 
Governments.61
Bombing Bulgaria was a legitimate, though a secondary military aim in its own right. The 
first recorded suggestion was made by the British Chiefs of Staff in early October 1943. This 
was taken up by the Defence Committee presided over by the Prime Minister on 19 October 
1943. It was revealed that Bulgaria had eight divisions helping the Germans to garrison 
Yugoslavia and Greece and employed forces against ‘guerrillas who are our friends and
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whose resistance is growing daily’. Churchill spoke in very harsh words insisting that the 
activities of the ‘Bulgarian jackals’ could not be tolerated any longer, ‘however much they 
might be under the heel of the Germans’. A sharp lesson had to be administered to Bulgaria 
with the primary objective of making its troops withdraw from occupied territories and of 
stretching German forces even further.62
The Defence Committee ‘carefully considered the best method of bringing the Bulgars [sic] 
to heel. All agreed that surprise air attacks on Sofia, accompanied by leaflets citing the fate 
of Hamburg and Hanover, would have best and most immediate effect.’ It was thought that a 
‘relatively small diversion of air resources’ would be ‘well worthwhile’. All the more so as it 
could also bring significant political results, especially since the death of King Boris m  in 
August 1943 had destabilised the internal situation in Bulgaria.
The first raid on Sofia was carried out on 14 November 1943 when the marshalling yards, 
the airfield and a number of civilian buildings were hit. The raid’s general effect was judged 
to have been ‘out of all proportion to the military significance of the target’. The Bulgarian 
Government had become seriously concerned with both further bombing and the sharp 
decline in public morale. It was even suspected that continued raids might result in internal 
upheaval ‘such as would constitute a grave embarrassment and threat to Germany’s whole 
military structure in the Balkans’.64
More attacks followed in December 1943 and January 1944, all of which were estimated to 
have satisfactory results. Administrative life in Sofia was brought to a virtual standstill, the 
inefficiency of the air defence was exposed. The population of the capital fled to the
62 F0371/37161, R12382, Air Ministry to Washington, 20.10.1943
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countryside where its tales spread panic and anger against the Government and Germany.65 
As a result of the raids, at the beginning of 1944 Bulgaria appeared to have become the most 
vulnerable of the three Axis countries in Eastern Europe: civil discontent was growing and 
the morale of the army was falling. In early February 1944, an appreciation by the SOE 
Balkan team forecast that a concentrated attack ‘may be able to break Bulgaria within a few 
months -  possibly in the summer’.66 Therefore, the Middle Eastern Command which was in 
charge of the air-attacks over Bulgaria decided that the geographical scope of attacks should 
be extended before Sofia was allowed to recover. For instance, there was a good strategic 
argument that Plovdiv and Kazanluk should be bombed. Both were important railway 
centres within twenty miles of which Partisans were operating. The latter ‘would no doubt 
secure valuable recruits and encouragement from a breakdown there similar to that at Sofia*. 
The Commanders of the Navy suggested attacks on the Black Sea ports and traffic.67
Historiography has practically neglected the fact that bombing was co-ordinated with the 
Bulgarian Partisans. As the possibility of direct military attack on Bulgaria was becoming 
remote in the spring of 1944, Britain was eager to strengthen its contacts with the Bulgarian 
guerrillas and give them some evidence of good will. When informed through the BLOs, the 
Partisan leaders approved of bombing in general. They asked that such points in Sofia and 
the country were struck so as the effect would be particularly damaging for the Government 
in both material and political terms. Simultaneously, they warned the Allies to avoid the 
working-class quarters of Sofia so not to inflict casualties on that part of the population best 
disposed to the resistance movement.68
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By April 1944, the importance of Bulgarian targets, which was subject to frequent reviews, 
had fallen. A few minor air-raids over Bulgaria took place in the early summer of 1944. 
Without eliminating Bulgaria as a possible target, priority was given to targets in Romania 
and Hungary. Attacks on these countries were thought likely to force them to withdraw 
troops fighting on the Eastern front.69
Bombing was another aspect of Allied policy to Bulgaria on which Britain sought Soviet 
concurrence. While the question was being discussed in London, in October 1943 in 
Moscow Eden suggested that Stalin should be informed of the planned air-raids over 
Bulgaria. Stalin turned out to be ‘surprisingly forthcoming*. This pleased Churchill despite 
his understanding that Stalin’s permission had not been necessary as the USSR was not at 
war with Bulgaria. The FO appreciated Stalin’s ‘being in the business’ and wanted to 
capitalise on this unexpected success. Southern Department officials discussed how to make 
the Soviet support for the bombing of Bulgaria known to the Bulgarian Government and 
population. Indeed, the Bulgarian Government had been given the cold shoulder when it had 
approached the Soviet Embassies in Sofia and Ankara to ask for mediation to stop the air­
raids. But this was different from making the Soviet Government openly associate with the 
Allied bombing, as such a step could diminish Soviet prestige in Bulgaria.70
Even though US bombers had taken part in the attacks, the US Government changed its 
mind on the subject of bombing Bulgaria at least once. In February 1944, while an OSS 
mission dealing with Bulgaria was still in Istanbul, the USA suggested that bombing should
69 AIR9/462, Air Ministry to AFHQ Algiers, 4.04.1944
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be temporarily ceased in order to allow Bulgaria to send a peace mission to Turkey in 
relative safety. Churchill refused.71
As a rule, plans for bombing were made with no other political objectives in mind than the 
detachment of Bulgaria from the Axis. There was some notion of the most desirable post­
war developments from a British point of view but this was of distinctly secondary 
importance in day-to-day thinking before the end of the war. This was a logical result from 
the limited contacts and knowledge about the political situation in Bulgaria resulting from 
Britain’s failure to establish stable communication with those political elements whom it 
could have felt able to support after the war.
The Futile Peace Negotiations. British Balkan experts were well-aware of the
political difficulties created by the fact that no Anglo-American troops would enter Bulgaria. 
There was no enemy army approaching the frontier to whom the Bulgarians could surrender, 
as in 1918 when they had asked for armistice from the British Commanders at Salonika. On 
their part, Bulgaria and the other satellites could not fail to notice that the Allies were 
stretched to the extreme in the Eastern Mediterranean. The small Axis powers used this to 
procrastinate in their approaches for peace, hoping to extract better terms later.72
Renewed Political Contacts. The Bulgarian Government used different
approaches made to its representatives abroad to sound out the intentions of the Western 
Allies. Most of these contacts took place in neutral countries and produced no particular 
commitment on either side. They were more often than not initiated by the US special 
services trying to side-step British supremacy in the Balkans. In Switzerland, Nikola 
Momchilov had sent letters to the Bulgarian Ambassador in Bern; Allen Dulles of the 
OSS was in touch with the Bulgarian Consul in Geneva. There were also US attempts to
71 F0371/43587, R2160, Resident Minister Algiers to FO, 1.02.1944, R2333, FO to Washington,
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influence Bulgarian political circles through the Bulgarian Mission in Stockholm.73 The 
most intensive and fruitful contacts were those made through the Bulgarian Mission in 
Turkey. Nikola Balabanov, the Bulgarian Ambassador, was a skilled diplomat who was 
extremely realistic about Bulgaria’s position in the war. He made good use of the post in 
Ankara, constantly trying to examine how both sides in the conflict regarded Bulgaria. He 
also received valuable information from Istanbul, one of the busiest centres of 
intelligence throughout the war. Balabanov was among the first to recommend to the 
Bulgarian Government the establishment of early links with the Western Allies in parallel 
to such with the Soviet Government. Additionally, he thought contacts with the Greek 
and Yugoslav Govemments-in-exile and resistance movements would be useful, as their 
association with the Allies was likely to have a great impact on Bulgaria’s future.74
All these contacts yielded little beyond the illusion on both sides that alternative routes of 
communication were being kept open. Their value faded rapidly in late 1943 and early 
1944 when the air attacks seemed to be producing immediate results. Bombing was 
intended to speed up Bulgaria’s defection, which would then help knock Romania out of 
the war. Initially, it was even hoped that the three Eastern European satellites would 
desert Germany at approximately the same time; this would produce a considerable 
strategic advantage for the Allies before OVERLORD. Some observers believed that the 
satellites were following ‘limited adherence to the German cause... determined largely by 
the same reasons which determined our Turkish ally, in his slightly more favourable 
position, to a policy of neutrality’. Therefore, it was essential for the Allies to devise a 
policy, which would lure the satellites with as little detriment on the latter’s existence as
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nation states as possible.76 Such an opinion of the motives behind the satellites’ behaviour 
was occasionally voiced by some British analysts in late 1943 and early 1944. It was in 
effect contrary to the Casablanca formula of ‘unconditional surrender’ to which the US 
Chiefs of Staff attached the greatest importance.77 Ostensibly, British military planners 
went along with their US counterparts but never found this rigid approach either very 
convincing or effective. The FO tried to introduce whatever degree of flexibility the 
situation afforded.
There had been no inter-Allied discussions of possible joint policy towards Bulgaria. This 
was partly due to the fact that British actions were dependent largely on the success of 
bombing. But while the Western Allies were attacking Bulgarian cities from the air, the 
Soviet armies were moving steadily towards Bulgarian territory. By the spring of 1944 no 
military plans had been co-ordinated. Attempts to obtain some indication of Soviet views on 
the future of Bulgaria and the South Slavs had produced little beyond a professed general 
desire for amenable Governments. It seemed to the Southern Department that Stalin was 
showing a pronounced reluctance to commit himself to any future political or military course 
in Bulgaria. Such an attitude could be, and usually was, interpreted as a Soviet intention to 
strike a separate deal. Alternatively, the FO observers were reassuring themselves that, 
maybe just like the British, the Soviet Government had not managed to achieve any definite 
political results and was loath to admit it.78 Besides, the British diplomats, who were mostly 
interested in Bulgaria on account of its closeness to Greece, were getting tired of the slow 
and non-committal Bulgarian requests for talks in the first half of 1944. They began
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expressing the opinion that, instead of listening to Bulgarian complaints and explanations, 
the Allies should present firm conditions not for negotiations but for armistice.79
In the autumn of 1943, bombing itself had been planned as only one component of a broader 
Allied strategy. It was to be part of ‘a determined threefold attack’ consisting also of support 
to subversive elements and effective propaganda. The goal would be Bulgaria’s detachment
O A
from the Axis, irrespective of whether it was done under the present or a new Government.
Britain preferred that Bulgaria should emerge from the war as a democratic country. 
Britain’s efforts to influence the policies of the wartime Bulgarian Governments 
concentrated on the moderate Bulgarian political elements. The latter, while being 
opposed to the alignment with Germany, were not aiming at radical internal 
transformation. Another factor Britain had to consider was the necessity to maintain a 
common front with Soviet Russia, not only in combat but in propaganda too. The steady 
Soviet military advance resulted in extremely good propaganda for the Soviet Union, 
something which made some British conservative circles complain that the West was 
deliberately enhancing the Soviet image. On the whole, British policy makers fully 
realised that without solid Soviet support any Western initiative in the Balkans would 
have a limited success.81
The OSS too sought Stalin’s approval before putting its own plan for Bulgaria into action. 
The plan had been elaborated at the end of 1943 under Colonel Donovan’s supervision. It 
envisaged the initiation of preliminary talks with the Bulgarian Government. The central 
figure in the plan was the Bulgarian-born financier Angel Kuyumdjiiski who had recently 
been granted US citizenship and then given the rank of Colonel in the US Army.
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Kuyumdjiiski was attached to a special mission headed by Colonel Jadwin and was able 
in about two months in Istanbul to renew his contacts among Bulgarian politicians and 
businessmen. At the end of February 1944, he believed that his efforts were about to 
result in a mission authorised by the Bulgarian Government to receive official Allied 
terms for Bulgarian surrender. The OSS and the State Department thought that this was 
the best possible outcome as it would both put an end to Bulgarian participation in the 
war and leave the Bulgarian Opposition untainted by surrender and therefore eligible for 
future office. US diplomats with longer experience in Bulgarian affairs than Jadwin, 
Kouyumdjiiski or even Donovan were not so optimistic. For them it was obvious that the
£7Bulgarian Government still had room for manoeuvres.
British services dealing with Bulgaria had not been told of the exact nature of the US 
project before it was outlined in Moscow. On this occasion, the OSS had specifically tried 
to avoid its British counterpart after Churchill had refused Roosevelt’s request to 
authorise Donovan’s initiative.83 The FO openly disapproved of the Jadwin-Kuyumdjiiski 
affair: it felt sidelined and above all expressed scepticism about the USA’s ability to 
handle negotiations properly. It also insisted that any Bulgarian envoys should talk to 
representatives of all Three Big Powers. In comparison, the Soviet Government seemed 
content to leave things in US hands. It expressed the desire to be kept informed of the 
progress of the contacts but abstained from practical involvement in the US initiative. The 
Soviet Ambassador in Cairo -  where the Bulgarian emissaries were expected -  was 
instructed to follow possible negotiations but not to present any views.84
82 FRUS 1944, vol.m, p.300, Washington to Moscow, 10.02.1944, p.302, Roosevelt to Churchill,
25.02.1944, p.310, Stettinius to Winant, 4.03.1944, p.311, MacVeagh to Hull, 7.03.1944, p.307, Istanbul to 
Hull, 3.03.1944; Rachev, St. Churchill... p.225; Miller, M.L. Bulgaria... p.170-172
83 Boll, M.M. Cold War... p.12-18
84 F 0371/43587, R2537, Clark Kerr to FO, 21.02.1944, R2160, FO to Moscow, 12.02.1944, R2161, Lord 
Killeam to FO, 9.02.1944, R2331, FO to Washington, 12.02.1944
90
Bulgarian Attempts at Double-dealing. Bulgarian handling of the talks with
the Jadwin mission revealed both inflated expectations about the outcome of the war and 
faulty perceptions of the interests of the Allies. Contacts had been authorised in the belief 
that generally the USA had a more lenient attitude to Bulgaria, unlike Britain which was 
committed to the protection of Greece and Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian Government of 
Dobri Bozhilov tried to extract preliminary concessions from Kuyumdjiiski, mainly with 
respect to Bulgaria’s retention of the occupied territories. Indeed, the question of the so- 
called national unification predominated in the thinking of Bulgarian politicians and 
precluded a more realistic analysis of the international situation.
The death of King Boris in August 1943 had caused a shock in Bulgarian governing 
circles. Bulgarian politicians and diplomats had feebly begun to consider the possibility 
that they were involved with the losing side in the conflict. Gradually, they became more 
willing to establish links with the Allies and prepared to dissociate themselves from 
Germany. This made them desperate to leam about any Allied deliberations on the fate of 
the Balkans.
At the end of 1943 after the Moscow and Teheran Conferences, the Bulgarian Legations 
across Europe were very active in reporting rumours about decisions reached by the Big 
Three. Some claimed that Stalin had taken the upper hand, others that the traditional British 
diplomatic skill had prevailed. The common theme was the conviction that there could be no 
agreement among the Allies. One Bulgarian Ambassador waved aside the possibility that the 
official communiques were saying the truth and thought that Bulgaria’s lot would be easier if 
only it could be found out ‘who had deceived whom or whether they had all deceived each 
other’. Naturally, Germany sought to increase Bulgaria’s fear that a deal had been reached to
91
apportion the Balkans to the Soviet Union. Bulgarian military intelligence too supported this
85view.
The leading figures in the Bulgarian Government refused to believe in the existence of a 
common Allied plan and thought that Britain and the Soviet Union were ‘playing hide-and-
o r
seek*. A lonely sober voice was that of the Bulgarian Minister in Turkey: from the 
beginning of 1944 his reports stressed that there would be no imminent serious rupture 
among the Three Allies. He advised that Bulgarian foreign policy should not be constructed 
on the false premise that it would be able to benefit from the existing inter-Allied 
differences. He was able to point to numerous examples, which showed that the principal 
role in the Balkans had been delegated to Stalin.87
But the conviction -  or rather hope -  of inter-Allied conflicts was difficult to shake off. 
Bulgarian Prime Minister Bagryanov (June -  August 1944) even believed that both Britain 
and the Soviet Union were ready to conclude a separate peace with Germany.88 Therefore 
his tactic was at the same time to alleviate German suspicions and divert Soviet pressure. 
Bagryanov’s big illusion was that because they did not want their confrontation extended to 
the Balkans, both Germany and the USSR had an interest in Bulgaria maintaining relations 
with both of them. The Bulgarian Government repeatedly concluded that it was best for it to 
wait and avoid taking sides until the outcome was clearer; then Bulgaria should quickly 
attach itself to the victor from whom it could hope for a satisfactory peace settlement. The 
Soviet Union should be wooed with the idea that Bulgaria would join it and the same
85 TsDIA -  AMVnR, op.176, op.15, a.e.68, 1.6-7, Bern to Sofia, 30.10.1943, 1.29, Moscow to Sofia,
29.10.1943, 1.21, Stockholm to Sofia, 2.11.1943, 1.56, Madrid to Sofia, 6.11.1943, 1.67, Madrid to Sofia,
10.11.1943, 1.74, Berlin to Sofia, 11.11.1943, a.e.69, 1.101-102, Army Staff to Foreign Ministry, 
16.11.1943
86 Mishkov, G. (ed.) Dnevnikut na Purvan Draganov -  bivsh minister na vunshnite raboti ot 12 yuni do 1 
septemvri 1944. Sofia: VIK ‘Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets’, 1993. p. 12
87 TsDIA -  AMVnR, op.176, op.15, a.e.75,1.15, Ankara to Sofia, 18.03.1944
88 Rachev, St. Churchill... p.233
92
possibility should be used to threaten Britain. In other words, Bulgaria was to try to keep all 
sides happy: not to provoke a German occupation and to improve relations with the Soviets 
at the same time. The ultimate objective was while keeping a low profile to reach an 
agreement to get out of the war with Britain and the USA. This was dictated by alarm that, 
unless Bulgaria joined the West, it would not be able to avoid a Soviet-backed Communist 
take-over. At the same time, there was a vague fear that if British troops entered the Balkans,
OQ
Soviet would do the same.
The positive result of these speculations was the revival of contacts with Western 
representatives. But the Bagryanov Government did not regard an armistice with the West as 
an urgent matter. Foreign Minister Purvan Draganov had in mind to start conversations, not 
negotiations. Georgi Kisselov, who was sent on a peace seeking mission to Istanbul in June 
1944, was ‘provided with a [deliberately] vague formula*: he should not promise Bulgaria’s 
pulling out of the war but should maintain that Bulgaria still hoped for a peaceful solution of 
the national question. But by the summer of 1944 Bulgarian ruling circles finally realised 
that the territorial question was unlikely to be settled favourably for Bulgaria. The 
Government was only just coming to terms with the necessity to withdraw its troops from 
Serbia, but it preferred this to follow rather than precede negotiations.90
The importance of the national question was overriding in Bulgarian political thinking. The 
opportunity to secure the Bulgarian territorial interest made even giving in to Soviet pressure 
acceptable to some political circles, represented in Bagryanov’s Cabinet. In the context of 
Bulgarian internal politics, this meant co-operation with the Communist Party, which could 
even be brought into the Government. Bagryanov himself had established personal contacts 
with the Communists even before he became Premier. These were not very fruitful but they
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illustrated a rising political trend. At the beginning of 1944 most prominent politicians who 
were not desperately pro-German talked not only to the Bulgarian Communists but also 
sought direct links with the Soviet Union, usually through its Embassy in Sofia. Most of 
them tried to determine what terms the Soviet Union would offer Bulgaria to withdraw from 
the war. The standard reply was that the Soviet Government would insist on withdrawal 
from Serbia.91 Confirming the demands of the Western Allies, the Soviet Government was 
was not necessarily driven by the same motives as they.
While the Bagryanov Government was continuing its balancing act, events in the Balkans 
were moving fast. On 2 August 1944 Turkey broke off relations with Germany. The same 
day in a speech in the House of Commons, Churchill referred to Bulgaria in very strong 
words. He said it had played a ‘petty and cowardly part’ in the war and had little time to 
repent.92 Pressure from the USSR was also mounting. Despite intensified diplomatic signals 
that Bulgaria should hurry, the Cabinet decided it could not break with Germany before 
‘leaning’ elsewhere.
In late July 1944, still trying to win time, the Bulgarian Government curtailed German 
activities in the country and prepared to repeal anti-Jewish laws and withdraw from Serbia 
shortly. This prepared the way for a new and already official Bulgarian peace feeler, led by 
the former President of the Bulgarian National Assembly, Stoicho Moshanov. 94 As early as 
21 June 1944 he had been sounded out with a view to his going to Turkey. His mission was 
eventually confirmed a month later. Three more weeks passed before he actually held his 
first conversation with the British Ambassador to Turkey Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen
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on 16 August.95 The long delay suggests lack of urgency on the part of the Bulgarian ruling 
circles to forestall any Soviet approach to Bulgaria. On the contrary, led by wrong 
evaluations of British interests, Bagryanov hoped that Soviet pressure on Bulgaria would 
disturb Britain and the United States and in consequence would make them less demanding 
towards the country. Knatchbull-Hugessen advised that the Bulgarian Government should 
speed up its moves. But the British Ambassador acted on the understanding that it was time 
for a quick solution of the question of the Bulgarian armistice. British diplomats were not 
guided by any the intention to pre-empt Soviet action with respect to Bulgaria.
While Moshanov was making his first moves in Ankara, the Bulgarian Government 
began a campaign to support his mission with domestic measures. In a Parliamentary 
debate it was admitted that the previous Government had erred in declaring war on Britain 
and the United States. This did not impress Britain, especially since the speeches of the 
Bulgarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister contradicted each other on the question of 
Bulgaria’s imminent external orientation. Ostensibly for Germany’s reassurance, 
Draganov proclaimed that Bulgaria was continuing with its erstwhile policy, simply using 
different methods. Neither were the Allies convinced by Moshanov’s appeals that nothing 
drastic could be done before Bulgarian troops were taken out of Serbia. While they were 
trying to ascertain how authentic and serious the new emissary was, he had to return to 
Sofia for consultations after the Romanian coup of 23 August 1944.96
Despite these setbacks, the FO decided to proceed with the talks. It also planned 
consultations on Bulgaria with both its US and Soviet colleagues. On 27 August the British 
Embassy in Turkey instructed Moshanov to go to Cairo to obtain the terms for a Bulgarian 
armistice. In his memoirs written about twenty-five years later, Moshanov claimed to have
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immediately felt that he should procrastinate. Among the various explanations he put 
forward was a conversation on 30 August with Dr.Floyd Black, the former Director of the 
American College in Sofia. Allegedly the latter advised Moshanov to delay so as not to 
create difficulties among the Allies 97 US archives have preserved no evidence of such a
QO
statement made to Moshanov by Dr.Black. The Turkish Foreign Minister gave Moshanov 
exactly the opposite advice: in order to prevent the large Soviet army on the Danube from 
entering Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Government should surrender immediately.99
In the circumstances, of more immediate importance was the absence of the Ambassadors of 
all Three Allies from Cairo. The designated Head of the British delegation Lord Moyne was 
in Italy. The US Ambassador MacVeagh had not come back from Washington whereas his 
deputy was not yet fully authorised to participate in the talks.100 Such a state of affairs 
contardicts the thesis of some Bulgarian scholars that both Britain and the USA desired to 
get Bulgaria out of the war as a matter of urgency.101 Examination of the evidence shows 
that Britain was not at all concerned to conclude a hurried agreement with Bulgaria. Britain’s 
responsibility for the delay in negotiations should be analysed against the background of the 
whole process of wartime planning for the country. Then, the failure to perceive the Cairo 
talks as urgent fits in the broader pattern of lack of strong British interest towards Bulgaria.
While Moshanov was in the Middle East, the Red Army was quickly approaching the 
Danube. The nearest British troops were at least 1,500 miles away from Bulgaria. Moshanov 
was also acutely aware that the Bulgarian Communists were going to play an increasingly
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important role in Bulgarian politics after the war. He had left Sofia for Cairo amidst 
negotiations to include Communists in the Bulgarian Cabinet. While Moshanov was waiting 
to begin talks with the Western representatives, he learned of the formation of the new 
Bulgarian Government led by Konstantin Muraviev but noticed there were no Communists 
Ministers in it. Moshanov found himself in the position of representing a Government which 
he believed could not last long. Also, he was required to sign an armistice which would not 
be lenient to Bulgaria. He had gone to Cairo hoping that he was going to take part in 
negotiations; instead he was soon made to understand that he was merely going to be 
presented with the Allied terms which simply had to be accepted.
Moshanov*s behaviour was confused and contradictory. He feared that he was going to be 
held morally responsible for armistice terms which he would be given no chance to 
soften.102 This would endanger his hopes for active participation in post-war Bulgarian 
politics. That explains why Moshanov tried to obstruct the conclusion of the armistice by 
raising doubts about the validity of his own credentials in a telegram to the new Bulgarian 
Premier. To Lord Moyne, Moshanov made a long and roundabout statement which 
prompted the Allies to check his authorisation. In communications to Sofia, Moshanov 
repeated that he would accept a new mandate ‘if entry of Soviet troops does not change 
the situation’.103
In a personal letter he sent to the Communist leader Dimitrov three years after the armistice 
negotiations, Moshanov admitted that he had ‘diverted’ the handing of the text of the 
armistice on the 1 September 1944 and was personally responsible for the failure of the 
mission. He had decided not to ‘betray the future of his country’ when its independence had 
been seriously threatened by the West. He even claimed that he had related the events to the
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Soviet representative who had complimented him on having performed ‘a great service not 
only for his country but also for the whole of Slavdom’. 104
Soviet Opportunism. The Soviet Union had continuously declined to take part in
Three-Power joint action in Bulgaria but Britain and the United States had not given up the 
idea.105 They were very much aware of the political leverage the USSR had and were eager 
to use it for what they considered the common purpose of getting Bulgaria out of the war. In 
February 1944, the FO was looking into ways of intensifying pressure upon Bulgaria. 
Sargent wrote to Eden that ‘the Russians should be asked to enter the picture as well*. So far, 
whenever approached by the FO Moscow had procrastinated showing evident unwillingness 
to commit itself. Sargent thought that ‘the Russians sit pretty, maintain diplomatic relations 
and wait for the day when they can step in not as conquerors but as deliverers’.106
In the spring of 1944, the Soviet Union began demonstrating a greater interest not only in 
Bulgaria, but in the Balkans as a whole. The pressure applied by Moscow on the Bulgarian 
Government to distance itself from Germany was greeted by the FO as long overdue. But 
Soviet criticism of British behaviour in relation to Greece was disquieting. Eden told the FO 
that there were ‘unhappily increasing signs of Russia’s intentions to play her own hand in 
the Balkans regardless of our desires and interests’. In early July 1944 his concerns were 
recorded in a document circulated to the Cabinet, reporting that the Soviet Government was 
using the Communist-dominated movements to gain a predominant position in South 
Eastern Europe.107
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This assessment was made at a time when both London and Washington were receiving a 
stream of intelligence reports about increased Soviet activity in Bulgaria. The West 
suspected the existence of links between the Soviet Union and the Bulgarian Communists 
but had no firm evidence of this. On the other hand, there was reliable information about the 
renewal of old and the establishment of new contacts between Bulgarian Opposition figures 
and Soviet representatives in Sofia. An illuminating example was the case of Petko Stainov, 
a leading member of the political circle Zveno and considered a staunch Anglophile. After 
the severe January 1944 air-raids over Sofia, he had made a strong speech in Parliament in 
support of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. He, as well as the Democratic Party 
leader Nikola Mushanov, another pro-Westemer, began visiting the Soviet Legation every 
other day. Other centre-right Bulgarian politicians, for example Atanass Burov and 
Alexander Girginov were also in touch with the Soviet Minister Alexander Lavrishchev and 
his aides.108
There is little contemporary evidence of the purpose of these encounters. But from the 
circumstances in which they were taking place it can be surmised that the Bulgarian political 
elite was striving to keep open links with Moscow. Most of the political leaders tried to 
demonstrate amicable relations with the Soviet Minister as they foresaw the increasing role 
of the Soviet Union in Bulgarian affairs. The aim of both Government and Opposition was 
to ascertain the Soviet attitude towards the country.
The Soviet Government put increased diplomatic pressure upon the Bulgarian Government 
to break off relations with Germany.109 In January 1944, Lavrishchev told the Bulgarian 
Premier Bozhilov that the Soviet Union would intercede with Britain and the USA to stop
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the bombing if Bulgaria withdrew from Serbia. The same offer was repeated in February, 
when Lavrishchev stated that the omission from Soviet propaganda of the demand that 
Bulgaria should withdraw from Aegean Thrace was not incidental.110 Soviet representatives 
were signalling a preparedness to make some concessions to Bulgaria which at the time 
compared favourably with the air strikes by the West.
In March 1944, Fyodor Gussev, the Soviet member of the European Advisory Commission 
(EAC) in London, declared that this body should not discuss the terms for Bulgaria. Molotov 
commented that it was simply too early. Both British and US experts seemed to interpret this 
Soviet aloofness as simply reflecting the fact that the Soviet Union was not at war with 
Bulgaria. Both Western Allies told the USSR that they would welcome any future Soviet 
observations on developments related to Bulgaria. Western diplomats understood that the 
Soviet Government reserved the right to reopen the question of the Bulgarian armistice when 
it would be in a stronger military position in the Balkans. Neither the British and US 
representatives in the EAC, nor their superiors saw anything worrying in this.111
In the spring of 1944 Soviet diplomatic efforts to precipitate Bulgaria’s exit from the war 
intensified. This coincided with the heavy Soviet offensive on the Eastern front which 
marked the advance of the Red Army into Eastern Europe and the Balkans. No documentary 
evidence has been found that at this time the Soviet Government had set plans for military 
and political action regarding Bulgaria. It is plausible that Stalin simply waited to see the 
outcome of fighting on Polish and Romanian territory, as well as the development of the 
internal Bulgarian situation before deciding on a specific course of action. This does not 
mean however that he was going to be a passive observer of events either in Bulgaria in 
particular or in the Balkans as a whole.
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Gradually, the Soviet attitude towards the Bulgarian Government stiffened and in mid-April
1944 the latter was faced with Soviet complaints that it was aiding the German war effort by
providing transportation, ports and air-fields to Axis troops retreating from the Eastern front.
To Bulgarian protestations of innocence, the Soviet Government replied with demands for
the re-opening of Soviet Consulates and establishment of new ones so as to be able to verify
Bulgarian claims for non-collaboration with Germany. The Bulgarian Government was told
it should appreciate how much Soviet Russia was doing to save Bulgaria from evil Western 
1 1designs. Unwilling to comply with the Soviet demands, the Bozhilov Government 
resigned at the end of May 1944.113
The new Government of Ivan Bagiyanov soon realised that Soviet demands would have to 
be met. Foreign Minister Draganov saw his task as satisfying them only partially and 
maintaining the balance between Soviet pressure and German influence as long as possible. 
Prophetically, Draganov wrote to a friend that Bulgaria had no more than three months of 
independence. Therefore, he began preparation to open talks with Britain and the USA. He 
also sent a special personal letter of good will to Molotov. In the reply, the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry asked outright whether Bulgaria was ready to break with Germany.114
Throughout this intense exchange of communications the Soviet Government did not inform 
its Allies about developments in Bulgaria or about its part in them. In late August 1944 Sir 
Archibald Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, related to Molotov rumours that 
Bulgaria was going to ask the USSR for an armistice as soon as the Red Army appeared on 
the Danube, and in response the Soviet Government was going to intercede with the Allies
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so that Bulgaria could keep the occupied territories. The Soviet Foreign Minister refuted 
these stories as complete lies. It was only then that he admitted that the state of Soviet- 
Bulgarian relations deserved attention, and promised to let the British Government have the 
relevant papers.115 In the meantime, the Soviet Union had professed no opinion or interest in 
the most recent Bulgarian peace initiative in Turkey.116
In late August and early September 1944, Soviet diplomats in London, the Middle East 
and Sofia undertook a series of steps regarding Bulgaria which at first sight appear 
unrelated and confusing. In their entirety, however, they reveal a logic aimed at 
neutralising as far as possible the Bulgarian armistice talks with the Western Allies, and 
the transfer of initiative to Moscow. All this was done with the knowledge that the Red 
Army was crossing Romania and would soon appear on the Bulgarian northern border.
On 24 August, after the Romanian coup which had forced Moshanov to return to Sofia, 
the Soviet delegate to the EAC finally agreed to participate in the discussions of the 
Bulgarian armistice. He agreed to most of the clauses dealing with the withdrawal of 
Bulgarian troops from any occupied territories, demobilisation of the Bulgarian armed 
forces, dissolution of paramilitary organisations, release of Allied prisoners-of-war, etc. 
But on 29 August, when Moshanov had again gone to Turkey to resume armistice talks, 
the Soviet representative was withdrawn from the deliberations in London. On the same 
day, the Soviet Charge d ’Affaires left Sofia where only a junior diplomatic officer 
remained in the Legation. Similarly, Moshanov was astonished to discover that the Soviet
117Ambassador had left Cairo where the final negotiations were gomg to take place.
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On 17 August in one of its last acts, the Bagtyanov Government declared complete 
neutrality in the continuing war. This was conceived as a temporary measure before 
breaking off relations with Germany. The Soviet Government’s attitude to Bulgarian 
neutrality was misleading. The official Bulgarian declaration was repeated on Moscow radio 
so both Bagrayanov and the Western Allies assumed that the Soviet Government accepted 
Bulgarian neutrality. The Bulgarian Communists were, however, informed that this was not 
the case. Only on 30 August did the Soviet Government deny any earlier approval and 
officially informed its Allies that it was not recognising the proclaimed Bulgarian 
neutrality.118 As soon as this attitude became known, Bagraynov announced his resignation, 
hoping that a Bulgarian Cabinet crisis would delay compliance with the Soviet demand that 
Bulgaria declare war on Germany.
Coercion from Moscow was well-timed as it followed the Bulgarian decision of 29 August 
finally to order the Bulgarian occupation forces to leave Macedonia. Simultaneously, 
German troops began leaving Greece. Joint Anglo-American intelligence explained the 
Soviet behaviour as caused by discontent with the plans for negotiations with Bulgaria; the 
pressure on Bagryanov had specifically aimed at stopping the Cairo negotiations in which 
the USSR did not participate.119 These were indications that the Soviet Givemment was 
beginning to have second thoughts about Bulgaria. However, Soviet unwillingness to 
participate in the current talks was not fully appreciated by the West. Britain and the USA 
were deluded by their own preparedness to let Soviet Russia influence or even join the Cairo 
negotiations at any time. The West also believed that the Soviet Union might be prepared to 
make concessions in order to alleviate fears of the imposition of Bolshevism.
EAC signified a desire to get Bagryanov under the Soviet wing in return for subservience, Mastny, V, 
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Simultaneously, in conversations with Bulgarian representatives several Soviet Ambassadors 
in neutral countries voiced displeasure that Bulgaria had not approached Moscow for 
mediation. This was accompanied by hints that probable Soviet terms would be more lenient 
than those offered by Britain and the USA.120
It seems plausible that it was only at the end of August 1944 that Stalin prepared plans for 
the military advance in Bulgaria.121 It was evident that Bulgaria was not going to offer 
resistance to the Red Army. The political influence resulting from a Soviet occupation of the 
country would be achieved without any material or human losses. But this does not point to 
the conclusion that Stalin had always planned the occupation of Bulgaria. On the contrary, 
just like the Western Allies, he had been led by military factors above all. He also employed 
political measures to influence the course of the war. Now that the military situation in the 
region was clear, Stalin could concentrate on political developments. This was when the 
USSR declared war on Bulgaria.
The new Bulgarian Government of the right Agrarian Konstantin Muraviev was formed to 
solve a single issue, that of getting Bulgaria out of the war. It needed to sign an armistice 
with Britain and the USA and finally declared war on Germany. It hoped to use the fact that 
Bulgaria still had diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government was 
asked to mediate the Bulgarian armistice. The Soviet Ambassador in Turkey Sergei 
Vinogradov, through whom the request was made, initially agreed readily but then quickly 
retreated. This was another sign that Soviet plans were still unclear. To get the Soviet 
Union’s support, Muraviev tried hard to include Communists in his Government. However,
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their position fluctuated, depending on Soviet plans, and finally they backed out of the 
deal.122
The Soviet Government declared war on Bulgaria on 5 September 1944 at 6 p.m. Moscow 
time. It seems that the Bulgarian Government learnt of the Soviet declaration of war from 
the radio and had to determine its authenticity via Ankara. Only half an hour’s notice was 
given to Clark Kerr and the US Ambassador, Averell Harriman. The Red Army was already 
poised at the Danube but when asked whether it would enter Bulgaria, Molotov gave a non­
committal answer. No immediate Soviet intentions were disclosed to either Harriman or 
Clerk Kerr.123
The Soviet decision to declare war on Bulgaria was made very late. For it military 
opportunities were of paramount but not sole importance. The Soviet Commanders 
considered Bulgaria ‘off to one side from the main highway of the war’ and accordingly 
reduced the numbers of the army which was to enter the country.124 For Moscow the 
declaration of war on Bulgaria was necessary for Soviet troops to have a pretext of 
occupying the country. Soviet occupation of Bulgaria was dictated by political rather than 
military considerations. The Red Army waited for three days between the declaration of war 
and crossing the Bulgarian frontier. Soviet troops entered Bulgaria on the very day when the 
Soviet Government officially announced that it would grant the Bulgarian request for 
armistice.125
Communist-time historiography never gave an explanation for the Soviet delay. It could not 
have been caused by fear that the last few retreating German formations were going to 
occupy Bulgaria or even stage a fight. Such possibility could easily have been dealt with by
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the 500,000-strong Bulgarian army alone. It was no secret that Bulgarian fears of German 
occupation had been exaggerated in order to justify procrastination. The Soviet Command 
was fully aware of the political situation and was supplied with last-minute military 
information by Communist Party members from northern Bulgaria.126
Nor did the Soviet troops stand aside so that the Communist-dominated Fatherland Front 
could take power with local forces only. The Red Army was already on Bulgarian soil at the 
moment of the coup d ’etat. The Soviet army had stopped to wait for an internal uprising 
which had been instigated by Communist Party circulars and a manifesto to the people. 
However, the country was relatively calm as the new Government had just assumed office 
and the last German troops were leaving. Once inside Bulgaria, the Soviet troops advanced 
initially only 120 miles; they entered Sofia on 15 September 1944 after a slow march.127
The only plausible explanation of this delay is that the Soviet Government waited for the 
Western reaction to the Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria. At 5 p.m. on 7 September 
1944 Lord Moyne informed Moshanov that it would be put on record that Bulgaria had 
requested armistice, that it had not received the terms and that the talks had ended because of 
the Soviet war declaration.128 Only after this final conversation between the representatives 
of the Western Allies and Moshanov in Cairo did the Soviet armies enter Bulgaria. Stalin’s 
improvisation in Bulgaria had gone very smoothly indeed.
British Attitude to Soviet Occupation o f Bulgaria. The FO was somewhat taken
aback by the Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria, especially as this came at a time when it 
seemed that finally Bulgaria was making a serious effort to get out of the war. Once the 
Western Ambassadors in Moscow had reported the news to their Governments, they
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returned to Molotov to find out the Soviet motives and intentions. They had been instructed 
not to express disapproval of the Soviet action. Clerk Kerr was directed to find out whether 
the Soviet Government had decided to join or proposed to end the current Cairo 
conversations as under the new circumstances they constituted separate peace negotiations. 
Molotov refrained from giving a direct answer and went into a long tirade about the whole 
course of Soviet relations with the last three Bulgarian Governments. He insisted that the 
Soviet break with Bulgaria was useful for all Three Allies. Beyond this statement which 
neither of the two Ambassadors challenged, he did not give any indication of the next Soviet 
move in Bulgaria.129
Admittedly, Molotov could not have made commitments to any firm course. At the time, the 
Soviet actions regarding Bulgaria did not follow a firmly set plan. To a great extent they 
were formulated in response to the attitudes demonstrated by the other Big Powers. Stalin 
had always shown great interest in Bulgaria. However, while fighting with the Germans was 
still going on, he was not prepared to risk a major confrontation. Caution was characteristic 
of Stalin’s behaviour. Before entering Bulgaria he waited to see that the West would not 
protest about the unilateral action of issuing a war declaration. When they entered Bulgaria, 
the Soviet troops were given strict orders not to interfere with internal developments as they 
were not carrying out a Communist revolution but a military operation. Soviet 
representatives told Bulgarian diplomats that they were not going to quarrel with their Allies 
over Bulgaria.130
Despite displeasure at not being informed earlier, Britain and the United States quickly 
recognised the new situation. The changed position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the
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129 AVPRF, f.06, op.6, No.242, p.23,1.62-64, conversation Molotov - Harriman and Clark Kerr, 6.09.1944; 
F 0371/43583, R14080, Clark Kerr to FO, 6.09.1944; FRUS 1944, vol.m, p.397, Harriman to Hull,
5.09.1944, p.401 -  402, Harriman to Hull, 7.09.1944
107
Bulgarian armistice talks was acknowledged with no hesitation and the Bulgarian armistice 
mission in Cairo was frozen until it was clear how further negotiations would proceed. This 
readiness to accommodate the Soviet views must have been registered in Moscow. It was a 
clear sign that the Western Allies were prepared to accept, even if not welcome, the Soviet 
action. Stalin understood that the West was not going to object to his having dealt firmly and 
unilaterally with Bulgaria. But this was also a precedent for future relations over the country.
In fact, the Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria could partially be explained by British 
insistence that something should be done about Bulgaria by the Three Allies in concert. 
Throughout 1944, the FO had been in favour of increased Soviet pressure on Bulgaria and 
initially even regarded the Soviet move as aid to Britain’s initiative.
Since the Red Army had began fighting on non-Soviet soil, there had been warnings in 
Britain against the possibility that the Soviet Union would soon be in a position to determine 
the future of Eastern Europe alone.131 But at that particular moment, the spring and summer 
of 1944, the FO had been worrying about the opposite, namely how to get the Soviet Union 
involved in policy towards the region. Britain recognised the Soviet interest, reinforced by 
geography and tradition, and was eager to use it for the purpose of eliminating Bulgaria from 
the European conflict. All the more so, since it had been long obvious that any effective 
military measures could be undertaken by Soviet troops only. For Britain, any consideration 
of the war operations was detached from positive post-war policy. The FO recognised the 
need for political planning but at the same time did not forget Soviet susceptibilities.132 
Western analysts concluded that to a great extent the Soviet Union would determine the
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course of future developments in Bulgaria; therefore the less it perceived the Allies to
■ * 1Hthreaten its natural claims, the less severe its eventual dominance would be.
The lack of co-ordination with the USSR had been judged to be detrimental to British 
political and propaganda efforts in Bulgaria. FO approaches to induce the Soviet 
Government to influence Bulgaria had in most cases ended without success.134 There was a 
distinct feeling at the Southern Department that Soviet Russia wanted to preserve its special 
position in Bulgaria and therefore British intervention could harm British-Soviet co­
operation.
In any case, the main British worries were about interests in Greece. In the spring of 1944,
the FO began considering how to make sure that the Soviet Government understood the
great importance of Greece for Britain.135 When at the end of May 1944 Eden spoke to the
Soviet Ambassador in London Fyodor Gussev, he made it clear that Britain did not object to
the intensification of Soviet pressure on Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s withdrawal from Greece would
1be of great military and political value for Britain’s involvement there.
Simultaneously, the FO was considering how to make Moscow at least announce 
solidarity with Britain’s actions regarding Bulgaria. British Balkan experts believed that 
any initiative with which the Soviet Union was associated had bigger chances of success 
in Bulgaria. Therefore, at the end of August the FO noticed with satisfaction that 
clandestine stations broadcasting over Bulgaria from the USSR were attacking the 
Bagryanov Government with increasing violence. British civil servants were not in the 
least perturbed by the fact that after having issued a statement which ostensibly
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recognised the newly proclaimed Bulgarian neutrality, Moscow was also urging action by
the Bulgarian Partisans to remove the Government and bring the Fatherland Front to
power.137 Western diplomats in Turkey worried about the contradiction in Soviet
statements but before such observations were seriously considered by the FO or the State
1 ^8Department, they were overtaken by events. In any case, as late as 29 August 
Knatchbull-Hugessen told Moshanov that since the Soviets recognised Bulgarian 
neutrality, all that had to be done was the conclusion of an armistice with the Western 
Allies.139
At the same time, Britain hoped that the Soviet Union would not be satisfied by the 
announced Bulgarian neutrality and would press Bulgaria to turn against Germany. Between 
29 August and 4 September 1944 Clark Kerr wrote to Molotov at least twice approving of 
the Soviet policy of dispelling Bulgarian notions that refuge could be taken in neutrality. On 
31 August 1944 Eden thanked Gussev for the views expressed on Soviet radio and said that 
Soviet propaganda would be of great help while negotiations with Bulgaria were going on in 
Cairo.140 When Moscow withdrew Gussev from deliberations on the Bulgarian armistice at 
the EAC, this was interpreted by both the FO and the State Department as a go-ahead for 
Britain and the United States to deal with Bulgaria. As late as 4 September Lord Moyne 
wrote to London that Soviet propaganda and Soviet withdrawal from the EAC and the Cairo 
talks meant that ‘the Russians would settle on our own terms’.141
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In the spring and summer of 1944 with the Bulgarian question evidently coming to a crisis, 
Britain had even considered proposing to the Soviet Government that it declare war on 
Bulgaria. In the end, when this happened without its prior agreement, the British 
Government was astonished but not worried.142 It was eager to find an explanation as to why 
the Soviet Government had not consulted it. Only then did the FO realise that it had not been 
informed of at least three communications between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.143 British 
civil servants and diplomats disagreed as to whether it had always been the Soviet plan to act 
alone in Bulgaria or whether Moscow had undertaken a last-minute action in order to join 
the armistice negotiations.144 Turkey, preoccupied with fear of the Red Army on its northern 
border, blamed Britain for delaying the Cairo talks and thus giving Soviet troops the 
opportunity to occupy Bulgaria.145 Bulgarian Premier Muraviev later wrote that in the 
crucial days after 5 September 1944, both Britain and the United States demonstrated a total 
lack of involvement with Bulgaria.146
* * *
The stubborn aversion of the British Ambassador to subversive methods coupled with the 
unfavourable political situation in Bulgaria had left the British special services with 
insufficient time to prepare the foundation for their work in the country before the 
evacuation of the British Legation in early March 1941. As a result the SOE suffered a series 
of setbacks in its operations in Bulgaria and was able to complete only a fraction of its 
objectives in the rest of the Balkans. The two British Military Missions sent in with huge 
difficulties towards the end of the war, ended in disaster. As Sargent concluded in June
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1944, the work of the SOE had hardly been satisfactory and ‘ever since the beginning of the 
war, their one and only showpiece has been [the Agrarian] Dimitrov’.147 This sober 
assessment of the futility of wartime links made British foreign policy makers realise how 
weak the basis for the promotion of Britain’s post-war interests in Bulgaria was.
Whitehall officials generally agreed that it was leftist organisations, which were going to 
force Bulgaria’s break with Germany. It was not illogical for British planners to envisage 
that the detachment of Bulgaria from the Axis could be accompanied by serious political or 
social turmoil. Such likelihood was usually associated with the growth of the role of the 
Communists as the most vociferous opponents of Germany. The prospect of increased 
Communist influence anywhere in the Balkans was viewed by most British policy makers 
as undesirable. It became even less palatable when considered as a stepping-stone for 
strengthening the positions of Soviet Russia in the region. Simultaneously British officials 
realised that one of the few methods to diminish the chances of a Communist seizure of 
power, was British preparedness to support anti-Communist elements in Bulgaria. 
However, in the last months before the Bulgarian surrender, the options and advantages of 
British involvement in Bulgarian internal politics remained largely unexplored. In fact, in 
the course of the war, there had been steady deterioration of the importance of political 
planning regarding Bulgaria and attention was increasingly concentrated on military goals. 
The closer real fighting moved to Bulgaria’s boundaries, the more British planners were 
prepared to drop their political schemes.
Despite Britain’s limited ability to affect Bulgaria’s participation in the war, most British 
officials dealing with Bulgaria believed it possible and planned for a most significant role 
at the time the country decided to back out of the conflict. The fact that the United States 
had made it clear that it would not consider occupying Bulgaria and that the Soviet Union
147 F0371/43586, R9693, Sargent, 22.06.1944
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was not at war with Bulgaria, left the British Government with the impression that it 
would have the leading part in the peace negotiations. British politicians and diplomats 
had always recognised the special position of Russia vis-a-vis the Balkans. But the radical 
change of situation, which occurred when the Soviets reached the Danube and declared 
war on Bulgaria, caught virtually all British planners unprepared. The tortuous peace talks 
in Cairo lost momentum and it soon became obvious that Britain’s plans had to be 
adjusted to reflect the new balance of internal and external forces in Bulgaria.
Part Two
Britain Has to Be A Little More than A Spectator’ *
Chapter Three
The Principles of British Post-war Policy towards Bulgaria
Throughout 1943 and 1944, British policy towards Bulgaria had been most concerned 
with the necessity to force the country out of the war and break the main Axis link in the 
Balkans. British efforts were only partly successful as Soviet pressure proved to be the 
primary factor behind Bulgaria’s exit from the European conflict. British diplomats had 
foreseen the increased role of the Soviet Union in South Eastern Europe in the final stages 
of the Second World War. They expected Soviet influence not only in Bulgaria but in the 
whole region to extend into the post-war period. To British planners the sober 
acknowledgement of Soviet strength did not imply relinquishment of British long-term 
interests in the Balkans.
Whitehall plans for the preservation of Britain’s world role consistently recognised the 
Balkan Peninsula’s strategic importance as flanking the Mediterranean route to British 
imperial possessions. Both before and during the war, Britain had paid a great deal of 
attention to its traditional ally Greece; considerable diplomatic and military resources had 
also been invested in the effort to enlist neutral Turkey in the Allies’ camp. The British 
Government had a vested interest in the security, stability and prosperity of these two
* Churchill in conversation with Stalin, Moscow, 9.10.1944
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countries which guarded the approaches to the Straits. British political and military 
analysts had to enquire into the consequences of potential Soviet strategic gains near the 
Straits, possibly combined with the ‘export’ of the Soviet socio-political system in the 
area. The British Government faced the question of whether through the countries it had 
occupied at the end of the war, Soviet Russia would be able to penetrate the continent 
even further to the south and west.
The vital significance of these matters inspired the Foreign and War Offices to renew 
attention to Bulgaria whose position under Soviet occupation was acquiring special 
dimensions. The country bordered both Greece and Turkey and could easily become a 
base for ideological or military aggression against them. Bulgaria’s defeat in the war had 
not destroyed its claims to adjoining territories. Soviet support for these claims could 
facilitate the emergence of Bulgaria into an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, whatever 
the latter’s objectives. To preclude such a possibility, Britain would have to strive to built 
up Bulgaria’s abilities and will to resist Soviet pressure. To achieve this goal, British 
policy makers were required to devise practical methods to ensure that Bulgaria 
developed into an independent, economically viable and democratic nation state.
The Consequences of the Percentage Agreement for Bulgaria. The British
Government preferred to maintain amicable relations with the Soviet Government after 
the war. On the other hand, quite early in the war, British foreign policy makers had 
identified areas where the interests of the two Great Powers overlapped and which could 
become the subject of a renewed Anglo-Soviet controversy. The potential of the Balkans 
to stir trouble in European relations was easily recognised, especially in view of their 
having been one of the primary reasons for the Nazi-Soviet breach in late 1940. The logic 
of British foreign policy thinking required a course of action, which would accommodate 
both Britain’s desire for sustained influence in the region and its hope of not alienating
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the USSR because of this. For a short period between the autumn of 1944 and the spring 
of 1945, such a delicate balance seemed to have been found in the so-called percentage 
agreement which Churchill and Stalin struck on the eve of 9 October 1944.
In the non-Communist world the deal was known before the opening of the British 
archives as most of the direct and indirect participants spoke of it in their memoirs.1 The 
release of the relevant Soviet documents after the collapse of Communism marked 
official Russian acknowledgement of the previously denied percentage agreement. The 
Russian records seem more detailed than the British but on the whole confirm the veracity
•j
of the long-released British papers.
It is hardly necessary to repeat the details of the famous episode on the evening of 9 October 
1944. By his own admission, Churchill put on a note a series of percentages, which would 
show the division of responsibility in the Balkans between Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union. Stalin approved it with a large blue pencil tick.3 This rough copy then became the 
document, which served as the basis for the following negotiations by the British and Soviet 
Foreign Ministers. The system, which emerged from the Moscow negotiations between 9
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and 11 October 1944, was intended to represent roughly the respective share of the two Big 
Powers in Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary.
While Churchill was explaining his idea to Stalin he did not mention Bulgaria at all. In 
Churchiirs initial note Britain’s influence in Bulgaria was fixed at twenty-five percent. In 
the course of the following two days, Eden had to make further concessions by which 
Britain’s portion in Bulgaria was reduced to twenty percent.4
Messages from the British delegation in Moscow to the British Cabinet and the Foreign 
Office explained that the percentages did not determine the number of British or Soviet 
representatives on the prospective Allied Control Commissions for Germany’s ex-satellites. 
Nor did the figures signify the presence of pro-Soviet or pro-Westem members in the 
countries’ future first post-war Governments.5
Churchill deliberately tried to alleviate the fears of the US administration that an old- 
fashioned secret bargain had taken place behind the small nations’ backs. In telegrams to 
President Roosevelt and his advisor Harry Hopkins, the British Prime Minister denied in 
advance any potential accusations that a spheres-of-influence deal had been executed.6 This 
was in accord with an earlier message to Roosevelt in which in May 1944, Churchill had
n
stated that Britain did ‘not of course wish to carve up the Balkans into spheres of influence’. 
Churchill himself had asked Stalin to agree that in official releases the phrase ‘dividing into 
spheres’ would be glossed over by suitable diplomatic language.8 According to the Soviet 
stenographer, Churchill said:
4 FO371/43601, R16315, Eden to FO, 10.10.1944
5 PREM3, 66/7, p. 177, Strang and Sargent to Eden, 11.10.1944, p. 176, Eden to Sargent, 12.10.1944; Resis, 
A. ‘The Churchill - Stalin Secret... ' p.371
6 PREM3, 66/7, Churchill to Hopkins, 12.10.1944; F0371/43647, R16426, Churchill to Hopkins,
11.10.1944
7 Feis, H. Churchill... p.340
8 Siracusa, J.M. ‘TheMeaning... 'p. 447
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The Americans will be shocked at seeing this document. But Marshal Stalin is a realist and he, 
Churchill, is not distinguished by sentimentality, while Eden is an absolutely wicked man. He, 
Churchill, did not show this document to the British Cabinet, but the British Cabinet usually 
consent to what he, Churchill, and Eden suggest. As for Parliament, the Cabinet has a majority in 
Parliament, and even if this document is shown to the Parliament,, they will understand nothing of 
it.9
During and after their Moscow visit, Churchill and Eden repeatedly stressed what the 
percentages were not. Both vigorously refuted the few attempts on part of FO to translate the 
percentages into practical measures to be taken up by British representatives in Eastern 
Europe. As early as 12 October 1944, Eden wrote to Sargent that ‘too much attention should 
not be paid to percentages which are of symbolic character only’.10 Churchill, the ultimate 
authority on the percentage deal, later insisted:
...the system of percentages [is intended] to express the interest and sentiment with which the 
British and Soviet Governments approach the problem of these countries, so that they might reveal 
their minds to each other in some way that could be comprehended. It is not intended to be more 
than a guide...11
Despite the rhetoric, a close inspection of Churchill’s proposal to Stalin reveals that he had 
done exactly what he was refusing to acknowledge. Deciphering the contents of the famous 
half sheet of paper is possible only in the context of the spheres-of-influence concept, 
whereby the rival Great Powers struck an agreement to apportion disputed territories. In 
October 1944, the Soviet Union and Great Britain reached a compromise by which they 
recognised each other’s interests in certain areas of the Balkans and Eastern Europe and 
drew a line between their respective zones. The later practical complications arose only
9 Rzheshevsky, O.A. ‘SovietPolicy...’ p.7
10 PREM3, 66/7, Eden to Sargent, 12.10.1944; Holdrich, P.G.H. ‘A Policy o f Percentages? British Policy in 
the Balkans after the Moscow Conference o f October 1944. ' International History Review. vol.IX, no.l, 
February 1987. p.31-32.
11 Churchill, W.S. The Second... vol.VI. p.203-204
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because the agreement did not envisage closed spheres in which each power would have 
exclusive influence. Instead of a division on purely geographical terms, Churchill suggested 
a scheme in which a majority share in one country was offset by a minority share in another, 
whereby an overall equilibrium seemed to be maintained.
The official record suggests that real bargaining started only after Stalin had ‘ticked off 
Churchilfs original set of figures. It was the failure to reach a complete understanding on 
Bulgaria that proved the greatest obstacle to sealing the scheme immediately. Until they took 
up the question of Bulgaria, the Big Two had struck a perfect deal: the percentages for 
Greece were reciprocated by those for Romania, in both Hungary and Yugoslavia a fifty- 
fifty division was contemplated. In these cases, not much discussion had been necessary. 
From the beginning conceded a much greater Soviet interest, declaring that ‘Bulgaria 
owed more to Russia than to any other country’. Stalin challenged the degree of interest in 
Bulgaria which Britain professed.12 Several times the discussion deviated from and then 
returned to Bulgaria, treating it as a part of a broader framework which involved also 
Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and even Italy. Stalin and Churchill were unable to agree on 
what exactly was included in their respective shares in Bulgaria and referred the Bulgarian 
issue for clarification to their Foreign Ministers.13
Two subsequent conversations between the British and Soviet leading diplomats dealt 
predominantly with Bulgaria. In the course of the war this was possibly the moment when 
the greatest deal of attention was paid to Bulgaria at the highest level. What can be extracted 
from the Moscow negotiations is the best example of British policy thinking on the country. 
Two premises mled Britain’s attitude, both related to Bulgaria’s geographic position. Firstly, 
Bulgaria was a country on the Black Sea, where the Soviet Union should have complete
12 Siracusa, J.M. 'TheMeaning... 'p.448,450
13 Resis, A. 'The Churchill - Stalin Secret... 'p.373-374
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freedom. Secondly, Bulgaria should withdraw its troops from Greece which was in Britain’s 
sphere of influence.14 Churchill also told Stalin that unlike Romania where it was a 
spectator, Britain wanted to be ‘a little more than a spectator in Bulgaria’.15
The Moscow talks were unique in that the issues were discussed and solved in the 
undisguised language of power politics.16 The larger implications of the percentage 
agreement can be comprehended in relation to the shifting balance of power in Europe in the 
second half of 1944 which Churchill had been observing with increasing apprehension.17 
Even before the Soviet armies appeared in the Balkans the FO discussed the traditional 
Soviet involvement there. Churchill’s sensitivities were triggered not by any definite Soviet 
actions but rather by what he understood to be Soviet threats to take action.
At the end of April 1944, after the suppression of the Greek forces’ mutiny in the Middle
//1
East and the dispatch of an SOE Mission to Romania, Molotov accused the British 
Government of disregarding the legitimate interests of the people concerned. Before Soviet 
troops started their march across the Balkans, further small and not necessarily related 
incidents were constructed by British diplomats into a logical chain of events, which seemed 
to indicate rising Soviet ambitions in the Balkans. One crucial occasion for display of this 
suspiciousness was the secret dispatch on 25 July 1944 of a Soviet Military Mission to the 
Greek Communists.18 Eden had already drawn attention to ‘Russia’s intentions to play her
14 Ibid. p.376-377
15 The Russian record attributes this phrase to Eden, Rzheshevsky, O.A. ‘Soviet Policy...' p.7.
16 Kimball, Warren F. 'Naked Reverse Right: Churchill, Roosevelt and Eastern Europe from TOLSTOY to 
Yalta and a Little Beyond. ’ Diplomatic History. vol.IX, no. 1, winter 1985. p.2
17 Rothwell, V. Britain... p. 127; Feis, H. Churchill... p.349
18 F0371/43636, R11461, PM to Eden, 1.08.1944; F0371/72194, R5413, FO paper on British and Soviet 
interests in the Balkans, 10.08.1943; Iatrides, J.O. (ed.) Ambassador McVeagh Reports: Greece 1933 -  
1947. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1980. p.572; McNeill, W.H. America... p.390; Barker, E. British 
Policy... p. 139; Xydis, St.G. ‘The Secret Anglo-Soviet Agreement on the Balkans o f 9 October 1944. ’ Journal 
of Central European Affairs. vol.XV, no.3, October 1955. p.257, 259. At the same time the Soviets increased 
their attention to Turkey, Deringil, S. Turkey’s . .. p.175-176.
own hand in the Balkans regardless of our desires and interests’.19 After consultation with 
the FO, the Foreign Secretary reported to the Cabinet that ‘the Russians were using the 
Communist-dominated movements to gain a predominant position in South East Europe’.20
The manner of the Soviet Government, not consulting or even informing its Allies of 
particular actions, was itself another reason for British irritation. In the autumn of 1944, 
Britain’s willingness to clarify its existing and future standing vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in 
the Balkans grew in proportion to the concentration of what looked like Soviet attempts to 
gain a serious political foothold in the region. In fact, acutely conscious of the strategic 
issues at stake, British diplomats had tried unsuccessfully to establish a common Allied 
policy in the Balkans for almost a year since the Moscow Conference of October 1943. At
that time, preoccupied with military issues the Soviet Government refrained from entering
^ 1
into political discussions so as not to prejudice its standing at the end of hostilities.
After October 1943, the British Chiefs of Staff had reviewed measures for British defence in 
the post-war era. In mid-1944, the Post-Hostilities Planning Committee defined the only 
foreseeable danger as a breach with the Soviet Union. Eden’s opinion was that unless it
incorporated an Anglo-Soviet alliance, any security scheme would precipitate the very
00danger it was intended to decrease. The successful conduct of the war had prompted the 
FO to emphasise the need for an early understanding with Soviet Russia on a number of 
post-war issues. This was especially true of the Balkans where British influence was under 
challenge. In the first half of 1944, it was becoming less certain that the military disposition 
at the end of hostilities would bear favourably on vital British strategic and economic
19 The Earl of Avon. The Eden Memoirs... p.459
20 F0371/43646, R9092, FO paper and Eden memorandum, 7.06.1944
21 Sainsbury, K. The Turning Point. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985. p.53-61; The Earl of Avon. The Eden 
Memoirs... p.412, 417
22 Keeble, Sir Curtis. Britain.... p. 188-189
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interests in the region. Realising that their forces might not be sufficient to safeguard a large 
and unstable zone, British policy makers had to introduce a degree of flexibility in their 
tactics. They had to work out a clear idea of what the minimum British interests were and 
how to secure them. British diplomats could only achieve this clarification m response to a 
sound understanding of the changing Soviet objectives and their possible manipulation.
The value of Greece for British strategy in the Balkans had never been questioned in 
Whitehall. British influence there had to be retained at any cost. The FO considered the 
possibility of any Soviet intervention fatal. Although earlier in the war British analysts had 
given Soviet intentions towards Greece the benefit of the doubt, they were never inclined to 
watch developments passively. By mid-1944, the steady approach of the Soviet armies to 
Greece coupled with Soviet pressure on the Straits seemed to form an ominous combination. 
What was more, Britain itself had seen to the strengthening of the Greek -  and Yugoslav -  
Communist movements as a part of the general anti-Axis military effort. In the early summer 
of 1944, the clash between British short- and long-term interests had come to a head.24
For two months in the summer of 1944, the Prime Minister put an enormous effort into 
persuading not only the British War Cabinet but above all, the US President and State 
Department that there was a way to keep the Soviet Union out of Greece. His proposed 
method was to agree with the Soviet Union that for the duration of the war in Europe Britain 
should take the lead in Greece, and the Soviet Union in Romania. Overcoming the 
difficulties posed by an evasive Roosevelt and a State Department adamantly hostile to any 
idea of ‘division of responsibility’, in mid-July 1944 Churchill wrote to Stalin that the
23 Ross, K.G.M. ‘The Moscow Conference o f October 1944 (Tolstoy). ’ Barker. E. British Political... p.68
24 The Earl of Avon. The Eden Memoirs... p.459
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scheme could go ahead. The initial understanding was that this was a temporary agreement 
which would be tested in the course of the following three months.
Because of US reluctance and slowness to accept the British proposal, there was some 
confusion in the FO as to whether the three-month trial period was ever enforced. Also, as 
the Soviet Union maintained its links with the Greek Communists, it appeared to be acting 
beyond the temporarily agreed boundaries of its zone.
The provisional wartime division of spheres of influence in the Balkans clearly gave Stalin a 
clue about Britain’s ultimate goals. It was perfectly clear that Britain would not tolerate any 
Soviet pretensions to Greece.
British attitude to the other Balkan countries is still subject to differing historical 
interpretations. Bulgaria is a particularly confusing case. British policy makers were on the 
whole realistic about their minimal influence over wartime developments in that country. 
But they were also reluctant to trade it off as easily as Romania had been for freedom of 
action in Greece. Indeed, at one moment in June 1944, when Churchill was particularly 
anxious to bring the US President round to his point of view, he mentioned that the trial 
agreement would also cover actions in Bulgaria.27 But he did not repeat this, possibly 
because it seemed to raise rather than alleviate US suspicions.
FO officials preferred to keep Bulgaria in Britain’s sphere, or at least not to forsake it at the 
very beginning of negotiations. They realised that in the worst possible scenario, Bulgaria 
would have to be assigned to the Soviet zone. In August 1944, an FO memorandum
98stipulated that Britain could not concentrate on the country. Eden’s own opinion fluctuated.
25 F0371/43636, Churchill - Eden, May-October 1944; Harvey, J. The War Diaries... p.344, 348
26 Ross, K.G.M. ‘The Moscow Conference... 'p.69-70
27 Hull, C. The Memoirs... p. 1453-1258
28 Rothwell, V. Britain... p. 128; The Earl of Avon. The Eden Memoirs... p.460
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In the spring of 1944, the Foreign Secretary seemed to be more inclined to abandon Bulgaria 
as at that moment Soviet danger to Greece was perceived to be too great. In the summer, 
when he thought the three-month agreement obliged the Soviet Union to keep away from 
Greece, Eden spoke of retaining British influence, although not at the cost of a resulting 
antagonism with the USSR. It now seems that Eden was waiting for some clarification of the 
Soviet attitude towards Bulgaria. This would be telling of future Soviet intentions and would
9Qalso give Britain a basis for the formulation of its own objectives.
In the course of the trial period between July and September 1944, in the intensive exchange 
of opinions about the Balkans, neither Eden nor any FO Balkan specialist denied the Soviet 
Union a greater interest in Bulgaria. What the FO insisted on was that the British 
Government should not reveal its preparedness to abandon Bulgaria in unfavourable 
circumstances. Bulgaria had to be kept as a reserve bargaining card, possibly to be played in 
the final negotiations. This is what happened in Moscow and this is why suddenly Bulgaria 
constituted such a difficulty in October 1944. In the end, Eden was bound to accept less 
British influence in Bulgaria than Churchill had contemplated. The crucial reason for this -  
apart from Soviet intransigence -  was that from the summer of 1944 the ambiguous British 
attitude to Bulgaria had made it impossible for the Government to decide on any firm 
demands for privileges in that country. At the October 1944 negotiations Eden repeatedly 
stated that all he wanted was to make sure Britain had more voice in Bulgaria than in 
Romania but made it clear that ultimately he cared for Greece, and Turkey. As resoluteness 
had been lacking in relation to Bulgaria its abandonment ‘in the real battle’ was almost a 
foregone conclusion.30
29 Resis, A. 'The Churchill - Stalin Secret...' p.375; Barker, E. British Policy... p.143; Garson, R. 'Churchill's 
'Spheres o f Influence': Rumania and Bulgaria. ’ Survey, vol. 24, no.3, summer 1979. p.144-145, 153-156
30 FO371/43601, R16186, Eden, 6.10.1944, R16586, Eden to Sargent, 15.10.1944; The Earl o f Avon. The 
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Given the FO’s down-to-earth approach to Bulgaria, the Prime Minister’s and the Foreign
'X1 • • • •Secretary’s actions in Moscow caused no worry in London. British civil servants barely 
changed their attitude towards the Balkans after the percentage deal. They simply continued 
to work on the assumption that the Soviet Union would have a greater say in all the countries 
which did not have a special status in British foreign policy. The advantage lay in the fact 
that the FO could rest reassured that the Soviet Government had no hostile intentions 
towards Greece.
Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office characterised 
the news of the percentage agreement as ‘nothing much’ but was relieved that some 
understanding in regard to the Balkans generally seemed to have been reached. Sargent 
was glad that ‘Eden had done well’.34 Oliver Harvey, Eden’s Private Secretary, who was 
often markedly critical of Churchill’s foreign policy methods, voiced no objections to the 
Moscow agreement at which he was present. He was especially content with the result of 
‘Eden’s plain speaking’. What is more, three months after Moscow, Harvey still thought that 
there was ‘much to be said for Russian claims to play a leading part in the East... as we 
claim in West’. He even admitted that it was time for Britain to accept that it could not ‘have 
[its] cake and eat it as HMG always expect[ed]’.35 On the whole those British officials who 
were familiar with the terms of the percentage deal approved of it or accepted it as the least 
bad solution. They had probably resigned themselves to granting the Soviet Union a free 
hand in the Balkans apart from Greece, and had seen in the Moscow negotiations one last 
British attempt to gain more than the absolute minimum. Churchill himself came back from
31 FO371/43601, R16547, Sargent to Eden, 11.10.1944; Holdrich, P.G.H. 'A Policy ...' p.45, interprets this 
as criticism by the Foreign Office.
32 Harvey, J. The War Diaries... p.363
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Moscow sure that he had reached not only a realistic agreement but also the best possible for 
British interests in Greece.36
Among the positive results of the percentage deal Britain could count the assertion that it 
would remain the leading Mediterranean power. In exchange, Churchill conceded that the 
Black Sea was a Soviet lake, probably not forgetting that the Black Sea was significant for 
the Soviet Union exactly because it opened to the Eastern Mediterranean.37 At the same 
time, Stalin increased pressure on the Straits by reiterating a demand for a new international 
agreement on the regime of passage through them. Churchill readily recognised the need to 
substitute the obsolete Montreux convention. Stalin assured Churchill that the Soviet 
Government had no plans to make any country Communist. Stalin claimed that he was 
exercising restraining influence on the local Communist Parties in the occupied countries. 
However, by saying that some Communists would not listen even to him, Stalin seemed to 
be warning of the difficulties he could create in Eastern Europe.38 Without giving any firm 
commitment Stalin touched upon British sensitivities.
Because of its ambiguity the percentage scheme has been interpreted differently in 
historiography. One analysis maintains that the preliminary three-month deal predetermined 
the final disposition of the forces.39 A radically opposite assertion is that the Moscow figures 
represented an already existing on the ground division.40 A third version claims that quite 
opposite from trying to perpetuate the situation at the time, Churchill in fact made a bid for 
larger British influence in the Balkans than could be secured with the few thousand British
36 Garson, R. 'Churchill's 'Spheres... 'p. 145
37 Xydis, St.G. ‘TheSecret... 'p.263
38 Resis, A. ‘The Churchill - Stalin Secret... 'p.375
39 Xydis, St.G. ‘The Secret... 'p.256
40 Holdrich, P.G.H. 'A P o l ic y . . .Kennedy-Pipe, C. Stalin’s Cold War... p.47
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troops in Greece.41 If the latter is accepted, then it was quite an opportunistic bid which 
Churchill had no resources to support. He could only rely on Stalin’s good will and this was 
exactly what he did not trust and therefore pressed for a division of responsibilities. The 
most he could hope for was to have Stalin’s word so that, if necessary, he would be able to 
show later that Stalin had violated it. But this could hardly be the case with an unwritten 
secret understanding which Britain could not admit even to its US Ally. The fact was, as 
Churchill told the House of Commons on 18 January 1945, that he had tried to avoid 
disagreement with Soviet Russia 42 The result of his attempt was uncertain because there 
was no mutually acceptable interpretation of the percentages. The crucial achievement was 
that Britain had secured Greece 43
The Problems o f the Bulgarian Armistice. While the Anglo-Soviet talks were
taking place in October 1944, armistice negotiations with Bulgaria began in the Soviet 
capital on 15 October 1944.44 Unaware of the percentage deal, the Bulgarian 
representatives were among the first to experience its practical effects. The elaboration of 
the terms, with which Bulgaria was presented by the victors, was a test for the feasibility 
of the Moscow deal. Earlier inter-Allied discussions of the Bulgarian armistice had 
revealed serious differences arising from the uneven geopolitical importance of Bulgaria 
for each of the three principal Allies.
Britain and the USA had already decided to make Bulgarian withdrawal from the 
occupied territories a preliminary condition for armistice negotiations. This and some 
other terms of the Bulgarian armistice were the subject of some ‘pretty vigorous
41 Garson, Robert. 'Churchill's 'Spheres... ’
42 Holdrich, P.G.H. 'A Policy... ’ p.42
43 Ibid. p.37 -40
44 Dimitrov, G. Dnevnik... p.443
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exchanges’ between Eden and Molotov in Moscow, becoming related to the final version 
of the percentage scheme.45
The last three wartime Bulgarian Governments had been unable to draw Bulgaria out of 
the war for the simple reason that they hoped to extract territorial concessions from the 
Allies. The Muraviev Government broke off with Germany but did not cancel Bulgarian 
administration of the ‘new lands’ in Yugoslavia and Greece, either. Even while the Red 
Army was overrunning Bulgaria, Bulgarian troops remained in occupation of Yugoslav 
Macedonia and Greek Aegean Thrace. British observers interpreted this as an indication 
that Bulgaria was going to try to get from the USSR what Britain had denied it. After all, 
only four years earlier, in its proposal for a non-aggression pact the Soviet Union had 
offered Bulgaria an outlet on the Aegean in return for Soviet bases on the Bulgarian 
Black Sea coast.46 Another disquieting factor for British policy makers was that the USA 
did not fully oppose the Bulgarian territorial claims, just like it had been in favour of 
some concessions to Bulgaria at the end of the First World War.47
To Britain all these developments looked very unsatisfactory; after all, a considerable part 
of Britain’s war effort in the Balkans had aimed at putting an end to Bulgarian occupation 
of parts of Greece and Yugoslavia. After Bulgaria had been knocked out of the war, 
Britain had been given no categorical assurances that the Soviet armies were going to stop 
on the southern Bulgarian border. This issue became a matter of great significance.
British wartime planning had deemed it essential that Bulgaria should be forced out of the 
war in such a way as not to affect the interests of the small Balkan Allies and the security
45 The Earl of Avon. The Eden Memoirs... p.482-483
46 F0371/43613, R13392, FORD paper, 24.08.1944; F0371/43600, R15270, Laskey, 26.09.1944: 
F 0371/43649, R20431, Leeper to FO, 11.11.1944
47 F0371/43613, R13392, FORD paper, 24.08.1944; FRUS 1944, vol.III, p.343, proposed terms,
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of the Straits. Instead, in September 1944 with Soviet involvement, if not encouragement, 
Bulgaria was likely to acquire a position from which it could threaten the fragile Balkan 
equilibrium. There was no regular Greek force to stop any invasion. No British 
detachments had yet been dispatched to Greek territory, but even if they had been, they 
would not have been prepared for an Anglo-Soviet clash. The situation attracted a great 
deal of attention as British military and political leaders followed closely the slightest 
movement of Soviet and Bulgarian troops on the Bulgarian-Greek border. On 16 
September 1944, in an attempt to ascertain the intentions of the new Bulgarian 
Government regarding Greece a British Military Mission arrived in Sofia from Drama in 
northern Greece. The British officers informed representatives of the Bulgarian 
Government that imminent British landings were going to take place at Dedeagatch,
JO
Kavalla and to the east of Salonika. The message implied that any remaining Bulgarian 
troops in Greece would soon face British military detachments. It was meant to dissuade 
the Bulgarian Government from harbouring any hopes of continuing the occupation of 
Greek Thrace. On 21 September 1944, after consultation with the Joint Planning Staff 
Churchill wrote to Stalin that British troops would soon land in Greece so there was no 
need for a Soviet advance in that direction.49 Sending this information to Stalin was 
designed to pre-empt any dreaded Soviet move towards Greece. On 27 September, with 
the British divisions still a week from their arrival in southern Greece, Churchill wrote a 
second message to Stalin, informing him of his wish to go to Moscow.50
The timing of these telegrams is not coincidental. They suggest that Churchill and Eden felt 
the need to talk to Stalin in person while the situation in the Balkans was still unsettled. The 
appearance of the Red Army in the Balkans could be explained by military expediency, but
48 Toshkova, V. Bulgaria, nepriznatiyat... p.39
49 Holdrich, P.G.H. ‘A Policy ... 'p.30
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the British leaders feared it could prejudice long-term developments. Most British analysts 
were convinced that British influence and prestige would sustain a great blow if the Soviet 
army crossed into Greek territory or Bulgarian detachments were allowed to remain there 
indefinitely. That is why Churchill wanted to make an effort to compensate with political 
negotiations for what Great Britain lacked in military presence in the region. British 
anxieties were complicated by the fact that Communist guerrillas were especially active in 
the northern Greek provinces, still controlled by Bulgarian troops. If EAM, the leftist 
resistance movement headed by the Greek Communist Party, was to get material and 
military support from Soviet Russia, a Greek civil war could easily flare up. These 
considerations were on Churchill’s mind when in Moscow he told Stalin that they should 
not ‘get at cross purposes’ but should work to prevent the eruption of ‘mini-wars’ in the 
Balkans.
Even though it now seems that they were not intended to provoke Britain, Bulgarian 
actions in Aegean Greece were a cause for British concern. Already on 11 September 
1944, the Fatherland Front Government sent to the Kavalla region two Government 
Ministers, the Communists Dobri Terpeshev and the Social Democrat Dimiter Neikov, 
accompanied by one of the leaders of the Bulgarian Communist resistance in southern 
Bulgaria. They met representatives of the Greek Partisans and promised them the 
Bulgarian Government’s help. They urged local EAM-ELAS detachments to come down 
from the mountains and take over power in the countryside. On their part, the retreating 
Bulgarian civil authorities were instructed to hand over control of local affairs to the 
population. All this aroused the suspicions of British observers, as it was evidently meant 
to aid Greek left-wing resistance against nationalist guerrillas loyal to the London- 
supported Greek Govemment-in-exile. For this reason, Terpeshev’s speeches on his tour
50 Feis, H. Churchill... p.441
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of Aegean Thrace which drew parallels between the struggle of Bulgarian and Greek 
Partisans and extolled the decisive intervention of the Soviet army in Bulgaria sounded all 
the more menacing.51
The situation in Thrace, aggravated by the Soviet presence in the Balkans, worried 
Whitehall officials. Their fears were exacerbated by the panic which had overwhelmed 
the Greek Govemment-in-exile when Bulgaria had turned on Germany and declared that 
Bulgarian troops were going to help drive the Germans out of the Balkans. The Greek 
Royal Government flooded the FO with protests against any Bulgarians remaining in
c'y
Greece under any pretext. The Greeks were eager to prevent later Bulgarian claims for 
participation in the liberation of Greece. Bulgaria could then campaign for a co­
belligerent status, which in Greek eyes was a single step away from renewal of territorial 
aspirations. Even at such a precarious moment Greek exiled leaders confirmed their own 
counter-demands for the rectification of the border at Bulgaria’s expense.53 British 
diplomats found themselves under the double burden of their own apprehensions and the 
genuine, if somewhat overplayed, Greek alarm. And Greek mistrust of Bulgarian 
intentions for Eastern Thrace seemed all the more justified since it was shared by the 
Royal Hellenic Government and the left-wing EAM activists.54 This fact was not to be 
discounted as it was important that after the war Britain should remain on good terms 
with the future Government of Greece, whatever the latter’s political complexion.
In October 1944, the British perceptions were that the USSR was assuming a threatening 
stance regarding Greece. Scrutiny of Soviet behaviour reveals that by October 1944 
Soviet Russia was prepared to relinquish any position in Greece. Major Micklethwaite-
51 Rachev, St. Churchill... p.305, 309, 316
52 F0371/43600, R15274, Papandreou to Leeper, 1.09.1944
53 F0371/43602, R18455, Athens to FO, 13.11.1944; F0371/43649, R20431, Leeper to FO, 19.11.1944
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Miller of the SOE, who had spoken with the Bulgarian Deputy War Minister in Sofia on 
16 September 1944, had been explicitly told that ‘the [Bulgarian] troops will go out and 
will not intervene in Greek affairs’. Informing Dimitrov in Moscow about the incident, 
Kostov added that ‘whether there were new or old authorities in the regions left by 
Bulgarian troops, this was a Greek affair’.55 It is notable that immediately after the visit of 
the British officers in Sofia, the Bulgarian Government issued a statement that it did not 
want to be dragged into the internal quarrels of the rival Greek groups and asked for 
instructions by the Three Big Allies on this matter. This shows that by mid-September 
1944 the new Bulgarian Government of the Fatherland Front had practically resigned 
itself to the idea that Bulgarian administration of the Aegean territories had to be 
cancelled. The Bulgarian civil authorities were recalled from the region.
There is no documentary indication that these signs were noticed by the British 
Government. Obviously, the reports of the SOE officers were also disregarded in London. 
What British officials observed carefully were the activities of the Bulgarian 
Government’s delegation and the ambiguous behaviour of the Bulgarian commanders in 
Greece. Another development which drew the attention of the FO was the Soviet 
Government’s declaration that the left flank of the Third Ukrainian Front needed to be 
guarded from possible attack by the Germans retreating from Greece and placed the 
Bulgarian troops in the Aegean region under direct Soviet command. The responsibility 
for the remaining Bulgarian military regiments in northern Greece was undertaken by the 
Soviet Union.56 It was noted in London that in early September 1944 the Soviet 17th 
Army had already undertaken intelligence operations in Greece.57 Also, on 17 September 
1944 when Soviet troops had entered Sofia, all Bulgarian armed forces, including
55 Ibid. p.39
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regiments outside the country had been placed under Marshal Tolbukhin, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Third Ukrainian Front. Britain’s fear was that if the Soviet 
army were given orders to take over all territories administered by Bulgaria, it could 
reach the Mediterranean in hours.58
A clash of interest on the question of the Bulgarian withdrawal from Greece became 
evident between Britain and the Soviet Union. The problem surfaced on 10 October 1944 
when in the conversation with Molotov Eden spoke emphatically about developments in 
northern Greece. He pointed out that ‘the Bulgarians were behaving with increasing 
insolence’ towards Britain and ‘had even dared’ to place British officers under house 
arrest.59 So agitated was Eden about Bulgarian behaviour, that he repeated three times in a 
row how important it was that all Bulgarian troops should evacuate Thrace without 
delay.60 Eden pointed out that he considered the intolerable Bulgarian actions to be 
condoned by the Soviet Government. The British Foreign Secretary insisted that Molotov 
should instruct the Soviet High Command to order an immediate Bulgarian withdrawal 
from Greek territory. Molotov seemed embarrassed and made a faint attempt to persuade 
Eden that no Soviet armies were engaged in any operations in Greece. On the whole 
Molotov did not deny responsibility for Bulgarian actions there. Only after Molotov 
promised that Bulgarian troops would be taken out of the northern Greek provinces, did 
Eden agree to a twenty-percent share for Britain in Bulgaria as opposed to the twenty-five 
initially claimed by Churchill. A similar change was agreed for Britain’s percentage in 
Hungary.61 Recalling the Moscow meeting in his memoirs, Eden expressed general
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satisfaction. The one particular result he thought worth mentioning was that the Soviet 
Government ‘would summon the Bulgars out of Greece and Yugoslavia’ the same 
evening.62 On 11 October 1944 the Bulgarian Government was informed that its troops 
had a fortnight to clear Thrace as a preliminary condition for the conclusion of an
fx'Xarmistice with the Allies.
The question of Bulgarian troops in Thrace resurfaced once again shortly after the 
Moscow summit - in the EAC, to which the Bulgarian armistice had been referred for 
final adjustments. In the discussion of Western participation in the Allied Control 
Commission (ACC) for Bulgaria, the US delegate stubbornly kept denying the Soviet 
Chairman more powers than those accorded to the British and US representatives. Then 
the Soviet delegate mentioned that Bulgarian military detachments should be allowed to 
stay in Greece as they now formed a part of the fighting Soviet army.64 Gussev certainly 
acted on instructions from Moscow but it is doubtful that these were intended as anything 
more than bargaining tactics to obtain concessions on other matters of importance to the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet diplomat, therefore, was probably simply underlining how easy 
it would be for the USSR to complicate affairs in the Mediterranean if it did not obtain 
satisfaction elsewhere.
It is extremely difficult to establish whether in the autumn of 1944 Stalin was prepared to 
support Bulgarian claims to the Aegean, as was the general impression among British 
observers at the time.65 Traditional historians infer the confirmation of this view from
62 The Earl of Avon. The Eden Memoirs... p.482
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later Soviet hostility to Greece and pressure on the Straits.66 Such a conclusion is 
contradicted by the fact that already on 6 October the Bulgarian troops had in fact been 
ordered to leave Thrace. On that day Stalin personally spoke with Dimitrov explaining 
that it was the British demands that were delaying the Bulgarian armistice. Stalin pointed 
out that his own priority was to retain the Bulgarian army intact in contrast to Britain 
which wanted to disarm it. Stalin expressed confidence that the Bulgarian armistice 
negotiations would be concluded soon and even intended to induce their pace by pledging
f \  7an early Soviet withdrawal from Bulgaria, ‘at the worst after the defeat of Germany’. 
So, Stalin had assessed correctly the agenda of the October 1944 political conversations 
Churchill initiated. Stalin was very much aware of the priorities of the British leaders and 
was able to exploit the weaknesses in Britain’s position in the Balkans, using the Soviet 
bargaining points to their fullest potential. For almost a week Soviet and Bulgarian 
leaders managed to keep the imminent Bulgarian evacuation from the Aegean provinces 
secret. This made all British observers extremely nervous and willing to sanction Soviet 
gains in almost all parts of the Balkans and indeed Eastern Europe, as long as the Soviet 
Union stayed away from Greece.
Newly available sources show that Stalin had not lost long-term interest in the 
Mediterranean. But as advised by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 1944 he 
decided to concentrate on strategic matters first. It was necessary to make the control of 
the Straits part of a lasting larger Soviet-British deal, based on ‘amicable demarcation of 
the security spheres in Europe according to the principle of geographical proximity’. If 
his recollections are to be believed, Molotov favoured more restraint than Stalin as far as
66 Xydis, St.G. ''The Secret... 'p.264
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pressure on Turkey was concerned. Molotov also remembered that the Bulgarian 
Communists used to urge that Bulgaria be allowed to annex a part of Greece:
It was impossible... you had to stay within limits. Raising this issue would have caused trouble 
right at the beginning of the peace. The English and French would have been opposed. I consulted 
with the Central Committee and was told not to bring it up, that the time was not right. We had to 
remain silent on this issue. But Kolarov was urging it. It was desirable but not timely.69
Neither Kolarov nor Dimitrov have left straightforward evidence of the Bulgarian desire 
to acquire part of Aegean Greece. Post-war Bulgarian historiography has hardly 
mentioned any Bulgarian territorial pretensions although before the conclusion of the 
Peace Treaty, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed several memoranda on 
the so-called national question to the victorious powers.70 The Bulgarian Government of 9 
September 1944 had renounced its predecessors’ policy of occupation of Yugoslav 
Macedonia and Greek Thrace calling for peaceful resolution of the territorial disputes 
with Bulgaria’s neighbours.71 In Craiova on 6 October 1944 the FF Government and Tito 
signed an agreement stipulating that Bulgarian troops should remain in Macedonia and 
fight against the retreating Germans under Soviet command. Tito was on his way back 
from Moscow where he had discussed the terms of the agreement with both Stalin and 
Dimitrov.72 The FO did not fail to notice these developments but attention remained 
focused on northern Greece.73
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The Establishment o f the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria. Churchill had
gone to Moscow in order to protect Greece from Soviet intervention. Stalin understood 
this and in turn had set out to probe how far he could go in the Balkans as long as he 
stopped short of direct intervention in Greece. The negotiations on the composition and 
functions of the ACC for Bulgaria revealed the priorities of both Britain and the USSR 
and the concessions they were ready to make to secure these. The clarification of the 
basic principles of the armistice administration for Bulgaria became a trial run for the 
practical implementation of the percentage agreement.
Already in the second half of 1943, the British and US Governments had begun paying a 
great deal of attention to preparations for the peace settlement. They had mapped out the 
political, economic and other problems that would arise on the cessation of hostilities and 
started looking into possible solutions. One of the most urgent issues was that of preparing 
the armistice terms for Germany and its principal satellites, including Bulgaria. At that time, 
British diplomats believed that the peace settlement should be founded on solid inter-Allied 
agreement. This principle was behind Eden’s proposition at the Moscow Conference in 
October 1943 that ‘a clearing house for any European problems connected with the war... 
arising either before or after the cessation of hostilities’ should be set up.74 This became the
•7C
London-based European Advisory Commission. To British disappointment, the US and the 
Soviet Governments considered the Commission to be little more than an extension of 
normal diplomatic activity and consequently their representatives had limited competence.
The British delegate in the EAC, Sir William Strang wrote later that despite long periods of 
inactivity and drawn out negotiations caused by the Soviet belief that time was on their side, 
‘never once... was there ever any serious misunderstanding... or any breach of given word’.
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Strang insisted that the work of the EAC ‘stood the test of events and ... plans went 
smoothly into operation when the time came to apply them’.76 The example of the Bulgarian 
armistice shows exactly the opposite. In May 1944 it had been agreed that the EAC should 
prepare terms for Bulgaria. Despite the fact that in the summer of 1944 the British 
Government was making a concentrated political effort to knock Bulgaria out of the war, the 
draft of the Bulgarian armistice was not ready until late August.77 This explained at least 
partially Britain’s procrastination during the unfortunate Moshanov mission.
On 29 August 1944 the Soviet delegate in the EAC withdrew from the deliberations of the 
Bulgarian armistice. At the time British observers interpreted this as a show of disinterest 
and agreement that the Western Allies should have the last say about Bulgaria. Only with 
hindsight did they realise that Gussev’s withdrawal meant that the Soviet Government had 
decided to impose its own conditions on Bulgaria under completely changed 
circumstances.78 The Soviet Government’s objective was not simply to participate in the 
discussions for Bulgaria, as Strang claimed: the Soviet Government was already doing this 
by invitation from its British and US partners. What is more, even when the Soviet Union 
was not at war with Bulgaria, the Western Governments had been willing to accept tripartite 
participation in the envisaged ACC for Bulgaria.79 When the Red Army occupied Bulgaria, 
the Soviet objective changed so as to draw the country into the larger Soviet strategic design.
Preparations for the Bulgarian armistice at the EAC began in earnest after the end of the 
Moscow Conference in October 1944. However, the EAC only worked out the formalities of 
the text. All significant decisions had been taken by the Soviet and British Foreign
76 Lord Strang. Home... p.205
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Secretaries in their talks on 10 and 11 October, and in the letters they exchanged shortly 
afterwards. Strang admitted that British Eastern European experts did not expect to have 
much say in the Bulgarian armistice regime as Soviet predominance in ‘the immediate 
wartime future’ had been expressed ‘in the figures given by the PM to Stalin in Moscow’. 
He also voiced the resignation of most senior British diplomats and civil servants in that ‘the 
effect of the armistice, no matter what the text might say, was to open the way for exclusive 
Soviet influence’. In an already lost battle, British representatives, helped to some extent 
by their US colleagues at the EAC, fought to preserve some say in the armistice settlement. 
Friction centred on the prerogatives of the representatives of the Three Big Powers in the 
ACC for Bulgaria.
By the end of August 1944, the various British and US administrative bodies in charge of 
armistice preparations had reviewed and reached a broad understanding on the main points 
of the armistice instrument. Apart from recalling Bulgarian troops within the Bulgarian 
boundaries as of 1 January 1941, these included demobilisation of the Bulgarian army, 
giving the Allies free passage across the country and securing any required material and 
financial facilities. In addition, an enabling clause was devised so that the Bulgarian 
Government was obliged to fulfil any demands made by the Allies. Although the 
preliminary drafts foresaw Anglo-American occupation of Bulgaria in extraordinary 
circumstances, such a development was not realistically expected by either British or US 
planners. Most importantly, no provision was made for any foreign control body to be 
introduced in Bulgaria. It was shortly before the entry of the Soviet army into Bulgaria that 
the British Chiefs of Staff raised the question of a Control Commission. This was accepted 
by the US Joint Chiefs only after the occupation of Bulgaria. When Gussev rejoined the
80 Lord Strang. Home... p.224-225
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EAC sessions on Bulgaria, he confirmed his Government’s wish for such a controlling 
mechanism.81
Gussev insisted that the proposed ACC should be run entirely by Soviet officers 
commanding troops in Bulgaria. Agreeing that the Soviet member would be the chairman, 
the British suggestion was that he should simply be primus inter pares in a truly tripartite 
commission. This view was upheld firmly by the US administration throughout the 
negotiations on the Bulgarian armistice, which in October 1944 moved from London to 
Moscow and back.82 The US Government had so far displayed little concern for Bulgaria, it 
intended to take a relatively lively interest in the future. In the first instance, increased US 
influence was to be conveyed through the ACC. The US Ambassadors to Moscow and 
London were given instructions to endorse the principle of equal participation in the 
Bulgarian ACC to the end, stopping short of US refusal to sign the armistice. Even after the 
Anglo-Soviet deal in Moscow made the US position untenable, the State Department 
proceeded to place on record its objections to exclusive Soviet rights in the ACC. The 
United States also reserved the right to bring up this question at a later date.84 Consistent 
assertion of the necessity for full tripartite membership in the ACC was motivated above all 
by general US ideas about the peace settlement and not by particular interest in Bulgaria 
itself. The impression of the future US representative in Bulgaria Maynard Barnes was that 
the Bulgarian negotiations were not followed by the US War, Navy or State Departments 
‘with any particular interest or intelligence’.85
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In any case, it was the rather more pragmatic British attitude to the problems of the 
Bulgarian armistice which carried the day in Moscow in October 1944. To use Barnes’ 
words, the British leaders ‘did not pull a fast one’ on the USA, they were trying to get a
o / r
deal. In the protracted and repetitive talks with Molotov on 10 and 11 October Eden 
opened the bargaining on the Bulgarian ACC with the proposal for equal representation. 
Molotov maintained firmly that this was not feasible. He protested his inability to 
understand how three people could have the same responsibility and proclaimed that it 
could only create confusion. Moreover, the eighty-percent share already allocated to the 
Soviet Government would become meaningless if the representatives of the other two had 
equal shares. Finally, a compromise was found in the decision to allow for two distinctive 
periods in the existence of the ACC. Until the end of hostilities with Germany, the Soviet 
High Command would be in full charge; in the second period which would last until the 
conclusion of the Peace Treaty, there would be increased participation of the British and 
US elements of the Commission.87 In letters to Molotov after the talks, Eden practically
• • o ogave away the right to any Western participation during the first period.
Historians have claimed that the establishment of the Bulgarian ACC followed broadly 
the precedent of Italy where Britain and the USA both had occupying armies and as a 
result claimed exclusive say in the armistice regime.89 While the situations in Italy on the 
one hand, and Bulgaria and Romania on the other, can be superficially compared, it is 
apparent from the available records that in the Moscow conversations the Soviet leaders
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did not touch upon this question. Yet it certainly was on the minds of British officials 
who were very conscious of Britain’s position in Italy and wanted to prevent the Soviet 
diplomats from raising it officially.90
The only concession Molotov made in Moscow was that a representative of the Anglo- 
American Combined Chiefs of Staff should also sign the Bulgarian armistice along with the 
Soviet Commander of the Third Ukrainian Front.91 This was a purely symbolic gesture and 
gave Britain little satisfaction for three years of war with Bulgaria. In the eyes of the FO, it 
was even less meaningful since worrying developments were shaping on the ground. The 
Soviet military authorities had already expelled SOE and OSS teams from Bulgaria on the 
pretext of improper accreditation. In addition, the Soviet High Command in the country 
claimed that the political representative of the British Government had arrived without the 
necessary Soviet permission and was refusing to receive him and facilitate his work. All 
this contained little promise for Soviet-British co-operation in and regarding Bulgaria. The 
picture was complicated by the fact that the political agreements undertaken by the British 
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in Moscow were made known to none of the British 
diplomatic or military officers sent to Bulgaria. They had been dispatched to the country 
with little knowledge about the preceding developments and with only the most basic terms 
of reference for their mission. It is no wonder then that initially they honestly believed that 
their task was to take a full and equal part in governing ex-enemy Bulgaria.
The Armistice between the Allies and Bulgaria was officially signed on 28 October 1944 in 
Moscow. The Bulgarian delegation included Government Ministers representing the 
different parties in the FF. It was given no chance for bargaining: it had been summoned to
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formalise an act of unconditional surrender. By then an official joint Allied Military Mission 
had verified the complete withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Thrace.
The attitude displayed towards Bulgaria during the Moscow negotiations in October 1944 
showed that the Second World War had changed little in Britain’s relationship with that 
country. It was evident that British diplomats gave priority to stabilising their relations with 
the other Great Powers. During the talks between the British and Soviet leaders it became 
obvious that the general principles determining the approach to Bulgaria were deeply rooted 
in the traditional power politics of the region. Once again, more than anything else Bulgaria 
attracted British attention by virtue of its geographic location and complicated relationship 
with its neighbours. The Moscow meeting also provided a precise and detailed miniature of 
future British behaviour towards the country.
The Meaning of Yalta and Potsdam for Bulgaria. The Moscow negotiations
demonstrated that the Soviet Union would quickly fill any vacuum resulting from British 
inability, unwillingness or hesitation to uphold British interests. Throughout the war Stalin 
had been interested in extending and stabilising Soviet influence over Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania. He could do so only after he had established that Churchill did not regard these 
countries as of primary importance. This is precisely what Stalin managed to confirm at the 
time of the percentage agreement. His political achievement was certainly underpinned by 
the military advantages the Soviet Union enjoyed in the Balkans. In the months after the 
TOLSTOY meeting, the westward military advances of the Red Army continued and caused 
British leaders to worry whether it would stop at the agreed line in Central Europe. But this 
renewed anxiety about Soviet intentions did not mean that British policy makers expressed 
any remorse about the rightness of the percentage agreement.
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At the same time, noticeable nuances in Britain’s attitude towards the Soviet Union 
developed. British observers did not deny Soviet predominance in the ex-satellites but they 
resented the methods with which it was being asserted. They were concerned with 
accumulating indications of Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the occupied 
countries. Above all, they were perturbed by hostile Soviet behaviour towards the Western 
representatives there.94 This gradual change of heart was especially characteristic of 
Churchill who did not have much trust in Soviet intentions anyway. Outwardly he 
maintained his understanding with Stalin. Churchill could not but admit that when civil war 
erupted in Greece in December 1944, Stalin had kept his word not to interfere. Without 
denying that he had recognised the Soviet lead in Bulgaria and Romania, Churchill was 
however disturbed by the fact that in these countries Communist-controlled Governments 
were ruling by force and with complete Soviet support. One way for the British Prime 
Minister to keep his promise and yet let Stalin know that Soviet actions in Eastern Europe 
were not considered legitimate, was to persuade the USA to exercise some moderating 
influence on Soviet behaviour.95
During the first half of 1945 no British official was given authorisation to challenge the 
percentage agreement. Accounts of the limitations and humiliations under which they 
were placed became a constant feature of reports from the Western representatives in the 
ex- satellites. These representatives were equally confused by the failure of their superiors 
to initiate any adequate action on a suitable international scale. Even though few British 
diplomats had been informed by the FO about the exact nature of the understanding 
between Churchill and Stalin, a number of men in the field independently came to the 
conclusion that some quid pro quo must have been achieved. Their greatest concern,
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however, was the realisation that their leaders might be entertaining false ideas about the 
real Soviet attitude to Big Power co-operation.96
As far as Bulgaria was concerned, the percentage deal overshadowed the subsequent Three- 
Power summits at Yalta and Potsdam. Despite its increasing unease concerning 
developments in the ex-satellite states, the British Government was not prepared to 
announce publicly that there had been an agreement, let alone that Stalin was not respecting 
it. Therefore, the only possible course was to try if not to supersede, at least to rectify the 
effects of the Moscow agreement. British adherence to the US-sponsored Declaration for 
Liberated Europe at Yalta in February 1945 could be seen as such an attempt. It stood 
halfway between belated reassertion of the principles of democratic government and 
restraint from confrontation because of the Soviet methods of application of the percentage 
deal. If this was so, however, Stalin remained immune to such sophisticated expression of 
disapproval of his behaviour in Eastern Europe. He signed the Declaration with quite a 
different meaning of democracy in mind, and after Yalta several times reminded British 
representatives of the October 1944 bargain.97 This served to make it clear to the British 
leaders that Stalin was not satisfied with receiving assurances of the strategic security of the 
Soviet zone. British diplomats realised that for the Soviet Union security was equated with 
territory, and what was more, complete domination of the acquired territory. Only then
no
would the USSR refrain from meddling in the others’ zones.
It is commonly agreed that the fate of Eastern Europe was finally determined at the Yalta 
summit. In fact, apart from Poland, which of course had been one of the greatest concerns 
for the British Government throughout the war, no other Eastern European country was
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discussed meaningfully by the Allied leaders. Harvey feared that the Conference would 
be the ‘usual scramble leading to the usual half-digested decisions’ and was soon able to 
confirm this prediction."
The internal situation in Bulgaria, which together with Romania was at the time of the 
Yalta Conference keenly watched by the FO, was not placed on the agenda. The subject 
of Bulgaria was briefly touched upon when British grievances regarding Soviet 
domination of the ACC, the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty and Bulgarian reparations to 
Greece were recorded.100 The closest the Big Three came to paying attention to the 
Balkans at all was in a general and indecisive review of the international regulation of the 
Straits. Both Stalin and Churchill reiterated their agreement for the revision of the 
Montreux convention by which they confirmed their positions from the previous October. 
Regarding Yugoslavia, it was decided to endorse a compromise between the Partisans and 
the London-based Govemment-in-exile, which could again be interpreted as practical 
implementation of the fifty-fifty deal.101 So, as far as the Yalta talks touched on questions 
raised at TOLSTOY, the general framework tended to be confirmed. The lawyers at the 
FO argued that neither Stalin nor the British Government ‘were committed very much’ by 
the Yalta Declaration. The major advantage they saw was that the document provided ‘an
1 fOexcellent bargaining counter’. Stalin was given almost no reason to suspect that Soviet
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actions in the ex-satellites were resented or that they could become the cause for a major
i minter-Allied controversy.
Already in late February 1945, the FO had decided to ‘let sleeping dogs lie’ and not 
invoke the Declaration except for the specific purposes of inducing the USA to accept 
responsibility for some other areas of British interest, such as Greece. FO officials 
discussed the idea whether Britain could agree to a degree of Soviet influence in Western 
Europe in exchange for the same for the British Government in Eastern Europe. There 
was no unanimous view. Sargent explored the question as to whether Britain should join 
the United States in invoking the Declaration in an attempt to stop the Soviet Union from 
“cooking” the elections in Bulgaria and Romania. He advised against this and repeated 
that the only value of the Declaration was in committing the United States to European 
affairs. But Britain had to be very careful with US involvement in Eastern Europe as ‘the 
Americans are only too prone to espouse a cause enthusiastically and later let us down 
with a bump’. Also, Britain had to consider whether for example claims in Romania 
would not make Stalin take an inconvenient line on Italy.104
After the Yalta Conference, however, the relative British complacency with regard to the 
northern Balkans steadily decreased. Diplomatic signals from the Soviet-occupied 
countries drew attention to the growing arrogance of the local Communist parties, derived 
above all from their firm belief in Soviet backing. British doubts that the Soviet military 
and political representatives exercised a strong influence on the ruling coalitions found 
constant confirmation. The ultimate proof came in late February 1945 with the Soviet- 
supported imposition of a Communist Government on the reluctant Romanian King. At 
the same time, the FO was markedly reluctant to take up with the Soviet Government the
103 Kovrig, B. Of Walls and Bridges. The United States and Eastern Europe. New York: New York UP, 1991. 
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issue of political conditions in Romania and Bulgaria. There was no official British 
criticism of the Soviet-directed change of Government in Bucharest.105 Nor did senior FO 
officials wish in any way to get involved in a dispute over the forthcoming elections in 
Bulgaria.106 One reason for this was that the problems of the Polish settlement were 
forcefully coming to the fore of political discussions between the Soviet Union and its 
Western partners. The FO preferred to concentrate on the solution of this most serious of 
questions, and did not wish to irritate and distract the USSR with disputes of significantly 
lesser priority. Another inducement for Britain to refrain from making public comments 
on the situation in Bulgaria and Romania was the ever-present fear that Russia could
107retaliate in Greece, Italy or another country of primary interest for Britain.
After Yalta British foreign policy makers set out to re-examine British policy towards 
South Eastern Europe, which was inextricably entangled with the conduct of Anglo- 
Soviet relations. British diplomats faced the crucial question whether Soviet actions in the 
ex-satellite states illuminated future Soviet intentions for the area. In addition, they 
wondered whether the Soviet Union was going to maintain friendly relations with its 
Western Allies or whether it would use its powerful position to dominate the post-war 
continent. As usual, there was not a straightforward answer to these complicated 
questions and the real task of the FO specialists was to look into possible scenarios and 
work out adequate solutions. The result was a memorandum signed by Sargent on 13 
March 1945 and soon afterwards circulated to the War Cabinet. In it there was reiteration 
of the fear that the Soviet Union had deliberately set out to violate the Yalta agreements. 
But there was also an allowance for the fact that Soviet behaviour remained consistent
104 Rothwell, V. Britain... p.363
105 Saiu, L. The Great Powers and Romania, 1943 - 1947. Boulder, Co: Columbia UP, 1992. p.83-91
106 F0371/48123, R4072, Howard, 5.03.1945, Sargent, 6.03.1945
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with what it was before Yalta and that the countries concerned had themselves not been 
renowned for their democratic traditions. The overall inclination of the collective authors 
of the paper was that the British Government would be much wiser in accepting the 
historic realities in the northern Balkans and resigning itself both to undemocratic regimes 
and Soviet predominance there. The alternative would only risk deterioration of relations 
with the Soviet Union without any realistic hope that political conditions could be 
improved, and would therefore spell the definite failure of all British objectives in the 
region.108 At the same time, Sargent was worried that Britain might be seen as 
abandoning certain countries, like Bulgaria and Romania, in the belief that it would be 
able to save others. This would amount to admission that it was willingly operating within 
certain geographical limits and therefore abdicating its right as a Great Power to be 
interested in the whole of Europe.109
The end of hostilities in Europe brought a new reappraisal of British foreign policy 
incorporated in another memorandum, written by Sargent in July 1945 and entitled 
‘Stocktaking after VE-Day’. Endeavouring to assess Britain’s international position in the 
foreseeable post-war years, this document recognised the decrease in material resources 
for which Britain would have to compensate with skilled diplomacy and the support of 
the United States. Three-Power co-operation was still considered central to British foreign 
policy but depended on accurate assessment of Stalin’s long-term objectives. Sargent 
voiced an emphatic opinion that the Soviet Union was not likely to pursue further 
territorial expansion but would instead opt for the consolidation of its power in Eastern 
and Central Europe. This meant the establishment of Communism in the countries
107 F0371/47883, N8674, Clerk Kerr to FO, 10.07.1945; Percival, Mark L. ‘British-Romanian Relations 
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controlled by the USSR which in its turn would become the greatest long-term danger for 
British security and influence on the continent. This time Sargent seemed to have 
reversed his advice of a month before and wrote that Britain should not be afraid to take 
the lead in an independent, anti-totalitarian policy in relation to Eastern Europe. But once 
again, he stated that British efforts should differentiate between the countries in the 
region: on this occasion he mentioned that Communism might have to be accepted in 
Romania and Hungary but not elsewhere, including Bulgaria.110
While the FO was re-evaluating British relations with the Soviet Union, the State 
Department was re-confirming the basic belief of US foreign policy that spheres of 
influence should be discouraged. This was directed equally against Great Britain whose 
imperial aspirations the US diplomats still suspected. What remained unclear was how 
US politicians hoped to reconcile the idea of no special zones of interest with continued 
insistence on good relations with the Soviet Union which was evidently going against its 
undertakings at Yalta. Among US diplomats, Kennan was the only one who saw the post­
war international dilemmas in terms close to those of his British colleagues: where it was 
not able or willing to confront the USSR, the USA need not challenge Soviet 
supremacy.111
As a rule, however, until the Potsdam summit the Truman administration continued
119Roosevelt’s search for general co-operation with Soviet Russia. This was m a sense one 
step behind the British Government, which was becoming more conscious that a 
confrontation with the Soviet Government was approaching. Nevertheless, the British
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political analysts were realists enough to recognise that the Balkans were not going to be 
the subject of such a showdown. In fact confrontation almost flared up in an area closely 
related to the Balkans. In May 1945, Tito’s troops occupied Trieste in an attempt to annex 
it to Yugoslavia. This was seized upon by Churchill who saw in it a suitable occasion to 
demonstrate to the USA how Soviet foreign policy operated. Churchill was convinced 
that the Soviet Union had plans for Trieste to become a Soviet-controlled outlet to the 
Mediterranean and that Tito was acting upon orders from Moscow. It is not clear whether 
this was the case but it is now certain that Tito withdrew his forces from Trieste on orders 
from Stalin who balked in the face of firm and unanimous British and US action.113 The 
whole episode was reminiscent of the Bulgarian withdrawal from northern Greece: the 
British Government took an inflexible position, as its Mediterranean interests were 
perceived to be under a strong threat. Abiding by the percentage deal the Soviet Union 
pulled out of an area it had recognised as of greater British concern. So, a month before 
Potsdam, it was confirmed by practical measures that the Moscow understanding was still 
in force. Nor was it superseded by the decisions at the last Three-Power Conference in 
July 1945.
Potsdam changed little as far as British attitudes to the ex-satellite countries were 
concerned. Of course, President Truman made a strong impression by insisting on the 
implementation of the Yalta Declaration. In his view the Three Allied Governments 
should agree on the necessity of immediate reorganisation of the present Governments in 
Bulgaria and Romania.114 But these questions were overshadowed by more imminent 
ones -  like the administration of defeated Germany - and effectively slid into the 
background. The results of the Potsdam Conference regarding Bulgaria can be best
113 Dinardo, R.S. ‘Glimpse o f an Old World Order? Reconsidering the Trieste Crisis o f 1945. ’ Diplomatic 
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exemplified by two contrasting statements made by the US President and the Soviet 
Foreign Minister. On his return to the USA, Truman repeated the assertion that the 
Balkans were not going to be in any one power’s sphere of influence.115 At precisely the 
same moment, Molotov privately reassured Dimitrov that ‘in general the [Potsdam] 
decisions are favourable to us. In practice our sphere of influence has been recognised’.116
* * *
The period between the summer of 1944 and the Potsdam Conference was vital for the 
clarification of Bulgaria’s place in the general British policy. This was the time when 
British foreign policy planners elaborated and tested the rationale of Britain’s position, 
taking into account Bulgaria’s place in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. It was 
predominantly strategic factors that ruled Britain’s attitude. Concern for Bulgaria’s 
internal development and even the establishment of Communism were little more than 
functions of the military danger the country could be able to pose to the Eastern 
Mediterranean.
British diplomatic conduct in October 1944 yet again confirmed the priority of Greece in 
Britain’s Balkan policy. This tendency was unequivocally recognised by the predominant 
majority of British politicians and diplomats. At Moscow it was made perfectly clear to the 
Soviet leaders that Britain was willing to go to almost any lengths to secure its 
predominance in Greece. As there was no British military presence in the region comparable 
to the Soviet armies stationed in the northern Balkans, Churchill and Eden tried to extract all 
the political concessions they could from Stalin. They understood too well that the Moscow 
deal was going to have a bearing on post-war developments, but justified it mainly as having 
prevented much more threatening alternatives.
115 Boll, M.M. Cold War... p.139-140
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The percentage agreement touched on the most sensitive issue of future Anglo-Soviet 
relations. It was an attempt to define the limits of British and Soviet policy in an area of 
mutual interest and therefore diminish the possibilities for a conflict of interest. That is 
why it helped to postpone the onset of the conflict, which later developed between Russia 
and Great Britain. Because of the percentage agreement, the strategic aspect of the 
Balkans was not among the earliest causes of increased Russo-Western hostility after the 
end of the Second World War. However, the negotiations had also exposed the fact that a 
full agreement was hardly possible and therefore served to alert the British Government 
to the need to fortify its Mediterranean positions.
Britain’s recognition of its inability to commit enough resources to secure predominance in 
Bulgaria was combined with the long-standing acknowledgement of Soviet interests. This 
explained the British Government’s adherence to the spheres-of-influence idea. It was 
Churchill who put into practice this approach. However, careful examination of the 
opinions prevailing in the Foreign Office reveals that ultimately the spheres-of-influence 
division was intellectually supported by a number of civil servants before and especially 
after the percentage agreement. It was^ie almost unanimous acceptance of the agreement of 
those British Government figures and officials who knew about it that secured its 
application throughout the armistice period.
116 Issussov, M. Stalin... p.87
Chapter Four
Observing the Establishment of Communist Rule in Bulgaria
The conclusion of the armistice changed the essence of Britain’s relations with Bulgaria. 
Great Britain came to believe that by having categorically insisted on and obtained the 
withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Aegean Thrace, it had successfully defended its 
strategic positions in the region. Through its participation in the Bulgarian armistice regime, 
the British Government also hoped to have some say in Bulgaria’s post-war development, 
particularly in the foundation of a stable democratic political system. A combination of 
historical and geographical factors had long made British foreign policy planners realise that 
theirs could not be the dominant influence in Bulgaria. Nevertheless, because of Bulgaria’s 
proximity to the Mediterranean, Britain could not afford to waive its interest in it.
Bulgaria had been assigned to the Soviet zone without too much misgiving on the part of 
Great Britain. Ironically, for Britain the importance of Bulgaria grew as a result of the Soviet 
occupation. With its military facilities under strict Soviet control and its Government 
looking for internal and international support to Moscow, Bulgaria would almost certainly 
become an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Bulgaria’s own dealings with its neighbours 
and its attitude to the Western Powers would be determined by, and therefore would be 
symptomatic of, Soviet post-war plans and behaviour. In the second half of 1944, British 
leaders were becoming increasingly worried that the Soviet Union might use its newly 
acquired positions of power in the Balkans to encroach on territories beyond those conceded 
to it and so endanger long-term British interests outside Eastern Europe. That is why, the 
establishment and reinforcement of Soviet authority in Bulgaria, greatly enhanced by the 
presence of the Soviet army, had a direct bearing on Soviet-British relations.
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British attention was equally focused on the possibility that Bulgaria could adopt 
Communism as a state ideology. British concern over this did not arise solely from aversion 
to Communist ideology. The much deeper anxiety was that a Bulgarian Communist 
Government would in all likelihood be willing to follow Soviet leadership. Then the USSR 
would have a stable foothold in the Balkans which could be easily used for offensive 
purposes, should Soviet objectives require it. Such a development would be a double threat, 
undermining British interests in the region both from a moral and a strategic perspective. 
Great Britain, which had few positive ideas on how to influence Bulgarian post-war 
development, considered its interest to lie in preventing a complete Communist domination 
in Bulgaria.
The lack of reliable links with Bulgaria during the war had revealed that any long-term 
policy formulation necessitated sound and timely knowledge of events in the country. In the 
immediate post-hostilities period this requirement would be served by British membership of 
the Allied Control Commission. The British Government believed that observations made by 
its political and military staff in Bulgaria would throw light on the actions of the little-known 
local political actors, but also on the methods and aims of Soviet foreign policy in Bulgaria, 
the Balkans and Europe in general. The ACC would be an experiment in lower-level Great 
Power co-operation: its functioning would test the desire of the Soviet Union to maintain 
friendly relations with its Allies.
Involvement in the First Post-war Elections in Bulgaria. Given the country’s
low priority in British foreign policy, there is little direct documentary evidence on British 
objectives in post-war Bulgaria. The large quantity of available archival material on the 
question of the first Bulgarian post-war elections, however, suggests that the Foreign Office 
considered this event of great significance. It was believed that the manner of carrying out of 
the elections would illuminate the direction in which the Bulgarian regime would evolve.
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This, in turn, would indicate whether the USSR would be content with establishing control 
over Bulgarian foreign policy or would insist on complete domination of internal 
developments too. Analysing diplomatic reports from all Soviet-occupied territories, the FO 
would be able to test the hypothesis of a grand Soviet design for the establishment of 
Communism in Eastern Europe.
British Doubts about Bulgarian Democracy. Even though the British Mission had
initially little knowledge of Bulgaria, its members grasped quickly the essentials of the 
small but complicated Bulgarian political scene. Already before the conclusion of the 
armistice Soviet authorities showed suspicion of any foreign presence in Soviet occupied 
Bulgaria. In early September, an SOE team sent from northern Greece to Bulgaria was 
unceremoniously thrown out of the country by the Soviet High Command.1 In October 
Soviet hostility culminated in the refusal of General Sergei Biryuzov, Commander of the 
Soviet forces in Bulgaria, to receive the British representative who had arrived before the 
Bulgarian armistice was formally completed. Soviet attitudes to British officials in Bulgaria 
changed little after the conclusion of the armistice. On 29 November 1944, an order issued 
by Biryuzov, in his capacity of Acting Head of the ACC, forbade the Bulgarian 
Government any direct contacts with the Western Missions.2 The Soviet High Command 
in Bulgaria went to extraordinary lengths to obstruct the activities and even physical 
movement of the Western members of the ACC. It was aided by the Bulgarian Communists 
who believed that the setting up of the ACC with US and British representatives had 
somehow worsened the internal situation in Bulgaria. This issue was indicative of Soviet
1 Mendelsohn, J. (ed.) Covert Warfare. The OSS -  NKVD Relationship, 1943 -  1945. New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1989. doc.64, OSS Cairo to Secretary of State, 25.09.1944, doc.66, US Army Forces Cairo 
to War Department, 26.09.1944
2 Black, C.E. 'The Start.. . ' p.171-175; Boll, M. ‘Reality... ‘ p.426
3 RTsHIDNI, f. 17, op.128, a.e.750,1.16, Rostov report, 26.01.1945
156
attitudes towards the Western Allies. Gradually, it became a legitimate reason for the 
worsening of inter-Allied relations.
Some practical problems were resolved at the Potsdam Conference which marked the 
beginning of the second period of the functioning of the ACC. But in the words of one 
American contemporary, ‘it had already become a habit for Russia to push us in the face, 
and they continued to do so’.4 Despite the Soviet High Command’s obstructions, the 
British military and political representatives managed to send home accurate and 
balanced reports on people and events in Bulgaria. Initially, they tried to analyse the 
nature of the ruling coalition of 9 September 1944. As the wartime National Assembly 
was disbanded, the Government ruled by decree. Since the Fatherland Front had seized 
power by a coup d'etat it needed to confirm its legitimacy through proper elections.
The FF Government included four members from each of the BCP and Zveno, two each 
from the Agrarian and Social Democratic parties, as well as some independent politicians. 
British observers noticed that in the Government, the Communists were in charge of 
Internal Affairs and Justice. This gave them strong positions which reflected the initial 
overwhelming influence of the Communists within the coalition. British officials were 
concerned that the Communists would seek to reinforce their own position in the country 
by infiltration of the security forces and the judicial system. The procedures of the 
People’s Courts and the special powers of the Interior Minister were certainly perceived 
as steps in that direction.5
The People's Courts were set up by a Government Decree in October 1944 before the arrival 
of British and US representatives. Their proclaimed task was to try German collaborators 
and wartime criminals; however, they were immediately turned into instruments of political
4 Bames, M. ‘The Current Situation...’ p.9
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vengeance. The former Regents, all Ministers in the wartime Cabinets and deputies of the 
last two National Assemblies were put to trial. Communist Party archives reveal that the 
verdicts were not taken in court but in the Communist Politburo. Traicho Kostov personally 
instructed the Public Prosecutors not to ‘measure who is guilty of what’ but to Took out for 
the slightest thing that would prove the guilt of these bandits’. He insisted on the most 
severe sentences.6 One hundred high-ranking Bulgarian politicians, civil servants and court 
officials were shot on 1/2 February 1945 while many others were imprisoned. By April 1945 
11,122 people had been tried, 2,618 sentenced to death and 1,046 executed.7 In comparison, 
in documents not intended for public consumption, the Communists themselves admitted to 
the Soviet Government that under what they called the ‘fascist rule’ between 1923 and 1944, 
of a total of 1,590 death sentences for political crimes, 199 had been carried out.8
Before the establishment of the People’s Courts, the Government turned a blind eye to the 
maltreatment and murders of activists and supporters of right-of-centre parties by 
Communists zealots immediately after 9 September 1944. After April 1945, when the 
People's Courts ceased their activities, cases of political opposition were dealt with under 
two of the earliest laws of the Fatherland Front Government, the Decree for the Protection o f 
the People's Power and the Law for Labour Educational Institutions.9 Through the use of 
these laws the small Bulgarian intelligentsia was decimated and inhibited from any serious 
future political activity. That the Communists intended the physical elimination and 
psychological destruction of non-Communist politicians was clear for the British
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representatives in Bulgaria who reported in detail to their Government. However, the content 
of the laws if not the spirit of their implementation could be formally interpreted as 
following the provisions of the armistice to punish fascists and warmongers. On account of 
this the FO chose not to raise the problem of political executions with the Bulgarian 
Government.10
The Communists’ aspirations to political monopoly could be discerned in their drive for 
predominance in the FF Committees, which sprang as a countrywide network of support for 
the Government. As at the national level, the Committees were supposed to include 
members of all participant parties but practically everywhere there was more than an equal 
proportion of Communists. The continuous efforts of non-Communist Ministers to secure 
representation for their followers met with the official agreement of their Communist 
colleagues, only to flounder on the intransigence of local Communists who demanded 
exclusive rights as anti-fascist fighters. This situation was used by the BCP to claim 
sweeping popular support and demand an even greater share of power. Gradually, not only 
foreign analysts but also non-Communist political leaders in Bulgaria realised that both 
centrally and locally, the FF was used by the Communists as the means of intervening in the 
other parties' affairs.11 The picture was further complicated by the fact that the non- 
Communist Government parties contained numerous factions. Some of these were not 
averse to co-operating with the Communists in exchange for more political power.
After 9 September 1944, the wartime ban on political activity was not lifted and the FF 
parties were the only legal political organisations. Even though they had subscribed to a 
common programme, tension appeared soon after the coalition had gained power. The main
10 F0371/48644, U827, Sofia to FO, FO minutes, 3 -  8.02.1945; F0371/48166, R3192, Sofia to FO, FO 
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reasons were Communist violence and the BCP’s dictatorial aspirations in the Government.
By January 1945, the disharmony among the ruling parties was no longer hidden. British
representatives did not regard these circumstances as conducive to democratic practices.
They followed with intense attention any signs that the Government intended to carry out
elections soon. They considered that in the prevailing atmosphere it would ‘be very easy for
a one-party Government to establish itself and this ‘would inevitably take the form of some 
1 0kind of Communism’.
The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe gave additional force to Britain’s argument that 
free elections and the establishment of a multi-party system were the most basic 
prerequisites for the stable democratic evolution of Bulgaria. In early 1945, the British 
political representative in Sofia, William Houstoun-Boswall, alerted his superiors to the 
possibility of elections for the National Assembly as early as May. Several Bulgarian 
Government officials, most notably the Communist Secretary of the National Council (NC) 
of the FF, Tsola Dragoicheva had made pronouncements to that effect. She had explained 
that there would be a single list of FF candidates; the ratio of deputies from each party would 
be decided at the forthcoming FF congress. The British representative did not think the 
moment ripe for elections. He quoted even some Communist leaders as judging that 
‘passions were running too high and time would be necessary for the public to return to 
something like normal after the present trials and executions’. Houstoun-Boswall suggested 
that Britain, together with the USA, should declare keen interest in the proposed Bulgarian 
general elections. The two Great Powers should publicise their expectations of free and 
democratic elections. They should make known their reservations whether the present 
regime would be able to ensure secret voting and the freedom of all parties to nominate 
candidates. Houstoun-Boswall believed that by formulating clear criteria the two Western
12 F0371/48123, R4072, Howard, 5.03.1945
160
powers could put off the elections for some time. To stimulate the attention of his own 
Government the diplomat reminded it that the Bulgarian would be the first post-war 
elections in a former German satellite and as such could set a precedent for the rest of 
Eastern Europe.13
At the time when Houstoun-Boswall was making these recommendations to the Foreign 
Office, the US Government had already taken action with regards to another ex-satellite. The 
State Department had protested to the Soviet Government about the imposition of a new, 
Communist-dominated Government in Romania in March 1945 which had been formed as a 
result of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinski’s direct intervention. The US 
protest was flatly rejected by Molotov who claimed that the implementation of the Yalta 
Declaration was not a joint responsibility of the Three Great Powers but of the Soviet Allied 
Control Commission.14 The State Department did not accept this interpretation and 
considered itself bound by promises made at Yalta. On 5 April 1945, the US Ambassador in 
Moscow made another protest to the Soviet Government. This time the note dealt with the 
prospect of elections in Bulgaria which in the USA’s opinion did not conform to the 
democratic principles upheld by the Allies. The US note proposed the establishment of some 
machinery for consultation between the Big Three on the question, for example an 
independent tripartite committee to look into the timing and preparation of elections. The 
most important requirement was that the Bulgarian Government should be stopped from 
carrying out elections in the foreseeable future.15 The Soviet reply precluded any discussion 
by pointing out there were no imminent elections in Bulgaria. It also made clear that the
13 Ibid., Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 28.02.1945
14 Lundestad, G. The American Non-Policy... p.232-233; Boll, M. Cold War... p.94-95
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Soviet Government would look on any further US action as interference in Bulgarian 
internal affairs.16
It is doubtful whether in the early spring of 1945 the Bulgarian Communists were seriously
thinking of elections.17 Available documents make it possible to suggest that the Western
representatives’ anxiety about the premature timing of the elections was somewhat
exaggerated. The Bulgarian Communists began planning for elections only in May 1945.
This is when the Communist Politburo looked into possible methods for interference in the
1 8other Fatherland Front parties with the aim of breaking their unity. Early fears for the 
manner in which elections would be carried out, however, were perfectly relevant. The short 
diplomatic exchanges about the allegedly untimely elections revealed the positions each of 
the Three Big Allies was going to take regarding Bulgaria when elections did eventually take 
place.
The US action in Moscow had been co-ordinated with the FO, which had reluctantly 
pledged support; a British representation was handed to the Soviet Government a whole 
week after the US. Houstoun-Boswall was more than sceptical about the US proposal. He 
predicted that participation in any tripartite body would simply make British and US 
representatives Took ridiculous and shoulder the responsibility’ for the results. He had in 
mind much subtler means of influencing the Bulgarian authorities and public, for example 
British propaganda for democracy, journalistic coverage of events in Bulgaria and above all 
encouragement of the moderate FF elements by official pronouncements of British interest.19 
On their part, the Balkan specialists at the Southern Department agreed with the general
16 AVPRF, f.74, op.27, p.17, no. 18, 1.29, MID to Roberts, May 1945; F0371/48124, R8082, Roberts to FO, 
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premises behind the State Department’s move but considered it unwise to raise the questions 
of the Romanian Government and of the Bulgarian elections simultaneously. They preferred 
a gradual approach by which matters would be resolved one at a time. Undoubtedly, British 
officials still felt themselves tied down by the provisions of the percentage agreement and 
expressed content that at least it was the USA who had taken the lead.20
FO officials dealing with the Balkans were not too concerned about the timing of Bulgarian
a s  £0
elections. Nor were they unduly worried how to react to improper behaviour by the 
Bulgarian Government. At the time they were preoccupied with internal deliberations as to 
whether the acceptance of the Yalta principles overruled the TOLSTOY agreement and
91whether they should continue to abide by the ratio fixed in October 1944. The alternative 
was to voice their views regarding Bulgaria and Rumania, and above all to insist on these 
views being taken into account by the Soviet Government. The main British anxiety was 
whether to take a firm attitude regarding a country subject to Soviet control. This could 
cause not only ‘bitter reproaches from Moscow’ but possible retaliatory action in territories
* • 99in which Britain had ‘a much more lively interest than... m Bulgaria’.
Although disconcerted by Communist excesses in Bulgaria, Houstoun-Boswall too 
understood that the question should be considered from the Mcfer angle of British long-term 
interests of co-operation with the USSR. And yet he reminded the FO that the elections 
would show how the Soviet Government proposed to apply the Yalta Declaration. He 
reported that the Soviet compromise on the composition of the Polish Government, the 
Soviet agreement for Bulgarian withdrawal from Thrace and Tito’s abandonment of Trieste 
were interpreted across the political spectrum in Bulgaria as signs of the Soviet Union
20 F0371/48124, R6081, US Embassy London to FO, 31.03.1945, Churchill, 3.04.1945, Clerk Kerr to Molotov, 
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assuming a defensive position.23 At the Southern Department, Howard found it premature to 
draw any conclusions on Bulgaria on the basis of these examples. Indeed, most British 
observers wondered whether Stalin would think it worthwhile to make some concessions or 
would decide that the principle of Soviet prevalence in Bulgaria was too important to be put 
at stake by working together with the West.24
British analysts saw the internal significance of the coming elections in Bulgaria in that they 
would confirm the existing political structure and would lend constitutional approval to the 
present Government.25 However unpalatable this seemed, knowledge of Balkan history 
justified doubts as to whether the legitimisation of the Communist-dominated Government 
could be prevented by such measures as a democratic electoral law and mitigation of 
Communist terror. Sargent repeatedly recorded his scepticism of the outcome of even 
relatively free elections anywhere in the region. He wrote that the last war had impoverished 
and reduced most of the population to a state of complete apathy. He did not expect 
ordinary people ‘to fight for parliamentary institutions, which in any case they never learnt 
to rely on or respect’. Instead, he could understand how they could wish ‘to obtain a 
minimum of security and stable government even ... at the cost of their political or personal 
liberties’.26 Sargent recalled that even in the calmest inter-war years parliamentary 
institutions in the region had been inefficient and corrupt, and had, as a rule, been replaced 
by some form of dictatorship. All this had made the majority of East Europeans 
increasingly susceptible to Communist propaganda and almost predetermined Soviet-style 
totalitarianism. Sargent’s view was that this coincided with the intentions of the Soviet
23 F0371/48128, R12876, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 31.07.1945; F0371/48159, R11158, Houstoun-Boswall to 
FO, 29.06.1945
24 F0371/48159, R11158, Stewart, 1.07.1945
25 F0371/48122, R3785, FO to Angora, 3.04.1945
26 F0371/48219, R5063, Sargent memorandum, 13.03.1945
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Government and made British chances to introduce free institutions into these countries 
‘somewhat dim’.27
Sargent’s reasoning led him to conclude that the establishment of totalitarian regimes across 
Eastern Europe was almost inevitable. He felt that the British Government should resign 
itself to its inability to change such an outcome. Most importantly, since it was highly 
unlikely that British protests would alter the overall direction of developments, such useless 
actions should be abandoned as they could only antagonise the Soviet Government. This 
thinking applied not only to Bulgaria but to most of Eastern Europe. It was especially 
pronounced, but not exclusive to those countries which had sided with Germany during the 
war. To some extent, this repeated pre-war patterns of Britain’s behaviour dominated by 
reluctance to get involved in a region to which another Great Power laid claims.
Preparation for the Elections. Ironically, at the time when leading British
policy makers were advising restraint regarding Bulgaria, prominent Bulgarian 
Communists were forming extremely hostile opinions of Britain. In January 1945, in a 
report for the Department of International Information of the CC of the Bolshevik Party*, 
Kostov accused the British representative of leading the non-Communist Fatherland Front 
parties to question the Communists’ predominance in the administration of the country. 
Kostov blamed the British Mission for encouraging the Agrarians to challenge the 
Communists. He was however aware that such accusations should be voiced with great 
caution and used for internal purposes only as relations with Britain should not be 
affected.30 Communist activists understood the need to maintain outward tripartite Allied
27 F0371/48123, R4072, Sargent, 6.03.1945
28 F0371/48219, R5063, Sargent memorandum, 13.03.1945 
* full name All-Soviet Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
29 RTsHIDNI, f.17, op.128, a.d.750,1.16-17, Kostov report, 26.01.1945; TsPA, f.146, op.4, a.e.182, p.3, Kostov 
to Dimitrov, 2.06.1945
30 TsPA, f.146, op.4, a.e.174, Kostov to Dimitrov, 9.02.1945
165
co-operation. In February 1945, the Communist Orlin Vassilev, Director of the Bulgarian 
National Radio, wrote to Georgi Dimitrov that reforms should be ‘carried out on a more 
indefinite, more vague, temporary basis of democratic compromises’ due to ‘the particular 
international situation and the impossibility for the USSR to interfere openly in [Bulgarian] 
internal dealings’.31
When in June 1945 the Regency Council set the polling day at 26 August, Houstoun- 
Boswall could report that all his grim predictions about the elections looked well on the way 
to fulfilment. The Fatherland Front had announced that its members would stand on a single 
list. According to the agreed in advance distribution of seats, of the 267 prospective deputies, 
the Communists and Agrarians were allocated 95 each. Houstoun-Boswall thought that the 
true proportion of Agrarians and Communists was three to one.32 The more worrying 
development was that in May left-wing splinter groups had overtaken the leadership of both 
the Agrarian and Social Democratic parties with active Communist support. At the 
beginning of June Nikola Petkov, Cabinet Minister and leader of the BANU group which 
participated in the FF, was removed from the leadership of the Agrarian Union and his 
Cabinet position became questionable.
Judging by these signs, British observers could only guess that the Communists were 
escalating their interference in the other parties' affairs. What they did not know was that the 
Politburo had passed a special resolution that the strengthening opposition within the 
Fatherland Front should not be allowed to form parties outside it. Another decision called for 
increased Communist support for the so-called ‘healthy forces’, i.e. leftist pro-Communist 
elements in the other parties. The Communist leadership was also preparing to launch a
31 RtsHIDNI, f.17, op.128, a.d.758, 1.21, Vassilev to Dimitrov, 10.02.1945; Clemens, D. Yalta, p.268-270 
claims that before Potsdam Stalin favoured free elections in Eastern Europe.
32 F0371/48128, R11987, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 11.07.1945
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discrediting campaign against G.M. and Petkov. The Communists continued to keep up 
the appearance of coalition unity, to appeal to the other parties for co-operation and to 
denounce the, as yet anonymous, enemies of the Fatherland Front.34 Stalin personally 
advised dealing carefully with Petkov and his supporters. Before being thrown out of the 
Cabinet and the ruling coalition, they had to be ‘unmasked’ so that they would not ‘emerge 
as martyrs and fighters for freedom’.
The British Government had only indirect evidence of Communist interference in the 
other parties’ affairs and could not make Communist behaviour the subject of any official 
action. Instead, the preferred British course was to raise objections to the Electoral Law 
and insist that any Government formed as a result of it could not be viewed as representative 
or democratic. This was done simultaneously by the British delegation at Potsdam and the 
British representative to Bulgaria. Houstoun-Boswall suggested to his superiors a joint 
Anglo-American declaration that neither power would recognise the Bulgarian 
Government.37 The US State Department favoured international observation of the 
Bulgarian elections, but this was not acceptable to the FO.38 Although British displeasure 
with the Bulgarian Electoral Law was genuine, refusal to support international monitoring 
might have been influenced by Stalin’s statement that the presence of foreign observers in 
the Greek elections -  another US suggestion - ‘would be an insult to the Greek people and 
an interference in Greek internal affairs’. If Stalin was reluctant to sponsor a precedent,
33 Ognyanov, L. Narodna... p.34
34 Dimitrov, G. Izbrani suchineniya. Sofia: Partizdat, 1972. vol.VI. p.212-213
35 Dimitrov, V. ‘The Cominform and the Bulgarian Communist Party: Embarking on a New Course?.’ 
Conference paper. International Colloquium ‘L'Unione Sovietica e l'Europa nella Guerra Fredda (1943 - 
1953)’: Cortona, Italy, September 1994. p.5
36 F0371/48223, R12235, Stewart, 18.07.1945
37 F0371/48128, R12711, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 31.07.1945
38 Ibid., Stewart, 20.07.1945; F0371/48128, R12711, FO to Sofia, 28.07.1945
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which might then be used to urge similar measures in Eastern Europe, the same may be said
" IQ
of the British Government.
Following closely the course of events in Bulgaria, the FO received information not only of 
official pronouncements but also of the views of the principal opposition figures. The latter 
increasingly consulted members of the British Mission. Houstoun-Boswall was able to 
report that in mid-July the Government-sponsored negotiations between the two factions of 
the Agrarian Union, those of Obbov and Petkov, failed because the latter had been refused 
the right to publish a newspaper and to campaign independently. This caused Petkov’s 
resignation from the Government. He then dispatched a letter to the Allied Missions, the 
Allied Control Commission, the Bulgarian Prime Minister and Regents, protesting against 
Communist terror against non-Communist candidates and asking for postponement of the 
elections.40 In August the remaining Agrarian and Social Democrat Ministers, as well as the 
independent Petko Stoyanov, Finance Minister, left the Government too. The different 
opposition groups -  those which had just left the Government and others which had never 
participated in it - formed the ‘United Opposition’ and published a co-ordinated electoral 
platform. The newly constituted Opposition proclaimed that it was not against the Fatherland 
Front but only supported it in its original form of a true coalition of independent political 
organisations with equal rights, as it had been on 9 September 1944. The centrepiece of the 
Opposition programme was the restoration of political rights and freedoms as defined by the
i|i
suspended Tumovo Constitution. The programme also emphasised the necessity to take the
39 F0371/48223, R12235, TERMINAL briefs, 30.06.1945
40 F0371/48128, R12616, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 26.07.1945
* The democratic Bulgarian Constitution adopted by the First Grand National Assembly in 1879 in the old 
Bulgarian capital, Tumovo. It was disregarded after the 19 May 1934 coup d ’etat.
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militia out of Communist hands and stop Communist interference in the affairs of public 
institutions or the private life of Bulgarian citizens.41
Most of the Opposition’s demands echoed the views of the British representative that a high 
standard of electoral conduct should be set in Bulgaria. Meanwhile, the British Mission in 
Sofia was receiving clear indications that the Opposition and wider anti-Communist circles 
in Bulgaria relied on staunch British support. At the end of July, Exarch Stephan, the Head 
of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, spoke to Houstoun-Boswall about the need to raise 
interest in the Bulgarian elections in the West. The Exarch had just returned from Moscow 
and was convinced that if Britain wished to take up the question with the Soviet 
Government, the latter would certainly take British considerations into account and tame the 
Communist extremists. The Exarch also insisted that if the anti-Communist Opposition 
received Western public endorsement, they would be much more willing to precipitate an 
electoral crisis 42 In August Houstoun-Boswall received information that the Zveno leaders 
had not yet withdrawn their confidence from the Government solely because they were not 
sure of consistent British support for the Opposition 43 The same was true of the two non- 
Communist Regents who privately appealed to the British Government to take some firm
44action.
Communists in Bulgaria were certain that the British and US diplomats were secretly 
encouraging the Opposition. The latter too seemed to take Western involvement on their side 
for granted. In fact, British policy makers hoped that the impending political crisis in 
Bulgaria could somehow be avoided 45 The FO felt that it could be embarrassed by further
41 Ognyanov, L. Narodna... p.35-36
42 F0371/48128, R12347, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 21.07.1945
43 F0371/48129, R13862, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 17.08.1945
44 F0371/48129, R13863, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 17.08.1945, Stewart, 18.08.1945
45 F0371/48128, R12616, Stewart, 27.07.1945
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active involvement with the Opposition. Petkov was judged to be in considerable political 
and personal danger and Houstoun-Boswall was instructed to make it clear that the 
consequences of the Opposition’s actions were its own responsibility. The British 
Government felt that as it would not be able to offer any protection, it was not justified in 
giving Petkov and his associates any direct encouragement.46
An additional factor accounting for British hesitation was the ever-present concern for 
Soviet retaliation in Greece, where the political situation almost mirrored that in Bulgaria 47 
Closely supervised by Britain, the Greek Government was in the middle of preparations for 
its first post-war elections. The British Government believed that its involvement in Greece 
would guarantee the democratic conduct of the elections and the veracity of the result. But 
the Greek Communists severely criticised Britain for creating unjust political conditions. 
The British Government was particularly sensitive to such accusations which were believed 
to reflect the views of the Soviet Union 48
The British Government’s position was complicated by sudden US activity. Both the US 
representative in Bulgaria Maynard Barnes and Ambassador Harriman in Moscow had for 
some time complained to their superiors about the lack of evident US interest in the 
Bulgarian electoral issue. Their grievances appeared to have been heeded when in a speech 
on 9 August 1945 President Truman paid renewed attention to Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania. On 15 August, the State Department presented the Bulgarian Government with a 
note stating that the USA would only resume diplomatic relations with a representative 
Government, which the one formed after the approaching elections would not be 49 On 18
46 F0371/48128, R12711, FO to Sofia, 28.07.1945
47 F0371/48223, R13696, Dixon, 14.08.1945
48 Iatrides, J.O. Ambassador... p.691-694; Stavrakis, P.J. Moscow and Greek Communism. Ithaca: Cornell 
UP, 1989. p.84-94
49 F0371/48128, R13766, Washington to FO, 15.08.1945
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August, Secretary of State James Byrnes said the same in a public statement exposing 
Communist machinations in Bulgaria.50 The Cabinet in Sofia did not fail to notice that the 
British Government was slow to associate itself with any of the US declarations.51
The FO was greatly offended by the USA’s failure to consult it about the final text of the 
US note of 15 August 1945. Simultaneously, the FO felt under immense pressure to act 
with regard to Bulgaria. British diplomats in the field saw a chance for ‘an outstanding 
diplomatic victory in Soviet-controlled Europe’ where British prestige and influence had 
reached ‘the lowest possible ebb’.53 In contrast, Whitehall officials preferred to ‘keep to 
generalities’ and undertake a course which, while making their views clear, would not 
expose them to a diplomatic rebuff. The Southern Department had very little hope indeed, 
that any Western rebuke of the Bulgarian Communists’ methods would serve to promote 
democratic standards in the Bulgarian electoral campaign. British experts predicted failure of 
any such initiative and were convinced it would harm Britain’s standing in Bulgaria. They 
recommended therefore a very mild approach which would be in step with the USA, without 
committing Britain to any radical measures in case of falsification or violence at the polls.54 
There was even serious consideration whether it was not better to wait until the Bulgarian 
elections had taken place: it would be easier to object to a manifest fraud whereas any 
superficial change of the Electoral Law could still conceal Communist intimidation.55 
Finally, on 20 August 1945 the Bulgarian Government was handed a note which simply
50 FRUS 1945, vol.IV, p.295, Byrnes to Barnes, 18.08.1945
51 F0371/48129, R13862, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 17.08.1945
52 F0371/48128, R13766, Stewart, 15.08.1945,
53 F0371/48129, R13863, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 17.08.1945
54 Ibid., Stewart, 18.08.1945
55 F0371/48128, R13548, Stewart, 12.08.1945
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outlined the reasons for British disapproval of electoral conditions in Bulgaria. This was 
immediately publicised by the British Foreign Secretary.56
The timing, motivation and content of Britain’s declaration suggest that British policy 
makers favoured a distinctly lower-profile campaign against Bulgaria than had been 
launched by the USA. There had been insufficient high-level co-ordination between the two 
Western powers regarding electoral conditions in Bulgaria. The eventual British note 
resulted much more from desire that Britain should not be perceived as lagging behind the 
USA than from conviction that a British involvement in Bulgaria would serve a useful 
purpose.
The Unexpected Postponement. Dispatching the note of 20 August to the
Bulgarian Government, the FO felt it had done its best as far as Bulgarian elections were 
concerned. British policy makers were not optimistic of their abilities to influence 
significantly Bulgarian internal developments and their action had partly been taken as a 
precaution against future accusations of acquiescent silence in the face of approaching 
totalitarianism. Three days before the date of the scheduled elections, a coincidence of 
factors afforded an unforeseen opportunity for a much greater Western involvement on the 
spot.
At a press conference on the evening of 22 August 1945, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister 
Petko Stainov stated that the British and US notes had produced a great political effect but 
had no juridical power. He explained that the Bulgarian Government was subordinate to the 
ACC, which was the only institution competent to decide whether the elections could go 
ahead.57 Historiography has accepted that Stainov’s statement motivated the Heads of the 
US and British Missions in Sofia to seek a meeting with the Chairman of the ACC and
56 Ibid., FO to Moscow, 20.08.1945
57 F0371/48129, R14209, BMM to WO, 22.08.1945
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demand discussions regarding the elections. Stainov has been credited with a certain degree 
of independence, which provided an opportunity for Western action. Some authors also 
maintain that the US political representative boldly surpassed his instructions, practically 
inducing Stainov to make his statement.58 While these assertions cannot be refuted, available 
documents reveal that the incident was even more complicated.
Events in Sofia were triggered by news from Romania where the British and US 
representatives in the ACC had just initiated political conversations with the aim of resolving 
a Government crisis. This provided an impulse for the British and US diplomats in Bulgaria 
to demand an appointment with Biryuzov about the pending elections. Judging by reports 
sent to London, Stainov gave his press conference after these demands had been registered.59 
Russian archives, on the other hand, show that on 22 August Stainov twice visited the Soviet 
Mission. During the day he saw Biryuzov and recounted a conversation with Barnes who 
had warned that the US and British notes were a step short of pulling out of Bulgaria. In the 
evening Stainov talked with the Soviet political adviser Stepan Kirsanov.60
If Stainov relayed his conversation with Barnes correctly, the latter did indeed exceed his 
instructions to a much greater extent than already supposed by historians. Barnes’ warning 
might have been the reason for Stainov’s press statement. On the other hand, it is equally 
possible that after being apparently cautioned by the American, Stainov informed the Soviet 
authorities and it was they who advised him to make his statement. As the content of 
Stainov’s meetings with the Soviet representatives is not known, any suggestion of possible 
Soviet influence on the Foreign Minister’s statement for the press would be purely 
speculative. All the released documents disclose is that during the crisis he was in close 
contact with the Soviet Mission.
58 Boll, M.M. Cold War... p. 146
59 F0371/48129, R14209, BMM to WO, 22.08.1945
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While the US and Soviet representatives were actively engaged in the events preceding the 
crisis of 22 August 1945, the British diplomats in Bulgaria seemed to have stood aside. They 
supported their US counterparts but did not themselves initiate any action. Such an attitude 
was in line with FO directives. In the next two days, however, British representatives in 
Sofia played their part in the quickly evolving events.
On 23 August, identical notes from the US and British representatives to the Soviet High 
Command in Bulgaria took issue with Stainov’s statement of the previous day, asking for 
postponement of the elections until the ACC devised measures which would assure free and 
democratic conduct.61 The FO was less than enthusiastic at the news. Sargent in particular 
considered a written request on behalf of the British Government for postponement of the 
Bulgarian elections a rather unfortunate step. He was anxious lest the Soviet Union would 
interpret it maliciously as interference and then use it to pose as the defender of Bulgarian 
independence. He was certain that a mere postponement would not automatically remedy 
conditions. Most significantly, in his understanding the earlier British note to the Bulgarian 
Government had been intended as ‘a warning and nothing else’. In effect, Sargent’s 
comments were critical of Houstoun-Boswall for sending the unauthorised note to Biryuzov. 
Even so, the FO did not explicitly order its representative to abstain from further actions.
Upon Biryuzov’s invitation, the US and British representatives presented their demands at a 
full meeting of the ACC at midnight on 23/24 August. They insisted on postponement of the 
elections until the Government secured freedom of speech, press, radio and assembly and 
guaranteed free and secret balloting. In addition, the main Opposition parties should obtain 
the right to hold their own party conferences and any other parties which could prove 
sufficient popular support should be legally registered. The fulfilment of these conditions
60 AVPRF, f.74, op.27, no.18, p.17,1.30, Kirsanov to MID, 22.08.1945
61 F0371/48129, R14328, BMM to FO, 23.08.1945
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should be entrusted to an interim ‘Cabinet of Affairs’, in which the powers of the Prime 
Minister should be assumed by the Regency Council and all principal parties should hold 
Ministries.63 The last point had not even been mentioned in correspondence with the FO or 
the State Department -  another indication that the Western representatives in Sofia had 
obviously acted spontaneously.
The Soviet members of the ACC tried to prevent a discussion of the Bulgarian situation. 
Kirsanov made a four-hour expose going over each article of the Electoral Law legalistically 
and insisting that it was a model of democracy. He was finally interrupted by General Crane 
of the US Mission who reminded him that Britain and the USA had no intention of 
recognising the Bulgarian Government under the present circumstances. Crane suggested 
that the ACC should take responsibility to avoid a major inter-Allied conflict over Bulgaria 
by simply postponing the elections. Biryuzov simply agreed to refer the question to Moscow 
and adjourned the meeting at 5 a.m. The British representatives were satisfied that finally a 
frank exchange of views had occurred in a friendly atmosphere. They did not for a moment 
believe that postponement of the elections could be announced practically on the eve of the 
poll.64
At 11 p.m. on 24 August Biryuzov convened another tripartite meeting. He read out a letter 
from Stainov to the ACC effectively asking for postponement of the elections in view of the 
US and British representations. The ACC briefly discussed the letter and agreed a reply 
recommending postponement.65 No one was more surprised at this outcome than the very
62 F0371/48129, R14209, FO to Washington, 24.08.1945
63 F0371/48129, R14365, BMM to FO, 24.08.1945
64 Ibid.
65 F0371/48129, R14356, BMM to WO, 25.08.1945, R14436, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 27.08.1945; 
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people who had pressed for it.66 Indeed, in his first telegram to London General Oxley 
thanked the Foreign Office for the support he believed it must have provided by co-
f\lordinating representations in Moscow and Washington. Months after the event Houstoun- 
Boswall continued to wonder at the Soviet Government’s climb-down in such a short time 
and could only explain this by it having been taken by surprise.68
In its internal correspondence, the FO frankly admitted that the postponement of the 
Bulgarian elections well surpassed its greatest expectations. Houstoun-Boswall and General 
Oxley were congratulated. Senior officials felt, nevertheless, that success could be more 
realistically attributed to luck or Bulgarian hesitation rather than to Western intervention. 
This attitude might be partly explained by the FO’s reluctance to admit that an US initiative 
it had not approved from the start, had indeed succeeded. It is also significant of the FO’s 
ability to recast past actions in a favourable light that after the postponement it informed the 
British press that the matter of the Bulgarian elections ‘had been fully discussed’ in the ACC 
and the decision had been reached after ‘satisfactory co-operation’. Several months later, 
even Houstoun-Boswall began to claim that it had always been Britain’s objective to 
postpone the August elections in Bulgaria.69
The FO could not but acknowledge that the postponement of the elections was the most 
important Western achievement in Bulgaria since the signing of the Bulgarian armistice. 
This could have significant consequences in as far as theoretically it increased the chances of 
a fairer second electoral campaign. It demonstrated the practical possibility for application of 
the principles of Great Power co-operation and seemed to mark the real beginning of the
66 F0371/48131, R17892, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 12.10.1945
67 F0371/48129, R14329, BMM to WO, 24.08.1945
68 F0371/48131, R17892, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 12.10.1945
69 Ibid.
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second period in the work of the ACC for Bulgaria.70 On the other hand there was renewed 
British apprehension about the price Soviet Russia would try to extract for its concurrence 
with Western demands in Bulgaria. Even British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin feared that 
the Soviet Government would raise its stakes on some subject vital for Britain, such as 
fastening the conclusion of the Italian Peace Treaty to the international recognition of 
Bulgaria. The FO expected to witness increased Soviet attention to Greece.71
With these reservations in mind, the FO was bewildered at the subsequent US actions in 
Bulgaria. On 27 August the US Secretary of State sent a note to the Bulgarian Government 
expressing satisfaction with the decision to postpone elections. In addition, as a token of 
approval, the United States agreed to the appointment of an unofficial Bulgarian 
representative in Washington, for which Bulgaria had long asked. The Bulgarian official 
press quickly seized the opportunity to proclaim that diplomatic relations with the USA were 
restored. The greatest shock for the FO came upon receipt of the news that Barnes had even 
proposed bestowing a suitable US order on General Biryuzov.72 The FO specialists saw in 
all this examples of ‘incredible muddled thinking’. Their general conclusion was that 
success had deprived the State Department of ‘all sense of proportion’.73 They were also 
worried that the conciliatory US actions would ‘stultify the denunciation by Byrnes and 
Bevin and... discourage the moderate elements that there is consistent Anglo-American 
policy’. British observers were most displeased that the State Department’s precipitate 
action had been undertaken without any consultations with London.74
70 F0371/48129, R 14329, Stewart, 25.08.1945, FO to Sofia, 25.08.1945
71 F0371/48129, R15115, Lawford to Sargent, Hayter to Lawford, 28.08.1945
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Preparation for Elections in November 1945. British policy makers did not
overrate the effect of the postponement of the Bulgarian elections. They soberly understood 
that all the Bulgarian Government had conceded for the moment was not to hold elections 
which it knew would have been unfair.75 However unexpected, this only constituted ‘an
K\initial step towards the satisfactory solution of the internal political situation’ in Bulgaria. 
The British political representative in Bulgaria agreed with his US colleague that ‘any 
disposition ... to rest on our oars can only give final victory in Bulgaria and throughout
77Eastern Europe to the Communists and the USSR’.
The postponement of the elections did not bring any significant change in Britain’s 
assessment of its own limited capabilities to influence developments in Bulgaria. The 
incidental success underlined the belief that British interest in the country could be 
defended only by constant pressure in Sofia and Moscow. To make its views known and 
taken into account, the British Government had to tackle specific cases with 
determination and a clear notion of its objectives. In practice, in the late summer of 1945 
the carrying out of free and unfettered elections in Bulgaria became an objective of 
British foreign policy in its own right. British representatives in Bulgaria saw their role as 
ensuring the establishment of the conditions outlined by the British and US delegates in 
the ACC at their crucial meeting with Biryuzov on 23 August.
Liberalisation Measures. The FO considered that priority should be given to the
need to alter the Bulgarian Electoral Law. According to the existing Law, the Government 
could disenfranchise Opposition supporters or expel Opposition members from the future 
Parliament. Houstoun-Boswall encouraged the Opposition to publicise its criticism of the 
Law and put forward proposals for amendments. He asked some Opposition leaders to
15 Ibid.
76 FRUS 1945, vol.IV, p.314, Barnes to State, 28.08.1945
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prepare for him extensive memoranda on the Electoral Law with points on which he himself 
could press the Government for improvements. Despite his clear sympathies, the British 
representative kept a good degree of objectivity which he considered the best protection 
against Soviet accusations of prejudice. He had the greatest understanding of the difficulties 
under which the Opposition laboured but also felt frustrated with some of its ‘childish
7Rdemands and complaints’. He and the FO severely criticised several Opposition proposals, 
notably that for disenfranchisement of soldiers on the grounds that they would vote
70according to the orders of their Communist commanders.
By 14 September, when the Decree for the Amendment o f the Electoral Law was published, 
the FO was satisfied that since the time of the postponement of the elections most of its 
demands had been favourably addressed. The last formal British objection was against the 
right of the Government to remove deputies from the Assembly but the FO decided not to 
press this point further.80 For Houstoun-Boswall, there was not ‘very much ground for 
complaint about the Law itself, at any rate judged by Balkan standards’.81 Both he and his 
superiors understood that the outcome of the elections depended on the application of the 
Law ‘with a reasonable degree of fairness’.
In the optimistic aftermath of the August electoral postponement, British diplomats had also 
considered possible the introduction of a neutral Cabinet to carry out elections. The leaders 
of the Opposition Agrarians and Social Democrats had welcomed this suggestion and the 
Western representatives unobtrusively set out to promote it among Bulgarian political 
circles. Houstoun-Boswall had particular influence over one of the Regents, Venelin Ganev,
77 Ibid., p.317, Bames to State, 3.09.1945
78 F0371/48131, R16061, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 19.09.1945
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an Anglophile member of Zveno. Ganev told Houstoun-Boswall that the other two Regents, 
including the Communist Todor Pavlov subscribed to the idea of a ‘Cabinet of Affairs’. In 
the first week of September they had managed to convert Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev 
to it. In fact, a week after the postponement of the elections Georgiev had mentioned the 
possibility of ‘strengthening and broadening’ the basis of the Government, that is including 
members of the Opposition. However, on 7 September, as Houstoun-Boswall was 
informed, hours after the Prime Minister had been persuaded to resign in favour of a 
caretaker Cabinet, General Biryuzov had called on the Regents. He had stated in categorical 
terms that the Soviet Government had decided that elections in Bulgaria should be carried 
out under the current Government failing which the USSR would withdraw protection from 
Bulgaria. It is not easy to interpret Biryuzov’s threat but the effect it had was that the Prime 
Minister declared that he would remain in office unless the Three Allies jointly 
recommended otherwise. Privately, Georgiev had complained that he was powerless since 
there were about 200,000 Soviet troops in Bulgaria and less than three British divisions in 
Greece.84
Still, in the middle of September the NC of the FF initiated negotiations for the inclusion 
of the Opposition in the Government. When the Opposition put forward ten firm 
conditions, among which were the appointment of an Agrarian as Premier and another 
non-Communist at the Interior Ministry, the talks were ended abruptly.85 It is difficult to 
see why they were started at all after Buryuzov’s firm statement unless the Bulgarian 
Communists had hoped for some easy compromise, which Britain and the USA would 
accept as a show of goodwill. Another factor might have been the Soviet Government’s
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desire to appear flexible shortly before the Council of Foreign Ministers was due to meet 
for its first session in London. Stalin personally explained to leading Bulgarian 
Communists who flew to Moscow on the day after the postponement of the elections:
It would be better if the Opposition was legalised, so you could handle them and force them to act 
loyally instead of going underground. It is in your interest that there should be Opposition... It is even 
beneficial for you to have an Opposition of 50 - 60 people: you will boast to Bevin that you have an 
Opposition.86
At the end of August, reviewing the political situation, the Communist Politburo 
concluded that the Communist Party needed to regain the political initiative by 
supporting certain measures of liberalisation. As a result, political amnesty was 
proclaimed and politicians who had not entered the Fatherland Front were released from 
prison. On 7 September, non-FF parties were legalised with the right to publish 
newspapers and campaign for election. This allowed the establishment in Opposition of 
Petkov’s Agrarians, Kosta Lulchev’s Social Democrats and the Democrats led by Nikola 
Mushanov and Alexander Girginov.
The governing coalition understood that the establishment of a number of parties outside 
it would further undermine its claims of being the sole legitimate representative of the 
majority of Bulgarians. In a desperate attempt to be seen to be broadening its basis, the 
Government admitted the re-established Radical Party into the FF and its leader Stoyan 
Kosturkov became Minister of Education, even though until 9 September 1944 he had 
been staunchly pro-German. There was also an unsuccessful attempt to incorporate the 
newly emerged right-wing Agrarians led by Dimiter Gichev even if this went against the
07
wishes of the FF Agrarian fraction.
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Many Communist activists admitted that compromises had been made under strong Soviet 
insistence to comply with the demands of the West.88 Initially, the Bulgarian Communists 
were severely shocked by the postponement of the elections, all the more so since they 
had not been consulted about it. Soon afterwards they were reassured by Stalin that they 
were to remain in overall control of Bulgarian affairs. However, the Soviet leader also 
advised them to accept the necessity of maintaining good relations with Britain and the 
USA and for the time being ‘not to shout too much about their eternal friendship with the 
Soviet Union’.89 Vassil Kolarov was sent from Moscow to Sofia to boost the morale of his 
co-partisans. He led the renewed electoral campaign for the BCP with vigour, proclaiming 
that the main tasks of the Communists in the new National Assembly would be to adopt a 
new Constitution and proclaim a Republic. Kolarov was more than once overheard saying 
that even though the Soviet Government would make some seeming concessions in 
Bulgaria, he had been sent to make sure that these did not come to much. He was convinced 
that the views of neither the British nor the US Governments mattered, as both would 
capitulate once confronted with a fait accompli90
The Opposition was far from content with the changes to the Electoral Law or the relative 
political relaxation, which it considered to be mere window-dressing. It related to the 
Western representatives the daily threats towards its leaders and supporters by the militia 
or Communist activists. Such encounters were especially vicious outside the capital 
where foreign observers rarely appeared and therefore could not report direct evidence to 
their Governments. The British and US diplomats knew, however, that a number of the 
most prominent pre-war leaders had been sufficiently terrorised by being constantly
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moved from prison to house arrest to hospital and back to prison even before their political 
activities were legalised.91
British Assessment o f the Situation. The British Government was reluctant to
increase official pressure on the Bulgarian Government. As a result, the British Mission 
in Bulgaria had no clear instructions on how to proceed and relied mainly on its own 
judgement. As the British political representative understood the situation, the 
postponement of the elections had given the Opposition the previously denied chance to 
present its case and make a bid for power in Bulgaria. This opportunity should be used by 
the Opposition even in the prevalent atmosphere of incertitude and pressure. The Bulgarian 
Opposition had to be persuaded to put up a real fight against the Communist-dominated 
Government. The practical goal Houstoun-Boswall and his colleagues set themselves was 
to keep up the spirit of the Bulgarian Opposition and give it all the necessary moral 
support. Britain also perceived its role in overseeing the course of pre-electoral 
developments and scrutinising the maintenance of general democratic conditions in 
Bulgaria.92 Britain’s efforts concentrated on the Agrarian Party as it was believed to be 
supported by at least eighty percent of the population. Another aim was to convince the 
various Opposition groups to combine their strength and unite against the Communists. 
This was partly achieved when upon Houstoun-Boswall’s advice the right-wing Agrarian 
Gichev joined Petkov, who had already become the centre of anti-Communists resistance.93
One unexpected difficulty encountered by Houstoun-Boswall was that frequently the 
Bulgarian Opposition turned a deaf ear to his doctrine of self-help. He reported an 
unhealthy tendency among Opposition leaders ‘to lie back ... content with the reflection
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that everything is in the hands of [the Western Governments]’.94 Gradually, the British 
diplomat himself lost confidence in the aptitude of the Bulgarian politicians. Occasionally, 
he even doubted the democratic potential of the Bulgarian nation in whom ‘five hundred 
years of Turkish rule [had] implanted a slave mentality too deeply’.95
Daily observation of the Bulgarian political scene convinced British political and military 
officers in Bulgaria of the truth of the Opposition’s allegations about the dependence of the 
Bulgarian Communists on Moscow. As a result both General Oxley and Houstoun-Boswall 
recommended that the British Government, in conjunction with the US Government, should 
apply political pressure in the Soviet capital. Houstoun-Boswall was ready to believe the 
rumours that in the face of another joint British and US action, Stalin would not deem it 
expedient to support the Bulgarian Communists.96 But Houstoun-Boswall’s major concern 
was that he was left without a clear idea of the political and strategic importance his 
Government attached to the country97 He was aware of the inability of the Southern 
Department to elaborate a general and consistent line of policy towards Bulgaria. He 
accepted the argument that British involvement in Bulgaria would affect relations with 
Soviet Russia and have a long-term impact on the whole post-war European 
configuration of forces. But his preferences lay on the side of testing Soviet will to co­
operate in practice. He was not informed of the fact that internal FO debates were leading 
senior diplomatic staff in London to lean increasingly in the direction of a compromise with 
the Soviet Union. This would amount to confirming the spheres of interest in the Balkans. 
Such an attitude was reflected in Britain’s decision not to take any action in Bulgaria until 
the outcome of the discussion of the Eastern European situation at the approaching London
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Council of Foreign Ministers was clear.98 There the Western delegations demanded 
democratisation of Bulgaria and Rumania while Molotov insisted that the regimes in both 
countries were fully representative and should be internationally recognised. In the wake of 
this deadlock, the FO briefly weighed up and dismissed the chances for a second 
postponement of the Bulgarian elections.99
In September and October 1945, despite great reservations the FO observed with certain 
satisfaction and even surprise the progress of the Bulgarian Opposition. The latter was 
praised for taking full advantage of the freedom of the press and showing much courage in 
its anti-Govemment campaign, all of which seemed to justify Britain’s efforts.100 Therefore, 
the decision of the Opposition to boycott the elections came as a disappointment. The 
legitimacy of the reasons for abstaining from the vote was fully recognised by British 
officials and diplomats who had long concluded that the elections would definitely be 
manipulated. The FO could also foresee one advantage in that, without the presence of the 
Opposition in the future Parliament, the latter could not claim to be representative. And yet, 
the FO instructed Houstoun-Boswall to press Petkov to go to the polls.101 There is no 
documentary evidence to suggest the motives behind this decision but most plausibly it was 
related to the overriding fear in the FO that anything which could be interpreted as British 
obstruction in Bulgaria might bring Soviet retaliation elsewhere.
The Consequences of the Etheridge Mission. While British foreign policy
makers were gradually realising that their involvement in the Bulgarian elections was not 
producing the desired results, their US counterparts decided to make another effort to 
influence political developments in Bulgaria. In October 1945, US Secretary of State Byrnes
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charged Mark Etheridge, a respected and experienced journalist and publisher, with the 
inspection of conditions in the country. Etheridge’s appointment came on the heels of the 
conspicuous failure of the London Council of Foreign Ministers. Bames had been present at 
the London summit and had tirelessly repeated to State Department officials his case for 
tough pressure on Soviet Russia in whose hands he believed Bulgaria’s fate lay. For this
109reason, Bames approved the dispatch of the Etheridge mission. Cyril Black, one of 
Etheridge’s principal assistants, who had profound knowledge and first-hand experience of 
the Balkans shared Bames’ impressions. Black believed that the Etheridge mission was 
called for by the hardening US attitude to the Soviet Union which had yet to be matched by
i rna shift in US public opinion.
Etheridge spent two weeks in Bulgaria, where he conducted conversations with politicians 
from all shades of opinion and sounded both the Soviet and the British representatives. The 
Opposition leaders described most forcefully the constant threats and obstruction of their 
activities by the Government. They restated the main political demands presented to the 
Government in September. Petkov also explained his decision to boycott the approaching 
elections partly as a result of the small likelihood that the USA would press for a second 
postponement. Etheridge considered the Opposition’s refusal to take part in the elections as 
a wrong step and said as much to the Bulgarian Prime Minister. Etheridge pressed Georgiev 
to admit that a possible solution was to reconstruct the Fatherland Front in its original form 
which had been supported by the overwhelming majority of Bulgarians. But Georgiev 
repeated the official line that the Opposition leaders themselves stood in the way of the 
Government being re-formed.104 To the Regency Council, Etheridge spoke of the
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impossibility of having a representative Bulgarian Government without the Agrarian Union. 
He prompted the Regents to extend the deadline for the nomination of candidates for 
election, an idea suggested to him by a number of anti-Communists.105
On 9 November 1945, Etheridge met Georgi Dimitrov who had just arrived from Moscow 
to take part in the final stage of the electoral campaign. The leader of the Bulgarian 
Communists stated firmly that his presence in Bulgaria had been required to make sure a 
second postponement did not take place. He tried to reassure the US envoy that the 
Communists had no intention of monopolising power and intended to rule in alliance with 
the rest of the FF parties. He even mentioned the possibility of discussing the inclusion of 
Opposition Agrarians and Social Democrats in the Government after the elections. 
However, the overall impression the US delegation carried away was that all concessions 
the regime might make before the elections would be purely cosmetic. Etheridge formed a 
suspicion that the Communists intended to crush any opposition after the regime had won at 
the polls.106
The Bulgarian Communists believed the USA’s involvement in Bulgaria to be ‘a cunning 
manoeuvre against the Government’.107 Etheridge’s arrival was seen as a pretext to postpone 
the elections once again, which would severely undermine the authority of the Government 
and increase the ambitions of the right-wing parties. Therefore, even before Etheridge met 
with the most prominent non-Communist figures in the Government, Kostov had achieved a 
clear understanding with Georgiev and War Minister Damyan Velchev. The latter agreed
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that the elections would not be postponed, the Government would not be reconstructed and
1 HRif the Opposition wanted to negotiate with the FF no outside mediation was necessary.
In the course of consultations in Bulgaria, the members of the Etheridge mission were 
increasingly convinced that the proper conduct of the elections required reorganisation of 
the Government and registration of separate party electoral lists. And if these conditions 
were to be met, the elections would have to be postponed for a second time.109 It was not 
certain that the State Department would approve such a solution. Etheridge was under the 
double pressure to find an alternative means of demonstrating undiminished US interest in 
Bulgaria and also somehow to prepare the way for a necessary US retreat on the subject of 
the Bulgarian elections. He proposed that his delegation should proceed to Moscow: after all 
Dimitrov himself had made it clear that important decisions regarding the Bulgarian 
elections had been taken there. Heading for the Soviet capital, Etheridge was specifically 
instructed by Byrnes to recommend the postponement of the elections. This would allow 
enough time for the preparations of Opposition electoral lists of candidates and for the 
reorganisation of the Government to include Opposition representatives. Another point to 
press was the reorganisation of the militia, the control of which had to be taken out of 
Communist hands so that it could not be used as an instrument of repression over non- 
Communists.110
The Soviet Government had access to full information about the course of the Etheridge 
mission as daily reports from Sofia reached Dimitrov when he was still in Moscow. The 
Bulgarian Communists were even able to relay to the Soviet Government details of 
Etheridge’s meeting with the Prime Minister who had not hesitated to disclose them to
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Kostov.111 The Soviet Government had responded to Etheridge’s arrival in Sofia by 
dispatching there the Soviet journalist Ilya Ehrenburg as a special correspondent. 
Ehrenburg’s articles for the Soviet press were carefully scrutinised by the DD. They extolled 
the achievements of the Fatherland Front and insisted that it had wide support from all 
progressive elements in Bulgarian society just while Etheridge was preparing to present 
exactly the opposite case to the Soviet Government.112
In Moscow the special US representative was received by Vyshinski. In the conversation 
with Vyshinski, Etheridge made little secret of his negative judgement of conditions in 
Bulgaria. Vyshinski was not impressed and insisted that his own information was quite the 
opposite. He ruled out postponement of the elections claiming that it would be an 
unjustifiable intervention. The Soviet Government would have considered a request from 
the Bulgarian Government but Vyshinski was sure that such a request would not be 
forthcoming. This was the reverse of what Etheridge had found out in Bulgaria: only days 
earlier the Bulgarian Prime Minister had indicated that he would have made such a request 
had he been a free man.113
Britain s Reaction to the Etheridge Mission. Houstoun-Boswall found Etheridge
agreeable and ‘very level-headed’.114 The British political representative in Sofia hoped the 
US mission was going to send a correct picture of the Bulgarian situation to Washington but 
failed to see how this would influence immediate developments in the country. What is 
more, in contrast to the Communist Kostov who expected Etheridge’s appearance to cheer
111 TsPA, f.146, op.4, a.e.192,1.4, Kostov to Dimitrov, 22.10.1945
112 RTsHEDNI, f. 17, op. 128, a.e.759,1.70-77, Ehrenburg draft article 19 -  22.10.1945
113 F0371/48194, R19324, Moscow to FO, 14.11.1945
114 F0371/48132, R18348, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 26.10.1945
189
the spirit of the Opposition, Houstoun-Boswall was afraid that the Opposition would lie 
back and place everything in the hands of the American.115
The appointment of the Etheridge mission caused mixed feelings at the FO. Firstly, British 
Balkan experts were slighted that they had not been consulted properly. Throughout the 
mission, there was abundance of complaints about short notice of the different stages of the 
venture and US failure to observe the principle of prior co-ordination.116 The FO was 
overcome by sudden jealousy of the increased US role in the region. The Southern 
Department somewhat hesitantly claimed that Great Britain had a greater interest than the 
USA, not only in Bulgaria but also in Romania which Etheridge was to visit too. Only rarely 
was a voice heard saying that Britain should not object to the more direct US methods as 
long as they achieved results.117 Therefore, the British Government reserved the right to 
make its own views known to the Soviet Government.118 British distrust of the US approach 
was to an extent matched by US desire to try to solve the Bulgarian problem alone. The 
State Department requested that there be no parallel British action as Etheridge's greatest 
asset was his being regarded as an independent enquirer.119
Only when Etheridge arrived in Moscow were British experts able to form a clear and 
objective opinion of his views. Etheridge talked with the British Ambassador Clerk Kerr and 
the Charge d ’Affaires Frank Roberts and tried to explain how the specific actions he had 
recommended fitted in with US long-term policy. Etheridge proclaimed Bulgaria to be of 
similar strategic importance to Poland, with the added advantage of being accessible to the 
West from Greece and Turkey. His ideas revolved around the possibility for the West to buy
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Bulgarian products for political reasons and secure free Bulgarian commercial access to the 
Aegean through Salonika and Dedeagatch. The West could save the Bulgarian Agrarian 
Union just as it had saved the Polish Peasant Party, by showing consistent interest in it. 
According to Etheridge, the West should work for the withdrawal of the Red Army from 
Bulgaria.120
Even after this update on the progress of the mission, the FO retained a certain dislike of it. 
British observers could not overcome the feeling that the whole venture had ‘somewhat 
flimsy grounds’ and showed distinct relief at its predicted ‘rapid and inglorious 
conclusion’.121 British officials were especially sceptical of the practical results of the 
Etheridge talks. British diplomats received indications that Etheridge's consultations were 
causing some Bulgarian Communist leaders to waver with regard to the carrying out of the 
elections. That is why Dimitrov had been promptly sent to Bulgaria to force through the 
elections on 18 November without any compromise with the Opposition.122 Some British 
analysts even saw in the abortive September talks between the Bulgarian Government and 
Opposition a sign that the Soviets had been considering changes in the regime to which the 
Etheridge mission had put an end.123 On the whole, the FO concluded that the US action had 
been too aggressive and had actually stiffened the resolve of the Bulgarian Communists who 
did not want to appear vulnerable to Western pressures. This can now be confirmed by 
evidence from letters from Kostov to Dimitrov discussing the best ways to demonstrate that 
the Bulgarian Government ‘would not waver at outside intervention and the Communists 
would stand firm’ in the face of insidious manoeuvres.124
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The Question of Another Diplomatic Note. At the conclusion of his Moscow visit
Etheridge recommended to his Government that it issue a diplomatic note on the question of 
the Bulgarian elections. This should stipulate that the coming Bulgarian elections were not 
going to be held in a satisfactory democratic manner and therefore the United States would 
not recognise the emergent Government. Immediately, Houstoun-Boswall took the
opportunity once more to persuade his superiors that a strongly worded note would tilt the 
balance in Bulgaria. It could precipitate the resignation of the Regency Council, which in 
turn would create enough justification for the postponement of the elections.126 Neither this 
nor previous communications on the subject specified the expected advantages of a second 
postponement. The British representative seemed to be accepting the belief -  or rather the 
hope - of the Opposition leaders that another postponement would mean explicit criticism of 
the Communists who would therefore alter their behaviour. Indeed, this scenario had been 
discussed with the Regents and some Opposition figures but Houstoun-Boswall overlooked 
the fact that even the USA was not asking for a new postponement. Apart from that, to the 
British representative in Sofia, some official pronouncement that the Bulgarian Government 
did not meet the criteria for recognition seemed to be the only ‘stick’ Britain had left in 
Bulgaria.127
On 14 November 1945, the US Government requested Britain’s support for a note of protest
1 9 8and the FO’s initial reaction was to oblige promptly. On second thoughts, however, 
British officials realised that the proposed statement would make it impossible for Britain to 
recognise the Bulgarian Government not just after the elections but for some considerable
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time afterwards.129 It became important, therefore, to find a middle course which would 
keep in step with the USA but also not tie the hands of the British Government. The 
compromise was discovered in a formula which would not state that Britain could not 
recognise or have diplomatic dealings with the new Bulgarian Government. It would be 
confined to saying that Britain did not consider the Bulgarian Government as ‘democratic 
and representative’.130 This subtle distinction was hardly going to be acknowledged outside 
Western diplomatic circles, and the FO quickly dropped it. The members of the Southern 
Department began arguing that as the situation in Bulgaria had not changed since August, 
the note which had been sent to the Bulgarian Government then was still in force and rightly 
expressed the official British views. Foreign Secretary Bevin personally reviewed Britain’s 
position and concluded that it would be a mistake to send a new note. The only remaining 
problem was how to wriggle out of the US proposal. A pretext was found in the fact that the 
US Embassy in London had not forwarded its Government’s request for support to the 
FO.131
At the end of the Etheridge mission, the British Government faced the question of whether 
to repeat its action in Bulgaria from the previous August, namely to state before the ballot 
that the emergent Government would not be regarded as representative. This would amount 
to admitting that the tactics employed so far had not produced any significant result. Despite 
the August postponement of elections and the ensuing Western pressure campaign on the 
Bulgarian Government, the conditions for the establishment of democracy in Bulgaria had 
barely improved. British official circles had to recognise that their best diplomatic efforts 
regarding Bulgaria were all but wasted. The FO was rapidly moving towards the opinion 
that since it could not influence Bulgarian developments, it should not object to them and
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thus merely expose British impotence in the face of dictatorship. What is more, the deadlock 
in relation to Bulgaria and the other ex-satellites was being used by the Soviet Union to 
prevaricate on other issues of importance for the West. That is why senior British diplomats 
began pressing more vigorously than ever for a compromise to be reached at the 
approaching December Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow.
On 16 November 1945, the Opposition made a last desperate effort to recreate the 
conditions that had brought the August postponement of elections. It sent identical letters to 
the Prime Minister, the ACC and the Allied Missions stating that the political atmosphere in 
the country had not improved but on the contrary, the terror of the authorities had 
increased.132 Almost simultaneously, the United States delivered a note to the Bulgarian 
Government expressing conviction that the results of the elections would not reflect the 
democratic choice of the Bulgarian people and therefore refusing to recognise the new 
Government.133
This action was not matched by a similar British one, despite Houstoun-Boswall’s numerous 
warnings that the Bulgarian Government and, he believed, the Soviet Government were 
‘openly banking ... on divergence of opinion between HMG and USG’.134 Indeed, the lack 
of a British note softened the blow of the US declaration but Houstoun-Boswall’s last- 
minute appeals did not activate any change of mind at the FO.135 During the week of the 
Bulgarian elections, the Mission in Sofia was left without any communications from 
London whatsoever. In vain did the representatives in Bulgaria plead for ‘any (even private)
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indication of the attitude of HMG’.136 It was almost a week after the elections that an FO 
letter explained to Houstoun-Boswall that the British Government had resolved ‘not to tie 
[ rfs] hands with a public statement’.137
As scheduled, the Bulgarian general elections took place on 18 November 1945. There was 
little overt physical violence on the polling day. The Government reported a turnout of 85.2 
percent, of which 88.3 percent voted for the Fatherland Front. Boycotting the elections, the 
Opposition had campaigned for the casting of blank ballots. The Government proclaimed 
these invalid. The number of blank ballots together with the number of people who had 
genuinely abstained from the vote constituted just below a quarter of the electorate. The 
smallest Government majority was observed in the constituencies of the biggest towns.
This could be attributed to more stringent 
supervision closer to administrative centres. In addition, the fact that the publication of
1 “3 Q
results in Sofia and some other major towns was delayed suggests falsifications.
On the basis of the official statistics, the FO concluded that at least a quarter of the 
Bulgarians were opposed to the Government. This was not considered an implausible result 
given that the electorate was largely illiterate, the electoral campaign had taken place in an 
atmosphere of Communist intimidation and psychological coercion, and the Opposition ‘had 
not put up a serious show’.139 In any case, British observers had not expected more than 
forty percent for the Opposition in a fair election.140 At the same time, Houstoun-Boswall 
wrote that members of the ruling coalition had been allegedly shaken by the real results of 
which they were aware. There were rumours that local Communist leaders had been
136 F0371/48194, R19541, Sofia to FO, 17.11.1945
137 Ibid., FO to Sofia, 23.11.1945
138 Kostadinova, T. Bulgaria... p.88
139 F0371/48132, R19781, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 20.11.1945
140 Ibid., Stewart, 23.11.1945
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‘upbraided’ by Georgi Dimitrov who himself had been reprimanded from Moscow for 
having misled the Soviets. It was also said that a secret Soviet mission had been sent to 
Bulgaria to investigate the real state of affairs.141
In the anticlimax after the elections, British diplomats tried to analyse the developments of 
the previous months in view of the necessity to modify policy to Bulgaria. Houstoun- 
Boswall could claim to have the best insight into the machinations of the Bulgarian 
Communists whom he had observed closely for more than a year. He was convinced of their 
being manipulated according to the objectives of Soviet foreign policy. He expected the 
radical left elements in the FF Government to work for the implementation of political and 
economic measures, which would not only consolidate their power but also strengthen the 
Soviet hold on Bulgaria. Apart from binding the Bulgarian economy to the USSR, the 
British political representative predicted the proclamation of a Republic to be followed by 
steps for the establishment of a South Slav Federation.
Houstoun-Boswall’s outlook was inevitably shaped by his proximity to the Bulgarian 
political scene. Naturally, he felt more emotional about events in Bulgaria than his superiors 
in London. Nevertheless, he was not misled about the low priority of the country in overall 
British policy. But he held that the pattern evolving in Bulgaria, where the Soviet hold was 
the firmest, would illuminate future developments in the rest of Soviet-dominated Europe. 
Incidents in neighbouring countries, like the proclamation of the Yugoslav Republic, could 
in turn indicate correctly the direction in which Bulgaria would go. For Houstoun-Boswall, 
only a holistic approach to the region could slow the Soviet determination to fortify Soviet 
positions in the Balkans. He was categorical that Bulgaria was being permanently drawn into 
the ‘vortex’ of Soviet security with its strategic as well as purely ideological dimensions. 
The real importance of this was, of course, its bearing on the protection of British
141F0371/48194, R20177, Sofia to FO, 29.11.1945
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communications and interests in the Near and Middle East. This required a thorough re­
assessment of policy towards Bulgaria and clarification of British long-term objectives.
Houstoun-Boswall’s general examination of the unstable British position in Bulgaria was 
not followed by any concrete proposals for action. He was aware that Great Britain could 
lend Bulgaria no ‘physical aid in any shape or form to stand up to its liberators’.142 All he 
could suggest was that British disagreement with the strengthening of Soviet control over 
Bulgaria should be made clear to the Soviet Government and this should be done from the 
position of a common Anglo-American front.143 Houstoun-Boswall’s assessment was 
confirmed by Clerk Kerr who saw no way to reverse the decisive Soviet influence over 
Bulgaria. British diplomats in Moscow warned of Soviet malicious capability to interpret 
British action with regard to Bulgaria as aimed at weakening the Soviet hold. They 
advised the FO not to bring the question of the Bulgarian regime to the attention of the 
Soviet Government. This would only rock overall Soviet-British relations without any 
real chance for local advantages. Any momentary British gains in Bulgaria would most 
certainly be compensated by Soviet trouble making in areas of far greater importance for 
Great Britain.144
The Southern Department agreed with the gloomy judgement of the picture in Bulgaria 
and could not see any obvious formula for improvement. British policy makers became 
increasingly uncertain that they should try to apply any pressure on the Bulgarian issue as 
they had serious doubts whether Bulgaria could be converted into a genuine democracy at 
all. Simultaneously, however, some reluctance to give up completely the erstwhile aim of 
promoting political and economic freedom lingered in the FO. The two conflicting lines
142 F0371/48194, R20451, Sofia to FO, 3.12.1945
143 F0371/48194, R20177, Sofia to FO, 29.11.1945
144 F0371/48194, R20830, Clark Kerr to FO, 12.12.1945
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of reasoning informed the search for an adjusted British approach to Bulgaria in the 
months after the November 1945 elections.145
* * *
Britain had followed the USA in the effort to secure the August 1945 postponement of 
elections in Bulgaria. In the course of this episode, it had become clear for British policy 
makers that they had managed to slow down the advance of Communist power in Bulgaria 
only because the Soviet Government had apparently been presented with a unified and 
strong Anglo-American front. At the time, the postponement had assumed an importance of 
its own but once achieved, it required the elaboration of further means to follow up and build 
upon the scarcely expected success. The period between August and November 1945, when 
elections were finally carried out was crucial for the clarification of long-term British 
attitudes to Bulgaria.
In retrospect, the FO realised that the practical effect of the August postponement of the 
elections was somewhat dubious. It was little more than an exception which did not 
change the intentions of the Bulgarian Communists but certainly alerted them to the need 
to proceed with their plans more carefully so as not to cause international embarrassment 
for their “Big Friend”. But they were also able to consolidate their position by 
reorganising the ruling political coalition they dominated and by working for the 
disintegration of the Opposition. Nor had the postponement of the Bulgarian elections 
brought any change in the pattern of British-Soviet relations regarding Eastern Europe. 
The momentary Soviet acquiescence in Western demands did not lessen overall Soviet 
influence in Bulgaria which was based foremost on the links of the BCP with the Soviet 
Union. The correct evaluation of this situation drove British foreign policy experts to the
145 F0371/48194, R20451, Williams, 6.12.1945, Sargent, 7.12.1945, R20830, FO draft to Houstoun-Boswall, 
Dec. 1945
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unequivocal conclusion that there was precious little they could do to affect the course of 
events in Bulgaria. That is why they had to cut losses and save face while aiming to preserve 
influence in the southern part of the Balkans.
British hesitance to get involved over Bulgarian affairs in the second half of 1945 had 
been overruled by unusual US activism at the time of the postponement of the elections. 
At that time, US recognition of Soviet interests in Eastern Europe was still not judged 
incompatible with the existence of independent democratic states. The Etheridge mission 
was launched as an attempt to overcome the deadlock regarding Bulgaria. Its advice for a 
second electoral postponement served no useful purpose in British eyes. The futility of 
the US initiative convinced the British Government that no precipitate action was 
desirable in Bulgaria. It also made the FO conscious of the need to persuade the United 
States that there was no feasible alternative to the increasing British resignation to the 
situation in Bulgaria.
Chapter Five
Recognising the Bulgarian Communist Regime
After the elections of 18 November 1945, British representatives in Sofia continued to 
scrutinise the Bulgarian political scene. They were especially interested in the correlation of 
political forces in the Government and the relations between the ruling parties within the 
Fatherland Front. Correct and timely information about political developments would 
indicate to the British Government the direction in which the country was likely to evolve 
both internally and internationally. Even small details assumed extraordinary importance, as 
it was becoming increasingly difficult for foreign observers to follow the trends inside the 
Bulgarian Government.
The electoral results provided the Fatherland Front Government with a certain degree of 
legitimacy. The position of the Communist Party, which had been the chief architect and 
beneficiary of the elections, was also stabilised. The Soviet Union had restored full 
diplomatic relations on 14 August 1945 but Bulgaria’s rulers still needed to secure 
recognition by Great Britain and the USA.1 This would bestow upon the Bulgarian regime 
the moral privilege of acceptance in the international community. Recognition would also 
allow Bulgaria to resume normal international trade. This was a crucial element in the 
country’s post-war reconstruction and would ultimately strengthen the Communist position.
The Soviet Union clearly had a stake in both the moral and economic aspects of Bulgaria’s 
recognition. The resumption of normal relations could be interpreted by friends and foes of 
Communism alike as acquiescence in the exclusive Soviet influence over Bulgaria. Since it 
was suspected that Soviet conduct in Bulgaria formed a part of the larger pattern of
200
establishment of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, Britain’s attitude to the country had to 
be consistent with overall British policy to the Soviet zone.
In the British interpretation, political developments in Bulgaria and the other Soviet satellites 
in 1945 -  1946 could be seen as contrary to the provisions of the Yalta Declaration. At the 
same time, looking at Eastern Europe, British policy makers reached a consensus as to the 
existence of a Soviet threat to British positions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
This overruled any general anxiety for democracy in Bulgaria in particular and in Eastern 
Europe as a whole. At the same time, the emerging strategic conflict could most eloquently 
be formulated in ideological terms: Soviet actions could be presented as anti-democratic. At 
the end of 1945, Sargent wrote:
We are trying to put a limit to Russian expansion in the Middle East and in fact to build up a kind of 
Monroe system in that area. This makes it of vital importance that Bulgaria should be an independent 
buffer state. If Bulgaria remains a Russian satellite it will always be in the power of the Soviet 
Government to use Bulgaria to keep Turkey and Greece perpetually on tenterhooks... with disastrous 
effects to our whole position in the Eastern Mediterranean.2
Here was the ultimate reason for preoccupation with Bulgarian affairs. Britain’s strategic 
aim of countering Soviet influence in the Balkans could be achieved only if non- 
Communists, who were not susceptible to control from Moscow, were in power. To this end, 
Britain was committed to supporting the Opposition, which could come into its own only if 
political liberties were observed. Britain had a stake in the implementation of the principles 
of democracy in Bulgaria which were best tested in the course of preparations for and 
conduct of parliamentary elections.
1 Valev, L.B. et al. (eds.) Sovetsko-Bolgarskie otnoshenia i Svyazi, 1944 - 1948g.: Documenti i materiali. 
Moscow: Nauka, 1981. p. 112-113
2 Documents on British Policy Overseas, vol.6, p.245-246, Sargent to Houstoun-Boswall, 26.11.1945
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The Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers. The 18 November elections produced
a National Assembly in which only the parties remaining in the Fatherland Front were 
represented. The Government had been reshuffled shortly before the elections. In the new 
configuration Petkov’s Agrarians and Grigor Cheshmedzhiev’s Social Democrats were 
substituted for leftist factions of their own parties prepared to collaborate with the 
Communists. Pro-Communist interference also forced a split in Zveno. The latter’s most 
prominent leaders Georgiev and Stainov remained Premier and Foreign Minister 
respectively. They had both been regarded by Western observers as the moderate elements 
in the Bulgarian Cabinet. However, their behaviour before and during the elections raised 
Western suspicions that they might turn into ‘not only willing tools ... b u t... star players on 
the Communist side’.3
The Bulgarian Government was aware that it was not regarded as representative by Britain 
and the USA. In late November and December 1945, the Bulgarian Government made 
several unofficial attempts to find out under what terms these views might be reconsidered 
by the Western Governments.4
The Bulgarian Communists knew that the basic criterion by which Britain and the United 
States would judge the situation was the opportunity for normal political activity of the 
Opposition, which should eventually re-enter the Government. That is why one of the first 
tasks faced by the Communists after the elections was the reassessment of their attitude to 
the parties outside the Fatherland Front. At the IX plenum of the Central Committee on 12 
December 1945, Kostov stated that ‘because of internal as well as international 
considerations’ the Communist Party was interested in co-operation with ‘the democratic
3 FRUS 1945, vol.IV, p.384, Bames to Byrnes, 17.11.1945
4 FRUS 1945, vol.IV, p.396-397, Bames to Byrnes, 26.11.1945, p.398, Stoychev - Reber conversation, 
27.11.1945
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part of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals’.5 At the same time, the Opposition was 
publicly warned by leading Communists, that unless it returned to the Fatherland Front, it 
would be regarded by the Communists as ‘a reactionary adversary fascist force’, which 
would be ‘ruthlessly revealed and destroyed’.6
The Moscow Advice. On 7 December 1945, three weeks after the Bulgarian
elections, Etheridge submitted his final report to US Secretary of State Byrnes. Etheridge 
concluded that in Bulgaria, as well as Romania, an authoritarian regime excluded 
representatives of large segments of democratic opinion. In both countries, the local 
Communists were supported by the Soviet Union, which used them to achieve domination 
of the Balkans as a stepping-stone towards the Mediterranean. While duly acknowledging 
the security considerations of the Soviet Union in the region, Etheridge’s report did not 
accept them as legitimate reasons for the denial of free elections.7
Etheridge was pessimistic about the prospect for genuinely free elections in Bulgaria. Even 
so, he proposed a number of improvements, which could address the most obvious British 
and US apprehensions. The first was a demand that the newly elected Government should be 
reorganised to include leaders of all parties which had originally adhered to the FF 
programme. An equally important requirement was that the Ministries of Justice and the 
Interior should be taken from Communist control. The new Government would then arrange 
fresh elections in which all democratic parties would be free to participate on the basis of 
single or separate lists according to their choice. The National Assembly which resulted 
from the 18 November elections should concentrate on calling new elections for a Grand
5 TsPA, f.l, op.5, a.e.5,1.4-6, Rostov’s speech, 12.12.1945
6 Ognyanov, L. Narodna. .. p.47
7 Davis, L.E. The Cold War Begins: Soviet - American Conflict over Eastern Europe. Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1974. p.333
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National Assembly which should revise the Constitution.* Etheridge himself understood this 
as a maximum programme and was prepared to regard the implementation of even half the 
measures as good progress. He placed his belief in the moderates within the Communist 
Party who were allegedly urging for an end to excesses.8 The report was generally approved 
by Bames in Sofia, whose experience with the Soviets prompted him to point out that it was 
more important to insist on some positive action rather than to expect them to agree with a 
condemnation of the existing situation.9
The members of the Etheridge mission believed that their outspoken reproach of the 
Communist regimes in Bulgaria and Romania would shock US public opinion.10 While it is 
debatable that many US citizens would have shown sufficient interest in events in the far 
comer of Europe, it is conceivable that they would have recognised the signs of the 
worsening of relations between the former Allies. The US Government itself was not yet 
ready to reveal publicly its displeasure with events in the Soviet zone. Open and sharp US 
criticism of Soviet policy in the Balkans was itself certain to exacerbate tensions among the 
Three Allies.
Etheridge’s report was circulated only among a limited circle of US policy makers and was 
not even forwarded to London. It was used as the main brief of the US delegation at the 
December 1945 Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers. The Council assembled at the 
insistence of Byrnes who was particularly anxious to resume discussion and reach 
compromises on the issue of the ex-satellites. The US Secretary of State thought it essential 
to overcome the deadlock from the previous meeting in London regarding Bulgaria and
According to the Tumovo Constitution, a Grand Assembly had twice the number of deputies of an 
Ordinary Assembly. It could alter the Constitution and make other important decisions, e.g. ratify peace 
treaties.
8 FRUS 1945, vol.IV, p.378, Etheridge to Byrnes, 14.11.1945
9 Ibid., p.410-411, Bames to Byrnes, 13.12.1945
10 Etheridge, M. Negotiating... p.201
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Romania.11 He was guided at least as much by concern for the fate of democracy in Eastern 
Europe as by compulsion to resolve the controversy on the question of the political situation 
in the Balkans before the conclusion of peace treaties with the former minor Axis powers.
As the Moscow Conference was a result of US efforts to improve political conditions in 
Bulgaria and Romania, its outcomes are easily attributed to US action. A closer look at the 
proceedings reveals that the compromise reached regarding the two Balkan countries was as 
much a Soviet initiative. Byrnes himself confirmed that initially Stalin had refused to 
consider any proposal, which undermined the results of the November elections in Bulgaria. 
Subsequently, Stalin himself suggested an arrangement whereby members of the Bulgarian 
Opposition could be included in the Government in exchange for Western recognition. 
Faced with the prospect of another fruitless conference, the US delegation agreed.12 On 27 
December 1945, the Moscow Council issued a communique stating that the Soviet 
Government would give ‘friendly advice’ to the Bulgarian Government to include two 
Opposition politicians. They should be truly representative of their parties and willing to 
work with the Government. On their part, the United Kingdom and the United States 
undertook to recognise the Bulgarian Government once these conditions were fulfilled.
It is not easy to explain why the Soviet Union showed willingness to consider favourably 
some of the Western demands in Bulgaria. It is possible that Stalin desired to regain credit 
lost in London in September and tried to reciprocate Byrnes’ obvious eagerness for an 
understanding over Eastern Europe. In addition, Molotov was undoubtedly impressed by the 
US inclination to allow Bulgaria to forego reparations to Greece and even consider the 
possibility of a Bulgarian outlet on the Aegean.
11 Davis, L.E. The Cold War... p.328-331
12 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.47, Byrnes to Bames, 12.01.1946, p.64, Byrnes to Cohen, 31.01.1946
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Archival evidence, however, points to the Soviet Government’s upholding the Moscow
decision because it provided an opportunity for mending relations with the West without
encroaching on the position of the Bulgarian Communists. Before making his proposal to
the Conference, Stalin wrote to Dimitrov about the US suggestion that the Bulgarian
Government should be reorganised. Stalin advised the Bulgarian Communists to think
whether they could include in the Government one or two Ministers from Opposition
circles. Stalin told Dimitrov that someone ‘not too popular’ - rather than Petkov - should be
given ‘some insignificant Ministry’. This would achieve the double result of drawing some
politicians away from the Opposition and giving some satisfaction to the USA. Apparently,
the Soviet leader considered the Bulgarian Communists sufficiently in control of the
situation to be able to grant some minor concessions, which would not tip the overall 
11balance.
The Bulgarian Communists faithfully embraced Moscow’s line convinced that Stalin 
intended to follow the letter of the communique without fulfilling the original Western 
expectations. Dimitrov deliberately misrepresented Britain’s and the USA’s position as a 
conspiracy to form a Government of the Opposition. He stated triumphantly that the 
Moscow decision indirectly recognised the November elections, the resultant National 
Assembly and the existing Government. He assured the Communist Politburo that the 
Moscow communique merely gave ‘Britain and the USA a chance to save their face’.14 For 
Kolarov, the decisions of the Moscow Conference meant that the two Western powers had 
acknowledged the predominant interest of the Soviet Union in Bulgaria.15 Such an 
interpretation echoed Stalin’s boasting to a Bulgarian Government delegation that he had
13 Issussov, M. Stalin... p.40-41; Dimitrov, V. ‘The Failure o f Democracy in Eastern Europe and the 
Emergence of the Cold War, 1944 -  1948: A Bulgarian Case Study’. DPhil thesis: Cambridge, 1996. p.324- 
328
14 TsPA, f. 146, op.6, a.e.1028,1.1-2, Dimitrov at Politburo, 27.12.1945
15 TsPA, f.147, op.2, a.e.56,1.1-8, Kolarov’s notebook, 29.03.1946
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been able to limit what he called ‘the demands of the Anglo-Americans’ and in some cases 
discard them altogether.16
The Moscow decision was welcomed by that part of the US administration, which was 
inclined to compromise with the Soviet Union in the name of good post-war relations. 
Byrnes spoke publicly of his hope that the application of the Moscow decision would 
improve the democratic character of the two East European Governments and that for the
17first time after Yalta this would be done in conjunction with the Soviet Union. On the 
other hand, President Truman who was believed to be the leading proponent of firmness 
towards the Soviet Union stated firmly on 8 January 1946 that the Bulgarian Government 
would not be recognised without guarantees for free and unfettered elections.18 By then, the 
first round of talks between the Opposition and the Government in Bulgaria had already 
ended in failure.
The British Government had little choice but to subscribe to the compromise. Indeed, Bevin 
had agreed to go to Moscow only after he faced the threat of being left out of any 
agreement.19 His reluctance was partly due to the fact that Britain had not been consulted 
before the proposal for the meeting was sent to Stalin. More importantly, at the end of 1945 
the British Government saw little chance for genuine long-term solution of the conflicts with 
the Soviet Union regarding internal developments in Eastern Europe. By this time, Bevin 
was convinced that that the Soviet Union was aiming to undermine Britain’s position in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East.20 British foreign policy makers were increasingly more
16 Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno... p.92
17 AVPRF, f.74, op.28, no.19, p .20,1.1, Byrnes’s statement, 9.01.1946
18 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.48, Acheson to Bames, 12.01.1946; Black, C.E. 'The Start... ’ p.192
19 Gaddis, J.L. The United States and the Origins o f the Cold War 1941 - 1947. New York: Columbia UP, 
1972. p.276
20 Adamthwaite, A. ‘Britain and the World, 1945 - 9: the View from the Foreign Office’. International 
Affairs, vol.61. no.2, 1985. p.245.
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concerned with securing British strategic positions in the Balkans rather than with what was 
perceived as short-lived improvement of political conditions in the Soviet zone. Due to 
Bulgaria’s geographic location, policy towards the country was coloured by the effort to 
limit Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. This geopolitical aim was translated 
into involvement in internal Bulgarian politics where Britain was associated with the 
ambitions of the Bulgarian anti-Communist Opposition.
The First Round o f Negotiations in Bulgaria and Vyshinski’s Mission. After
the publication of the Moscow communique optimism prevailed among leading Bulgarian 
Communists. They confirmed their intention to avoid unnecessary clashes and take every 
opportunity to come to terms with Britain and the USA. They also believed that the 
Western powers themselves had no choice but to ‘bow to the existing circumstances’ in 
Bulgaria.21 Confident in their superiority, the Communists perceived the Moscow 
decision as a magnanimous concession to the Opposition, which now had an opportunity 
to get back into the Government. They were determined that their dominance of the 
Government should not be disrupted by the inclusion of two new members. In addition, 
they saw a welcome possibility to split their opponents even further. It was assumed that a 
few Opposition groups would want to participate in power and therefore, the Communists 
would be able to handpick the two Opposition representatives to enter the Cabinet.22
This tactical plan was devised on the background of firm Soviet control over Bulgaria. 
The Soviet High Command was issuing orders to stop Opposition newspapers and even to
21 RTsHIDNI, f*. 17, op. 128, a.e.759,1.121, CC of BCP secret letter to CC of VCP(b), 30.12.1945
22 TsPA,f. 147, op.2, a.e.56,1.1-8, Kolarov’s notebook, 29.03.1946 
: AVPRF, f.74, op.28, no. 19, p.20, 1.1;
FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.48, Achesonto Bames, 12.01.1946; Black, C.E. ‘The Start... ’ p.192
RTsHIDNI, f.17, op. 128, a.e.759, 1.121, CC of BCP secret letter to CC of VCP(b), 30.12.1945,
30.12.1945
TsPA, f.146, op.6, a.e.1028,1.1-2,27.12.1945, Dimitrov at Politburo, 27.12.1945
208
take plays off the stage of the National Theatre. On 18 December 1945, the Soviet 
delegation to the ACC had sent the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry a letter categorically 
insisting that communications from the ACC should be treated not as requests but as 
‘official orders which require precise and timely fulfilment’. The Government’s position 
was presented to the Opposition in a memorandum, which stipulated that the Opposition 
members who accepted office should endorse the present Government’s domestic and 
foreign policy. Parliament would sit until the end of the current session in March 1946. The 
only prospective concession was that future elections should be discussed without restriction 
of the right to nominate separate electoral lists.24
The Opposition in Bulgaria judged the Moscow decision on the whole positively. For them, 
the communique had publicly acknowledged the non-representative character of the existing 
Bulgarian Government and had stressed the importance of their own existence 25 That is 
why, on 4 January 1946, the Agrarians led by Petkov, and the Social Democrats led by 
Pastuhov, accepted the Government’s invitation to talks. They handed the Government their 
own proposals for the fulfilment of the Moscow decision. Insisting on Government 
guarantees for ‘liberty of press, thought, assembly and association’, the Opposition 
emphasised its requirement for fresh elections, to be carried out according to a new electoral 
law. As a sign of its own good will, the Opposition pointed out that it was ready to appoint 
only two Ministers as opposed to the six they had had before walking out of the Cabinet in 
August 1945. Despite this, the Bulgarian Government announced that the Opposition was 
disregarding the friendly Soviet advice and ended negotiations 26
23 AVPRF, f. 74/074, op.27, no.8, p.16,1.57-68, various communications, December 1945
24 TsPA, f.146, op.4, a.e.983,1.4-5, Cabinet information, 4.01.1946
25 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.46, Bames to Byrnes, 4.01.1946
26 TsPA, f.146, op.4, a.e.983,1.5, Cabinet Information, 4.01.1946
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It is difficult to judge whether the brief contacts between the Opposition and the Bulgarian 
Government had been conducted with a genuine desire to establish co-operation. Certainly, 
the talks had been started mainly to give the impression of compliance with the tripartite 
Moscow decision. But the Communists also expected to fortify their position in the 
Government and increase their influence in internal politics by weakening the Opposition. It 
is likely that the Communists were disappointed that the Opposition showed no signs of 
disintegrating as they had predicted. They might have even feared that the Government 
could have been unwittingly strengthening the Opposition by treating it on an equal basis. If 
the Bulgarian Government had acted on its own by closing down the short-lived talks with 
Petkov and Lulchev, its actions soon found approval in Moscow.
On 7 January 1946, a Bulgarian delegation consisting of Kimon Georgiev, Petko Stainov 
and Interior Minister Anton Yugov flew to the Soviet capital for a special meeting with 
Stalin and Molotov.27 The visit was shrouded in secrecy and Western observers could only 
guess that it was part of the process by which Bulgarian leaders were ‘being coached to play 
then* part in the formulation of the Russian foreign policy programme’. BCP archives 
reveal that Stalin spent two hours with the Bulgarian delegation analysing the whole post­
armistice period. He made particular efforts to assure the Bulgarian Ministers that Soviet 
Russia had the interests of Bulgaria at heart, pledging lasting support in return for ‘certainty 
that Bulgaria would never become the terrain for adversary initiative and aggression’ 29 
Posing as the protector of Bulgarian interests, Stalin also described how he had succeeded in 
resisting the Western Foreign Ministers’ demands, which, he implied, were harmful for both 
Bulgarian and Soviet interests. He had only agreed to a reconstruction of the Bulgarian
27 Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno... p.94
28 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.55-57, Kennan to Byrnes, 15.01.1946
29 TsPA, f.147, op.2, a.e.1033,1.1, Kolarov’s notebook, 27.01.1946
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Government as this simply meant the inclusion of two Opposition members.30 Stalin even 
seriously reprimanded the Bulgarian representatives for entering into negotiations with 
Petkov and Lulchev:
You should have just plainly pointed out the decisions of the conference and invited them to appoint 
two of their representatives loyal to the Fatherland Front. Why was it necessary for these 
representatives to give you declarations on this or that You, with yoiytactic, have made the opposition 
think that you need them when in fact you don't need them at all...31
Stalin thus castigated what he interpreted as the excessive zeal of the Bulgarian Government 
to fulfil the Moscow advice. On the other hand, he explained that the Bulgarian 
Opposition’s uncompromising position should be portrayed as entering into an argument 
with the Soviet Union itself. For this reason, the Bulgarian Government should do nothing 
more. The Soviet Government would assume responsibility for the failure of the Moscow 
decision if the Bulgarian Government strictly followed instructions from Moscow. To show 
that he meant business, Stalin ordered Vyshinski to depart immediately for Sofia and 
explain the exact meaning of the Moscow decision to the Opposition. To the visiting 
Bulgarian delegation Stalin confessed that in practice Vyshinski ‘had no mission’ apart from 
relaying once again the Moscow communique.32
Vyshinski’s meetings with the Opposition leaders were complete failures. Both Lulchev and 
Petkov refused to bow to threats and demands to enter the Government without being 
granted any concessions in exchange. Vyshinski’s unyielding attitude was based on Stalin’s
personal instructions not to negotiate with the Opposition but simply to require it to
✓
nominate two politicians for inclusion in the Government. After two days in Sofia,
30 Issussov, M. Stalin... p.41
31 Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno... p.95
32 TsPA, f.147, op.2, a.e.1033, 1.2, Kolarov’s notebook, 27.01.1946; FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.50, Bames to 
Byrnes, 13.01.1946; Issussov, M. Stalin... p.42-43; Ognyanov, L. Narodna... p.52-55
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Vyshinski proclaimed that no compromise was feasible and left Bulgaria.33 His departure 
marked the end of Soviet endorsement of the Moscow decision. Stalin might have preferred 
an arrangement whereby the Bulgarian Government could have presented itself as 
representative. But he was ‘not willing to compromise ... the realities of Russian influence 
to obtain this end’.34
Britain’s Search for Alternatives. By mid-January 1946 the Moscow
communique had become subject to two irreconcilable interpretations. The Bulgarian 
Government insisted that the Opposition should take up ministerial posts thus showing 
willingness to co-operate with the authorities. The Bulgarian Opposition pointed to the 
provisions in the Moscow decision that those entering the Government should be truly 
representative of their parties and therefore required preliminary concessions. These 
differences were reflected in the opinions of Soviet Russia and the Western powers which 
backed the interpretation of the Government and the Opposition respectively. This situation 
gave confidence to the Bulgarian Communists and Dimitrov proclaimed at the 
Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs that the lack of unanimous opinion among 
the Three Big Allies ‘untied’ the hands of the Government to follow the more advantageous 
Soviet interpretation.35
The Bulgarian Communists were anxious to attribute the refusal of the Opposition to 
comply with their demands to British and US influence. In documents for internal 
Communist use, Petkov’s group was portrayed as ‘organised and inspired by British and US 
intelligence’ who urged the Opposition towards ‘more energetic terrorist actions’.36 In
33 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.48, Bames to Byrnes, 12.01.1946; Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno... p.96
34 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.56, Kennan to S/S, 15.01.1946
35 TsPA, f.146, op.6, a.e.1032,1.3-4, Dimitrov in Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Commission, 9.02.1946
36 RTsHIDNI, f.17, op.128, a.e.94,1.29, DII Bulletin, 15.01.1946 - the official representatives of Britain and 
the US are named as members of the respective intelligence services.
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contrast to such allegations, the available British and US state archives reveal that while 
feeling unable to advise the Bulgarian Opposition to enter the Government, the Western 
Governments did little to bolster the Opposition. The British and US representatives in Sofia 
expended substantial energy urging their Governments to activate policy towards Bulgaria. 
Britain and the USA, however, experienced difficulty in deciding how to react to the failure 
of the Moscow decision. Both subscribed to the view that nothing in the communique 
stopped the Opposition from laying down advance conditions. They did not feel compelled 
to insist on the Opposition just entering the Government under any circumstances.37 Despite 
analysing the situation in similar terms, British and US policy makers proposed different 
actions, just as their motives for signing the Moscow communique had been different.
The US political representative in Sofia urged the State Department to accept that the 
Moscow formula had not been based on an honest appraisal of the situation. He was in 
favour of firm action to resolve the deadlock but also warned that if the Great Powers did 
not try to enforce some compromise, ‘much blood will be spilled in Bulgaria’.38 Even if 
sceptical of these extreme pronouncements and radical recommendations, the State 
Department considered the moment ripe for some new ‘constructive proposals’, such as new 
elections after the dissolution of the present Assembly, to be advanced to the Soviet 
Government.39
Unlike the State Department, the Foreign Office had little faith in Britain and the USA’s 
abilities to exert pressure on political developments in Bulgaria. The discussion of Bulgarian 
affairs rarely went beyond the FO and there is no evidence that the Moscow decision was 
discussed by the British Cabinet. Occasional references to the difficulties of the Bulgarian
37 F0371/58512, R538, FO to Sofia, 10.01.1946; F0371/58513, R1732, Washington to FO, 1.03.1946
38 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.60, Bames to Byrnes, 18.01.1946, p.66, 86, Byrnes to Bames, 2.02.1946,
23.03.1946
39 F0371/58513, R1732, Washington to FO, 1.03.1946
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Opposition were made in the House of Commons but mostly these were prompted by the 
FO itself. Whitehall officials had long realised that there was precious little they could do to 
stop Communist advances and Soviet domination in Bulgaria. Analysing events from the 
latter half of 1945 and the beginning of 1946, they were deeply sceptical that any course 
short of confrontation with the Soviet Union would produce the changes Britain desired in 
Bulgaria. And since a definitely anti-Soviet stance was out of the question, the only rational 
attitude was that of conciliation and downplaying the differences with the USSR. This line 
of reasoning was gradually crystallising among British foreign policy makers but its 
adoption was preceded by some contradictory behaviour.
Signals from Sofia unmistakably pointed out that parallel to the consolidation of the rule of 
the Bulgarian Communists, the Soviet Government was entrenching itself even more firmly 
in Bulgaria. The FO concluded that it was useless to pursue any further the implementation 
of the Moscow advice, or for that matter, to put forward any new initiative. At the end of 
January 1946, the FO told the State Department that as far as Bulgaria was concerned they 
should both wait for the next move to come from Moscow.40 Such a decision was a far cry 
from the recommendation of Houstoun-Boswall that the British Government should assume 
a firm attitude, abandon half-measures and refuse to negotiate with the unrepresentative 
Bulgarian Government at the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference in May 41 In fact, the FO 
had in mind exactly the opposite - not to cause any hold-up of the peace negotiations.
The confusion in the FO is especially obvious from the contradictory messages it sent to the 
British representative in Bulgaria. During the same week at the end of January 1946, 
Houstoun-Boswall was instructed to uphold the demands of the Opposition, to take special 
care not to antagonise the Soviets and also not to oppose any new action initiated by the
40 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.67, Cohen to Byrnes, 2.02.1946
41 F0371/58512, R1011, FO to Sofia, 26.01.1946; FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.63, Bames to Byrnes, 30.01.1946
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United States.42 Senior British civil servants were reluctant to make a definite public 
statement about the existence of disagreements with the Soviet Union regarding Bulgaria. 
This was extremely exasperating to British officials in the field and annoying to the State 
Department.43
Contradicting his own initial recommendation for silent firmness, Houstoun-Boswall 
proposed a strong-worded British declaration to sober up the Soviet Government. His 
superiors, though, were not worried by the prolongation of the indefinite state of affairs in 
Bulgaria, and at times even mentioned that there was ‘a good scope for bargaining’ there. 
The latter judgement was based on the assumption that eventually the Bulgarian 
Government would seek recognition, and on this score Britain possessed advantages.44
Sargent himself wrote confusing minutes. He was most certain that the prospects of genuine 
free elections seemed distinctly unlikely. He was extremely pessimistic of British ability to 
influence Bulgaria and yet, even he occasionally suggested some approach to the USSR for 
‘diluting’ the existing Bulgarian Government. Then, he thought, additional concessions for 
foreign journalists and for a greater degree of individual freedoms could be achieved through 
‘nagging’ 45 But this contained the inherent danger of actually signalling British lack of deep 
interest in the future of the country and above all lack of resources to underpin open 
disagreement with the USSR. Britain’s ill-defined course towards Bulgaria was exposed 
even further against the background of disturbances in the Pelopennese and the Soviet- 
British friction at the United Nations Organisation. From this, it would be obvious to Soviet 
foreign policy specialists as well as to political observers in Bulgaria that the real concerns
42 F0371/58513, R1101, FO to Sofia, 22.01.1946, R1432, Moscow to FO, 28.01.1946, R1362, Hayter,
31.01.1946
43 FRUS 1945, vol.IV, p.403, Bames to Bymes, 3.12.1945
44 F0371/58512, R538, FO to Sofia, 10.01.1946
45 FRUS 1945, vol.IV, p.405-406, Winant to Bymes, 7.12.1945
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of Great Britain in the Balkans were related to the strategic defence of the Mediterranean. 
Any interest in the establishment of democracy in Bulgaria took a distinctly secondary 
importance. Such conclusions would make it difficult for the Bulgarian Opposition leaders 
to maintain a courageous attitude in the face of renewed political attack from the 
Communists.46
As if sensing this hesitation, at the end of January 1946, the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs pleaded with the British representative not to place his Government in the position of 
‘having to choose between one Ally who is here in force and the two Allies who are not 
physically here’. He repeated that any solution of the Bulgarian situation must be imposed 
from without and only by the Big Three Allies in agreement47
During the later half of January and in February 1946, the US State Department was actively 
trying to elaborate yet another initiative regarding Bulgaria which would be acceptable to 
the Soviet Union. The best option which emerged was to persuade the Soviets to send new 
advice to the Bulgarian Government, this time proposing dissolution of the National 
Assembly after its current session and the calling of fresh elections. The United States 
would then respond by agreeing to recognise the Bulgarian Government if the latter
Aftguaranteed full civil liberties. It is not clear how the State Department hoped to induce the 
Soviets to adopt the proposed course. In any case, some US Government advisors 
understood that the proposition was inherently flawed since it would commit the USA to 
recognising the Bulgarian Government in exchange for promises, which in the fight of past 
experience were unlikely to be honoured.
46 F0371/58513, R1269, Sofia to FO, 24.01.1946, R1832, Sofia to FO, 4.02.1946
47 F0371/58513, R1788, Sofia to FO, 1.02.1946
48 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.65, 71, Bymes to Cohen, 31.01, 5.02.1946
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In view of this, on 22 February 1946, the United States sent the Bulgarian Government a 
note urging the renewal of negotiations between the Bulgarian Government and the 
Opposition. In practice the note restated the provisions of the Moscow decision.49
The British representative in Sofia was instructed to support the US note only verbally. The 
British Government’s intention was to register disapproval of the Bulgarian Government 
without entering into formal discussion. Unwittingly, the lack of a written statement 
complicated the situation as the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stainov was able to tell the press 
that he had not received any formal British communication.50 In the meantime the Soviet 
Government practically accused the USA of violating the Moscow decision by encouraging 
the Bulgarian Opposition to resist it.51 In its turn, the Bulgarian Government was quick to 
declare that until the evident differences between the Allies were cleared, it could only 
follow Vyshinski’s authoritative interpretation of the Moscow agreement. All this finally 
pushed the FO to issue on 11 March 1946 an official communique that it agreed with the US 
interpretation of the Moscow decision.53 On 22 March 1946 a British note was presented to 
the Soviet Government. This contained detailed arguments against the actions of the 
Bulgarian Government and outlined disagreement with the Soviet interpretation of the 
Moscow decision.54
To some extent, the two notes represented a bolder British attitude towards events in 
Bulgaria. For this the FO had long been pressed by Houstoun-Boswall, himself influenced 
by Petkov’s requests that Britain take a firm stand against the Bulgarian Government. While
49 Ibid., p.75, Cohen to Bymes, 16.02.1946, p.78, Barbour - Stoychev conversation, 22.02.1946; 
F0371/58515, R3848, Washington to FO, 6.03.1946
50 F0371/58514, R3167, R3208, R3254, R3519, R3624, Sofia - FO, 26.02. -  7.03.1946
51 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.78, Novikov to Bymes, 7.03.1946; Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno... p.97-98
52 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.85, Bames to Bymes, 13.03.1946
53 F0371/58515, R4217, Sofia to FO, 16.03.1946
54 F0371/58514, R3733, FO to Gussev, 22.03.1946; F0371/58515, R4520, R4611, R4612, Houstoun- 
Boswall to FO, 12, 24.03.1946
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Houstoun-Boswall maintained that Britain’s manner should be as rigid as the USSR’s, he 
fully realised that there could be little concrete achievement in Sofia where British actions 
would mostly be of ‘nuisance value vis-a-vis the Russians’. He also saw the problem of 
reconstructing the Bulgarian Government in terms of ‘which side holds long enough in 
Bulgaria while the main issues are outlined elsewhere’.55
At this moment the British Government was closely involved in the first post-war Greek 
elections and would resent even remote Soviet interest which might be stimulated as a result 
of the diplomatic exchanges regarding Bulgaria. That is why the British Foreign Secretary 
ruled that the note to the Soviet Government regarding Bulgaria should be postponed for a 
week. He was particularly anxious that British actions should not be seen as provocative by 
the Soviet Government at such a sensitive moment for British policy in the Balkans. Bevin 
opposed any British accusation of Soviet breach of agreement.56 In these circumstances, FO 
officials were trying to devise a course of action which would enable them to overcome the 
stalemate in Bulgaria with as little loss of prestige as possible. They hoped for but a few 
concessions by the Bulgarian Government to the Opposition. Even these had to be extracted 
in a careful and timely manner which would not jeopardise positions elsewhere and above 
all the relations between the Great Powers. It was of utmost importance that the attempts to 
resolve the Bulgarian deadlock should not hinder the continuing preparation of the Peace 
Treaty with Bulgaria. Then, if the Bulgarian Government could be seen to be reformed, the 
British side could easily extend recognition.57 The latter consideration motivated British 
support for another round of negotiations between the Bulgarian Government and the 
Opposition.
55 F0371/58515, R4216, Sofia to FO, 14.03.1946
56 F0371/58515, R4611, Sofia - FO, 24 -  26.03.1946
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The Final Negotiations. In the time between the verbal communication and
the British notes the Bulgarian Prime Minister submitted his resignation and began
c o
negotiations for the formation of a new Government. The British political representative 
judged this to be the result of nervousness in the FF and popular discontent with the present 
political situation. Houstoun-Boswall believed that even the Communists respected the 
strong support the Opposition commanded throughout the country. He found confirmation 
of his opinion in the fact that Petkov had again been approached by the Communists to 
‘work out some modus vivendi\ In addition, a special Soviet emissary had urged Petkov to 
come to terms with the Fatherland Front ‘at almost any price except fresh elections’. For 
Houstoun-Boswall these were signs that a firm attitude impressed the USSR and made it 
anxious to find an internationally acceptable solution to the Bulgarian question.59
The recess of the Bulgarian Parliament which started on 28 March 1946 provided an 
appropriate moment for reconstruction of the Government. Prime Minister Georgiev was 
prepared to agree to Petkov becoming Deputy Prime Minister and to discuss the other 
demands of the Opposition. The latter had not changed since the negotiations in January 
1946: changes in the Government had to be accompanied by cessation of political 
persecution against Opposition leaders and supporters.60
The US and British representatives in Sofia were kept informed of the talks through contacts 
with the Opposition. While pleased with the veiy fact of the negotiations, Bames and 
Houstoun-Boswall estimated the possibility for a compromise differently. The US diplomat 
felt that the Opposition had held out for so long, that it should not stay out of the 
Government much longer or it would never get in. Oxley and Houstoun-Boswall advised 
Petkov not to abandon his erstwhile demands but to propose some compromise himself. For
58 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.87, Bames to Bymes, 25.03.1946; Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno... p.99
59 F0371/58515, R4575, Sofia to FO, 16.03.1946
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example, he could admit that the Opposition was not in the Assembly due to its own actions 
and to confirm its commitment to a Republic. Britain cautioned that the Opposition should 
exercise ‘the greatest possible moderation of speech and in the press, not to create the 
impression that they were only die-hards who were less able to compromise than the 
Fatherland Front’.61 Both the US and British representatives in Sofia were prepared to 
accept once more that Georgiev’s attempts to negotiate were genuine. That is why they 
pressed for a joint British-US message to facilitate further talks.
At that moment, unknown to the Western diplomats the Soviet Union had already begun a 
broad offensive against the reorganisation of the Bulgarian Government. Stalin personally 
criticised the Bulgarian Communists about their ‘modesty and lack of initiative’ to secure at 
least four or five essential ministerial portfolios. In mid-March 1946, in a letter to Dimitrov 
and Kostov, Stalin and Molotov rejected the legitimacy of the Opposition’s demands after 
the November 1945 election.63 Replying to Dimitrov who had appealed for support to 
Moscow, Stalin4 s new recommendations to the Bulgarian Communists stipulated:
First, the Opposition should be ignored in every way and no negotiations with them should be held. 
Second, a number of well-thought and cleverly organised measures should be undertaken to strangle 
[sic] the Opposition.64
All British observers in Bulgaria learnt was that the Soviet Ambassador had explained to 
Georgiev that the Opposition’s demands were unacceptable to the Soviet Government. As a 
result just when the State Department expressed satisfaction with the offers made to the
60 TsPA, f.147, op.2, a.e.56,1.48, Kolarov’s notebook, 28.03.1946
61 F0371/58515, R4794, Sofia to FO, 26.03.1946; FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.91, Bymes to Bames, 26.03.1946; 
Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno... p.99
62 F0371/58515, R4855, R4904, R4906, Washington - FO - Sofia, 27 -  28.03.1946
63 Issussov, M. Stalin... p.45
64 Ibid., p.45-46
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Bulgarian Opposition, Georgiev claimed that he had not made any such proposals.65 For the 
Western diplomats there was no doubt that Georgiev’s reversal was caused by the stiff and 
obstructive Soviet attitude.66
On 28 March the negotiations between the Bulgarian Government and the Opposition broke 
down. The Opposition had not even had a chance to reply to the Government proposals 
before these were withdrawn 67 A new Government took office on 31 March 1946. Far from 
making the executive more representative, the Communists actually obtained additional 
ministerial posts. Five Ministries, including that of Finance on which the Soviet 
Government had specifically insisted, were now in Communist hands. Of the two Deputy 
Prime Ministers who were added to the Cabinet, one was Communist. This happened at the 
expense of the other FF parties whose positions were weakened; the Social Democrats 
retained only two ministerial posts. The new Government issued a declaration that it would 
adhere to the policies of the previous one.68
These developments rendered the fulfilment of the Moscow agreement in Bulgaria very 
remote. Both the British and US Governments had to face their failure to bring about the 
inclusion of the Bulgarian Opposition in the Government. British and US policy makers 
were aware of their lack of adequate diplomatic and political means to outweigh Soviet 
influence on Bulgarian political life. The Foreign Office concluded that there was nothing it 
could do at the moment. It believed that the communications sent to the Bulgarian 
Government had elucidated the position of the British Government and should have
65 TsPA, f.147, op.2, a.e.56,1.46-47, Kolarov’s notebook, 29.03.1946; FRUS 1946, vol.VT, p.93, Bames to 
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deprived the FF of any illusion of British lack of interest.69 However, the hope that the 
Bulgarian rulers would appreciate British firm actions was increasingly overshadowed by 
the growing realisation that the Moscow communique had never really been appropriate for 
Bulgaria but Britain had been drawn into it by the United States. In April 1946, 
M.S.Williams at the Southern Department called the Moscow decision ‘a millstone around 
[Britain’s] neck’, especially since it could not be easily renounced.70 It would be impossible 
to nullify it in Bulgaria without impairing its credibility in Romania and therefore risking 
expulsion of the Romanian Opposition from the Government. Of even greater significance 
was the fact that British officials could propose no alternative to the Moscow agreement and 
therefore preferred to uphold it publicly since at least it committed the Soviet Union to the 
reorganisation of the Bulgarian Government.71
British behaviour was also dictated by an unwillingness to enter into an open confrontation 
with the Soviet Union regarding Bulgaria. Stalin had persistently refused to recognise the 
legitimacy of British and US views, and had even begun accusing his former Allies of 
deliberately breaking the Moscow agreement. Soviet military presence in Bulgaria was 
coupled with unrestrained meddling of Soviet officers and political representatives in all 
aspects of Bulgarian politics and economy. This was facilitated by the close political links 
between the BCP and Moscow. British observers admitted that attempts to check the pace of 
Communisation could have no more than nuisance value and would be perceived by the 
Soviet Union as illegitimate interference in its sphere of influence.
Towards Recognition of the Communist Regime in Bulgaria. The failure of
the Moscow agreement on Bulgaria took place against the background of general worsening 
of inter-Allied relations. The end of the war exposed the lack of long-term cohesion between
69 F0371/58516, R4992, Williams, 1.04.1946
70 F0371/58516, R4952, Sofia to FO, 29.03.1946
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the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and Britain and the United States, on the other. 
Increasingly, disagreements which signalled different strategic aims were coming to the fore 
in international politics. In a pre-election speech of 9 February 1946, Stalin prophesied 
that the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the West would inevitably lead to future 
wars. As he underlined the incompatibility of Communism and Capitalism, he was judged 
by contemporary analysts in London and Washington to be announcing the beginning of a 
new militancy in Soviet foreign policy.72 Stalin’s pronouncement provided the occasion 
for George Kennan’s famous Long Telegram of 22 February 1946 which explained 
Soviet aspirations to dominate territories beyond the Soviet borders in the context of both 
centuries-long Russian policy and Communist ideology. Kennan’s analysis confirmed the 
US policy makers’ worst fears that the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe 
was going to become the basis for a more aggressive attitude towards the former Allies. 
As this was generally seen to call for a correspondingly tougher policy, it was welcomed 
by diplomats stationed in Eastern Europe, where the ones in Bulgaria were among the
• 71most vocal and active.
British policy makers drew similar conclusions from the recent Soviet acts. In concurrence 
with reports of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, most British 
diplomatic experts had little doubt that the USSR aimed at the consolidation of a belt of 
Communist satellite states around its borders. The Charge in Moscow Frank Roberts fully 
agreed with Kennan’s assessment as to the motives and aims of Soviet foreign policy.74 His 
views influenced thinking in the FO where Under-Secretary Christopher Warner suggested
71 F 0371/58516, R5250, Sofia to FO, 2.04.1946, Warner, 6.04.1946
72 Dallin, Al. 'Stalin and the Prospects o f Post-war Europe. ’ Gori. Fr. and Silvio Pons (eds.V The Soviet 
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• • 75firmer British measures to attack and expose Communism wherever it demonstrated itself. 
An initial step in this direction was Churchill’s Fulton speech of March 1946. This was 
not an authorised British statement but neither did the British Government dissociate from 
it officially. Contemporary FO documentation shows that views voiced in the speech 
truthfully represented the swing of opinion taking place among senior civil servants.76
The Familiar Difficulty o f Policy Formulation. The noticeably firmer British
stand towards the Soviet Union derived from developments in Iran and Turkey where
77
Soviet pressure threatened the security of the British Empire. As far as Bulgaria was 
concerned, this hardening attitude was not reflected immediately in dealings with the Soviet 
Union. The first months of 1946 were devoted to relatively quiet observation of the 
consecutive failures of the political forces in Bulgaria to reach any agreement, mainly as a 
result of Soviet support for the radicalism of the Bulgarian Communists. The final 
breakdown of the Moscow decision was followed by a period of bewilderment as to what to 
replace it with and how to overcome the ensuing deadlock.
While not an original cause for the conflict with the Soviet Union, Bulgarian politics added 
to Soviet-British tension. In April 1946, the FO once again grappled with the question of 
granting recognition to the Bulgarian Government. The issue was brought up in relation to 
the forthcoming Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers, where peace treaties with the ex­
satellites were on the agenda. The problem of the non-fulfilment of the Moscow decision 
reappeared as the British Government had made it clear that it would sign no Peace Treaty 
with a Government, which did not match its criteria for being representative and democratic. 
At the same time, Houstoun-Boswall, who was aware of the FO’s prejudice against new
75 Warner, G. 'From "Ally” to Enemy: Britain’s Relations with the Soviet Union, 1941 -  1948. ' Gori. Fr. 
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initiatives in Bulgaria, strove to precipitate the reactions of his superiors. His 
communications challenged the indecisiveness of the Southern Department by insisting that 
‘by studiously avoiding any action which Russia might think provocative and aggressive as 
she jolly well pleases’, the British Government was bound to repeat its ‘great pre-war
78mistake with Germany’. Passionately, he declaimed:
It is surely better to think and do something consistently and then be slightly wrong, than to wobble 
and reflect and inevitably to be wrong and then to have to catch up lost ground... The time has come to 
commit our friends, to fortify them and to bind them clearly on our side - otherwise they will fall 
helter-skelter into the other camp making friends with the Power of Evil because there seems to be no 
Power of Good. And we are capable of being a Power of Good if only we will play our part and show 
some guts.79
In a sobering reply he was warned that even though the FO understood how demanding and 
exasperating conditions in Sofia were, the strength of expression in some of his recent 
telegrams had ‘prejudiced important officials against, rather than in favour of his
QA # # t
recommendations’. Indeed, FO officials were long past the stage of avoidmg action so as
not to stir Soviet sensitivities. By their own admission, more than ever they faced the
difficulty of devising actions, which would have a real effect. That is why without
entertaining hopes for implementing the Moscow decision, the FO clung to its phraseology.
81Unable to find a substitute for the Moscow agreement, the FO was loath to admit failure.
Despite his frequent reminders that the first element of success in Bulgaria was to have a 
foreign policy and stick to it’, Houstoun-Boswall himself found it difficult to recommend a
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definite course of action in the spring of 1946. He agreed with the Southern Department 
that the general aim of British policy in the Balkan satellites should be ‘to strengthen and
O'!
encourage the anti-Communist elements’. And yet, he comprehended the Southern 
Department’s serious difficulty at this moment ‘to think of any action to be really effective 
in checking the spread of Communism and Totalitarianism’.84 The only possibility 
appearing remotely plausible at the moment was the re-launching of negotiations between
Of
the Bulgarian Prime Minister Georgiev and the Opposition.
The earliest opportunity for advance in this direction presented itself at the end of June 1946 
when in Paris Molotov agreed that Soviet troops were going to withdraw from Bulgaria
Of
within ninety days after the signature of the Peace Treaty. For Great Britain there was the 
distinct danger of finding itself in a situation in which to get rid of the Soviet army, it might 
be forced to recognise the Bulgarian Government without approving of it. Thus, even a 
partial success towards the implementation of the Moscow communique might render the 
approaching recognition of the Bulgarian Government more palatable. This was endorsed by 
the readiness of the Bulgarian Opposition to moderate its demands for participation in the 
Government. The British representatives in Sofia began thinking that the mere presence of 
the Opposition in the Government would be psychologically and politically valuable for it.87
The FO was eager to exert direct pressure on the Bulgarian Communists through Vassil 
Kolarov who headed the Bulgarian Peace Delegation in Paris. The British Foreign Secretary 
had been advised by senior civil servants to show a very stiff attitude, not only criticising 
internal conditions in Bulgaria but above all repudiating the ‘monstrously impudent’
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Q O
Bulgarian territorial and financial claims against Greece. However, when Bevm received 
Kolarov on 29 June 1946, Greek issues were hardly raised. As soon as Kolarov had 
mentioned Bulgarian disappointment at not being recognised, he was told that the British 
Government would not even discuss recognition until negotiations with the Opposition were 
resumed. Bevin said that the Opposition had been given onerous terms which had 
precipitated the breakdown of the Moscow decision. He also pointed out that the persecution 
of the Opposition press and the behaviour of the militia had caused him anxiety because it 
showed that there was no political freedom in Bulgaria. Kolarov helplessly repeated the 
official Bulgarian line that the Opposition was to blame for the breakdown of the talks as it 
had imposed the impossible demand of dissolving the Assembly. He stated that there would 
be fresh elections in September and promised that if the Opposition co-operated the 
Government would also seek accommodation with it.89
British diplomats and civil servants considered that the deliberately cold attitude and plain 
speaking of the Foreign Secretary had impressed the Bulgarian delegation and shocked the 
Bulgarian Government. This was seen as a stimulus for the Bulgarian Government to initiate 
a settlement with the Opposition to which end Britain’s main task would be to remain 
equally steadfast until a genuine reconstruction of the Government.90 Britain even became 
uncharacteristically eager to encourage similar US firmness. Bevin wrote to Byrnes to 
inform him about the talk with Kolarov and suggest a new attempt to implement the 
Moscow decision. In his subsequent conversation with Kolarov, the US Secretary of State 
essentially confirmed the British views.91
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Not for the first time did similar analysis of the circumstances lead US and British policy 
makers to different conclusions. The US State Department surmised that the Bulgarian side 
would be so eager for an immediate conclusion of the Peace Treaty that it would willingly 
make reasonable offers to the Opposition. Until then the United States should refuse to 
recognise the Bulgarian Government or to sign the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria. Following 
this logic, the State Department issued a declaration on the Byrnes - Kolarov talks repeating
09that the USA could not have normal relations with the current Bulgarian Government.
While the US strategy was to wave the prospect of non-recognition so as to drive the 
Bulgarian Communists towards acceptance of Opposition members in the Government, 
Britain’s aim was almost the opposite. For the FO resumption of negotiations could bring at 
least limited participation of the Opposition in the executive which could then be taken as a 
sufficient basis for the recognition of the Bulgarian Government. Recognition would make 
the signature of the Peace Treaty possible and three months later all Soviet troops could be 
out of Bulgaria, thus relieving the pressure on the Eastern Mediterranean. This prospect was 
so appealing to the British Government that Bevin had suggested to Kolarov that the British 
representative in Sofia should mediate between the Government and the Opposition. In 
addition, the Foreign Secretaiy hinted that in view of the new elections, Britain would advise 
the Opposition to withdraw some of its demands. This constituted the first official admission 
that Britain carried some influence with the Opposition and was willing to use it. Houstoun- 
Boswall had already ascertained that the Opposition was ready to modify its conditions for 
taking up office. It had dropped its requirements for the dissolution of the National 
Assembly and for obtaining the Ministry of Justice. It still insisted on two Opposition 
Deputy Ministers for the Ministry of the Interior, equal participation of supporters of all 
parties in the militia as well as general political amnesty for offences committed after
92 F0371/58521, R10784, Washington to FO, 20.07.1946
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September 1944. Communicating with Opposition leaders, British observers concluded that 
the non-Fatherland Front parties realised that they faced one of their last chances to enter the 
executive before the new elections in the autumn. On their part, British experts felt they 
should not press the Opposition too much lest the latter came to think it was being urged to 
accept too little and backed out.93
Simultaneously, the FO found it necessary to bring the Bulgarian question to the attention of 
the Soviet Government. The Foreign Secretary chose to approach Moscow alone, without 
asking for a supportive US move.94 On 12 July 1946, Bevin brought up the subject of 
Bulgarian recognition in a conversation with Molotov and Vyshinski and suggested that both 
sides use their influence with the Government and Opposition respectively. Bevin informed 
Molotov that the Bulgarian Opposition was ready to drop the demand for the dissolution of 
the Assembly but in exchange its remaining demands had to be met by the Government. 
Without acknowledging the right of the Opposition to put forward any claims at all, Molotov 
agreed that the recognition of Bulgaria was an outstanding question which should be 
resolved before the signature of the Peace Treaty. His words left little doubt in the British 
delegation that the Soviet Union was well aware of the link between recognition and the 
Peace Treaty and was anxious to improve the international status of Bulgaria.95
In the summer of 1946, British senior officials showed unprecedented willingness to deal 
with the Bulgarian question quickly and efficiently. For the first time they were prepared to 
accept openly the role of mediators in Bulgarian internal affairs so as to facilitate the 
compromise between Government and Opposition. Most uncharacteristically, Britain even
93 F0371/58521, R9677, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 29.06.1946
94 F0371/58521, R10186, Majoribanks to Hayter, 8.07.1946; FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.110, Bevin to Byrnes,
1.07.1946
95 F0371/58521, R10430, FO to Sofia, 18.07.1946; F0371/58522, R11273, Maijoribanks, 15.07.1946
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approached the Soviet Union to speed up some form of implementation of the Moscow 
agreement, which the FO had long held to be unrealistic.
This practical British involvement in Bulgaria occurred at a moment when it seemed that 
Britain could draw substantial strategic benefits in the form of complete Soviet evacuation 
from the country. British strategists considered that an agreement on Soviet withdrawal from 
Bulgaria would alleviate pressure on the Eastern Mediterranean and especially Turkey, 
which had been directly threatened by the Soviet Union earlier in 1946. It also meant that the 
Soviet Union would commit itself not to continue its actions in Iran from where it was 
refusing to withdraw causing a major international dispute.96
All this was estimated to signify a real concession on the part of the Soviet Union at a time 
when its actions in the Middle East and Eastern Europe had helped to magnify its 
expansionist image. Even though it was becoming rapidly obvious that a more resolute 
British foreign policy to check unilateral Soviet actions was required, the British 
Government was unwilling to forego any possibility of collaborating with Soviet Russia 
on international decisions. In this sense, Bulgaria was an opportune case: British interest 
in it was not sufficient to justify an Anglo-Soviet clash. Once again it provided a testing 
ground for minor compromises on both sides.
Recognition without Conditions. In mid-July 1946, Houstoun-Boswall reported
a most urgent appeal from the Opposition to Britain and the USA for assistance to put an end 
to the reign of Communist terror in Bulgaria. To the British representative it seemed that 
while agreeing to seek a compromise in Bulgaria, Molotov had privately given Kolarov full
Q7Soviet backing for the elimination of the Opposition from Bulgarian political life.
96 De Santis, The Diplomacy... p. 170-172
97 F0371/58521, R10430, Houston-Boswall to FO, 12.07.1946
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Given that British representatives in Bulgaria could move outside the capital only with 
difficulty, they were able to send to London a surprisingly accurate picture of the state of 
Bulgarian politics. As official encounters were rarely enlightening, the British Mission relied 
for detailed information on overt or covert adversaries of the regime. Throughout the latter 
half of 1945 and the beginning of 1946, the FO had to consider its attitudes to the problem of 
Bulgarian recognition on the background of accumulating news of Communist-backed 
arrogance and violence towards opponents of Communist rule across the country. Despite 
plans for the resumption of talks between the Bulgarian Government and the Opposition, 
British experts could not overlook the constantly increasing lawless behaviour of the 
Bulgarian authorities.
The renewed offensive against the Opposition in Bulgaria had begun just after the 
November 1945 elections and was stepped up after the January 1946 failure of talks based 
on the Moscow agreement. Verbal and physical assaults on the Opposition had not even 
stopped during the short-lived Government attempts for dialogue with it. The accelerated 
clamp down on the Opposition was initiated by the Communist Politburo which in early 
1946 postulated that no actions against the interests of the Communist Party were to be 
tolerated. This led to the legislative adoption of repressive laws* which could be used by 
the Communist Party-controlled militia and courts of justice to maltreat, imprison and 
intern any real or imagined opponents of the regime.98
Accordingly, a succession of political trials was staged in the second half of 1946, 
beginning with the sentencing to death in absentia of the exiled G.M. for treason. In this 
and subsequent trials there were abundant attacks against Petkov but as yet he was not 
brought to the dock. Social Democrat leaders like Pastuhov and Lulchev, Agrarians like
* Law for Defence o f the People’s Power (April 1946), Law for Control o f  the Army (July 1946) and Law 
for Mobilisation o f Idlers and Loafers (August 1946)
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Assen Stamboliiski experienced the violence of the authorities. The well-known 
journalists Tsveti Ivanov and Trifon Kunev, who criticised the regime in the Social 
Democrat paper Svoboden Narod, were also convicted. Simultaneously, the Interior 
Minister imposed arbitrary bans on Opposition newspapers for publishing allegedly anti- 
Soviet and anti-Yugoslav articles. All this created an ominous atmosphere in which the 
authorities could accuse and sentence members of different organisations. This happened 
to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation led by Ivan Mihailov and the Tsar 
Krum Secret Military Organisation -  whose existence is questionable - for a range of 
‘terrorist activities’ and ‘anti-Govemment conspiracies’."
That the aim of the Communist Party was to eliminate the Opposition was demonstrated 
by the fact that the CC ordered Interior Minister Yugov ‘to prepare a report ... which 
should give details of the concrete facts revealing the existence of an Opposition centre 
which leads planned [anti-Govemment] actions, and ...state that it is necessary to take the 
most severe political, administrative and legal measures to stop these actions which harm 
the national interests of Bulgaria’.100 This was an example of the methods the 
Communists employed to use their positions in the Government against their political 
opponents.
Despite the lack of firm evidence, there can be little doubt that the actions of the 
Bulgarian Communists were known and approved by the Soviet Government. The 
January 1946 onslaught on the Opposition was triggered by the Communist Politburo 
immediately after Vyshinski had proclaimed that it was futile to negotiate with the non- 
FF parties. On 29 June 1946, the day Kolarov met Bevin in Paris, the Politburo gathered in 
the presence of Marshal Tolbukhin, the Head of the Allied Control Commission and
98 Tsvetkov, Zh. Sudut nad opozitsionnite lideri. Sofia: Kupessa, 1991. p. 10-11
99 Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno... p. 102-112
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Commander in Chief of the Third Ukrainian Front, to deliberate on the need to ‘cleanse’ 
the army and remove from Government the Zveno leader War Minister Velchev.101 In the 
summer of 1946, several delegations of high-ranking Bulgarian Communists consulted 
with Stalin about the Bulgarian political situation. The Soviet leader was especially 
interested in the army and militia, probably wanting to know whether they would be a 
reliable support for the Bulgarian regime after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. Stalin 
personally oversaw the changes in the Bulgarian Cabinet. On 2 September 1946, he 
explained to Dimitrov that in view of the worsening international status of Bulgaria 
Georgiev should by all means be retained as Prime Minister. The Communists should
109influence him to distance himself from the nght wing of his own party, Zveno. These 
examples suggest that the accelerated persecution of non-Communists was directed from 
the Kremlin. Only in the case of Pastuhov’s arrest was Soviet displeasure recorded. This 
was on tactical grounds: instead of helping make a martyr of the old and feeble Pastuhov, 
the Bulgarian Communists were told to target Petkov.103
Of the numerous violent incidents reported by the British Mission in Sofia, Pastuhov’s 
imprisonment stirred the Foreign Office the most and provoked the handing of a rare note 
verbale to the Bulgarian Government. In it the British Government not only stated its 
disapproval of the particular case but also protested against the lack of civil liberties and 
especially of freedom of the press in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian reply stuck to mere diplomatic 
formalities.104 This increased British hesitancy as to possible further moves regarding 
Bulgaria. No official British reaction was registered in cases similar to Pastuhov’s.
100 Ibid. p. 102
101 Issussov, M. Stalin... p.47
102 Dimitrov, G. Dnevnik... p.533; Dimitrov, V. ‘The Failure...’ p.358-360, 373-376
103 RTsHDDNI, f.17, op.128, a.e.887,1.20, Konstantinov note, 9.03.1946; Issussov, M. Stalin... p.43
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Witnessing the steady Communist advance, Foreign Office observers were daily convinced 
that in Bulgaria the only change after the Moscow decision was for worse. They entertained 
no illusion that British interference could bring but the slightest and temporary political 
improvement. Already in June 1946, Geoffrey Warner of the Southern Department admitted 
that he saw no way to help the Opposition and therefore had no hope that it would 
succeed.105
The FO considered that the position of the British Government regarding Bulgaria had been 
expressed unequivocally on a number of occasions and was therefore well known to 
Bulgaria’s rulers. The Bulgarian Government had had sufficient time and opportunity for 
compromise and since it had not offered any, no further British action was expedient. The 
FO stood by this view even when in May 1946 the Bulgarian Opposition sent an appeal to 
Britain and the USA drawing attention to the aggravated political situation. After a similar 
letter from the Romanian Opposition, the British Government had raised the issue with the 
Soviet Government. Its lack of success had led it to conclude that protests in the Bulgarian 
case would hardly make any headway.106 British observers recognised the difficult task of 
the Bulgarian Opposition, and doubted that any direct British encouragement would be 
justified. The FO advised Bevin not to send Petkov a message of encouragement despite 
Houstoun-Boswall’s request. The political representative was instructed simply to convey 
the ‘general agreement of HMG with the Opposition’s views’ and explain that for precisely 
this reason the Bulgarian Government had not been recognised.107 So stark did the situation 
in Bulgaria look to British experts that even Houstoun-Boswall, still convinced of the daily
105 F0371/58519, R8277, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 1.06.1946, Warner, 5.06.1946
106 F0371/58518, R7331, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 9.05.1946, FO to Sofia, 28.05.1946, Warner, 
23.05.1946; FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.101, Barnes to Byrnes, 8.05.1946
107 F0371/58517, R6066, FO brief, 1.04.1946
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strengthening position of the Opposition, at this moment appreciated the need to await
108developments quietly rather than to undertake doomed haphazard actions.
As the FO perceived the situation in Bulgaria to be rapidly deteriorating, it recognised the 
necessity to formulate a clear course of action and implement it steadily. By the end of July 
1946, the predominant opinion of FO officials was that from the British perspective it was 
best to grant recognition to the Bulgarian Government at the first suitable opportunity. The 
immediate reason underlying this view was that it had become useless to tie their hands by 
publicly adhering to the Moscow decision which they knew was no longer relevant. Since 
they had accepted that they had no chances to induce the entry of the Bulgarian Opposition 
into the Government, it was logical to pay less attention to Bulgarian internal affairs.109
In the internal Southern Department discussion on Bulgarian recognition in August 1946, 
there were only a few dissenting voices like that of the newcomer to the FO Bulgarian desk 
R.P.Pinsent. He argued that even with the Red Army out of Bulgaria, the chances that the 
next elections would be free were distinctly remote. Already the Communist hold over the 
country was judged to be so complete that it would not make much difference whether 
Soviet troops were physically present. For the proponents of this line the question was, ‘is it 
worth making an evident climb-down involving a severe loss of prestige in order to gain an 
illusory advantage’? Even Pinsent conceded that refusal of recognition, apart from its 
distinct moral satisfaction, would yield few practical advantages.110 Houstoun-Boswall 
reached the peak of frustration when he claimed that ‘HMG... have decided to swallow the 
rape of Bulgaria by the Communists’ and challenged the FO at least to display ‘guts and 
honesty to tell the world beforehand just what we are doing’.111 Putting aside violent
108 F0371/58515, R6456, Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 16.04.1946
109 F0371/58524, R12682, FO draft to Byrnes, 28.08.1946
110 F0371/58523, R11992, FO minutes, 13 -  31.08.1946
111 Ibid., Houston-Boswall to Hayter, 5.08.1946
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emotions brought by the horrible position of having ‘to stand by impotently and watch 
events’, he made an attempt at arguing with the sober FO decision with equally rational 
calculations. He tried to prove that even according to the most optimistic estimate, 
ratification was logistically unlikely before December 1946, which then pushed the 
departure of Soviet troops to the end of March 1947. Therefore he pleaded that Britain’s
1 p
decision to recognise Bulgaria should not be announced so far in advance.
In Soviet military withdrawal from Bulgaria the FO saw the only noticeable benefit for 
Britain in the extremely unsatisfactory situation. It was estimated that as the withdrawal was 
not in the strict Soviet interest, Britain should secure it while the USSR was still willing to 
make the compromise. In the late summer of 1946, the Southern Department worried about 
whether it had double-guessed Soviet calculations correctly. After all, Stalin might have 
committed himself to withdrawal in the knowledge that the West would not recognise the 
Bulgarian Government soon. The British Military Mission in Bulgaria reported a strong 
Soviet military presence on the Turkish border and fortification of the Bulgarian-Greek 
border. As always, this added to British fears of an invasion of Greece and once again 
pointed to the need to speed up the removal of the Red Army from the southern Balkans.113
This indeed was the most pressing argument for diplomatic recognition of the Bulgarian 
Government. For Britain, Soviet withdrawal was judged to be the only positive development 
in the Balkans outside Greece. If recognition of the Bulgarian regime was the price, it should 
be paid without imposing any further conditions. The adoption of this logic by the FO 
signified the final point of an important reversal of priorities in British policy towards 
Bulgaria. This had begun with the realisation that recognition could actually bring the 
initially unforeseen advantage of Soviet military withdrawal from bases threatening the
1.2 Ibid.
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Eastern Mediterranean. Not long after Molotov had mentioned Soviet readiness for 
withdrawal from Bulgaria, this became an object of primary significance for British policy in 
the region. Once again, the general strategic disposition of forces in the Balkans 
overshadowed any earlier British attempts to influence domestic processes in Bulgaria.
The one hindrance to the fulfilment of Britain’s resolution to grant recognition to the 
Bulgarian Government came from the United States. At the beginning of August 1946 the 
State Department was considering a new representation to Moscow. It would again urge the 
Soviet Government to persuade the Bulgarian Communists to include the Opposition in 
office.114 In addition, on 28 August 1946 the Secretary of State received the Bulgarian Prime 
Minister Georgiev in Paris and warned him that unless the situation was remedied there 
would be no Peace Treaty with Bulgaria as the US Senate would refuse to ratify it. 
Georgiev retorted that in the circumstances of exclusive Soviet influence his Government 
was the best there could be in Bulgaria. He made it clear that the only way the Bulgarian 
Government could comply with the US demands was with Soviet agreement, so the US 
efforts should be directed to Moscow. The US officials, including Barnes, urged Georgiev 
to start acting on the US proposal immediately and to summon the Opposition to Paris to 
begin negotiations. For a moment it looked as if this was going to happen as on 31 August 
the Bulgarian delegation in Paris handed Barnes a memorandum stating its readiness to 
start negotiations with the Opposition and accepting the mediation of US representatives. 
Three days later Georgiev shifted his ground completely, telling the US delegation he 
‘could not do what was politically impossible’.115
114 F0371/58522, R11299, FO minutes, July 1946; F0371/58523, R11992, FO minutes, August 1946
115 F0371/58583, R12904, R12993, R13031, R113283, Paris -  FO - Sofia, 1 - 5.09.1946
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The FO judged State Department officials to be ‘subdued and chastened’ by their 
experience in Paris.116 Moreover, it was satisfied that it had rightly declined to support any 
US demarche in Moscow of which nothing positive had come. FO officials were also 
horrified that their US counterparts had nearly succeeded in putting them precisely in the 
position they wished to avoid. Their attitude to the latest US move was mixed. Some civil 
servants hoped that the US representation would have some slight effect which would
117provide an opportunity to grant recognition to the Bulgarian Government. When on 30 
August 1946, Byrnes approved recognition in principle, the FO breathed with relief that 
eventually the USA was coming round to the British point of view. Another, more cynical 
thought began creeping into British reasoning: since Bulgarian behaviour was so deplorable,
1 I Q
it seemed expedient to recognise the Government before it committed yet another offence.
Looking for Opportunities to Grant Recognition. The longer British officials
looked at Bulgaria, the firmer became their belief that they should grant it recognition if not 
before, then at the time of the signing of the Peace Treaty. Towards the middle of August 
1946, the FO began scrutinising events in Bulgaria with the view to finding at least some 
positive developments which could justify the extension of diplomatic relations. Its hopes 
were pinned on the forthcoming elections to the Grand National Assembly for which the 
referendum for a Republic was going to be a dress rehearsal.
The issue of the abolition of the Bulgarian Monarchy was a matter of indifference to the 
British Government. Wartime plans had dismissed it as more or less irrelevant. The 
Bulgarian ruling dynasty had earned little sympathy from the British Government. The 
FO was convinced of the widespread republicanism of the Bulgarian people. British 
experts had no illusions that a Republic would bring Bulgaria closer to the Soviet model
116 F0371/58583, R13283, Paris to Sofia, 5.09.1946
1,7 F0371/58524, R12682, Warner, Dixon, 29 - 30.08.1946
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and facilitate the creation of a Federation with Yugoslavia. Indeed, as a result of the 
political violence following the coup of 9 September 1944, there remained no groups or 
individuals in Bulgaria prepared to declare pro-monarchist feelings and thus openly 
challenge the Government’s determination to abolish the Monarchy. Even the Opposition 
was well known for its republican convictions and had difficulty in distinguishing itself 
from the FF on the question of the form of the state. While urging a pro-republican vote, 
the Opposition objected to the referendum in principle as such a method was not provided 
for by the existing Constitution.*119
The referendum took place on 8 September 1946 with a turn out of over ninety-one 
percent. Almost ninety-six percent of the votes were in favour of a Republic. On 15 
September 1946 the National Assembly proclaimed Bulgaria to be a People’s Republic.120 
As this had been expected, it provoked little official reaction from London and 
Washington. The matter on which they concentrated was that of the recognition of the 
Bulgarian Government. Exclusive attention was directed towards the elections for a 
Grand National Assembly which were scheduled for 28 October 1946.
Although British observers could not realistically expect the Grand National Assembly to 
influence radically political developments in Bulgaria, they followed closely the electoral 
campaign. The Opposition parties became allied in the Federation of Urban and Rural 
Labour. This launched a strong electoral campaign engaging in intense political disputes 
with the Communists and reporting in its newspapers the full extent of the terror 
campaign pursued by the authorities. The FO focused on the fact that the new Grand
118 Ibid., Warner, 17.08.1946
* The Tumovo Constitution stipulated that the form of the state could only be altered by a Grand National 
Assembly. This could only be summoned by the Monarch and in the present instance nine years had to pass 
before the King would come of age.
119 Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno... p. 120-121
120 Ibid., p. 122; for details on the referendum see Kostadinova, T. Bulgaria 1879-1946... p.90-92
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National Assembly could provide the desired opportunity for recognition and did not
preoccupy itself with details of the pre-electoral campaign in Bulgaria. The main British
concern was that some inopportune US action would delay the signature of the Peace
Treaty. The State Department was contemplating withdrawal of the US Military Mission
from Bulgaria as a sign of utmost displeasure with political developments. British
officials in London were strongly opposed to the idea mainly because they were
convinced it would have no effect on the Bulgarian Government while at the same time
121denying the West an important source of information and intelligence.
The greater British anxiety was that Secretary Byrnes saw no reason why the Treaty with 
Bulgaria had to be signed as soon as it was ready. To British civil servants he did not
1 99seem to be convinced of the importance of getting the Soviet troops out of the country. 
On the whole, US specialists analysed the Bulgarian situation from the perspective of 
democratic principles, pointing to the non-implementation of either the Yalta Declaration 
or the Moscow decision. That is why they still hoped that as a result of Byrnes’ 
conversation with Georgiev, the Bulgarian elections were not going to be ‘too unjust’.123 
Moreover, in the light of the violent election campaign, the US Government was 
extremely reluctant to extend recognition to the Bulgarian Government.124
Senior Foreign Office civil servants like Sargent had been pressing for discussion and co­
ordination of the whole policy towards the satellite countries with their US colleagues. 
They were worried that the US Government might go in the opposite direction from the 
British and become so committed to a policy of non-recognition as not to be able to sign
121 F0371/58525, R14052, US Embassy London to FO, 16.09.1946, R14543, Houstoun-Boswall to FO,
1.10.1946, R14715, Paris to Sofia, 4.10.1946; F0371/58585, R14912, FO to Washington, 7.10.1946, 
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the Peace Treaty at all.125 While these matters were briefly touched upon at a meeting 
between Bevin and Byrnes in Paris on 4 October 1946, their resolution was left to the 
normal diplomatic channels.
Britain’s views were most extensively outlined in a letter from Bevin to Byrnes of 7 
October 1946. For the FO the latest talks with Georgiev in Paris showed that serious 
modification of the present Bulgarian policy could not be expected. Using terror and 
unfair elections, the Bulgarian Communists were well on the way to establishing a solid 
Communist regime. For Britain there seemed no alternative but to resign itself to 
‘recognising the present Government or one similarly controlled by Communists’. This 
course was not seen as satisfactory but at least it would hasten the signature of the Peace 
Treaty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Bulgaria. Even though for the British 
Government it was technically possible to sign a peace treaty with an unrecognised 
Government, its inclination was to simplify things by granting the Bulgarian Government 
recognition at the time of signature.127
The State Department appreciated British moderation and agreed not to withdraw the US 
Mission from Bulgaria. It began to consider the possibility of signing the Peace Treaty 
with Bulgaria even though it was still firmly opposed to granting the Bulgarian regime 
formal recognition. In a last attempt to influence the Bulgarian Government, on 24 
October 1946 Byrnes sent a letter to Georgiev reminding him that the future international 
status of Bulgaria depended on the conduct of the elections. Simultaneously, in order to 
demonstrate US interest, Barnes and the new Head of the US Military Mission General 
Robertson were authorised to propose a full ACC meeting in relation to the forthcoming 
elections. Wishing to refute any impression that it was condoning the terror perpetrated
125 F0371/58585, R14912, Sargent to Bevin, 1.10.1946
126 F0371/58525, R14932, Paris to Sofia,4.10.1946
241
by the authorities, the US Mission requested from the Bulgarian Government a full report 
on recent events and insisted on visiting concentration camps and prisons, including a
190
visit to the arrested former War Minister Velchev.
The FO instructed the British representative in Sofia to support the US move. 
Nevertheless, British officials deplored the wide range of US demands and strove to limit 
them. The requirement for prison inspection was judged to be especially unfortunate as it 
might turn into a precedent for reciprocal Soviet demands in Greece which would be 
unpalatable to Britain. It seemed difficult to alter the active US approach but the FO 
hoped that by going along with it, it would be in a better position to prevent more serious 
steps.
On 23 October 1946 at a meeting of the ACC, the US representatives put forward 
comprehensive measures to ensure freedom and fairness of elections. The most important 
proposal was for Opposition controllers at each polling booth. Ostensibly, the 
circumstances resembled those of August 1945 when elections were postponed upon joint 
US and British insistence. In this instance, however, Biryuzov refused to consider what he
1 OQtermed ‘interference in Bulgaria’s internal affairs’. His words echoed those of 
Vyshinski who days earlier had mentioned in a speech in Paris that no interference would 
be allowed in Bulgaria where there was ‘no place for Petkov or Lulchev’.130 US foreign 
policy officials retreated but continued to look for ways to improve the situation in 
Bulgaria. Byrnes contemplated the idea of discussing the country directly with Molotov 
and Vyshinski at the forthcoming Council of Foreign Ministers in New York. He believed
127 FRUS 1946, vol.VI, p.152, Acheson to US delegation Paris, 9.10.1946
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he could get the Soviet Union ‘to order the Bulgarian Communists to show some degree 
of co-operation with the Opposition’. Alternatively, he suggested placing the matter of 
Bulgarian elections on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations.131
Apart from thinking that the proposed moves would be ‘utterly useless’, most FQ officials 
discerned a hardening of the United States approach. Even more worrying was the fact 
that Biryuzov’s behaviour in Bulgaria and Vyshinski’s declarations in Paris indicated that 
the Soviet Union too was embracing a hard-line attitude. The FO could accept that the 
time for identical British and US actions and strictly co-ordinated initiatives in Bulgaria 
had passed. Simultaneously, it worried that the moderate British approach was being 
sidelined.132
The only reason attention continued to be paid to the elections was because they would 
demonstrate the strength of the Opposition and give final indications as to whether the ruling 
Communists would make a compromise.133 Without British knowledge, in June 1946 Stalin 
gave instructions about the electoral tactics of the Bulgarian Communists. He approved 
the preservation of the Fatherland Front in which, however, the Communists ‘should do 
everything possible to be the first party’. If the Communists could not secure at least forty 
percent on the common electoral lists they should participate in the elections on their 
own. This was repeated in a warning by Dimitrov to the other FF parties.134 In addition, 
Stalin made it clear that it was important that the Bulgarian Opposition should not boycott 
the ballot again. He saw it as natural that the Government to be formed after the elections 
would not include the Opposition. But, it was crucial for the Fatherland Front’s image not
131 F0371/58527, R16212, Tollintonto FO, 7.11.1946
132 Ibid., FO to Washington, 14.11.1946, Colville, 11.11.1946
133 F0371/58519, R8277, FO minutes, 5 -  11.06.1946
134 Dimitrov, G. Dnevnik... p.528; Issussov, M. Stalin... p.46
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to be seen as dismissing the possibility of negotiations for a coalition Government too 
hastily.135
In public, Communist leaders stood for calm and orderly elections, but their 
pronouncements revealed that they were planning severe measures against the 
Opposition. Dimitrov stated that ‘until the elections for the Grand National Assembly the 
national militia and the [state] administration should be restrained’. But he also claimed 
that the Opposition was preparing evil acts of provocation which were going to be
1 -liT
prevented by the militia.
On the eve of the elections, the United Opposition asked Great Britain and the USA to 
intervene again in favour of postponing the elections. This action had little but 
propaganda value. The British and US Governments had no means of influencing the 
behaviour of either the Bulgarian Communists or the Soviet political and military 
representatives in Bulgaria. All they could do, was to protest to the Bulgarian and Soviet 
Governments about the improper conduct of the electoral campaign. Indeed, they had 
already done so without any obvious effect. From Britain’s perspective, what remained 
was to watch the Bulgarian situation carefully and find a suitable moment to discard 
responsibility for it by granting recognition to the Bulgarian Government.
Despite its unfavourable position, the United Bulgarian Opposition secured more than one 
fourth of the vote -  28.4 percent - and returned ninety-nine deputies to the Grand National 
Assembly. The Fatherland Front had 365 deputies. The new Government was formed 
without any Opposition participation and contained a bigger number of Communists than 
the previous one. For the FO the mere presence of the Opposition in Parliament seemed to
135 Issussov, M. Stalin... p. 50-51
136 Tsvetkov, Zh. Sudut... p. 19
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open prospects for altering the course of events in the country. This could be a justification 
for active abandoning of the policy of non-recognition on Britain’s part.
On 12 November 1946, the House of Commons debated the Peace Treaties with the 
former Axis satellites. The FO Minister of State Hector McNeil criticised the methods 
used by the Bulgarian Government to obtain a parliamentary majority and expressed 
profound doubts that the results of the elections truly reflected the wishes of the Bulgarian 
people. But he was unable to state clearly what methods the British Government planned 
to employ in place of non-recognition in order to register disapproval of the Bulgarian
117regime. After the debate there were voices in the FO suggesting that it was better to 
leave the Bulgarians guessing as to when exactly Britain would extend diplomatic 
relations.138 Captain Raynold Blackburn, a Conservative MP, put forward to the FO the 
idea of ‘conditional and gradual recognition’ in exchange for strictly formulated 
concessions on the part of the Bulgarians. Without serious discussion, this was discarded 
as inappropriate by civil servants dealing with Bulgaria.139
These few isolated cases of attention to Bulgaria did nothing to alter the official view that 
recognition should be accorded at the time of the signing of the Peace Treaty. The 
decision taken in principle by the FO was reaffirmed by the advice of its legal expert, 
G.G.Fitzmaurice. He failed to explain the case in clear juridical terms. His repeated 
opinion was that from a legal point of view, HMG had already recognised the Bulgarian 
Government. The British Government had sent representatives to Bulgaria, granting in 
essence a de facto recognition, which carried almost all the legal consequences. In 
international practice this differed from a de jure recognition which implied political 
attitude and, if it was extended, meant that Britain was satisfied with the proper
137 F0371/58527, R16584, House of Commons debate extracts, 12.11.1946
138 F0371/58528, R17083, Washington to FO, 18.11.1946, Colville, 3.12.1946
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credentials of the regime in Bulgaria. The legal adviser was not sure whether a de jure 
recognition was necessary to bring the state of war to an end. He admitted that the whole 
‘recognition business’ had fallen into ‘a terrible mess causing endless tangles’. After 
weeks of confusing interdepartmental memoranda the FO arrived at the conclusion that 
for the British Government it ‘would not be legally impossible’ to sign or ratify a peace 
treaty with a Government which was only recognised de facto, as was the case with the 
Bulgarian Government.140
With the approaching end of the Paris Peace Conference it was clear that the day of the 
signing of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria was also near. This increased the desire of the 
Foreign Office to get the ‘whole muddle’ of Bulgarian recognition out of the way.141 It 
was no longer a question of securing political or even strategic advantages for Britain; the 
only practical benefit appeared to be the closure of a confusing and at times embarrassing 
question for British foreign policy. There were signals that for political and practical 
reasons even the US State Department was beginning to reconcile itself to the 
approaching recognition of the Bulgarian regime.142
While officials in London were elaborating on a number of legal and technical details at 
the beginning of 1947, noticeable deterioration of the Bulgarian political situation was 
reported. It had become obvious that the Bulgarian Communists were intent on 
eliminating the Opposition and the withdrawal of the Red Army would have no effect on 
this. The British representative in Sofia wrote that without doubt in the persecution of 
opponents the Bulgarian Government ‘makes use of torture as a method of interrogation,
139 F0371/66912, R1558, Blackburn to McNeil, 21.01.1947
140 F0371/58526, R15583, FO minutes, 26.10. -  22.11.1946
141 F0371/58526, R15583, FO to UK delegation New York, 22.10.1946, R15948, FO to Washington, 
6.11.1946
142 F0371/66912, R1315, Lord Inverchapel to FO, 29.01.1947, Colville, 1.02.1947
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maintains concentration camps and is in general the most barbaric of all totalitarian 
regimes in Eastern Europe’.143 Boyd Tollinton, Acting Head of the British Mission, 
believed that the prospect of the departure of the Red Army from Bulgaria had resulted in 
a drive to stamp out all effective opposition. Even Dimitrov, already Bulgarian Prime 
Minister and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, had stated in the Bulgarian Parliament 
that the Opposition would be dealt with in a month. Tollinton wrote that far from enabling 
more normal political life to be established in Bulgaria, the signature of the Peace Treaty 
would become the occasion ‘for an additional attempt to fix a totalitarian grasp upon 
further aspects of Bulgarian life with the two-fold object of settling the Soviet hand on the 
country and of preventing Western influence of any chance of reviving’. He 
recommended that as a sign of disapproval the British Government should not appoint a 
Minister Plenipotentiary to Sofia, but send just another political representative to act as an 
observer. In Tollinton’s opinion, the last weapon Britain possessed was the power to deny 
Bulgaria trade, making it the price for certain political concessions to the genuinely 
democratic elements. His gravest doubts were that soon there would be no democratic 
elements in Bulgaria, despite the courage Opposition leaders continued to show.144
At the beginning of February 1947, just before the signing of the Peace Treaty, Dimitrov 
made an ostensible show of good will towards the Opposition. He stated in the Assembly 
that ‘certain collaboration is possible and necessary’ but at the same time continued to 
insist that the Opposition was slandering the Government and the Fatherland Front as 
well as encouraging the dissatisfied elements in the country. This proclamation of 
moderation was immediately obscured by Dimitrov’s words that he could throw the
143 F0371/66912, R62, Colville, 4 -  22.01.1947
144 F0371/66912, R1461, Tollinton to FO, 31.01.1947
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Opposition out of Parliament in an hour and that the Communists were under obligation 
‘to bridle the Opposition’.145
The Southern Department judged the moderating motives in Dimitrov’s speech to be 
‘sickeningly insincere’. On the other hand, the very proclamation of the need for 
compromise with the Opposition was seen as a sign that Britain’s attitude still counted for 
something with the Bulgarian Government. But it was to be expected that until 
recognition was granted not only by Britain but also the USA, the Bulgarian Communists 
would be on their best behaviour.146 Some FO officials like D.Colville were amazed that 
some of the articles in the Opposition press had been allowed to appear at all which 
would not have been possible in Yugoslavia, Romania or Poland.147
On 10 February 1947, the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria was signed. On 11 February 1947, the 
British representative wrote to Dimitrov informing him that HMG had decided to 
recognise the Bulgarian Government de jure. The note made it clear that the Bulgarian 
Government was not considered to be representative of the people’s wishes. On 12 
February, the Bulgarian Government replied stating satisfaction with the recognition and 
declaring that it would fulfil the requirements of the Peace Treaty. John Stemdale-Bennett 
was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary in Sofia, wh/<£ , Professor Nikola Dolapchiev 
became the Bulgarian Minister in London.
The United States Senate ratified the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria only in June 1947 against 
the strongly-worded advice of the US representative in Sofia who likened the Soviet non- 
fulfilment of the Yalta agreements to the behaviour of Germany in the prelude to the First 
and Second World War. President Truman used the occasion of the ratification to voice
145 Otechestven Front, 12.02.1947
146 F0371/66929, R2083, Colville, 12.02.1947, Williams, 18.02.1947
147 F0371/66905, R1014, Tollinton to FO, 10.01.1947
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strong dissatisfaction with the Bulgarian Government.148 The delay, however, produced no 
effect on the situation in Bulgaria and, to the US Government’s embarrassment, coincided 
with the arrest of Petkov. This signified the start of a new wave of terror aimed at 
eliminating anyone who challenged the Communist-dominated Government before the 
withdrawal of the Soviet army from Bulgaria. The very development which according to 
British policy makers could alleviate political tension in Bulgaria had the opposite effect.
British and US recognition did not improve the international reputation of the Bulgarian 
Government but was used to boost its internal standing and to some degree facilitated the 
consolidation of the regime. Without the fear that they might incur the intervention of 
Britain and the USA, the Bulgarian Communists could continue to repress their political 
opponents. To those Bulgarian politicians who were familiar with Stalin’s reassurance 
that Bulgaria would eventually be recognised, the Soviet leader’s words must have 
seemed almost prophetic. In early 1946, he had told a Bulgarian delegation,
Why are you so worried about that? If the Opposition does not want to enter [the Government], it 
is possible that they will not recognise you immediately. But the time for the preparation of the 
Peace Treaty is short. In about two or three months they are going to recognise you.. We were not 
recognised for twelve years and nevertheless we survived... If Petkov thinks that because of him 
Britain and America are going to go to war with us, he is gravely mistaken.149
* * *
For almost half a year after the November 1945 elections Britain had practically accepted 
that in Bulgaria free elections ‘in harmony with the Yalta agreement’ were not possible. It 
believed that the future of its influence in the country lay with the fortunes of the anti­
communists and therefore its main efforts had been directed towards securing more 
favourable conditions for the Opposition. The crucial question Britain faced was how to
148 De Santis, H. The Diplomacy... p.180-181
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facilitate the entry of non-Fatherland Front politicians into the Government which would 
then become more representative of popular opinion.
Led by its desire to solve this problem, the British Government had subscribed to the 
Moscow decision, thus risking a repetition of the failure of Yalta. The wording of the 
Moscow communique could - and indeed did - become subject to two irreconcilable 
interpretations. Once this was obvious, Britain realised that it could not implement its views 
unless it stood up firmly to the Soviet Union. Although willing to take issue with the Soviet 
Government on different occasions, London was not ready to confront Moscow openly. 
Instead, British demands were scaled down which to the USSR signalled British 
vulnerability. Furthermore, although there was hardly any meaningful disagreement between 
the two Western Allies, the timing and tone of their dealings with the USSR gave the 
impression of a lack of coherence and consent. This was exploited by the Bulgarian 
Communists for their own propaganda and diplomatic purposes.
149 Tsvetkov, Zh. Sudut... p. 17
Part Three
‘We Are Supporting Certain Principles’ *
Chapter Six
British Acceptance of Communist Rule in Bulgaria
After the signing of the Peace Treaties with Germany’s ex-satellites, the divergence of 
attitude between the Soviet Union and its Western Allies regarding Eastern Europe 
continued. The controversy focused on the undemocratic nature of the regimes being 
established in the Eastern European countries, Britain and the USA believed the violent 
methods used by the Eastern European Communists to be not only condoned, but actually 
inspired by the Soviet Government and Communist Party. This was judged to be true to 
the greatest degree of the Bulgarian Government, which on various occasions was known 
to have strictly adhered to Stalin’s instructions.
British policy makers did not dispute the place of Bulgaria in the post-war Soviet zone of 
interest. Although earlier conflicts over the area had marked some of the lowest points in 
dealings with the Soviet Union, in early 1947 the overall importance of Eastern Europe in 
British foreign policy had visibly diminished. By then, British Government officials had 
adopted the view that nothing was to be gained from clashes over long-foreseen faits 
accomplis. In the case of Bulgaria, throughout the armistice period the British 
Government had shown preparedness to search for mutually acceptable solutions, hoping 
that compromises on specific problems would improve relations in general. This approach
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had yielded undesirable results: in addition to seeing the Soviet Union assert its power in 
Bulgaria, the Foreign Office began worrying that the Soviet leaders perceived British 
mildness as a sign of weakness.
Britain’s continued watchfulness of Bulgaria was justified by the country’s being a test 
ground for the lengths to which the Soviet Union would go to safeguard its control in the 
areas of Soviet interest. British efforts in Bulgaria were dominated by the need to devise a 
course of firm and successful actions, which would have a definite impact on political 
events in the country. Britain explored a range of diplomatic, cultural and economic 
means, which would revitalise its influence and above all retard the pace of 
Communisation of Bulgaria.
Background of British Policy to Bulgaria. In the post-war period, British policy
towards Bulgaria was elaborated in the context of Anglo-Soviet relations. The Foreign 
Office scrutinised each prospective action regarding the country in the light of its possible 
effect on the behaviour of the Soviet Union, not only in Bulgaria but also in the whole 
adjoining region. British officials realised that Soviet Russia was in a position to retaliate 
outside its zone, should it perceive any British actions as intended to curtail Soviet 
superiority in Eastern Europe. This had been clearly demonstrated in the negotiations over 
the Bulgarian Peace Treaty.1 In the first half of 1946, Soviet reluctance to withdraw troops 
from Iran and suspected preparation for an attack on Turkey had confirmed the strong 
British fear of Soviet pressure on the Middle East.2 Such considerations forced British 
strategists to pay greater than usual attention to Bulgaria, which could provide military 
bases for Soviet aggression.
* J.H.Watson, FO minute, 6.08.1947, cited in Rothwell, V. Britain... p.388
1 F0371/47883, R13784, Molotov - Bevin conversation, 23.09.1945; F0371/47883, N15702, Roberts to 
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From March 1946 to June 1947, British military planners undertook a comprehensive 
effort to outline the strategic position of the British Commonwealth resulting from the 
war. A range of issues - including estimates of possible enemy diplomacy, strategy and 
warfare -  were examined. The various studies commissioned by the Chiefs of Staff came 
to one conclusion, namely that the main threat for Great Britain and its overseas territories 
would come from Soviet aggression in any area adjacent to the Soviet sphere. The 
underpinning assumption was that the Soviet Union would continue to pursue a policy of 
expansion by all means short of war. Any political or military vacuum created by reduced 
British commitment in strategic for Britain territories would in due course be filled in by 
the Soviet Union and would add to the latter’s war-making potential. As it was difficult to 
predict the risks Stalin would be willing to undertake, the chance of a new war was not so 
remote as it had seemed immediately after the end of the Second World War.3 In the eyes 
of most British military experts, the Soviet Union’s double motivation - Russian 
nationalistic desire to seize foreign lands coupled with a militant Communist ideology 
committed to the destruction of Capitalism world-wide - increased the threat of British 
long-term strategic interests emanating from the USSR.
None of the papers produced by various Government Departments responsible for war 
planning forecast an imminent danger from the Soviet Union. British analysts believed 
the Soviet leadership needed to overcome the exhaustion of the war, rebuild the economy 
and consolidate its gains in Eastern Europe before it could afford a breakdown of relations
2 Boyle, P. ‘The British... ’ p.316; Adamthwaite, A. ‘Britain...’ p.227; Smith, R. and J.Zametica. ‘The Cold 
Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered, 1945-7’. International Affairs, vol.61. no.3. 1985. p.240
3 Lewis, J. Changing Direction. British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942 - 1947. 
London: The Sherwood Press, 1988. p.243-249, 316-334
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with the West. On the whole, British policy makers looked upon Soviet military power as 
‘a source of unease, rather than a direct threat’.4
Stalin’s insatiable security demands and the belligerent public pronouncements of Soviet 
statesmen caused grave concern to the British Government. Striving to acquire influence 
over its adjacent territories, the USSR created an international atmosphere of animosity 
and uncertainty, which itself increased the risk of an accidental war.5 Even if the Soviet 
Government itself was not prepared to engage in armed hostilities with its erstwhile 
Allies, British observers suspected it of backing Communists everywhere with material 
and propaganda help. Overzealous local Communists, in particular those in Yugoslavia 
and Bulgaria, were obviously involved in supporting the Greek left-wing guerrillas. Most 
British officials found it hard to believe that this was not sanctioned by Moscow.6 
Communist solidarity across the Balkans was a sufficient reminder of how vulnerable to 
outside pressure Britain’s position in the Mediterranean was.
In British post-war military strategy the importance of the Mediterranean could not be 
overestimated. It was vital for imperial sea and air communications. It constituted the first 
line of defence of Great Britain which could not be secured from a Western base only. 
The region was at the centre of British strategic planning against the USSR as its 
continuous reinforcement would be an instrumental advantage at the start of any future 
war.7 Even though the overall British aim was to prevent war, Britain’s diplomatic 
strength against the Soviet Union could not be maintained without proper military 
reinforcement.8
4 Keeble, Sir C. Britain... p.218
5 Lewis, J. Changing... p.295-296
6 F0371/47883, N8674, Clerk Kerr to FO, 10.07.1945, N15702, Roberts to Bevin, 31.10.1945
7 Lewis, J. Changing... p.285-287
8 Ibid. p.292; Keeble, Sir C. Britain... p.219
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The Diplomatic Perspective. In 1946 -  1947, at the time of final British
preparations for the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria and the recognition of 
the existing Bulgarian Government, the Foreign Office thoroughly re-examined British 
policy towards the Soviet Union. This was crucial for the formulation of British policy 
towards the Eastern European satellites, including Bulgaria. British foreign policy makers 
looked into issues similar to those addressed by the military planners. Naturally the 
diplomatic discourse revolved predominantly around the political dimensions of the 
unfolding international conflict, and sought political means to reinforce the British 
position. In general, FO studies confirmed both the premises and the conclusions of the 
military authorities’ analysis.
In April 1946, Christopher Warner, the Head of the FO Northern Department, wrote a 
long memorandum entitled ‘The Soviet Campaign against This Country and Our 
Response to It’.9 On the basis of this, the FO as a whole became involved in a 
comprehensive examination of the strategic aspects of British foreign policy. To some 
extent, the process of re-evaluation of attitudes to the Soviet Union had been spurred on 
by Frank Roberts’ dispatches in March 1946.10
FO memoranda, internal communications and exchanges with diplomats serving abroad 
disclose that British officials had little direct evidence of Soviet thinking apart from 
external manifestations of policy. In Bulgaria for instance, the Soviet Union appeared to 
be exerting ruthless control. Coupled with local Communists’ emulation of Soviet 
domestic policies, this supported the assumption that the same pattern would be followed 
across the Soviet zone. In consequence, the southward Soviet pressure on Turkey and Iran
9 DBPO, p.345-352; Rothwell, V. Britain... p.255-260
10 FRUS 1946, vol.IV, p.696-709, Kennan to Byrnes, 22.02.1946; Jensen, K.M. (ed.) Origins o f the Cold 
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and the virulent propaganda campaign against the Western democracies could not but be 
seen by the British Government as a prelude to attempts at increasing Soviet influence in 
the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. This could gradually lead to take-overs 
similar to those executed by the Soviet Union in its Eastern European zone. Churchill’s 
words at Fulton, that nobody knew the limits to Soviet ‘expansive and proselytising 
tendencies’, reflected the growing concerns of the British Government.11
In the mid-1940s, the FO experienced difficulties in determining whether ideology or 
Realpolitik was the leading trend in Soviet foreign policy. It was impossible to ignore 
increasing pronouncements by top Soviet politicians about the inevitability of the clash 
between world Communism and Capitalism. For Roberts, this fundamental Marxist 
principle guided Soviet long-term strategic thinking, thus intensifying the danger of ‘a 
modem equivalent of the religious wars of the sixteenth century’ in which the opposing 
philosophies would struggle for domination of the world.12 Soviet revolutionary 
proselytism was all the more disconcerting since it championed military superiority and 
could lead to behaviour not much different from that of centuries-long Russian 
imperialism. This could transform militant Communism into an aggressive foreign policy 
course which threatened on an equal scale the security of the British Empire and the 
democratic principles which Britain upheld.
Uncertain as to whether Marxism was the predominant motive of Soviet external policy, 
the FO as a whole inclined to the view that Soviet Russia could be the only future 
aggressor against Britain. In British estimates, the Soviet Union would certainly use its 
vast military potential as a threat to obtain political influence over the areas in which it 
was interested despite the possibility for a clash with the West. There was no doubt either
11 Morray, J.P. From Yalta to Disarmament. Cold War Debate. New York: MR Press, 1961. p.41-49; 
Bohlen, Ch. Witness... p.271
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that the Soviet Union had decided on using the international Communist movement for 
the achievement of Soviet strategic goals. As the military balance in Europe was in favour 
of the USSR, Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and claims outside it were seen by the FO 
as attempts to profit from the unsettled post-war state of the continent. In such a fluid 
situation, however, British experts judged that a substantial possibility of miscalculation 
existed.13
The acceptance of the reality of the Soviet threat prompted Whitehall officials to look for 
methods of mounting effective resistance against it. The first principle of British defence 
was that no territories should be evacuated voluntarily as this would always result in 
Soviet attempts to extend influence in direct or indirect ways, through the local 
Communists parties. In response to Soviet propaganda, Britain should point out the value 
of freedom, democracy and political tolerance in stark opposition to physical violence and 
psychological terror. Sargent suggested that one possible counterattack would be for the 
United Nations to indict the Soviet Government for establishing a reign of terror in 
Eastern Europe. Most important of all, victory in any future conflict with the USSR 
depended on the state of the British economy, which should be strong and viable.14
Taking into account the worst possible outcome, the FO did not disregard the search for 
some modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. Despite pointing out the imperialist aspects of 
Soviet foreign policy, Roberts advocated the acceptance of the virtually existing spheres 
of interest. He recommended that Britain should insist on reciprocity but simultaneously 
not shy away from the establishment of cultural and trade links with the Soviet Union. 
Warner was not opposed to the idea that, if the USSR concentrated on its own sphere in 
Eastern Europe, Britain should be more careful with measures against it. However, all
12 DBPO, p.305-311, 315-332; Roberts, Fr. Dealing... p.107-111
13 Rothwell, V. Britain... p.269; Lewis, J. Changing... p.257-263
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British analysts insisted on demonstrating British determination never to abandon the 
Mediterranean, as this would result in the weakening of influence in areas crucial to 
Britain, in particular Iran and Turkey.15
The FO was keen to keep open channels of communication with the Soviet Union. This 
was evident at the last Council of Foreign Ministers in London in December 1947 where 
opinions were exchanged on East European matters. Such an act resembled co-operation 
at least superficially.16 Even so, most officials understood the futility of this approach 
which was reminiscent of appeasement: concessions just vanished in a bottomless pit of 
demands. Thomas Brimelow, a Soviet specialist at the Northern Department noted,
If we were to pursue a policy of appeasement, our concessions would be accepted without 
gratitude and used against us. We must therefore be firm. On the other hand, if we are actively 
hostile, we merely confirm the rulers of the Soviet Union in their belief that we hate and fear them, 
and we accelerate the deterioration of relations.17
This echoed the thoughts of some US foreign policy makers. For Charles Bohlen, the 
State Department expert on the Soviet Union, Bolshevik ideology paid no attention to 
‘what the capitalist countries did; the mere fact that they were capitalist made them the 
object of continuous hostility on the part of the Soviet rulers; they could not do otherwise 
and pretend to be Marxist-Leninist’.18 Gradually, a tougher attitude to the Soviet Union 
was formulated in both Britain and the USA. Despite the different foreign policy methods 
of the two, a converging approach in dealing with the Soviet Union became notable.
This new line of thinking in the FO was soon reflected in the public pronouncements 
made by British political leaders. In June 1947, in the Parliamentary debate on foreign
14 Rothwell, V. Britain... p.265
15 Ibid. p.247-257
16 Keeble, Sir C. Britain... p.210-211
17 Rothwell, V. Britain... p.277
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policy, Bevin admitted that confidence and trust were lacking in relations with the Soviet 
Union. He claimed that the British Government had not and was not, supporting ‘any 
party or movement in any country’ which was hostile to the legitimate Soviet interests. 
Simultaneously, he unambiguously criticised the Soviet Union for not allowing its 
satellites to have political and commercial ties with the West. He also condemned the 
Soviet Union for having
rightly or wrongly succeeded by its present policy in giving the impression to the outside world 
that it is satisfied with no Government however democratically elected and however well- 
intentioned which is not subservient to Soviet aims and indeed dominated by Communists.19
A most effective criticism of Soviet behaviour in Eastern Europe was voiced by the 
British Prime Minister Clement Attlee. In January 1948, he publicly summed up the 
perception of the Soviet threat: ‘imperialism in a new form - ideological, economic and 
strategic - which threatens the welfare and the way of life of other nations in Europe’.20 It 
formed the basis of the Foreign Office ‘Bastion’ position paper of July 1948 which 
summarised the considered opinion of all Departments dealing with the USSR and 
Eastern Europe. Its point of departure was the assumption that ‘from secure entrenchment 
in Eastern Europe the Russians are now seeking to infiltrate Western and Southern 
Europe’. The employed Soviet tactic was to probe for a weak spot along the Western line, 
to find and to penetrate it, after which it was going to cause ‘the whole line to collapse’.21
The hardening British attitude towards Soviet Russia which was taking shape throughout 
1947 and 1948 was the result of serious analysis of Soviet policy motives by British 
Government institutions. Understandably, concurrent Soviet actions in Eastern Europe
18 Bohlen, Ch. Witness... p.271
19 F0371/66966, R8719, Bevin speech, 27.06.1947
20 Keeble, Sir C. Britain... p.220
21 F0371/72196, R10197, ‘Bastion’ memorandum, 20.07.1948
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coloured British understanding of and reactions to Soviet foreign policy. Consequently, 
the views of the FO and the British representatives in Moscow and in the countries of the 
Soviet zone, served to confirm the political assumptions and the methods proposed by the 
Chiefs of Staff.
The decision to take a firm stand against Soviet aggression was translated mostly into 
anti-Communist propaganda. It was also reflected in the uncompromising attitude towards 
the Soviet Union taken by Britain at the United Nations forums. Above all, it was the 
main stimulus to participate in the strengthening of the defence of Western Europe and to 
try to draw the USA closer to European affairs.22 In purely British-Soviet relations there 
were still friendly gestures, most notably the new Trade Agreement signed at the end of 
1947 and Soviet agreement to the incorporation of the Dodecanese islands into Greece.23
Soviet behaviour contained indications that once control over territories considered 
essential in terms of security had been gained, the Soviet Union could afford to display 
flexibility. Stalin recognised and in most cases was ready to accept the limits imposed on 
Soviet ambitions by the interests of his former Allies. In countries of the Soviet zone he 
did not contemplate compromises. The British and US influence was to be curtailed to the 
absolute minimum, particularly in Bulgaria which was a vital link in the Soviet zone. With 
its strategic location in the Balkans and having one of the oldest Communist parties, the 
country was a suitable ground for the speedy implementation of the Soviet model. This was 
facilitated by the willing collaboration of the Bulgarian Communist leaders. Their actions at 
home and their foreign policy pronouncements became increasingly aggressive towards the 
end of 1947. Since the political moves of the Bulgarian Communists were synchronised 
with the Kremlin, they provided good indications of Soviet policy and thinking. Any British
22 Ibid.-, Barker, E. Britain in... p.64-96
23 Rothwell, V. Britain... p. 262-263; Keeble, Sir C. Britain... p.216
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reaction to events in Bulgaria had to be considered in the light of the impact this would have 
on relations with the Soviet Union.
Anglo-Bulgarian Relations in the Aftermath of the Peace Treaty. With
the ratification of the Peace Treaty Bulgaria regained legal sovereignty and most 
European states established diplomatic relations with it. The Allied Control Commission 
terminated its activities. The Soviet Union withdrew all troops from Bulgaria by mid- 
December 1947. The normalisation of Bulgaria’s international position enabled the 
Bulgarian Communists to concentrate on internal developments, triggering brutal attacks 
on the Opposition. Nothing characterised the Communists’ drive to eliminate all active 
opponents better than the vicious treatment of the Agrarian leader Petkov who was 
arrested in Parliament just days before the USA granted recognition to the Bulgarian 
Government. This happened against the background of noticeable deterioration of 
relations between Bulgaria and the West, which official Bulgarian propaganda portrayed 
as offering moral and material support to the Opposition. At the same time, lacking even 
the flawed machinery of the ACC, the British and US Governments had to find new 
methods to influence Bulgaria’s rulers.
In late 1947 and especially at the beginning of 1948, John Stemdale-Bennett, the newly 
appointed British Minister in Sofia, reported increasingly strident defiance of the 
Bulgarian Government regarding Britain and the United States. He noted that ‘not a 
speech is made by a Bulgarian politician which does not include an attack upon us both 
and yet it is us who are held up as warmongers’.24 The tone was set and maintained by the 
most prominent Bulgarian Communists, who were most closely connected to the Soviet 
Government. In two speeches at the turn of 1947, Prime Minister Dimitrov accused ‘the 
imperialists’ of employing ‘diplomatic pressure, intrigues, threats, blackmail’ in order ‘to
24 F0371/72143, R278, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 2.01.1948
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hinder the peaceful development and creative construction of Bulgaria’. He also stated 
that those who wished Bulgaria ill supported ‘the remnants of the exploiting circles’ as 
represented by the Opposition. Dimitrov saw the ultimate proof of his allegations in the 
international campaign against Petkov’s execution.25 Kolarov, newly appointed Foreign 
Minister, claimed that Britain and the USA were demonstrating ‘a flagrant disregard’ of 
their Treaty obligations by refusing to support Bulgaria’s application for membership of 
the United Nations.26
The Bulgarian Communists perceived their open hostility towards the West as a 
legitimate counterattack in the wake of the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall Plan. By trumpeting the alleged imperialist schemes for intervention in the 
countries with “People’s Democracy”, they effectively undermined in advance any 
Western interest in Eastern European affairs. This reflected the Soviet Union’s own 
profoundly altered attitude towards the former Allies. In the latter half of 1947, Soviet 
propaganda against “the Anglo-Americans” noticeably gained momentum ceasing to 
differentiate publicly between the two countries and the policies of their Governments. 
The newly gained confidence of the Bulgarian Communists was also rooted in 
developments concerning the whole emerging Soviet bloc. The founding conference of 
the Communist Information Bureau in September 1947 mildly criticised the Bulgarian 
Communist Party for following a ‘vague and hesitant’ course and not showing sufficient 
strength in dealings with the Bulgarian ‘bourgeoisie, Church and Opposition’. In direct 
response to these observations, on 14 October 1947, the CC of the BCP resolved to 
‘destroy completely’ the Opposition.27
25 Rabotnichesko Delo, 31.12.1947, 13.01.1948
26 F0371/72135, R10432, Greenhill to FO, 8.09.1948
27 Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno... p. 191-195
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Observing the Final Elimination o f Opposition. British officials in Sofia were
aware that since their seizure of power the Communists had never really abstained from 
meddling in the internal affairs of the other political parties. They had simply mitigated 
their interference until the conclusion of the Peace Treaty essentially gave them a free 
hand.28
In the disappearance of the non-Govemment Press the British representative in Sofia 
discerned the first sign of the treatment that awaited the Opposition. The Communist 
authorities closed down various newspapers denying the non-Communists the single most 
effective means for the dissemination of their views. Stemdale-Bennett pointed out that 
‘the suppression of the Opposition press is only one symptom of a general move aiming at 
complete disintegration of the Opposition and its elimination as effective force’. His 
understanding of the situation generated no suggestion as to how to convey to the 
Bulgarian authorities the British Government’s displeasure at the violation of civil 
freedoms in Bulgaria. It was even more difficult to imagine measures for stopping the 
Communist advance.29
This difficulty was aggravated when at the very moment Bulgaria achieved independent 
international status, the Bulgarian Communists proceeded to eliminate -  in a number of 
cases physically - the whole Parliamentary and non-Parliamentary Opposition. This 
process was a continuation of the trend set by the People’s Courts, the forced emigration 
of the Agrarian leader Dr.G.M.Dimitrov and the hanging of Nikola Petkov. Throughout 
1948, the remaining activists were discredited in Soviet-style show trials. In February the 
Agrarian Gichev and in November the Social Democrat Lulchev were sentenced for inciting 
economic sabotage and armed resistance against the regime. The Government Prosecutor
28 FO371/72160, R8341, Stemadale-Bennett to FO, 29.06.1948
29 FO371/66907, R9439, Stemadale-Bennett to FO, 10.07.1947
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maintained that both had participated in “Anglo-American” conspiracies and acted on the 
instructions of the British and US political representatives.30 Stemdale-Bennett, who had 
followed the judicial proceedings as closely as possible, concluded that the trials had also 
been directed at discrediting Great Britain and the United States. This was intended as a 
measure to isolate British and US diplomatic representatives from any contacts with non- 
Govemment political organisations.31
After the Opposition was effectively disposed of, the Communists turned the state 
security apparatus against all organisations which were hostile to the regime and had 
foreign contacts, and were therefore seen as potential centres of anti-Communist 
activities. This was the rationale behind the trial in February 1949 of fifteen Evangelical 
Pastors accused of espionage and currency offences. This time an unprecedented number 
of Western correspondents and missionaries were specifically implicated by name. In 
addition, former and serving British and US diplomats were linked with the offences of the 
Pastors. The FO in conjunction with the State Department expressed concern about the 
violation of the human rights of the accused and the improper conduct of the trial. The 
Bulgarian Government used this as further proof of guilty association.32
By this time all foreign schools, colleges and courses maintained by foreign Governments, 
as well as all religious missions in Bulgaria, had been closed down.33 In early 1948, the 
English Speaking League was among the first to disappear, immediately followed by the
30 Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno... p.194-195; F0371/72131, R1754, Lord Inverchapel to FO, 6.02.1948, 
F0371/72132, R2120, US press release, 6.02.1948, R3592, Sofia to FO, FO minutes, 13.03.1948; 
F0371/72138, R12957, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 16.11.1948
31 F0371/72137, R12731, R12788, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 10, 12.11.1948; F0371/72138, R12957, 
Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 16.11.1948
32 Devedjiev, H. Stalinisation o f the Bulgarian Society1949 - 1953. Philadelphia, Pa: Dorrance&Company, 
1975. p.61-73; F0371/78300, R2523, FO brief, 2.03.1949; F0371/78298, R1916, BBC Monitoring 
Service, 10.02.1949
33 F0371/72134, R9168, Greenhill to FO, 3.08.1948
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British Council.34 Stemdale-Bennett concluded that in Bulgaria ‘anything British is a matter 
of suspicion and anything, which is both cultural and British, attracts the special attention of 
the militia’.35
Attacks against the Western Missions. With the closure of the foreign
cultural and educational institutions, the diplomatic missions remained the only sign of 
Western presence in Bulgaria. They became the next targets of repression. A succession of 
trials of Bulgarians working for foreign institutions took place in the middle of 1948. The 
most publicised was that of Yuli Genov, a long-term employee of the British Legation. 
Together with three journalists, who had all worked for Opposition newspapers and had 
maintained links with Britain, he was arrested on charges of ‘activities against the security 
of the state’.36 The British representative was quick to see in the accusations an attempt to 
implicate the British Legation. On this occasion he was extraordinarily concerned as Genov, 
and the three arrested journalists, ‘did obtain information, which [was] passed on to the 
Legation’. ‘The information was nothing more than the usual political gossip and passed in 
the usual informal way’ but in the current political climate it was ‘sufficient for a charge of 
espionage through an organised spy ring’.37 Genov’s case was reviewed by the Communist 
Politburo which instructed the judges to pass a ‘ruthless’ sentence.38 Accordingly, Genov 
was sentenced to twelve and a half years of rigorous imprisonment.39 Bulgarian residents 
who had any personal or business connections with the West were intimidated and 
mistreated by the militia. On one occasion, the British Minister learned that a British citizen
34 F0371/72129, R1274, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 23.01.1948
35 FO371/72130, R3686, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 18.05.1948, FO minute 31.05.1948
36 F0371/72129, R86, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 30.12.1947; F0371/72131, R1427, FO minutes, 31.01.-
19.02.1948
37 F0371/72131, R1427, Stemdale-Bennet to FO, 31.01.1948, Conquest, 9.03.1948
38 Ognyanov, L. Durzhavno...p.209
39 FO371/72130, R6140, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 15.05.1948
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living in Bulgaria had been told by a Bulgarian official ‘that Bulgaria was now against 
England’.40
Links with the West were rendered even more difficult by the constantly changing and 
increasing restrictions on the movement of diplomatic personnel.41 By 1949, the border 
regions, especially those to the south, were practically sealed off for the staff of foreign 
missions. In addition to official restrictions, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry went to 
incredible lengths to obstruct even leisure journeys.42
The Bulgarian Government also began a campaign to impede the work of the British and 
US Legations. In August 1948, shortly after the expulsion of the US Vice-consul Donald 
Ewing, the British Pro-consul Jack Adams was declared persona non grata.43 Months of 
efforts to find out the reasons for this drastic measure revealed the enormity of Adams’ 
offences as allegedly having given ‘from time to time ... presents, including chocolates to 
Bulgarian friends with the implication that this was in return for information with which 
they had supplied him’.44 In March 1949, the Bulgarian Government made it known that the 
First Secretary of the British Legation Denis Greenhill was not welcome in Bulgaria. No 
official explanation was supplied; privately the expulsion was connected to Greenhill’s 
having been named in the Pastors’ trial as someone who had recruited the accused for the 
British intelligence services.45
Greenhill’s expulsion brought British retaliation against Bogomil Todorov, the Third 
Secretary of the Bulgarian Legation in London. This led to the declaration in July 1949 that
40 F0371/72143, R3003, Sofia to FO, 25.02.1948; FO371/72130, R9170, Stemdale-Bennett to FO,
31.07.1948
41 F0371/72136, R11745, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 14.10.1948
42 F0371/78289, R631-R11390, Sofia to FO, January-August 1949
43 FO371/72130, R9593, Greenhill to FO, 16.08.1948
44 F0371/72137, Dunnet to FO, 21.09.1948, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 20.10.1948
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the Third Secretary of the British Legation in Sofia John Blakeway was persona non grata. 
Then Boris Temkov, the Bulgarian Press Attache in London was sent home and in 
September 1949, the British Minister was forced to withdraw the Assistant Military Attache 
Major B.G.Merivale-Austin in a case of pure reprisal.46
The cycle of expulsions was becoming disadvantageous for the British Legation in Bulgaria 
as it was causing loss not only of prestige but also of experienced officers. Significantly, a 
relatively short series of reprisals would bring Britain up against the question of whether to 
expel the Head of the Bulgarian Legation in London. In August 1949, the new British 
Minister in Sofia Paul Mason suggested that Britain should retaliate directly against the 
Soviet Government, as he was convinced that the actions of the Bulgarian Government were 
incited by the USSR. The FO dismissed this suggestion on the grounds that reprisals against 
the Soviet Union would inflict exactly the same problems as those against Bulgaria. 
Moreover, similar developments were taking place in Hungary and Romania. Retaliation 
against the Soviet Union would imply that the satellites were not treated as independent 
states which in itself had to be logically followed by the withdrawal of Missions.47
Most British officials recognised the futility of the expulsion war but considered that any 
sign of reconciliation would be interpreted by the Bulgarian Government as nervousness 
and weakness on the British side. The dilemma the FO had to resolve was ‘whether to 
continue [a] tit-for-tat policy with the risk that it will end in a complete rupture of relations, 
or whether to climb down and let ... opponents win a moral victory’. Bevin himself 
supported a policy of full retaliation. In a telegram to Sofia he explained that he was
45 F0371/78261, R2702, Sofia to FO, 9.03.1949; Greenhill, D. More by Accident. York: Wilton 65, 1992. 
p.64-66
46 F0371/78264, R7323, Mason to FO, 29.07.-1.08.1949, R7811, Bateman, 11.08.1949; F0371/78265, 
R8724, Mason to FO, 8.09.1949
47 F0371/78264, R7576, Mason to FO, 3.08.1949
267
‘prepared to face the consequences... even to the point of expelling the Bulgarian Charge 
d ’Affaires ’ which would mean the breaking off of diplomatic relations.48
The prevailing opinion in the FO was that the satellites would be only too glad to break off 
diplomatic relations with Britain if Britain could be made to appear responsible. Unlike 
Hungary, Bulgaria would not even lose trade with Britain. What Britain would miss if its 
missions were withdrawn from Eastern Europe was receiving ‘from time to time ... a scrap 
of information, which throws light on Soviet intentions’.49 The FO had often pointed out 
that probably the most useful function of its personnel in Bulgaria was to collect 
information about developments behind the Iron Curtain, especially in view of Bulgaria’s 
proximity to the Eastern Mediterranean. As the Soviet Union was universally suspected of 
having designs on that region, it was vital for Britain to gather data on the Bulgarian armed 
forces ‘which might be useful and should be passed on to the Greeks and Turks’.50
A lengthy discussion between London and Washington on the question of breaking off of 
relations with Bulgaria followed. Agreeing with British arguments as to the usefulness of 
Sofia as ‘a listening post’, US experts nevertheless believed that the balance of advantage 
was in favour of a break. British analysts drew the opposite conclusions. For one, the British 
Minister in Sofia believed that if the Bulgarian Government was anxious to get rid of his US 
colleague, ‘it would be a mistake to play prematurely into its hands’.51 The Southern 
Department accepted the Minister’s logic as it envisaged that both the British and US 
Governments stood to lose more than they would gain from a rupture of relations with 
Bulgaria.
48 F0371/78311, R9881, FO minutes, 5.10.1949
49 Ibid.
50 F0371/72175, R1536, Wallinger, 17.12.1947, Watson to WO, 6.02.1948
51 F0371/78250, R11468, Sofia to FO, 9.12.1949
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This seems to be ... one of these occasions ... in which the same solution to a problem happens to suit 
both sides. The Soviet Government might well wish us to maintain our missions in the satellite 
countries ... but it does not follow that it must therefore be in our interest to withdraw them. On the 
contrary, they will continue to be useful so long as they are able to obtain some inkling about what is 
going on behind the Iron Curtain. Our experience with Albania demonstrates the disadvantage of 
having no diplomatic mission in a satellite country.52
The Search for Effective British Policy towards Bulgaria. After the
signing of the Peace Treaty, the pace of Bulgaria’s Communisation increased. The 
radicalised Bulgarian Communist Party displayed fierce intolerance to all real and 
potential internal opponents as well as deep-seated hostility to the Western powers. In 
such an atmosphere the British Government had to formulate a policy towards Bulgaria, 
to be also consistent with policy to other countries in the Soviet zone. The approach to 
Bulgaria was a component of British-Soviet relations.
Contemporary British documents dealing with Bulgaria contain little more than general 
policy objectives, which applied to most Eastern European satellites. The British 
Government desired to preserve its interests in Eastern Europe but before that it had to be 
certain that the countries of the region did not constitute any strategic threat to Britain. This 
was most pertinent in the case of Bulgaria which bordered the British Eastern Mediterranean 
zone of influence. Britain wanted to restore economic links with the region, as trade could 
prove an opening for other contacts. Attempts to maintain some political and economic 
influence in Bulgaria should not obliterate the fact that it had been an enemy in the Second 
World War and was becoming a front post in the Soviet zone. The British Government 
intended to make sure that Bulgaria pmdently fulfilled all its Treaty obligations: it proposed 
to require from Bulgaria no less than the Soviet Union would from Italy.53
52 F0371/78251, R11704, FO to Washington, 22.12.1949
53 F0371/66971, R1879, FO information, 31.01.1947; F0371/66974, R8796, Campbell, 2.07.1947
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Simultaneously, the British attitude to Bulgaria was conditioned by traditional views of 
the country’s Russophilism. In mid-1947, in the Parliamentary debate on foreign policy, 
Christopher Mayhew, the FO Minister of State, claimed that the Bulgarian Government 
was ‘entirely Communist-dominated and entirely subservient to Russia’. In his opinion, 
the prevailing pro-Russian feelings of the population would make Soviet domination 
more acceptable to the Bulgarian people than in other Eastern European countries.54
With no illusions about the course of Bulgarian development, the FO was still careful that 
Britain should not look intent on confrontation. The policy it was trying to formulate did 
not envisage active political intervention to change the nature of the Bulgarian regime. 
British Government officials would only commit themselves to watching the situation 
closely and pressing the Bulgarian Government to fulfil its Peace Treaty obligations. 
Shortly after ratification, the Peace Treaty remained almost the only point of diplomatic 
and political dialogue between Bulgaria and Great Britain. Instead of being an instrument 
of British policy, the insistence on Peace Treaty implementation became a policy 
objective in its own right. This was shaped by two separate issues: Bulgarian lack of 
respect for human rights and failure to reorganise the army.
Dealing with the Political Trials. Already in September 1947, the Foreign
Office realised that it would ‘not be able physically to prevent the [Bulgarian Government] 
from evading such of their Treaty obligations as Communist policy demands’.55 Shortly 
after the ratification of the Treaties with the ex-satellites, in the House of Lords debate Lord 
Vansittart suggested that in view of the persistent violations by the Soviet puppet regimes 
the Treaties should be reconsidered and possibly even repudiated. 56 This was hardly a
54 F 0371/66965, R8719, Bevin draft speech, 27.06.1947
55 F 0371/66976, R12522, FO to Washington, 13.09.1947
56 F0371/66979, R14882, House of Lords debate, 5.11.1947
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realistic demand, especially since the FO had decided to recognise the Communist- 
controlled Governments after long and painful deliberations.
The need to react to particular developments inside the Communist bloc had been 
championed by most Western representatives since the armistice period. Among them 
Stemdale-Bennett in Sofia had ‘long clamoured for action’, often in relation to particular 
instances of violation of human rights.57 His successor Mason was also dissatisfied with the 
mild British reaction to the numerous charges of British espionage plots mentioned in most 
trials. He tried to explain to his superiors that the typical British ‘refusal to be drawn and to 
pass over with silent contempt obviously baseless charges’ was totally inadequate when 
dealing with Communists who regarded ‘silence ... as an admission or at least as proving 
inability to deny’.58 Both diplomats recommended that the British Government should adopt 
the US Government’s approach of putting on record every single case in which it 
disapproved of the conduct of the Bulgarian Government. While agreeing to prior 
consultation with the State Department, the FO preferred to examine each case on its own 
merits. British Eastern European specialists in London claimed that it was neither necessary 
to have the same approach to all the countries in the region, nor useful to get involved in 
constant friction.59
Britain’s preoccupation with not appearing prejudiced against the Bulgarian Government 
had been vividly demonstrated a long time before the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. One 
of the first acid tests for Britain’s attitude towards the Communist persecution of the 
Bulgarian Opposition had been the case of G.M.. In May 1945 he had escaped from home 
arrest and found shelter with a member of the British Military Mission. Receiving the news, 
the FO immediately instructed the British representative to remove the Agrarian leader from
57 F0371/72154, R4837, Peck, 26.04.1948
58 F 0371/78251, R11682, Mason to FO, 19.12.1949
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the British Mission and inform the Bulgarian Prime Minister that G.M. ‘had simply passed 
through British hands’. The FO resolved to refuse G.M. political asylum without even 
knowing whether he would ask for it. He was driven to premises belonging to the US 
Mission in Sofia, where he remained for several months until his departure for the USA. 
Throughout this period, the main British concern was that the British Government should 
avoid confirming even the slightest suspicion of supporting anti-Fatherland Front and anti- 
Soviet activities in Bulgaria.60
Such careful behaviour had no impact on the attitude of the Bulgarian Communists. Their 
hostility to Britain was motivated by ideological stereotypes rather than concrete British 
actions. That is why in G.M.’s case, the Bulgarian Government distinguished little between 
the British Government which refused to get involved and the US Government which 
ultimately granted asylum to the Agrarian leader. The fact that G.M. had worked for the 
British propaganda services during the war loomed large in the accusations against him. In 
every subsequent arrest of Opposition activists, the charge of being ‘an agent of Anglo- 
American imperialism’ was sooner or later brought up.
In June 1947, Nikola Petkov was accused of ‘fomenting disorder and sabotage to induce 
foreign powers to intervene in Bulgarian affairs’. The prosecution named no particular 
foreign country, but the official press freely linked the accused with Britain and the USA. 
Petkov’s case stirred Western public opinion. The extension of diplomatic relations with the 
USA completely overshadowed the fact that simultaneously the State Department issued a 
statement expressing concern over the violation of civil liberties in Bulgaria.61
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If this did not send a clear signal to the Communists that neither Britain nor the USA 
intended to get seriously involved in Bulgaria, the quasi-measures taken at the proclamation 
of Petkov’s death sentence did. Instead of threatening to suspend relations with Bulgaria, as 
recommended by their diplomats, both Governments protested to the Soviet Chairman of 
the ACC and discussed whether to invite the Soviet side to a tripartite discussion of the case. 
Shortly before Petkov’s execution, a desperate appeal was made to Kolarov, then President 
of the Republic. All actions met with the reply that the trial and sentence were an internal 
matter. Dimitrov went as far as stating that Petkov’s sentence ‘might have been commuted 
but for foreign intervention and attempts to dictate in ultimatum fashion’.62 This 
pronouncement only confirmed Stemdale-Bennett’s words that ‘guilty connection between 
ourselves and the accused is ... just as likely to be assumed from silence as it is from official 
intervention’.63 Even though British officials were certain that Petkov’s execution had been 
decided in advance of any British and US moves, Dimitrov's statement was interpreted as an 
unconcealed warning for future cases. It aimed at putting the Western powers on the 
defensive. It was obvious that in future trials, steps undertaken to alleviate the plight of the 
accused would inevitably be regarded as aggravating circumstances. Every suggestion for 
action on the part of the FO would be weighed against the possibility of unwittingly 
victimising the accused further.64
British reluctance to challenge the Bulgarian authorities was rooted in the realisation that 
such efforts were bound to have a minimal effect. Moreover, the Foreign Office was eager 
to avoid any suspicions of double-dealing in the Balkans which would aggravate relations 
with the Soviet Union. This rationale was defeated by the fact that implication of Britons in 
the trials of anti-Communists continued despite official British self-restraint. To some
62 Homer, J.E. 'The Ordeal... 'p.82-83
63 F0371/72137, R12767, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 11.11.1948
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extent, the FO hesitated between adopting a moral and a thoroughly realistic, almost cynical 
stance. This generally accounted for a wait-and-see attitude, often taken to the point when 
delay made late reaction superfluous and irrelevant. One example was Kolarov’s speech 
blaming Britain and the USA for not abiding by their Treaty obligations. This spurred a 
strongly worded US note of protest. The British Legation in Sofia was unanimously in 
favour of a similar move, while the FO United Nations Department was categorically 
against. The Southern Department tried to satisfy both. It did not rule out a protest in 
principle but deferred it for a number of tactical reasons.65
The FO’s vacillating manner was further demonstrated in internal memoranda aiming to 
clarify outstanding issues. At the beginning of January 1948, Geoffrey Wallinger, Head of 
the Northern Department, noted that ‘the trend is towards toughness’.66 He was convinced 
that after Dimitrov’s recent shocking statements, public and Parliamentary opinion 
favoured swift and firm dealing with Bulgaria. He saw numerous indications from all 
Eastern European countries ‘that toughness may at least have the effect of delaying moves 
by the Communists to speed their plans of consolidation’.67 This theory was not applied: 
at precisely the same time, Stemdale-Bennett’s appeals for vociferous criticism of the 
Bulgarian Government were ignored. The rather strange logic for this attitude was that 
‘there will be plenty of chances later to go to town on some Bulgarian incident’.68
The FO hesitated mainly as to whether British censure of particular actions of the 
Bulgarian authorities should be extended into a general offensive against the regime. 
Article 2 of the Peace Treaty obliged the Bulgarian Government to observe human rights
64 F0371/72138, R13034, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 17.11.1948
65 F0371/72136, R11007, FO to US Embassy, 24.09.1948, Wallinger, 23.09.1948
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and could justify attempts to stop the Communist advance. Such a course would affect all 
Eastern European countries, signalling an assault on the Soviet-model as a whole. 
Stemdale-Bennett was among the staunchest advocates of this initiative. He repudiated 
the British Government’s narrow legalistic view of the Treaties which revealed British 
uncertainty.69 The British Minister in Sofia was not deterred even by the memory of 
Petkov’s execution as he believed British protests had been made ‘in full realisation of the 
risk that [they] might not help him personally’.70
Occasionally, FO specialists agreed that Britain should not become apathetic just because it 
could not give the people concerned any effective assistance, but their prevailing 
inclinations were on the side of patience and caution. From the local perspective this could 
only be perceived as unwittingly helping to strengthen the Bulgarian Government and 
diminish British prestige in the country. It could not impress the Bulgarian authorities; 
neither could it win the respect of the dissidents.71 If anything, the FO was growing more 
convinced that any involvement, for example to ask for mitigation of Genov’s sentence 
could become the source of a potential embarrassment.72 By the time of Rostov’s trial, when 
the Communists started purges of their own party, the British representatives refrained even 
from insisting on access to the courtroom. The FO wished to avoid the impression that it 
was ‘unduly concerned’ about the charges.73
Donald Heath, the US Ambassador in Sofia, was as active as his British colleague in 
trying to impress his superiors with the need to protest vigorously against all Treaty 
violations. This would disabuse both the Bulgarian and Soviet Governments of their
69 FO371/72170, R2582, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 14.02.1948, R2367, Stemdale-Bennett to FO,
18.02.1948
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71 F0371/72136, R11410, Greenhill to FO, 4.10.1948, R11745, Porter, 10.10.1948
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belief that their actions in Eastern Europe provoked no interest in the West.74 The high 
point of US involvement in Bulgaria after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty was a stiff 
aide-memoire handed to Kolarov on 23 September 1948. In it, the US Government took 
an unequivocally critical view of the behaviour of the Bulgarian Government from the 
very moment Sofia had signed the Peace Treaty:
... the Bulgarian Government has prosecuted a systematic and ruthless campaign to obliterate 
democratic opposition in direct disregard of fundamental principles of freedom... Through abuse of 
the instrumentalities of political power and subversion of judicial process the Bulgarian Government 
has subjected substantial numbers of Bulgarian people whose only crime was a belief in the rights of 
man, to involuntary servitude, banishment, concentration camps, imprisonment, torture and 
execution. It has obliterated the Opposition party and by means of terror stifled free expression.75
Not only did the Bulgarian Government claim a clean record in its reply but it also 
complained that the Great Powers had taken no concerted action under Article 35 to 
exercise their right to advise and enlighten the Bulgarian Government in the interpretation 
of the Peace Treaty. In such circumstances, British silence would ‘lower the morale of 
Bulgarian Opposition and encourage the impertinence of the authorities’. Stemdale- 
Bennett approved of the tone of the US representation and called for immediate British 
support. He also confirmed that the Bulgarian Government’s militancy was in substance 
related to the attitude of the Soviet Union. The latter appeared not ‘in the least concerned 
about protests to the [Soviet] Orbit countries as long as they do not interfere with the 
main line of Soviet policy’.76 British diplomats in Bulgaria drew attention to the necessity 
to supplement swift and blunt occasional protests with a more principled long-term 
approach. They sought to recommend a specific line but could only repeat the need for
74 F0371/72136, R11007, US Embassy London to FO, 22.09.1948
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consistent acceptance, observation and control of Treaty obligations assumed by both 
sides under Article 2.
In January 1949, Mayhew proclaimed in the House of Commons that ‘the record of the 
present Bulgarian Government... shows that their interpretation of human freedom is so 
different from ours as to make any form of protest quite unavailing’.77 This conviction had 
been formed by the time of the Lulchev trial in 1948. While initially keen to continue with 
the handing of notes of protest to the Bulgarian Government, the FO could foresee nothing 
but sterile diplomatic exchanges. Unlike US foreign policy officials, the FO experts never 
really contemplated applying the machinery of the Peace Treaty for the resolution of 
arguments with the Bulgarian authorities.78
Article 36 of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria stipulated the procedure for the handling of 
disputes between the signatories about the interpretation and implementation of the Treaty 
This involved the participation of the Soviet Union. Expectations of Soviet collaboration 
were not supported by the experience of the ACC in Bulgaria.79 The FO believed that the 
first attempt to enforce the Treaty through the dispute machinery should be a ‘specific, 
solid-ground case’. It should be related to military or economic clauses, rather than 
‘something so indefinite as infringement of human rights’.80
Stemdale-Bennett was naturally upset by the irresolute attitude of Whitehall. He lamented 
that officials in London were ‘hypnotised by the legal difficulties and overlooking the 
psychological aspect’ and warned that the excessive caution of the British Government
76 F0371/72136, R11326, Greenhill to FO, 2.10.1948FO371/72136, R11672, Stemdale-Bennett to FO,
13.10.1948
77 F0371/78292, R1234, FO draft, 10.02.1949
78 FO371/72130, R5098, Sykes, 23.04.1948; FO371/72170, R59, R2582, FO minutes, 7.01.1948, 8 - 
16.03.1948, R3967, Washington to FO, 26.03.1948
79 F 0371/66972, R4928, Hoyer-Miller, 14.04.1947
80 F 0371/66982, R16687, Warner - Hickerson conversation, 18.12.1947
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could be seen as lack of confidence and determination. In his view, the Treaty gave Britain a 
lever with respect to the satellite countries which was not available in the case of the Soviet 
Union. This advantage should be used consciously with the aim of throwing Communists 
‘off their balance’ and embarrassing them wherever it was practicable. The British Minister 
in Sofia saw this as the only way ‘to give hope to people who otherwise see none’ and ‘keep 
alive the core of potential resistance to Communists’.
It is precisely by broadening the moral, as opposed to the purely material, basis of our stand against the
Communist offensive that we are most likely in the long term to defeat it.81
The FO was moving in exactly the opposite direction from its representative in Bulgaria. It 
assured him that it too was thinking about how ‘to expose to the world the tyrannical and 
menacing policy’ of the Kremlin-directed Communist Parties throughout Europe. But it 
drew different conclusions from Stemdale-Bennett’s. It proposed to treat the Soviet Orbit as 
a whole and declare the puppet Governments Moscow’s agents, rather than merely 
unrepresentative and tyrannical. The objective would be to draw a clear distinction between 
ordinary people in the satellites and their Communist rulers. While Britain would condemn 
the behaviour of local Communist Parties, its main target would be the USSR.82
These intentions showed that the British Government was effectively ceasing to attach much 
importance to the Peace Treaties. By the time of Lulchev’s trial, it had become ‘the fixed 
policy of HMG not to invoke the Treaty’.83 The logical extension of such an approach was 
that even protests on specific cases became undesirable. Bevin wrote to the British Minster 
in Sofia to explain that, instead of presenting notes to the Bulgarian Government based on
81 F0371/72168, R5205, Stemdale-Bennett to Wallinger, 3.04.1948
82 Ibid., Wallinger to Stemdale-Bennett, 24.04.1948
83 F0371/72139a, R13568, Bateman, 20.11.1948
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Article 2, the British Government was going to seek future opportunities to expose publicly 
Bulgaria’s treatment of human rights.84
In the two years after the signature of the Peace Treaty Britain sent seven protests to the 
Bulgarian Government against the violations of Article 2 and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.85 The sober conclusion was that these official communications had produced 
no result and the British Government had to face the fact that it possessed no means of 
enforcing respect for human rights in Soviet-dominated states. Even worse, any attempt to 
do so merely demonstrated and emphasised the ineffectiveness of the Treaty machinery to 
deal with violations. It also advertised British impotence to achieve results in the Soviet 
zone.86
Publicising the *Bulgarian Atrocities'. The British Legation followed closely
the series of political trials in Bulgaria in 1947 - 1948. Concern with the allegations against 
British citizens was combined with careful observation of the ominous proceedings, which 
could reveal the logic of the Communist regime. This could contribute towards the analysis 
of the process of establishing the Soviet system in Eastern Europe. Such understanding as 
was acquired by the Foreign Office could then be employed in education and propaganda.
British officials were looking for methods to influence the Bulgarian Government without 
engaging in direct diplomatic and political clashes. These had the double disadvantage of 
presenting the British Government in a confrontational light and being exposed to possible 
rebuff by the Bulgarian side. When in January 1948, Wallinger urged adoption of a more 
offensive policy he had in mind above all intensified propaganda.87 This idea had been 
encouraged by diplomats in Bulgaria and was taken up by a number of Southern
84 F0371/72138, R13231, FO to Sofia, 30.11.1948
85 F0371/78290, R6783, Sofia to FO, 7.07.1949
86 F0371/78300, R2487, FO brief, 3.03.1949
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Department officials. They considered that vigorous publicity of the unsightly events in 
Bulgaria would to some extent make up for British inability to implement the Peace Treaty 
with this country.
One fundamental fact which is clear to us and public opinion is that it is not possible to prevent the 
Bulgarian Government and others in the Soviet Orbit from behaving as they wish. We may, by 
means of successful publicity, and by means of keeping the flame of liberty alight, i.e. by pressure 
of public opinion outside and inside Bulgaria - be able to modify the actions of these Governments 
to some very slight extent... We cannot hope... to enforce the Treaty on Bulgaria. What we can do 
is to make the most effective use of the Treaty for publicity purposes.. .88
Daily contacts with the Communist authorities provided possible topics for press and radio 
features. The British representatives in Sofia were especially keen on collaborating with the 
BBC Overseas Service in programmes for Bulgaria, which were judged to have a big impact 
on listeners in the country. Stemdale-Bennett was extremely glad when Georgi Dimitrov’s 
boisterous speeches at the start of 1948 were noticed by the BBC and interpreted as proof 
that Petkov’s execution and the treatment of anti-Communists had been motivated by 
political vengeance. The speeches were turned into real political news -  they were quoted 
on the BBC Bulgarian transmissions, used for several newspaper editorials and finally 
formed the basis for an “inspired” Parliamentary Question.89
The most important result from such a media campaign in Britain was the clear 
embarrassment of the Bulgarian Communist leadership. Its actions and statements for 
domestic consumption were now being widely circulated abroad.90 Reports from Sofia 
confirmed that publicity was the one weapon, which deeply affected the Bulgarian
87 F 0371/72129, R1837, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 20.12.1947, Wallinger, 24.12.1947- 2.01.1948
88 FO371/66980, R15859, Bevin memorandum for Cabinet, 24.11.1947; F0371/72167, R3320, FO to 
Stemdale-Bennett, 20.03.1948
89 F0371/72131, R637, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 14.01.1948
90 F0371/72139a, R13675, Greenhill to FO, 4.12.1948
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Government. Ample evidence pointed in the direction that the appearance of materials in the 
Western press and radio touched the Bulgarian Government ‘on the raw’. Prominent 
disclaimers were published in local newspapers in order to try to refute the publications. At 
the time of Lulchev’s trial, the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice summoned a special press 
conference for foreign corespondents in order to give a detailed official ‘explanation’.91
Even when the pressure of international public opinion was believed to have a significant 
impact on the Bulgarian Government, it was of little help to the defendants.92 The FO 
worried lest publicity should do more personal harm than good to the accused. It was 
extremely reluctant to circulate freely diplomatic reports from Bulgaria. It preferred to show 
the dispatches in confidence to selected journalists who could be trusted to weave them into 
articles. Whitehall officials hoped to develop ‘a system for ordering feature articles and ... 
place these in the appropriate journals’.93 Such an approach, however, was not to the liking 
of the British Press and Radio. The media handled information coming directly from the FO 
with care, generally regarding it as being adapted to Government interests and therefore 
partial. The FO often found even the Government-financed BBC European Service 
scrupulously objective and reluctant to broadcast what it considered to be undiluted 
propaganda.
The news editors preferred to rely on their own correspondents, rather than use ready 
diplomatic information. The Bulgarian authorities, however, posed many hindrances to the 
entry of journalists into the country. Most trials were conducted in camera leaving the
91 F0371/72138, R13231, FO to Sofia, 30.11.1948; F0371/72139a, R13675, Greenhill to FO, 4.12.1948
92 FO371/72130, R5097, FO minutes, 5.04.1948
93 F0371/72133, R8342, McDermott, 29.07.1948, Talbot de Malahide, 21.08.1948
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media with the feeling that their people had travelled in vain. All this made the calls for an 
openly tough attitude to Bulgaria difficult to translate into concrete measures.94
By far the greatest impediment to what the FO saw as adequate publicity of Bulgarian 
developments was the low British public interest towards the country. Consequently, the 
BBC tended to include information about it in pieces dealing with the Soviet satellites in 
general. The FO complained that it was almost impossible to ‘selT material from Bulgaria 
to the diplomatic correspondents of the newspapers.95 In response, British diplomatic 
representatives who felt frustrated by the meagre coverage occasionally attacked the 
Southern Department for not ‘organising’ better publicity. In relation to the Social 
Democrats’ trial in mid-1948, Stemdale-Bennett wrote that ‘public apathy... [lay] very 
largely in the hands of the Governments concerned and the main object of the British 
Government's action should surely be to awake public interest’.96
The British Legation in Sofia received the greatest blow during Gichev’s trial in early 1948. 
It had managed to secure the right for foreign observers to be present in court but no British 
journalist was willing to report.97 When even the Foreign Secretary enquired about press 
coverage, the FO confessed to the futility of its attempts to induce various papers to send 
reporters for the trial.
We are unfortunately at a disadvantage in trying to exert pressure upon the press in regard to 
corespondents behind the curtain because they all feel that their men are wasted in that they can 
only send straight reports such as the news agencies supply and are unable, owing to censorship
94 F0371/72143, R279, Bateman to Stemdale-Bennett, 6.02.1948
95 F0371/72135, R10406, Wallinger, Watson, Stannarel, 4.09.1948
96 F0371/72134, R9096, Stemdale-Bennet to FO, 30.07.1948
97 F0371/72132, R5337, FO minutes, 3.05.1948
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and/or physical danger, to provide any worthwhile comment until they have passed through the 
Curtain.98
In addition to the technical problems regarding the dispatch of reporters to Eastern Europe, a 
range of political difficulties existed. The FO worried that media attention could expose the 
Government’s actions abroad in undesirable light. It would not be difficult for journalists to 
notice that Britain’s attitude to foreign trials was not the same everywhere. It would be 
embarrassing for the Government to answer questions about why it sent observers to Polish 
trials and not to Greek, and why it was willing to answer Parliamentary Questions about 
Polish and Bulgarian trials but not about those in Greece or Spain."
The FO feared that the increased publicity it favoured would bring greater public scrutiny of 
British policy which could then backfire. The Government could be accused of not 
following up its propaganda with sufficiently tough concrete measures towards the 
Communist bloc. The FO faced a dilemma on publicity, similar to that regarding earlier 
official protests to the Bulgarian Government. British foreign policy experts had no illusions 
about the inherent link between diplomatic moves and publicity. A bolder policy would 
guarantee continuous publicity and propaganda. But in this case, publicity was itself 
receiving so much attention because it had remained one of the few means of exerting 
pressure on the Communist regime in Bulgaria. It was necessary and worthwhile because 
it signified continued British interest in events in Bulgaria. If British attempts to make the 
Peace Treaty work had come to no avail, then the continuous disregard of the Bulgarian 
Government for its international obligations should be exposed at every suitable 
opportunity.100
98 F 0371/72131, R1861, Bevin, Wallinger, 9-11.02.1948
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The controversial issue of publicity was complicated further when Sargent became anxious 
‘that the number of protests being made to the satellites and given to the press was too great 
and was beginning to look ridiculous’. Contrary to the Southern Department’s carefully 
elaborated logic that where protests had no effect publicity would work, he suggested that it 
was ‘all right to protest’ as long as less publicity followed.101 Sargent’s influential opinion 
rapidly changed the perspective from which the Foreign Office looked at the link between 
action and propaganda. Since diplomatic notes had no meaningful consequences and media 
coverage merely advertised defeat, both methods came to be considered undesirable. 
Towards the end of 1948 ‘the general feeling... was against advertising, by ineffectual 
protests... inability to enforce the Treaty’.102
Publicity was essential but not sufficient, unless closely linked to a well-rounded 
approach towards the Bulgarian regime. To have any effect on the course of events in 
Bulgaria, Britain needed to combine international exposure of the methods of the 
Bulgarian authorities with political action which would secure implementation of the 
Peace Treaty. This was where the British Government faltered: it did nothing about 
violations of the human rights provisions beyond just calling attention to them. It refused 
to admit openly that the question of human rights in Bulgaria was related to the very 
essence of the political system, and that this was too broad an issue to be dealt with by the 
limited machinery of the Treaty.
Economic Relations with Bulgaria. While experiencing difficulties in the formulation of 
precise and enforceable policy towards Bulgaria, the Foreign Office was equally unprepared 
for dealing with British-Bulgarian economic relations. The general state of affairs between 
the two countries rendered the prospect of normal trade exchanges not only unlikely but also
101 FO371/72170, R2307, Wallinger, 9.02.1948
102 F0371/72139a, R13568, Talbot de Malahide, 18.11.1948
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highly controversial. Throughout 1948, the British side needed to clarify the basic principles 
underpinning economic relations with Bulgaria.
Since interest in trade with Bulgaria was determined neither by a strong tradition nor a 
sound economic rationale, the question had highly political undertones. The international 
political climate made each country look upon the approaches of the other with suspicion. 
The Bulgarian Government seemed eager to trade but feared that Britain would impose 
severe conditions for compensation of the property of Allied citizens nationalised after 9 
September 1944. The British Government insisted that Bulgaria should resume payment of 
its external pre-war debt, unilaterally suspended in March 1948. Bulgaria should also reach 
agreement with the foreign holders of pre-war Bulgarian Government bonds. Until this was 
done in December 1948, trade was conducted on an ad hoc basis. This involved protracted 
negotiations between the two sides. Long and complicated co-ordination between the 
various British Governmental Departments dealing with ‘trade with the enemy’ was 
required as well as painful communication with the multitudinous Bulgarian state 
enterprises which took ‘until Doomsday’ to make up their minds.103
As on other subjects, the views of the British representative in Bulgaria and of the FO 
differed. Stemdale-Bennett recommended a consistent course for the conclusion of a trade 
agreement which would guard British economic interest. He warned that unless forced to 
commit itself to specific terms, Bulgaria would continue to obtain supplies from Britain 
without reciprocal legal binding. His line of reasoning questioned the long-term effects of 
British-Bulgarian trade. Bulgarian purchases in 1948 exceeded export threefold in value and 
consisted mainly of machines, wool, chemicals, medicines and rubber. This could contribute 
to the collectivisation of Bulgarian agriculture and support Bulgarian industry. Significantly,
103 F0371/72135, R10432, Watson, 17.09.1948; F0371/72158, R5861, note verbale, 31.03.1948,
3.05.1948
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Bulgaria was buying from the West only goods not secured by its long-standing agreement 
with the Soviet Union.104
The alternative view was that Britain was not in a position to affect internal Bulgarian 
policy, or for that matter, the policy of any of the satellites. Some trade ‘might whet the 
[Bulgarian] appetite’. Unless the desired items were included in the British list of controlled 
exports, it would seem unwise to refuse the business. Since Britain was rarely the only 
exporter, others would get a share of the Bulgarian market and Bulgaria would get what it 
had formerly obtained from the UK without the inconvenience of meeting British demands. 
Moreover, Britain could make buying easy without itself buying anything from Bulgaria. 
The latter, as well as other satellites, would soon be in need of sterling earnings and then 
prepared to sign a trade agreement. If, as a result, Bulgaria became to any extent dependent 
on the UK, this could be turned into a useful political weapon.105
The gravest British doubt regarding trade with Bulgaria sprang from scepticism that ‘the 
Bulgarians had anything of exceptional value’. In the beginning of 1949, the Ministry of 
Food wrote to the Foreign Office that it had ‘really no interest... and ... saw little prospect 
of trade’. The biggest potential Bulgarian export was tobacco but the FO ruled out 
purchases. It categorically refused to allow Bulgarian tobacco to compete with Greek and 
Turkish even if the latter ‘cost a little more’.106 Such attitude shadowed pre-1939 concerns 
showing little change of the link between politics and trade when it came to choosing 
between Bulgaria and its southern Balkan neighbours.
The unyielding British attitude proved justified. While hesitating about its economic 
approach to Bulgaria, Britain had turned down Bulgarian requests for licences for import in
104 F 0371/78227, R946, Porter, 17.02.1949
105 F0371/78331, R833, conversation British Embassy Washington - State Department Office of European 
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the spring and summer of 1949. As a result the Bulgarian Government conceded that there 
should be a general agreement not only on trade but also on issues related to debt and 
compensations.107 This, however, did not alter the ambiguous British conduct. Unwittingly, 
the FO and the Board of Trade made sure that Britain accrued no significant economic 
advantages which could be used to exert political influence on the Bulgarian authorities.
Even in economic relations, the FO was more interested in propaganda rather than in actual 
trade. Already in January 1947, in a special memorandum Mayhew promoted the idea to 
‘put Communism in Eastern Europe on the defensive vis-a-vis Social Democracy not only 
politically but in terms of living standards’. He proposed publicising the idea that that 
Eastern Europe was being exploited by the Soviet Union. This was discussed at a special 
meeting chaired by Gladwyn Jebb, Head of the FO Reconstruction Department, which 
decided that such an argument was too broad and easily disputed. Instead, it was more 
useful to concentrate on concrete topics with relatively short-term implications. Attention 
should focus on the great expenses incurred by the Soviet troops in occupied countries and 
on Soviet acquisition of former German and Italian assets in Eastern Europe. 
Simultaneously, the Communist Parties’ lack of economic competence should be 
continuously exposed. But generally, it was agreed that economic propaganda could be of 
little political use.108
The International Dimension. As the British Government had little
practical interest in Bulgaria, it stumbled over the task of how to express its attitude to 
Bulgarian Communism in specific foreign policy measures. By the end of 1948, the need 
to react to internal Bulgarian developments had acquired distinctly moral and ideological 
overtones. This was in sharp contrast to the FO’s unwillingness to get involved in actions,
107 F0371/78277-8, FO minutes and letters, 29.12.1948-13.10.1949
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which were known to produce little effect inside Bulgaria and merely drew attention to 
British helplessness regarding the country. Still, Britain refused to dissociate itself 
completely from Bulgaria on account of the broader significance of events there. Not only 
was the consolidation of the Communist regime indicative of developments across 
Eastern Europe, but it had specific Balkan dimensions.
Bulgarian Involvement in the Greek Civil War. Throughout the Second World War 
British attention to Bulgaria had been determined by Bulgarian occupation of Greek and 
Yugoslav territories. Post-war relations between Bulgaria and its neighbours remained a 
vital factor for the British position regarding the country. British foreign policy experts 
could point to numerous confirmations of continuing Bulgarian irredentist ambitions. The 
original FF Government had reiterated its wartime predecessors’ demands for Greek 
Thrace, or at the minimum, an Aegean outlet. This objective was common to all 
Bulgarian political parties, remaining a foreign policy priority for Petkov’s Agrarians and 
Lulchev’s Social Democrats even after they walked out of the coalition with the 
Communists.
Britain’s view was that Bulgarian claims to Greek territory were all the more dangerous 
since they coincided with Soviet interests in the Balkans. Soviet dominance over Bulgaria 
would ensure that any Bulgarian expansion to the south would virtually bring the USSR to 
the Eastern Mediterranean to which it was believed to harbour traditional aspirations. Such 
British fears had found considerable proof in Soviet behaviour in Iran and towards Turkey 
in 1945 - 1946. British military and political analysts, on their own and in consultations
108 F0371/65975, N7438, FO minutes, 9.06.1947; F0371/65947, N4247, Mayhew memorandum, 
10.01.1947, EID paper, 23.01.1947
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with the US Government, had concluded that securing a presence in the Straits had been 
among the prime objects of Soviet manoeuvres in the Middle East in the spring of 1946.109
Greece stood in the first line of defence against any Soviet advance in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The ongoing Civil War made the situation there especially precarious 
from the British perspective. Most British diplomatic and political observers believed that 
the Greek Communists were receiving moral and material support from the Soviet Union, 
which aimed to increase influence over Greece. If this method succeeded, Stalin would 
have the double advantage of establishing another Communist regime in the Balkans and 
acquiring vital strategic positions. The FO Southern Department was certain that the 
Soviet Union planned to obtain control of Greece or at least to diminish sufficiently 
British and US influence there. Soviet success in either alternative would have a long­
standing impact on Britain:
Communist control of Greece would not place the Commonwealth in mortal danger but it would 
seriously jeopardise ... chances of defending vital areas, turn Turkey’s flank, weaken Italy’s 
strategic position and threaten communications through the Mediterranean.110
The British Government’s concern was that unofficial Bulgarian involvement in the 
Greek Civil War was a vital instrument for the realisation of such a Soviet design. Since 
the first days of the Communist take-over in Bulgaria in September 1944, the British 
Government feared that instability in northern Greece where the Civil War was most 
acute, could easily be used to the territorial benefit of Bulgaria. The Athens Government 
constantly provided the FO with evidence that the Bulgarian Communist authorities were 
arming, training and sheltering Greek guerrillas. As a result, armed clashes regularly
109 Mark, E. ‘The War Scare. ..'
110 F0371/72196, R10197, ‘Bastion’ memorandum, 20.07.1948
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occurred on the Bulgarian-Greek border. The tension did not recede after the conclusion 
of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, which the Greek Government also signed.111
The British Government acknowledged that Bulgarian assistance to the Greek rebels was 
not as crucial as that afforded by Yugoslavia and Albania. Even so, it was an important 
contribution to the cause of spreading Communism and disrupted the fragile balance of 
power in the Balkans.112 British observers were convinced that Bulgarian state-organised 
help to the Greek Communists was carried on in close co-ordination with the Soviet 
Union. This derived from the assumption that as a rule Moscow actively supported and 
directed foreign Communists.
British analysis of the Soviet attitude to the Greek Civil War was based on overt signs 
such as Soviet diplomatic actions and public pronouncements castigating British 
involvement in Greece. Similar hostile to Britain statements by Bulgarian Communist 
leaders only served to confirm the British belief in a Soviet-led initiative for 
comprehensive aid to the KKE, the Greek Communist Party. Even the most attentive 
British observers had little reason to suspect lack of Soviet enthusiasm regarding the 
Greek Communists’ efforts. It remained almost unnoticed that from the end of 1946 
Stalin was behaving in a more conciliatory manner with respect to Greece. This could be 
surmised from the Soviet agreement to the formation of a Commission of Investigation of 
Greek Frontier Incidents.113 What the British Government would never have guessed was 
the fact that in May 1947, in a personal meeting with the Greek Communist leader Nichos 
Zachariades, Stalin was extremely hesitant as to the wisdom of providing money,
111 Bozhinov, V. Zashtita na natsionalnata nezavissimost na Bulgaria 1944 -  1947. Sofia: Izdatelstvo na 
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equipment and weapons to the Greek Partisans.114 By January 1948, Stalin had grown 
completely disillusioned with the KKE. He warned a Yugoslav delegation that if by 
supporting the Greek guerrillas Yugoslavia came to war with Britain and the USA, the 
Soviet Union would not come to its rescue.115 No such caution was directed to the 
Bulgarian Communists who -  with Stalin’s knowledge - had set up a whole secret 
organisation for aid to their Greek comrades.116 This discrepancy might merely reflect the 
fact that Russian archives are not yet fully open to researchers and the relevant documents 
have not yet surfaced. An alternative interpretation is to see the warning of Tito not so 
much as related to the Greek Civil War but as a sign of the growing Soviet irritation at the 
Yugoslav Communists’ bid to become the leading regional power in the Balkans.
In any case, the British Government considered that Stalin fully supported the Greek 
guerrillas. This was seen as part of a larger Soviet scheme for influence over Greece in the 
familiar pattern of developments across the Soviet zone. The ultimate Soviet aim was 
judged to be political and strategic domination of the whole Balkan Peninsula. The FO 
understood that the proclamation of the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan would be 
an additional stimulus for Soviet determination to win over Greece with the help of its 
northern neighbours.117 Such an analysis of the disposition of forces in South Eastern 
Europe provided additional dimensions to the position of Bulgaria. From one direction, it 
was ‘a springboard towards Turkey and Greece’: from the opposite standpoint it was ‘an 
important link which, if broken, might seriously weaken the whole Soviet chain’.118
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British representatives in Bulgaria suggested that what they believed to be Soviet 
intervention in Greece could be effectively deterred only by matching military measures 
undertaken jointly by Britain and the United States.119 In agreement with Heath, Stemdale- 
Bennett recommended resolute action to stop the progress of the Communists in Greece. 
For the two diplomats, resolute common Anglo-American action contained less danger of 
precipitating an open war than allowing Soviet subversion in Greece to continue and 
eventually spill over into Turkey. The latter effect would occur if Britain and the USA 
continued only to remonstrate verbally.120 With some hesitation, the FO Southern 
Department acknowledged the value of Stemdale-Bennett’s recommendations and in the 
late spring of 1948 started to explore the possibility of applying diplomatic pressure on 
Moscow both directly and through the United Nations. Preliminary efforts were however 
cut short by Bevin who totally disagreed that this was the time or place for a ‘showdown’ 
with the USSR.121
Any British offensive against what was considered to be the Soviet interest in the Balkans 
had to be backed by a real show of force. Greece offered such a possibility, as the 
international influence of the Soviet Union would be seriously undermined by curtailing the 
advance of the Greek Communists. This would have the supplementary effect of frustrating 
the consolidation of Communism in Bulgaria. Any British military initiative in northern 
Greece would alert the Bulgarian leaders as to their vulnerability caused by the contiguity 
with Greece and Turkey. Although somewhat unstable, Britain’s position in these two 
countries in 1947 and 1948 could theoretically be used as a point from which to apply 
pressure on the southern flank of the Soviet zone of influence. For this, however, Britain 
possessed neither the military capability nor the necessary political will. In the immediate
119 Ibid.
120 F0371/72154, R4836, Stemadale-Bennett to FO, 14.04.1948
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post-war period the British Government was committed to restricting military 
commitments overseas which would also affect armed forces in the Balkans. To this end, 
the British Government looked into possibilities of reducing the cross-border tensions 
created by the Greek Civil War. It abstained from directly challenging the perceived 
Soviet involvement in Greece and therefore the whole Soviet hold on Eastern Europe.
The Danger o f a Danubian Federation. Britain’s concern about Bulgarian
involvement in the Greek Civil War had a corollary in the question of a Bulgarian- 
Yugoslav Federation. The idea for closer national co-operation among all the Balkan 
countries liberated from the Ottoman Empire existed in Balkan political thinking since the 
late XVIII century. In the inter-war years it was promoted by leftist political circles as a 
solution to the bitter rivalries in the Peninsula, and was adopted by the Bulgarian 
Communist Party.122
Towards the end of the Second World War the Foreign Office too had contemplated the 
possibility of a Balkan Federation but had come up against the Soviet veto in Moscow in 
October 1943. When the post-war Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments revived the idea, 
Britain faced a completely different geopolitical situation. The appearance of a large state 
with a predominantly Slav population would certainly change drastically the balance of 
forces in the Balkans. In the post-war period, an additional complication arose from the 
fact that both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had Communist-dominated Governments. By 
1944, Britain was inclined to suspect these of easily and willingly becoming channels of 
Soviet influence throughout the Balkans. Therefore, in the new circumstances, the 
proposed South Slav Federation would have distinctly negative implications for Britain’s 
position in the region.
121 F0371/72154, R4837, Wallinger, Bateman, 27.04.1948
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In January 1945, after official Bulgarian declarations calling for the speedy establishment 
of a Federation, the British Government was quick to send notes to the Bulgarian, 
Yugoslav and Soviet Governments, voicing disagreement with the proposal. Britain 
agreed with the planned institution of a separate Macedonian unit in the Federal Yugoslav 
state but warned that it would not recognise any transfer of territory from Bulgaria to 
Yugoslavia hinted at by official Bulgarian statements. The British warning was firmly 
reiterated at the Yalta Conference.123 Britain’s stance reflected concern that the discussed 
unification of Yugoslav (Vardar) and Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia, within Yugoslavia or 
as a federal entity in its own right, would unquestionably raise the question of the status 
of the Greek, that is Aegean part of Macedonia.
Britain’s uneasiness regarding Macedonia was exacerbated by already existing worries 
about Bulgarian and Yugoslav involvement on the side of the guerrillas in the Greek Civil 
War. FO position papers and internal communications prove that British thinking did not 
underestimate the strong -  and indeed traditional -  role of Macedonia for the position of 
any Bulgarian regime, including the Communist. The strength of the latter, in turn, would 
bear directly on the vitality of any Danubian scheme. British officials suspected that 
unfulfilled Bulgarian territorial demands could be linked with those of Yugoslavia which 
was vigorously supporting the Greek guerrillas.
It was the logical connection between the aspirations of the Greek Partisans and the 
Bulgarian-Yugoslav plans that made the British Government extremely watchful of any 
notion of changes in the southern Balkan regions. The Greek Communists were known to 
be fighting for ‘Free Greece’. In the worst for Britain scenario, the Partisans’ efforts could 
concentrate on Greek Macedonia with Bulgarian and Yugoslav backing. In 1947 -  1948
122 Semerdjiev, P. BKP... p.27-45; Lalkov, M. Ot nadezhdata kum razocharovanieto. Sofia: Vek 22, 1994. 
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the KKE talked of detaching Aegean Macedonia from Greece, admitting that this could 
only succeed with the assistance of the “People’s Democracies” to the north.124 If Greek 
Macedonia effectively seceded from the Athens Government, it would not be difficult to 
set up a ‘Free Macedonia’ by the addition of territory from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. 
Such a possibility looked all the more realistic when considered against the background of 
the concurrent Bulgarian authorities’ promotion of a “Macedonian nation” in the Pirin 
region and the proclaimed intention of creating a Bulgarian-Yugoslav Federation. It 
would solve a number of existing irredentist and ideological problems: nationalist 
Bulgarian and Serbian ambitions towards Macedonia would be satisfied, while the Greek 
Communists could join established Communist regimes.
Above all, from the British perspective the Federation idea would put under considerable 
threat the independence and integrity of Greece. If a large Communist Slav state took 
shape to the south of the Balkans, the Soviet orbit would be extended to the Aegean thus 
disrupting all British plans for the reinforcement of the Mediterranean. Greece would be 
reduced to impotence and Turkey severed from Europe. For Britain therefore the 
importance of the preservation and strengthening of Greek legitimacy was such that the 
FO thought it prudent to prevent the Macedonian question from even becoming a subject 
of international discussion.125
Britain’s consideration of the Macedonian question steered clear of any judgement of the 
validity of the claims of either Bulgaria, Serbia or Greece as to the ethnic composition of 
Macedonia. The nationalist controversy had for decades marred relations in the Balkans 
but was per se of little genuine interest to the British Government. The latter was of
123 Ibid., p.215; Livanios, D. ‘Bulgar-Yugoslav...’ p.208-215
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course acutely aware of the political passions these issues always inflamed in Greece and 
the neighbouring countries. After the Second World War, Britain refused to become 
entangled in the ongoing debate as to the existence and origins of any “Macedonian 
nation” as opposed to the mere mixture of populations of different religious and ethnic 
character.126 For practical purposes Britain looked upon Macedonia mostly in geographic 
terms, evaluating its strategic importance in the shifting Balkan equilibrium. As Britain 
could neither influence the substance of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav negotiations after 1945, 
nor secure territorial alterations to the Greek advantage, it firmly supported the status quo 
regarding Macedonia, that is its division between Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece.
Looking for means to fortify Britain’s Eastern Mediterranean flank, British officials 
understood that the Soviet Union was undoubtedly going to do the same on the edges of 
its sphere. In the light of this, Britain was bound to reconsider the importance of Bulgaria, 
which bordered two countries forming a vital link in Britain’s strategic defence plan. 
British observation of political and military developments in Bulgaria especially focused 
on the issue of the South Slav Federation, which -  if it came into being - would upset the 
strategic equilibrium in the region. Convinced of Soviet domination of both Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia, British specialists had no doubt that Stalin monitored and in fact guided the 
progress of the Federation idea. They were certain that Stalin would not fail to understand 
that the creation of a large state at the centre of the Balkans would naturally increase the 
apprehension of the neighbouring countries. Such a result, in Britain’s view, would 
definitely prejudice any advantages the establishment of a firmly pro-Soviet Communist 
formation might entail.127 Watching the development of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav
126 Yugoslav and Bulgarian views on “the Macedonian nation” are discussed in Lalkov, M. Ot 
nadezhdata... and Nation, R. ‘A Balkan Union? Southeastern Europe in Soviet Security Policy, 1944-8. ’ 
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Governments’ plans for a South Slav Federation would give Britain another indication of 
the overall aims of the Soviet Union and the lengths to which it proposed to pursue them.
After the 1945 British note opposing Federation, for the next two years until the 
conclusion of the Peace Treaty, the Bulgarian Government was careful not to provoke 
further British protests on the subject. This did not mean, however, that the goal had been 
cancelled. On the contrary, it was simply postponed. Meanwhile, the Government was 
implementing internal measures which would smooth the prospective union with 
Yugoslavia. The unconcealed plan was to establish a customs union after the ratification 
of the Peace Treaty, then an alliance with Yugoslavia and Albania, and finally a 
Federation. In some unguarded statements, Bulgarian Communists even called for 
rapprochement with Greece, where they envisaged the establishment of ‘a democratic 
regime’. This alerted Britain to the fact that indeed Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were poised 
to unify into one state stretching between the Black and Adriatic seas, which could then 
form the nucleus of an even larger Balkan Federation.128 For Britain this constituted a 
design for unprecedented Communist territorial, economic and ultimately strategic gains 
in the Aegean. This also spelt the undisguised danger of future attempts to incorporate 
Greece or parts of it in the proposed Federation. The overall outcome of such a 
development would be Greece’s engulfment in the Soviet sphere.
After the recognition of the Bulgarian Government, Great Britain had no means of 
influencing the course of events regarding a Balkan Federation. All it could do was to 
observe the process from outside and try to judge how soon the Federation was going to 
emerge. Diplomatic reports from across Eastern Europe suggested that its launch was not 
as imminent as some declarations of Bulgarian statesmen suggested. Stemdale-Bennett’s 
growing impression in January 1948 was that in Bulgaria itself the ‘formality of a
128 Lalkov, M. Ot nadezhdata... p.209-221
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federation even with Yugoslavia may still be in doubt and formation of a larger 
confederation even more so’.In Sofia it was apparent that for various reasons the question 
was receding into the background. There had been speculation about the personal rivalry 
between Dimitrov and Tito, who during his visit in Sofia had the air of ‘a prospective 
purchaser coming to inspect the estate with a view to taking it over’. Another difficulty 
related to Macedonia, as it seemed to the British Minister that Bulgaria was not really 
prepared to see the Pirin region detached except for territorial compensation in the 
Aegean.129 Nothing in Prague, Bucharest and Budapest or, for that matter, even in 
Belgrade made the British representatives in these cities consider the idea of a Federation 
practical or think that Yugoslavia was seriously contemplating it.130 Still, the available 
information was often confusing and the substance of the propaganda had not changed 
much.131
The vague British perception that progress towards a Balkan Federation had been halted 
was not based on any firm evidence, and even less on knowledge of the changing Soviet 
position. It was known that leading Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communists had been 
summoned to Moscow shortly after the signing of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav Agreement for 
Friendship and Co-operation in Bled (Yugoslavia) on 1 August 1947. British observers 
however had no information about the talks with the Soviet leadership, and even less of 
the severe Soviet criticism of the noisy publicity with which the Agreement had been 
concluded. Stalin condemned the wide scope of the document, which touched on a 
number of political, economic and cultural issues. He was extremely displeased with the 
fact of its signing before the ratification of the Peace Treaty. Most importantly, Stalin
129 F0371/66985, R10224, British aide-memoire to State, 21.07.1947; F0371/72162, R484, Sofia to FO,
8.01.1948
130 F0371/72162, R52, Belgrade to FO, 27.12.1947, R740, Bucharest to FO, 16.01.1948
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pointed out that the precipitate actions of the two Governments gave ‘the reactionary 
Anglo-American elements’ a pretext to increase their military intervention in Greek and 
Turkish affairs.132
Stalin’s angry reaction to continued open Bulgarian and Yugoslav adherence to a Balkan 
Federation reached an unprecedented level in early 1948. On 17 January 1948, Dimitrov 
spoke to journalists about, among other questions, the Federation. Stating that the idea 
should be left to mature, he said that as a first step towards Federation the “People’s 
Democracies” of Eastern Europe would enter into a customs union. Dimitrov’s statement 
that, when it finally went ahead, the envisaged Federation might include even Greece 
provoked an immediate international outcry.133
The Kremlin reacted swiftly: on 24 January Dimitrov received a ciphered telegram that 
his interview was ‘judged by the Moscow friends as harmful’. It was considered to be 
undermining the “new democracies” and above all giving a winning card to Britain and 
the United States which could point to Dimitrov’s inopportune words as an example of 
aggressive Soviet plans. According to the Soviet message, such grand designs, propagated 
by a well-known activist of the international Communist movement might serve as an 
excuse for closer alignment of Britain, the USA and Western Europe against Communism 
worldwide.134 In addition to this private reproach, Dimitrov was publicly rebuked in the 
Soviet newspaper Pravda which wrote that the Soviet leadership did not subscribe to 
‘problematic and fantastic federations and confederations’.135 The final blow to Dimitrov 
was dealt on 10 February 1948 when Stalin presided over a tripartite Bulgarian-Yugoslav- 
Soviet meeting at the Kremlin. He castigated the Bulgarian Prime Minister for making
132 Gibianskii, L. ‘The Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Soviet Bloc. ’ Gori. Fr. The Soviet Union... p.228- 
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sweeping statements without higher authorisation. Stalin repeated that Dimitrov’s 
declarations made easier the creation of the Western bloc. He was especially irritated by 
the possibility that friends and foes alike could think that it was all a Soviet idea.136
The FO was quick to grasp that the setting up of a broad Federation would make it 
extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to condemn plans for Western European 
integration.137 However, this was not viewed as the primary reason for the Soviet change 
of attitude regarding Federation. British experts had little information on which 
convincingly to base their analysis and could only speculate about Stalin’s reluctance to 
deal with an extraordinarily strong South Slav state which might spur centripetal 
tendencies in the Soviet bloc. Retrospective interpretations of Stalin’s motives were 
precipitated by the open Soviet-Yugoslav split later in 1948. What became immediately 
obvious, however, was that the Bulgarian Communist leadership was not in a position to 
take independent decisions about Bulgaria’s external or internal affairs. The quick 
dropping of plans for a Bulgarian-Yugoslav Federation demonstrated clearly that even the 
most long-standing items on the Bulgarian Communists' agenda could be overturned at 
the Kremlin’s insistence. If Britain needed proof that the Bulgarian Communists’ loyalty 
to the Soviet Union stood above commitment to any specific actions, it was not going to 
receive a better one in a long time.138
This trend was only institutionalised by the founding in September 1947 of the 
Communist Information Bureau, which undertook the co-ordination of the activities of 
nine Communist parties. This practically subordinated them to the Soviet Communist
135 F 0371/72162, R1349, translation of Pravda excerpt, Moscow to FO, 29.01.1948
136 Issussov, M. Stalin... p.68-72, Djilas, M. Conversations... p. 173-175
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Party and through it, to the interests of the Soviet state. The leading objective of the 
Cominform was the acceleration of the revolutionary transformation of the countries of 
Eastern Europe on the Soviet model. This was to be reflected not only in their domestic 
developments but also in their foreign policy. The Cominform’s first meeting confirmed 
the validity of Marxist-Leninist postulates about the inevitable clash between 
Communism and Capitalism.139
The establishment of the Cominform had relatively little impact on British attitudes to 
Bulgaria. The new international institution was regarded as a Soviet instrument for 
exporting Communism and consolidating the Soviet position in Eastern Europe through 
the national Communist parties. Such views only justified the British Government’s 
already existing assumptions regarding the Soviet Union’s aggressive foreign policy. 
British experts understood that a new phase of Communist development had begun. This 
increased their understanding of the Soviet Union’s political and strategic objectives. 
Simultaneously, Bulgaria’s role in the Cominform was in line with British expectations 
and added no new dimensions in the British analysis of developments in that country. It 
confirmed the FO’s belief that the Bulgarian Communist Party was set on faithfully 
emulating the Soviet model. As British observers had long accepted the advent of 
Communism in Bulgaria, this brought no active British reaction.140
Observation o f the Military Clauses o f the Peace Treaty. Britain had one
supplementary objection to the establishment of a Danubian Federation, namely that it 
would lead to the formal disappearance of Bulgaria as a separate object of international 
law. If the Bulgarian state no longer existed as such, its economic, military and moral
139 Di Biaggio, A. 'The Marshall Plan and the Founding of the Cominform June -  September 1947. ’ Gori.
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obligations under the Peace Treaty would be nullified. In view of Yugoslavia’s Allied 
status, the new Yugoslav-Bulgarian state could refuse to assume the responsibilities of the 
erstwhile Bulgarian Government.141 This would entail serious consequences for British 
interests in the Balkans, as usual related to the Greek issue. As a federal unit, Bulgaria 
could continue providing help to the Greek Communist guerrillas. With combined 
resources, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could pose a greater threat to the existence of Greece 
than either of the two alone.
Even while the Federation question was fading during the unfolding Tito-Stalin dispute in 
1947 - 1948, Britain was distinctly aware of Bulgaria’s military capabilities. To limit 
these the British Government could only insist on due observation of the restrictions the 
Peace Treaty imposed on the Bulgarian army. Britain had abstained from enforcement of 
human rights observation in Bulgaria, but this did not preclude it from contesting the latter’s 
fulfilment of the military clauses of the Peace Treaty.
In March 1948, the Bulgarian Minister of Defence Georgi Damyanov declared that the 
country had complied with the militaiy articles of the Treaty, something Britain was in a 
position to challenge formally. Carefully compiled British information showed that although 
Bulgaria had indeed cut down its armed forces, it was increasing the activities of para­
military organisations, including the militia, the border guards, and even sports clubs. To 
prove or refute such suspicions Britain needed to inspect the Bulgarian army, above all in 
border areas, which for some time had been practically sealed off for foreigners. British 
demands to that effect were justified by the assertion that proper verification and acceptance 
of the official Bulgarian statement could only be brought by examination.142
141 F0371/72162, R95, FO memorandum, 23.12.1947, R700, Fitzmaurice, 31.10.1947
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Earlier US attempts to inspect the southern Bulgarian border had been ignored or obstructed 
by the Bulgarian Government. The latter had declined to give assistance claiming that it was 
only obliged to respond to demands emanating from all Three Allied Powers, and the USSR 
had not supported the US initiative.143
At the end of January 1948, Britain had agreed to participate in another US-led joint attempt 
at border inspection. The diplomatic notes requesting a tour of the borders were to be based 
the on the relevant Article 12 of the Peace Treaty and not to mention alleged Bulgarian 
involvement in the Greek situation. The FO also agreed to back the State Department in 
declaring a dispute with the Bulgarian Government under Article 36 in case of renewed 
Bulgarian obstruction.144 For the first time the Bulgarian authorities did not dispute Britain’s 
and the USA’s right of inspection but again insisted on a similar Soviet approach, which 
was not forthcoming.145
A last-moment British reversal ruined the whole effort. The British Legation in Italy insisted 
that any action in the Balkans be postponed until after the Italian elections, scheduled for 18 
April 1948. Bevin swiftly agreed. The embarrassed FO was left with the task of explaining 
to the State Department that ‘the balance of advantages’ had been reconsidered in an attempt 
‘to co-ordinate... overall policy... without undue regard for Treaty enforcement for its own 
sake’.146 The change provoked a strongly worded warning from Stemdale-Bennett that
...in countries like Bulgaria we are unlikely to achieve effective results and therefore it is easy to 
argue that implementation here is of academic value which should be subordinated to practical 
considerations in Italy. This is false reading because the importance in Bulgaria is not in concrete
143 F0371/72166 - 72169, FO communications and minutes, 26.02. - 27.05.1948
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results but in psychological stand - whenever we try to soft-pedal the Communists are jubilant and 
our stock goes down in other quarters.147
In June 1948, the question of inspection of the Bulgarian border was briefly revived in both 
Britain and the USA. This time Bevin dismissed it claiming that it was not ‘wise to intensify 
a quarrel now while we have so much on our hands in Germany’.148 This attitude was 
maintained in the face of a stream of Greek grievances, submitted to the FO not only on 
border incidents but also on intransigent Bulgarian behaviour over restitution of Greek 
property and war reparations. Greece continuously pressed the British and US Governments 
to implement those provisions of the Peace Treaty dealing with Bulgarian failure to fulfil its 
obligations. Invariably, the Greek Government was firmly told that Britain was not in the 
position to uphold the Greek claims against Bulgaria.149
British anxiety that Bulgaria ‘will simply treat the Treaty as a joke’150 was confirmed by the 
Bulgarian Government’s treatment of the Special Commission set up in December 1947 
by the United Nations to investigate Bulgarian-Greek border incidents (UNSCOB). The 
Commission was to look into the Greek Government’s allegations that the Bulgarian 
regime was helping the Greek Communist guerrillas. Initially, Bulgaria showed signs of 
co-operation with the United Nations. In mid-1947, however, the Bulgarian Government 
categorically refused to admit the Commission into the country, stating that it had been 
established illegally and infringed Bulgarian sovereignty.151 Simultaneously, Kolarov 
practically confirmed some of the accusations against Bulgaria, stating that it was right to 
let in refugees from ‘the terror of Greece’ and unwittingly admitting the occurrence of
147 F 0371/72166, R2727, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 27.02.1948
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frontier incidents.152 Without British knowledge, Molotov had informed Dimitrov that the 
USSR was no longer in favour of the UNSCOB and advised the Bulgarian Government to 
refuse the Commission right of entry to the country.153
British reluctance to bring the Bulgarian Government to task about non-observation of its 
military obligations partially derived from the belief that Bulgaria could not pose an 
imminent military threat to Greece. Intelligence from the spring of 1948 testified that 
despite the gradual re-equipping of the Bulgarian army with Soviet help, the state of training 
was backward and the general efficiency very low. Some units were judged to be potentially 
able to stage guerrilla-style operations in Greece but the army as a whole could not be 
considered modem or efficient by European standards.154 Such arguments showed that 
British policy planners distinguished between the perceived ambitions of the Bulgarian 
Government and the practical ability to fulfil them. They were guided by realities and 
considered it inappropriate to immerse Britain in disputes from which little tangible 
improvements would follow. The nuisance value of the incidents on the Bulgarian-Greek 
border was not judged sufficient to justify the initiation of the lengthy and unpromising 
procedure envisaged by the Peace Treaty.
Non-admission to the United Nations. The impossibility of implementing
the Peace Treaty had a long-term effect on the international situation of Bulgaria. Britain 
had extended diplomatic relations but refused to support the Bulgarian application for 
admission to the United Nations Organisation. On two separate occasions, in September 
1947 and April 1948, the UN Security Council reviewed the matter of new candidacies. 
The British delegation abstained from voting on Hungary’s and Romania’s applications on 
account of these countries’ abuse of human rights. Britain, however, pointedly voted against
152 F0371/72136, R11012, R11050, Dunnett to FO, 24.09.1948
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Bulgaria’s application, arguing that apart from constantly violating human rights, the 
Bulgarian Government had deliberately flouted the authority of the UN Security Council 
over the dispute with Greece.155
The Foreign Office foresaw unwanted consequences of its vote against Bulgarian UN 
membership. Any argument against the entry of Bulgaria into the UNO could be used 
mutatis mutandi by the Soviet Government regarding Italy’s application. This might 
easily happen as the Italian Government had criticised the Soviet attitude to Italy’s 
admission in a form milder but similar to statements made by Kolarov. The FO 
understood that ‘it would, to say the least of it, be difficult... to maintain that the Italian 
Government had carried out effectively every single provision of the Italian Peace Treaty, 
... but rather we wish to wink an eye at some ... occasional failures’.156
On a more practical basis, the FO treated the matter of admissions to the UNO as distinct 
from that of the implementation of the human rights clauses of the Peace Treaty. 
Whitehall officials had long acknowledged that they could do next to nothing to force the 
Bulgarian Government, or any other totalitarian Government, to observe human rights. 
The British Government, however, possessed effective instruments to bar Bulgaria’s entry 
into the UNO.157
British officials realised that the Bulgarian candidacy for the United Nations could succeed 
only as a part of some general understanding between the Soviet Union on the one hand and 
Britain and the United States on the other. To this Bulgaria’s, or the other satellites’, 
domestic record would not be relevant. Such a possibility in turn reinforced British 
reluctance to act decisively on developments inside the country as protests might prejudice
154 F0371/72156, R4744, Green memorandum, 30.03.1948
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306
the UNO negotiations. The FO for instance reasoned that the Lulchev trial provided an 
admirable occasion for launching an attack on the Bulgarian Government without touching 
on Bulgarian eligibility for the UNO. The two questions were, however, very closely linked 
and the logical implication of any indictment would also clearly go against the Bulgarian 
application.158 The conclusion was that as a compromise on Bulgarian admission could not 
be thoroughly excluded, the protest on the human rights issue should be forestalled. 
Moreover, the FO reasoned that if Bulgaria’s application was rejected, a protest would 
become superfluous, whereas in the unlikely event of Bulgaria being admitted a protest 
‘would only be irrelevant’. Therefore, experts in London concluded that no protest should 
be undertaken before the outcome of the membership talks in Paris was known. The 
Foreign Office was anxious to avoid ‘looking silly’ which could happen if, ‘having let off 
steam’ it eventually concluded a deal with the Soviet Union.159
No agreement was reached in 1948 and in early 1949 Britain reverted to the policy of public 
condemnation of the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet satellites. But the momentum for 
protests to the individual Governments had been lost. The new approach was to criticise the 
Soviet Orbit countries at international forums, most notably the United Nations towards 
which they aspired. In the spring of 1949, the UN General Assembly discussed the trials of 
the Bulgarian Pastors and Church leaders in other Communist-controlled countries. Despite 
strong Soviet opposition, the Assembly expressed deep concern at the alleged violations of 
human rights. As a result, the UNO brought the question before the International Court of 
Justice in The Hague. Great Britain together with the United States was a protagonist of the 
prosecution. Britain’s statement on the case was careful to emphasise concern not with the
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307
substance of the allegations but only with the steps that should be taken to investigate 
them.160
The hearings at The Hague were a protracted affair. In April 1950, the International Court 
confirmed die validity of those articles in the Peace Treaty which related to the settlement of 
disputes.161 When the satellite states refused to oblige, the Court admitted that it was 
powerless to take the case further.162 This amounted to official international 
acknowledgement of what the FO had long maintained internally - the Treaty procedure had 
become unworkable and the possibilities of recourse and settlement had been exhausted.
Pursuing the case further, in 1951, the UN General Assembly invited its members to submit 
evidence of breaches of the human rights clauses of the Paris Peace Treaties. The British 
Government constructed its first case against Bulgaria, presenting as evidence the Bulgarian 
Constitution, the Law for the Ban and Dissolution of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union of 
Petkov, the General Elections Law and the Local Elections Law.163 Subsequently, the same 
was done for Hungary and Romania.164 Nevertheless, in March 1951 when the question of 
human rights appeared on the agenda of the imminent Four-Power talks, a Foreign Office 
expert wrote:
I do rather view with dismay the prospect of flogging again the dead horse of human rights in the 
satellites. There is frankly nothing that we can do about it here, it merely exasperates the local 
Governments and it makes it much more difficult for us to establish any kind of reasonable relations 
with them.165
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*  *  *
After the signing of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, the British Government found it 
almost impossible to devise a policy, which would reflect Britain’s general strategic goals 
and achieve concrete results in the country. Already during the annistice the British 
Government had become aware of the discrepancy between its proclaimed commitment to 
democratic ideals and the practical inability to defend those who supported such ideals in 
the Soviet-dominated area. After 1947, the Foreign Office attempted to follow a middle 
course, protesting against infringements of human rights in Bulgaria but simultaneously 
refraining from invoking the Treaty machinery. This seemingly lopsided method was 
undertaken after initial disputes with the Bulgarian Government had produced no effect but 
had only demonstrated British political and diplomatic impotence.
Britain concentrated on reinforcing the countries which remained outside Soviet control, 
mainly on preventing any potential conflict with Greece’s and Turkey’s Communist 
neighbours and on speedy economic recovery to immunise these two countries against 
Communist penetration. Britain realistically accepted that the Soviet Union would act 
with parallel policies to secure and consolidate its own sphere of influence. In such 
circumstances, the best Britain could hope for in Bulgaria was ‘to keep the flame of 
liberty alight’ ‘by demonstrating our own vitality’ and ‘following events here with close 
attention’.166
As British diplomats were unable to propose adequate actions to secure British moral 
leadership, the idea of dropping of any actions directed against the Bulgarian Government 
gained force. Doubt hung over the whole rationale of an active policy, which could be 
interpreted as an indictment of the Communist system and could easily serve as an excuse 
for increased Soviet hostility. This posed the question of whether it made sense to take
any interest in Bulgaria which was small and unimportant in global terms. But 
developments in Bulgaria illuminated a far-reaching Soviet intention to consolidate the 
Soviet zone of influence on a Communist basis. This was augmented by the militancy and 
irredentism of Bulgaria’s Communist rulers. Against the background of such soul- 
searching in the Foreign Office, the British representatives in Bulgaria were driven to near 
desperation by their status of silent observers. Their very presence in the country became 
a constant reminder of the impotent position of Britain vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in this 
part of Europe.
166 F0371/72143, R279, Stemdale-Bennett to FO, 3.01.1948
Conclusion
The final years of the Second World War and the immediate post-war period formed British 
foreign policy in the second half of the twentieth century. Emerging victorious from the 
hostilities, Britain believed itself to be the guardian of democracy world-wide. However, its 
Great Power status was somewhat constrained by the rising strength of its two wartime Allies, 
the United States and the Soviet Union. This, together with Britain’s economic decline, had a 
profound impact on its foreign policy. Nevertheless, Britain’s wartime performance and its 
traditional role in diplomacy accounted for its continuing significant role in international affairs 
after the end of the war.
The transitional nature of Britain’s foreign policy in 1943 -  1949 makes its examination all the 
more interesting and meaningful. A study of the process of anticipation of, and readjustment to 
the imminent post-war realities illuminates Britain’s long-term interests and the principles 
underlying its international conduct. In the second half of 1943, when British Government 
Departments took up political planning for the peacetime in earnest, they had above all to 
consider the disposition of forces in the ongoing armed conflict. They also drew heavily on 
experiences from the inter-war period, understandably projecting past developments on future 
ones. External resemblance between Britain’s attitudes and approaches before and after the war 
was due to the essentially stable nature of Britain’s strategic and political priorities. It is 
interesting that in the case of Eastern Europe the pattern has re-emerged after the collapse of 
Communism, albeit in a different setting.
From the broad perspective of modem British history and politics, analysing British foreign 
policy towards Bulgaria is not an obvious topic. The distance between the two countries in
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terms of geography, political tradition and international standing allowed but for few 
meaningful contacts in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. This situation 
was augmented by the lack of sustainable economic links. Any sporadic attention Britain 
displayed towards specific Bulgarian developments could be shown to have resulted either from 
historical coincidence or in relation to wider European crises.
In its own right Bulgaria had rarely been a priority for British foreign policy before the Second 
World War. Britain had largely accepted that other Great Powers had the right to a greater 
influence in Bulgaria. This meant that on the isolated occasions Britain did become involved 
with the country, intervention was likely to have limited effects.
1943 -  1949 was the longest single historical period during which Britain consistently 
manifested interest towards Bulgaria. Britain became engaged in a host of military and political 
problems arising from Bulgaria’s participation in the Second World War and bearing upon 
Bulgaria’s place in post-war Europe. This was unusual, especially in comparison to the inter­
war period when Britain had treated Bulgaria, at best, with indifference and had given it little 
genuine encouragement to reconsider its growing attachment to Germany. This was also in 
striking contrast to the second half of the twentieth century when Britain saw in Bulgaria the 
most obedient satellite of Soviet Russia, almost refusing to look on Bulgaria as a sovereign 
country.
The years 1943 -  1949 were crucial for the entire Bulgarian socio-political evolution in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Despite the gradual realisation of the bankruptcy of the 
policy of affiliation with the Axis, successive Bulgarian Governments failed to re-orient the 
country towards the Allies. The Soviet Union skilfully took advantage of the resulting political 
and military vacuum, occupying Bulgaria and imposing its will on most aspects of Bulgarian
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domestic and foreign policy. The ensuing relatively quick sovietisation of Bulgaria took place 
with the knowledge and acquiescence of Britain. The latter saw it fit not to intervene actively in 
the Soviet take-over of Bulgaria. Inability and unwillingness to oppose Soviet actions set the 
trend for Britain’s role in Bulgaria in the latter 1940s.
The clarification of Britain’s position regarding Bulgaria requires understanding of two 
independent processes -  that of formulating British post-war foreign policy and that of 
Bulgaria’s political evolution in the latter 1940s. Mapping the interaction of the two illuminates 
Britain’s interest and actions in a remote country in the Balkans and highlights how these 
reflected the general principles and priorities of British foreign policy. Examination of Britain’s 
attitude and approaches to Bulgaria reveals the logic of policy making towards a small power of 
no global importance. It sheds light on the interplay of internal and external forces in shaping 
Bulgaria’s post-war development. Placed in the context of Great-Power relations and in 
comparison to developments in other countries of Bulgaria’s rank, all this acquires larger 
historical significance.
*  *  *
British foreign policy towards Bulgaria during 1943 -  1949 evolved mainly as a reaction to the 
establishment of Soviet influence and the communisation of Eastern Europe. As such it also 
corresponded to the changes within the Grand Alliance. Therefore, it both derived from and 
contributed to the onset of the new antagonism in European affairs at the end of the Second 
World War, that of the Cold War.
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While the Second World War was still raging, Britain’s attention to Bulgaria went little beyond 
the necessity to secure the latter’s withdrawal from the neighbouring territories it had occupied. 
British military strategists had judged this to be essential for the weakening of the Axis hold in 
the Balkan Peninsula. To this end, under the co-ordination of the Foreign Office a triple policy 
was designed consisting of special operations, propaganda and strategic bombing. All these had 
limited effects.
Sabotage and subversion, carried out by the SOE, were hindered not only by a series of mishaps 
but above all by inadequate pre-war preparations. The biggest problem arose from the fact that 
there was little genuine local resistance willing to co-operate with Britain, let alone be guided by 
Britain. Although well-organised and benefiting from the exiled Bulgarian politicians’ insight 
into Bulgarian politics, British war-time propaganda to Bulgaria suffered from an 
overwhelmingly negative character. British official broadcasting from London and emigre 
channels in the Middle East condemned Bulgaria’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact without 
offering any genuine inducement for the reversal of Bulgaria’s conduct. The British 
Government was fully aware that nationalist ambitions were the principal driving force for 
Bulgaria’s choice of allies. But Britain did not offer the one encouragement that might have 
pushed Bulgaria to turn against Germany, that of indicating that the Bulgarian territorial 
question might be reassessed in the future. Britain even refused to guarantee Bulgaria’s 
continued independence after the war. The bombing of Bulgaria, undertaken jointly with the 
USA and with Soviet consent, caused physical destruction and administrative and economic 
chaos. But the air-raids fell short of forcing the Bulgarian Government to capitulate to the 
Allies.
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The failure of British military and propaganda activities in Bulgaria in 1943 - 1944 was related 
to the abandonment of the Balkan front strategy strenuously propagated by British Commanders 
and politicians while planning the Allied war effort in Europe. Indeed, the proponents of the 
idea, including Churchill, were motivated chiefly by military expediency rather than the political 
advantages military presence in the Balkans would have afforded Britain. Such a conclusion is 
also confirmed by Britain’s preparedness to lend assistance to the most radical war-time 
opposition elements in Bulgaria, the Communists, as long as they were seen to contribute to the 
downfall of Bulgaria’s pro-German regime and thus to the defeat of the Axis in the Balkans.
The precedence of military exigencies over the elaboration of long-term political objectives 
resulted in one of the enduring features of British foreign policy towards Bulgaria in the mid- 
1940s, namely the lack of consistent political planning regarding that country. The British 
Government fully appreciated Bulgaria’s central strategic position: influence in the country 
could facilitate any British aspirations to predominate in the adjoining region and seriously 
strengthen the traditionally important British positions in the Eastern Mediterranean. The one 
British political initiative, which this logic produced, was the proposal that Bulgaria joined a 
Balkan Federation. The timing, national composition or form of government were never clearly 
stipulated but most British Balkan experts thought that the idea provided the only opportunity 
for Britain to secure a lasting role in the whole of the Balkan Peninsula. It was precisely this 
view that made the Soviet Union practically veto the Balkan Federation idea in October 1943.
Contemplating possibilities for British involvement in Bulgaria, the FO was realistic enough to 
face the fact of its limited capabilities to influence Bulgaria’s internal or external policies. 
British military and political planners did not underestimate the traditional Russian links with 
Bulgaria and the variety of methods with which the Soviet Union could determine the country’s
behaviour. Therefore, the British Government did not shy away from considering how Soviet 
Russia could be involved in the effort to force Bulgaria out of the war. Although specific Anglo- 
Soviet co-operation was negligible as far as Eastern Europe was concerned, the British 
Government -  when it was informed - generally approved of the independent political and 
diplomatic pressure the Soviet Union applied on Bulgaria throughout 1944. Even though the 
Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria of 5 September 1944 caught Britain unawares, the latter 
did not hesitate to readjust the armistice terms and to join fresh Soviet-led negotiations with 
Bulgaria. For Britain, the sudden Soviet intervention was controversial but risking increased 
tension with the Soviet Union over Bulgaria was not worthwhile. To a degree, it was Britain’s 
confusion as to the Soviet actions regarding Bulgaria, along with willingness to be seen to 
accommodate its Soviet Ally that allowed Soviet troops to occupy Bulgaria unimpeded.
At the end of the Second World War Bulgaria figured little in inter-Allied diplomacy. The 
greatest deal of attention the country received was at the time of Churchill’s visit to Moscow in 
October 1944. On that occasion, the British Prime Minister offered Stalin seventy-five percent 
influence in Bulgarian affairs; later Molotov extracted from Eden as much as eighty percent. 
The ‘percentage deal’ was a prime illustration of Britain’s precarious position regarding 
Bulgaria. Despite its debatable nature and the different interpretations it has provoked, it 
constituted a practical understanding between two Great Powers whose interests in the Balkans 
clashed. The agreement embodied a realistic assessment of Britain’s own restricted influence 
over Bulgaria and signalled that Britain did not intend to challenge Soviet dominance there. As 
Britain hardly attached any intrinsic value to Bulgaria, it saw in the ‘percentage formula’ a 
method for satisfying the Soviet aspirations. At the same time, Britain reserved for itself a
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modicum of influence, which was deemed in tune with its vital interests in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.
The armistice terms for Bulgaria were finally settled only after the conclusion of the ‘percentage 
agreement’, which seemed to spell political consensus regarding Bulgaria. Britain was 
accordingly allotted disproportionately small participation in the Allied Control Commission for 
Bulgaria, a body under Soviet command. Significantly for the British Government, however, 
this was the moment when for the first time since relations had been broken off in March 1941, 
it had a direct presence in Bulgaria. The British delegation in the ACC provided adequate 
analysis of the Bulgarian political scene and Soviet activities in Bulgaria. It became an 
important element in the discussion and formulation of British policy towards Bulgaria; its 
experiences and advice also contributed to the elaboration of British attitudes to the Soviet 
Union.
In 1944 -  1945, Britain affirmed its belief that it could benefit if Bulgaria followed a pro- 
Western foreign policy and embraced Western European values of political freedom and 
democracy. By mid-1945, however, the FO was able to observe the growing tension in 
Bulgarian domestic politics caused by the Bulgarian Communists’ endeavours to establish 
control over the coalition Fatherland Front Government as well as infiltrate the whole national 
and local administration. This coincided with the widening of the cracks in the Grand Alliance 
exacerbated amongst else by what Britain, along with the United States, interpreted as Soviet 
Russia’s attempts to establish its exclusive zone of influence across Soviet-occupied Eastern 
Europe, including Bulgaria. The British Government could not but suspect a link between these 
two parallel processes, which became all the more threatening since British strategist perceived 
in the Soviet Union the only possible future enemy. Therefore, the Bulgarian Communists’
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attempts at political monopoly coupled with increased Soviet dictate over the country’s internal 
developments and relations with the outside world spelt for Britain the establishment of a Soviet 
stronghold too close to the Southern Balkans. A Bulgaria controlled by the Soviet Union could 
become a springboard for the spread of Communism in Europe and for the undermining of 
British power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Contacts between the Bulgarian and Greek 
Communists, renewed occasional Soviet attention to Greece and the menacing Soviet attitude 
towards Turkey in late 1945 and 1946 all fitted the pattern.
The outcome was that Britain firmly associated itself with the anti-Communist anti-Soviet 
political groups in Bulgaria, mainly the Agrarians of Nikola Petkov and the Social Democrats of 
Krustyo Pastuhov. Being careful not to appear to be urging anti-Soviet behaviour, British 
political representatives in Bulgaria encouraged the Opposition’s stand against the dictatorial 
manner of the Communists and insisted on the adoption of democratic principles in Bulgarian 
Government and politics. These efforts culminated in British support for the postponement of 
the Bulgarian general elections in August 1945 as demanded by the Opposition. The 
postponement remained the most important victory of Britain and the USA in Bulgaria for the 
whole period under review. True as it is, that the initiative was taken by the members of the two 
Western Missions without full authorisation from their superiors, it showed that firmness and an 
active attitude paid off. For once, the local British representatives were vindicated in their long- 
neglected recommendations of decisive and timely actions in Bulgaria coupled with strong 
representations in Moscow.
The postponement of the elections was however an isolated incident, which the British 
Government had not fully sanctioned in advance and was not prepared to repeat for fear of 
antagonising unduly the Soviet Union. Since the subsequent November 1945 elections were
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carried out in an atmosphere not much different than that in August, the postponement had no 
other lasting effect than to make the Bulgarian Communists and the Soviet Union more acutely 
aware of the dangers of joint British and US pressure. As overall Communist dominance was 
not challenged and Soviet control remained at least as firm as before, Britain’s boldest effort 
brought only temporary marginal achievements.
As confrontation had the dual effect of revealing British weakness and antagonising the 
Soviet Union, it resulted in continuous scaling down of British demands as to the democratic 
standards to be observed by the Bulgarian Government. This in turn indicated British 
vulnerability, bringing renewed Communist onslaughts and increasingly isolating Britain 
from the Bulgarian political scene. In 1946, after the failure of the Moscow decision for the 
reconstruction of the Bulgarian Government, Britain’s main preoccupation became how to 
grant a speedy recognition to the Bulgarian regime. Understanding that such an act would only 
support the Bulgarian Communists’ claim for legitimacy, the FO also realised that the opposite 
alternative could not alter the political course of the Bulgarian Government. After prolonged 
soul-searching and much disagreement with the USA, the British Government finally 
adopted the view that the very conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria in February 
1947 amounted to a de jure recognition. In this, Britain focused on the advantage of the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Bulgaria which Moscow had pledged in exchange for the 
recognition of the Bulgarian Government.
Already in 1946, Britain steadily moved towards a passive policy in Bulgaria. After the 
signing of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, the British Government experienced substantial 
difficulties as to what course to adopt towards internal Bulgarian developments. The problem 
lay in the near impossibility to devise a policy which would co-ordinate Britain’s general
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strategic goals of maintaining strong influence in the Southern Balkans and keeping hostility to 
the Soviet Union to a minimum, and achieve concrete results of undermining the Communist 
strength in Bulgaria. Prolonged inter-departmental discussions of the possibilities to take 
Bulgaria to task in front of the international community for not observing various articles of the 
Peace Treaty remained little but intellectual and legalistic exercises. In practice, without any 
open supporters inside the country, Britain reverted to the type of negative policy towards 
Bulgaria it had displayed in the latter stages of the Second World War. Having recognised the 
near impossibility to assert the little interest it had left in Bulgaria, Britain effectively treated the 
country as a Soviet dependency. In 1949 relations were frozen at the lowest point. As the 
consolidation of the Bulgarian regime was taking place the British Legation acted more and 
more as a plain monitoring post.
*  *  *
An objective chronicle of events and impartial analysis of the ideas and principles governing 
British policy towards Bulgaria in 1943 -  1949 leads to some broad logical conclusions. Above 
all, it becomes abundantly clear that although Britain had an interest in Bulgaria, it did not place 
that country among the leading British strategic priorities in the Balkans. Neither at the end of 
the Second World War, nor in the first peaceful years did Bulgaria assume the importance of 
some other East European countries of the rank of Poland, for example, over which Britain was 
prepared to go to considerable disputes with the Soviet Union. When compared to the extent of 
British involvement in the neighbouring Greece and Turkey, attention to Bulgaria acquires 
marginal proportions. This is clearly illustrated by the low level of decision making regarding 
Bulgaria. Most issues were resolved by the Southern Department of the Foreign Office with rare
320
intervention by the Foreign Secretary. On very few specific occasions were matters related to 
Bulgaria presented to the Cabinet and then mostly in an informative capacity. Only at highly 
exceptional moments, most conspicuously the ‘percentage agreement’, did the British Prime 
Minister devote attention to Bulgaria. On the other hand, one of the most successful events in 
the course of British relations with Bulgaria, that of the August 1945 election postponement, 
occurred on the initiative of the British representatives in Bulgaria even without proper 
consultation with the FO.
Even so, the fact that distinct efforts were made to elaborate policy towards Bulgaria indicates 
that Britain considered the country to be of some interest. Neither the low priority accorded to 
Bulgaria, nor the predominantly unsuccessful nature of Britain’s attempts to give some practical 
dimension of its objectives should be confused for lack of interest. After all, any disavowal of 
interest would have amounted, amongst else, to Britain’s resignation from its position of a Great 
Power, at least as far as Europe was concerned.
The main driving force of British policy towards Bulgaria throughout the reviewed period was 
that of British geopolitical interests. Together with the threat for European stability, the Second 
World War revealed weaknesses in Britain’s support lines and naval communications, which 
compromised the security of the metropolis itself as well as that of its imperial possessions. The 
British approach to Bulgaria, therefore, mirrored the latter’s capability to threaten militarily the 
Eastern Mediterranean. This is what in the British view put Bulgaria apart from Eastern Europe 
and gave it a special value in a predominantly Balkan context. This is also the reason for the 
cyclical nature of British foreign policy formulation with respect to Bulgaria.
An extension of this logic is the secondary role played by ideology. Indeed, Britain had fought 
the Axis on the moral grounds of preventing the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship over
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Europe. Such rhetoric was contained in the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and could 
easily be adopted against the Soviet Union once it was accepted that its ultimate objective was 
the imposition of global Communism. However, the latter process was relatively slow and 
reluctant, always preconditioned on the desire not to exacerbate Soviet hostility. Therefore, it 
should not obscure the fact that most of British thinking about Bulgaria was carried out in purely 
strategic terms: the establishment of Communism in Bulgaria was analysed from the perspective 
of enhancing and consolidating the Soviet position in proximity to the Mediterranean Straits. 
Concerns for democracy in Bulgaria appeared later, and then as a function of security 
calculations; the best example in this respect were again the ‘percentage negotiations’ when 
urgent serious and secret negotiations were carried out in the unambiguous language of power 
politics. In addition, if British-Soviet disagreement over Bulgaria can be seen as adding to the 
tensions of the emerging Cold War, this was not because of British commitment to democracy 
in that country but rather because of Britain’s aim to contain Soviet strategic gains in the region.
The most significant and stable feature of British policy towards Bulgaria was the realisation 
that Britain had no practical means of matching either the traditional Russian influence or the 
advantages that sprang from the Soviet occupation of the country in 1944 -  1947. The British 
Government readily conceded the Soviet Union predominance in Bulgarian affairs, as long as 
this was not used for anti-British purposes. British involvement in Bulgarian internal 
developments was reluctant, inconsistent and ineffective. It was problematic because it was 
contradictory: recognition of the dominant Soviet position did not bring disavowal of the British 
interest, opposition to the Soviet Union did not mle out practical British acquiescence with 
Soviet actions, moral support for the Bulgarian anti-Communists found little outward
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demonstration. Finally, Britain’s predicament in Bulgaria was exemplified in its inability to 
stand firmly behind a policy of disinterest and detachment.
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